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It is commonly accepted that a political divide exists between Saskatchewan and Alberta.  
Both provinces share similar settlement patterns, histories, and economies, but there 
exists a perceived division in their political cultures between a “conservative” Alberta 
and “socially democratic” Saskatchewan.  Whereas Alberta emerged from the Great 
Depression as the champion of “free enterprise” and limited government control, 
Saskatchewan experimented with state ownership and sought to dramatically expand 
Canada’s social welfare system.  There is a willingness to accept that modern 
Saskatchewan’s conservatism has moved it closer to its western neighbour, but historians 
remain wedded to the idea that this conservatism is a departure from the past.  
Saskatchewan’s political history remains almost entirely dedicated to explaining the rise 
of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation and the roots of the province’s social 
democratic legacy. 
This study challenges these narratives by detailing the development of a conservative 
ideology in Saskatchewan between the province’s creation in 1905 and the election of the 
Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in 1944.  Rather than the preservation of a tory-
touched hierarchy, Saskatchewan conservatives defended individual rights and freedoms.  
This individualist conservatism manifested itself in the major economic and social 
discussions of the period, including conservative farmers’ adherence to the capitalist 
grain trade, nativist campaigns for limited immigration and increased assimilation of 
“foreigners,” and the growth of conservative Christian schools in response to the Great 
Depression.  This conservative ideology was also influential.  Both the provincial Liberal 
and Conservative parties owed their successes to conservative support.  Whereas the 
Liberal Party appealed to an economic conservatism that sought to limit the government’s 
involvement in the capitalist system, the Conservative Party built its support from a racial 
conservatism that argued for increased assimilation.  Neither party, however, was able to 
withstand the rise of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation.  The 1944 election 




overshadowed the large segments of the population that championed an individualistic 
worldview.   
Keywords 
Saskatchewan, Conservatism, Liberalism, Agrarianism, Orderly Marketing, Nativism, 
Grand Orange Lodge, Ku Klux Klan, Nativism, Fundamentalist Christianity, Roman 






Summary for Lay Audience 
It is commonly accepted that Saskatchewan and Alberta constitute twins separated at 
birth.  Although the provinces possessed similar demographics, economies, and 
experiences in territorial politics, we are told that Alberta’s conservatism is in direct 
contrast to Saskatchewan’s social democratic political culture.  Election results certainly 
lend credence to this assumption.  Alberta has continually elected a long series of right-
of-centre governments, beginning with Social Credit in 1935, followed by the PCs in 
1971, and most recently the United Conservative Party in 2019.  In contrast, 
Saskatchewan’s 1944 election ushered in a long-period of CCF/NDP dominance wherein 
social democratic governments have ruled for forty-seven of the last seventy-five years.  
As this study demonstrates, however, Saskatchewan has always been more conservative 
than historians have suggested.  To argue that Saskatchewan conservatism was a non-
factor due to its inability to the CCF’s rise in 1944 assumes that elections serve as the 
sole barometer of ideological commitment.   Social democracy was not Saskatchewan’s 
default setting.  The province has always been home to a dynamic and influential 
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Saskatchewan’s political history is conflicted.  Between 1905 and 1944, the Liberal Party 
served as the “tap-root of Saskatchewan’s history,” governing for all but four years.1  
Unlike Alberta, which rejected the Liberals in 1921, and Manitoba, where the Liberals 
were absorbed into the United Farmers in 1922, the party maintained its stronghold in 
Saskatchewan prior to the Second World War.2  In 1944, however, the province rejected 
the Liberals in favour of Tommy Douglas and the Co-operative Commonwealth 
Federation (CCF).  The CCF and its successor, the New Democratic Party (NDP), 
dominated post-war politics, winning twelve of the nineteen elections held since 1944.  
Successive CCF/NDP governments encouraged a system of co-operative enterprises, 
experimented with government ownership of manufacturing industries and natural 
resource production, and launched Canada’s state-funded health-care system.  The 
CCF/NDP’s long tenure and progressive policies left Saskatchewan with an image as the 
“cradle of Canadian social democracy.”3 
Saskatchewan’s recent political history challenges this characterization.  In 1982, Grant 
Devine’s Progressive Conservative (PC) Party swept the NDP from power.  Devine 
campaigned on a promise to “undue the ‘baneful’ effects of ‘socialist’ policies in 
Saskatchewan and to unleash the forces of free enterprise.”4  According to James Pitsula 
                                                 
1
 David E. Smith, Prairie Liberalism:  The Liberal Party in Saskatchewan, 1905-71 (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1975), 3. 
2
 David Smith attributes the party’s remarkable success to its organizational abilities, its close relationship 
with the province’s farmers’ organizations, and the creation of “a reputation for Liberal inventiveness” 
when dealing with economic and social issues.  Similarly, Robert Wardhaugh details King’s attempts to 
ensure that the Prairies remained loyal to the Liberals.  David E. Smith, Prairie Liberalism, 230; Robert 
Wardhaugh, Mackenzie King and the Prairie West (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001). 
3
 Jared Wesley, Code Politics: Campaign and Cultures on the Canadian Prairies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2011), 1. 
4
 James M. Pitsula, “Grant Devine, 1982-1991,” in Saskatchewan Premiers of the Twentieth Century, ed. 




and Ken Rasmussen, Devine’s two terms in office transformed Saskatchewan from “a 
laboratory for social democracy” into “a hotbed for neo-conservatism.” 5  Under the 
motto “open for business,” Devine relaxed environmental regulations, reduced resource 
royalties, and privatized crown corporations.6  Similarly, the recent success of the 
Saskatchewan Party—a right-of-centre amalgamation of PCs and Liberals—and the 
seeming ineffectiveness of the NDP after 2007 has led many observers to question 
Saskatchewan’s social democratic roots.7  Saskatchewan is now widely considered one of 
the most conservative provinces in the country.  This new political reality, however, does 
not match the province’s supposedly social democratic roots.   Academics treat this 
conservative shift as something new, a product of rural depopulation, the decline of the 
family farm, and the neo-conservatism that swept the Western world in the 1980s.8   
Despite the province’s recent conservatism, the CCF’s social democratic legacy continue 
to dominate Saskatchewan’s political history.  Seymour Martin Lipset’s Agrarian 
Socialism, first published in 1950, laid the foundations for an understanding of 
                                                 
5
 James M. Pitsula and Kenneth A. Rasmussen, Privatizing a Province: The New Right in Saskatchewan 
(Vancouver: New Star Books, 1990), 2. 
6
 The only detailed studies of the PC government have been overwhelmingly critical of Devine for 
undermining the CCF-NDP’s social democratic legacy.  Pitsula, for example, argues that Devine sold 
“billions of dollars of public assets” and introduced a social policy that “rejected collectivism” and 
“minimized the role of government as an instrument of collective responsibility, cooperation, community 
interest, and social responsibility.”  Pitsula, “Gant Devine,” 318-52. 
7
 Howard Leeson, “The 2007 Election,” in Saskatchewan Politics: Crowding the Centre, ed. Howard 
Leeson (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 2008), 119-142; David McGrane and Loleen Berdhal, 
“A Social Democratic Province?: An Examination of Saskatchewan Public Opinion in 2011-12,” Journal 
of Canadian Studies 49:1 (Winter 2015), 95-127; and Kenneth Rasmussen, “Saskatchewan: From 
Entrepreneurial State to Embedded State,” in The Provincial State in Canada: Politics in the Provinces and 
Territories, eds. Keith Brownsey and Michael Howlett, (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2001), 234-60.  
8
 J.F. Conway, “The Decline of the Family Farm in Saskatchewan,” Prairie Forum 9, no. 1 (April 1984): 
101-17; John Courtney, “The Fate of Socialism in Saskatchewan,” in Lipset’s Agrarian Socialism: A Re-
examination, ed. David E. Smith (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 2007), 13-22; and John 
Richards and Larry Pratt, Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West (Toronto: McClelland 




Saskatchewan as uniquely socially democratic.9  Lipset argued that farmers’ interactions 
with the monopolistic grain trade combined with the wide opportunities for political 
participation in rural Saskatchewan to create an “agrarian class consciousness.”  These 
“hostile class attitudes” produced a form of “agrarian socialism” that attacked “the total 
economic structure” of Canada.  The CCF, Lipset concluded, was victorious because its 
socialist leadership transformed the party into the vehicle of this agrarian unrest.10  This 
interpretation placed Saskatchewan at odds with the dominant understanding of politics 
in Alberta.  Whereas Lipset argued that Saskatchewan’s farmers developed a class 
consciousness, C.B. Macpherson’s seminal study of the rise of Social Credit, Democracy 
in Alberta, attributed Alberta’s apparent conservatism to farmers’ inability to transcend 
their petit bourgeois outlook.11  Alberta’s farmers viewed themselves as part of the same 
dominant class and directed their grievances at the province’s “quasi-colonial status” vis-
à-vis central Canada, not at the socio-economic and class disparities within Alberta 
itself.12    
Lipset and Macpherson’s elucidation of a “social democratic” Saskatchewan and a 
“conservative” Alberta continue to influence how historians and political scientists view 
the provinces.  Nelson Wiseman, for example, argues that these divisions were a product 
of the province’s separate immigration patterns.  Saskatchewan’s “socialist imprint” was 
left by “immigrant urban Britons radicalized by late nineteenth century industrialism” 
who “carried their old country labour-socialist inclinations with them and exerted 
                                                 
9
 Alan Cairns notes that Lipset’s Agrarian Socialism was the lens through which a generation of students 
“were encouraged to view political developments and party systems” in Saskatchewan.  Alan C. Cairns, 
“Agrarian Socialism (Lipset), or Agrarian Capitalism (Macpherson),” in Lipset’s Agrarian Socialism, 75. 
10
 Seymour Martin Lipset, Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in 
Saskatchewan, Anchor ed. (Berkley: University of California Press, 1971). 
11
 Alan Cairns provides a brief discussion of these two authors, their different interpretations, and the 
influence they have had on the dominant understanding of Prairie politics.  Cairns, “Agrarian Socialism 
(Lipset), or Agrarian Capitalism (Macpherson),” 75-88. 
12
 C.B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System, 2nd ed. (Toronto: 




political influence disproportionate to their numbers in the province’s formative years.”13  
Alberta, in contrast, was settled by midwestern Americans whose “great plain” politics 
reinforced a “radical…form of petit-bourgeois liberalism.”14   Similarly, Jared Wesley 
argues that differences between Saskatchewan and Alberta’s political cultures were 
maintained and supported by political rhetoric.  Whereas Saskatchewan’s dominant 
political code is one of “security,” Albertan politicians stress a “code of freedom.”15  Not 
all observers agree with this division.  Historians of Alberta, for example, stress the social 
democratic underpinnings of the early Social Credit Party.16  Likewise, Evelyn Eager’s 
analysis of Saskatchewan politics led to the conclusion that, “contrary to the legend of 
radicalism…the electorate of the province has shown the traditional conservatism of a 
farming population.”17  These dissenting voices, however, are in the minority.  There is a 
willingness to accept that modern Saskatchewan’s conservatism has moved it closer to its 
western neighbour, but historians remain wedded to the idea that this conservatism is a 
departure from the past.18   
                                                 
13
 Nelson Wiseman, “The Socialist Imprint on Saskatchewan Politics,” Saskatchewan History 65, no. 2 
(Winter 2013): 22. 
14
 Nelson Wiseman, “The Pattern of Prairie Politics,” Queen’s Quarterly 88, no. 2 (Summer 1981): 311. 
15
 Wesley, Code Politics, 55-174. 
16
 Edward Bell, Social Classes and Social Credit in Alberta (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
1994); Larry Hannant, “The Calgary Working Class and Social Credit Movement in Alberta, 1932-35,” 
Labour/Le Travail 16 (Fall 1985): 97-116. 
17
 Evelyn Eager, “The Conservatism of the Saskatchewan Electorate,” in Politics in Saskatchewan, ed. 
Norman Ward and Duff Spafford (Don Mills, ON.: Longmans Canada, 1968), 1.  See also, Eager, 
Saskatchewan Government: Politics and Pragmatism (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1980). 
18
 This is partly the product of historians’ disinterest in conservatism.  Canadian historians have not kept 
pace with their American counterparts’ increased interest in the history of conservatism since the 1990s.  
Unlike the United States, where studies of conservatism have seen a revival since the mid-1990s, Canadian 
historians have ignored conservatism as a field of inquiry.  For a discussion of the American 
historiography, see Kim Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism: A State of the Field,” The Journal of American 
History 98, no. 3 (December 2011): 723-43.  Notable examples of this new conservative history include 
Laura Jane Gifford, The Center Cannot Hold: The 1960 Presidential Election and the Rise of Modern 
Conservatism (Dekalb, Il.: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009); and Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: 




This dissertation complicates these findings by detailing the development of an 
influential conservative ideology in Saskatchewan prior to 1944.  Questions over 
assimilation, the functioning of the capitalist economy, and the proper role for the state 
dominated the period.  This study does not dispute that large segments of Saskatchewan’s 
electorate adopted a social democratic response to these questions.19  It does assert, 
however, that the successes of this left-wing response and the CCF’s triumph have 
overshadowed those who remained wedded to traditional values.  Conservatives actively 
engaged in the debate, championing an individualist ideology that resisted rising calls for 
state intervention and collectivization.  Although conservatives opposed the CCF’s vision 
of a “co-operative commonwealth,” they were unable to block the CCF’s rise.  Yet, even 
in defeat, their opposition challenges traditional assumptions of the nature of 
Saskatchewan’s social democratic political culture.  Saskatchewan is, and has always 
been, much more conservative than the historiography suggests. 
Conservatism is a nebulous term.  This study contends that Saskatchewan conservativism 
was predicated on a staunch protection of individual rights and freedoms.  This 
definition, however, runs counter to traditional interpretations.  Classical conservatism, or 
toryism, advocated for “a hierarchically ordered and organically interdependent whole.”20  
Tories rejected Lockean liberalism’s individualism in favour of “traditionalism, elitism, 
the strong state,” and a “paternalistic concern” for the common good.21  Gad Horowitz’s 
seminal article, “Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada” applied Louis 
Hartz’s “fragment” theory to the study of Canadian political foundations to argue that the 
                                                 
19
 David Laycock argues that the dominant populist response to these questions in Saskatchewan was a 
“social democratic populism” that rejected “the two major parties as instruments of eastern business,” 
supported “state ownership for major industries,” advocated for “a farmer-labour alliance,” and supported 
the “full extension of democratic rights and practices.”  David Laycock, Populism and Democratic Thought 
in the Canadian Prairies, 1910 to 1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 20.  
20
 James Farney and David Rayside, “Introduction: The Meanings of Conservatism,” in Conservatism in 
Canada, eds. James Farney and David Rayside (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 4. 
21
 Gad Horowitz, “Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation,” The Canadian 




influx of tory loyalists after the American Revolution gave Canadian politics a “tory 
touch” that tempered the excesses of the eighteenth century.22  Canadian politics, he 
concludes, contained a tory communalism that, when combined with liberalism’s 
equality, endowed Canada with a vibrant socialist movement in the twentieth century.23  
This conception of a “tory touch” influenced a generation of Canadian academics who 
viewed toryism’s restraining influence on all aspects of Canada’s political 
development.24  As Lipset argues, “Horatio Alger has never been a Canadian hero.”25  
Yet, the adherence to a “tory touch” has not withstood more recent scrutiny.  According 
to Janet Ajzenstat and Peter Smith, there is “little evidence of tory conservatism in 
Canada’s past.”  Many historians and political scientists now maintain that “the challenge 
to nineteenth-century liberalism arose from a republican ideology on the political left, 
rather than toryism on the right.”26   
Challenges to the “tory-touched” thesis have had profound ramifications for our 
understanding of Canada’s political development.  Allan Smith, for instance, notes how 
nineteenth century English Canada adhered to an “individualist idea” that insisted “on the 
                                                 
22
 Seymour Lipset’s equally influential Revolution and Counterrevolution also stressed this tory touches’ 
influence in Canadian political culture.  Lipset argues that Canada was born of “counter revolution” that 
stressed deference and a rejection of unbridled individualism.  Seymour Lipset, Revolution and 
Counterrevolution: Change and Persistence in Social Structures (New York: Basic Books, 1968).  
Likewise, Donald Creighton stands out among Canadian historians as the champion of a tory influence in 
Canada’s political development.  For a discussion of Creighton’s political thought, see Carl Berger, The 
Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing Since 1900, 2nd ed. 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 208-37. 
23
 Horowitz, “Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada,” 143-71. 
24
 Janet Ajzenstat and Peter J. Smith provide an overview of toryism’s influence in Canada’s political 
culture.  Janet Ajzenstat and Peter J. Smith, “Liberal-Republicanism: The Revisionist Picture of Canada’s 
Founding,” in Canada’s Origins: Liberal, Tory, or Republican?, eds. Janet Ajzenstat and Peter J. Smith 
(Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1997), 1-7.  H.D. Forbes critically evaluates the foundations of 
Horowtiz’s thesis.  H.D. Forbes, “Hartz-Horowitz at Twenty: Nationalism, Toryism and Socialism in 
Canada and the United States,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 20, no. 2 (June 1987): 287-315. 
25
 Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative 
Perspective (New York: Basic Books, 1963), 287-8. 
26




reality of competition, self-reliance, mobility, and the atomic individual.”27  Similarly, 
Ian McKay uses these insights in his proposition that Canada developed a liberal 
hegemony between the 1840s and the 1940s.  McKay’s “liberal order framework” is 
founded on the premise that this liberalism was fundamentally individualistic.28  
“Liberalism,” he argues, “begins when one accords a prior ontological and 
epistemological status to ‘the individual.’”29  For McKay, it was politicians’ commitment 
to this “‘individual’ that made the liberal order revolutionary—that is, one geared to 
(rapidly or gradually) overturning patterns of economic and social relations that had 
persisted for centuries.”30  Canada, he concludes, was not “an essence we must defend or 
an empty homogeneous space we must possess,” but an ongoing “project of liberal 
rule.”31  McKay’s “liberal order” is not without its critics.  Kevin Anderson, for example, 
maintains that Lipset’s understanding of liberal individualism is inherently reductionist.32  
However, numerous academics have used McKay’s framework to explain all elements of 
Canadian history, from race relations to tobacco consumption.33  It is increasingly 
                                                 
27
 Allan Smith, “The Myth of the Self-made Man in English Canada, 1850-1914,” Canadian Historical 
Review 59, no. 2 (1978), 215. 
28
 Ian McKay, “The Liberal Order Framework: A Prospectus for a Reconnaissance of Canadian History,” 
Canadian Historical Review 81, no. 4 (December 2000): 617-45; and McKay, “Canada as a Long Liberal 
Revolution: On Writing the History of Actually Existing Canadian Liberalisms, 1840s-1940s,” in 
Liberalism and Hegemony: Debating the Canadian Liberal Revolution, eds. Jean-François Constant and 
Michel Ducharme (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 347-452.  For a discussion of this 
framework, see: Michel Ducharme and Jean-François Constant, “Introduction: A Project of Rule Called 
Canada—The Liberal Order Framework and Historical Practice,” in Liberalism and Hegemony, 3-34. 
29
 McKay, “The Liberal Order Framework,” 623. 
30
 McKay, “Canada as a Long Liberal Revolution,” 350. 
31
 McKay, “The Liberal Order Framework,” 627. 
32
 Kevin Anderson, “Canadian Political History and Ideas: Intersections and Influences,” History Compass 
12, no. 5 (2014): 444-54; and Jeffrey L. McNairn, “In Hope and Fear: Intellectual History, Liberalism, and 
the Liberal Order Framework,” in Liberalism and Hegemony, 64-97.  Others have relied on McKay’s 
insights to reinterpret Canada’s history.   
33
 Examples include: Stephane Castonguay and Darin Kinsey, “The Nature of the Liberal Order: State 
Formation, Conservation, and the Government of non-Humans in Canada,” in Liberalism and Hegemony, 




apparent that, rather than a Loyalist toryism, Canadian society is buttressed by a 
hegemonical liberalism.   
As a result, our understanding of the nature of conservatism must be reinterpreted.  
Michael Freeden argues that conservatism is an ideology that is bounded by “resistance 
to change, however unavoidable, unless it is perceived as organic and natural.”34  Within 
the context of the liberal order, conservative resistance was not predicated on protecting a 
tory-based hierarchy but a deeply ingrained liberal individualism.  At its core, this 
individualism held that each person had the right to think and act according to their own 
desires and interests with limited state or societal constraint.  The most extreme 
manifestation of this belief, as C.B. Macpherson explains, resulted in a form of 
“possessive individualism” wherein the individual was considered “the proprietor of his 
own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them.”35  More moderate forms, in 
contrast, accepted the role of the state, but sought to limit the application of state power 
to furthering individualist ends.  The state, in this conception, is a necessary evil that can 
be channeled towards the liberal ends of “individual liberty, competitive markets, 
equality, and a circumscribed public sphere.”36  According to Ajzenstat, Canada’s 
founders were dedicated to the notion that “every individual would be equally entitled to 
the benefits of ‘peace, order and good government.’”37  It was Saskatchewan 
                                                 
America,” in Liberalism and Hegemony, 274-97; and Jarrett Rudy, The Freedom to Smoke: Tobacco 
Consumption and Identity (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005) 
34
 Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 
344. 
35
 C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1962), 2. 
36
 Nelson Wiseman, “Provincial Conservatism,” in Conservatism in Canada, eds. James Farney and David 
Rayside (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 211. 
37
 Janet Ajzenstat, The Canadian Founding: John Locke and Parliament (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 




conservatives’ focus on defending this individualism, not a tory-inspired adhesion to 
hierarchy, that made their politics conservative.   
This defence of individual freedoms aligns more closely to contemporary conservatives 
than classical tories.  Modern conservativism combines elements of moral traditionalism 
with a neo-liberal—also termed neo-conservative—outlook that maintains “individuals 
should be as free from constraint as possible.”38  Neo-liberalism emerged in the late-
twentieth century and was central to the governments of Ronald Reagan and Margaret 
Thatcher.39  In Canada, both Brian Mulroney and Grant Devine are widely viewed as 
subscribing to these same neo-liberal tenants.40  Even Nelson Wiseman who generally 
supports the tory-touched thesis concedes that the “ethos” of provincial conservative 
parties “has always been more liberal than tory.”41  This is not to say that Saskatchewan 
conservativism constituted an identical response in these two periods.  As Donald 
Critchlow warns, “political terms, ideology, and party struggle must be placed 
historically, and scholars must guard against imposing contemporary labels on past actors 
and movements.”42  Yet, the similarities between these periods, even after accounting for 
historical differences, demonstrate a continuity in the conservative defence of 
individualist values.  Historians maintain that the province’s dominant political response 
downplayed individualism in favour of collectivism.  After all, the CCF’s vision of a “co-
operative commonwealth” was predicated on replacing liberal individualism with a 
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communitarian collectivism.  Saskatchewan conservatives, in contrast, resisted what they 
viewed as a challenge to the people’s individual freedoms.  It was, in short, an 
individualist conservatism. 
What follows is not an exhaustive analysis of conservatism prior to 1944.  Rather, it 
explores conservative responses to the central political divisions of the inter-war period.  
These questions were not static.  Whereas divisions over the nature of the wheat economy 
and the pace of assimilation dominated political discussions in the 1920s, the debates in 
the 1930s centered on the state’s role in combating the economic and environmental 
catastrophe of the Great Depression.43  In both periods, Saskatchewan’s conservatives 
were much more active and influential than historians have previously suggested.   
This project has two primary objectives.  Firstly, it outlines conservativism’s main 
beliefs.  Conservatives viewed society as fundamentally individualistic.  This focus on 
individual freedoms, however, manifested itself in decidedly different outlooks, goals, 
and aims.  Far from a united movement, conservative ideology prior to 1944 was 
characterized by internal divisions and a lack of cohesion.  Second, it reveals how the 
province’s political parties reflected this individualist ideology as they vied for 
conservative support.  The Conservative Party itself was largely unsuccessful throughout 
the period, only wining a single election in 1929, but it was not the only organization to 
offer a conservative outlook.  No single party had a monopoly on the conservative vote.  
It is only by understanding what conservatives believed and how these beliefs influenced 
the province’s political discourse that Saskatchewan’s full political history is illuminated. 
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Saskatchewan’s central political divisions prior to the Great Depression were fought over 
questions on the nature of the capitalist wheat economy and the province’s ethnic and 
religious composition.  Chapter one explores conservative farmers’ opposition to orderly 
marketing.  Unlike supporters of a voluntary wheat pool or a government mandated 
Wheat Board who viewed the capitalist system as inherently exploitative, conservative 
farmers remained wedded to the belief that they could compete effectively as individuals.  
As Allan Smith explains, the farmer was traditionally viewed as the vanguard of English 
Canada’s individualist focus: “He was, claimed his literary friends, in the fullest sense his 
own master, free of all constraint and interference, quite literally able to shape his world 
as he wished, the heir to an abundant and fulfilling future.”44 It is not surprising, 
therefore, that many farmers resisted what they considered a collectivist assault against 
their personal freedoms.  These conservative farmers tolerated orderly marketing when its 
program remained voluntary, but actively resisted any compulsory scheme that infringed 
on their individualism.   
Chapter two explores the place of nativism and racism within Saskatchewan politics.  The 
foundations of Saskatchewan conservativism lay with the province’s liberal tradition, but 
its manifestation often took anti-liberal forms.  The Grand Orange Lodge and the Ku 
Klux Klan (KKK) promoted a citizenship that was limited to the province’s Anglo-
Protestants.  Both groups articulated a form of British nativism that viewed Catholics and 
continental-Europeans as deficient individuals, lacking the prerequisite cultural values 
and political beliefs to act individually.  This chapter details how this nativism fueled a 
conspiratorial anti-Catholicism wherein the Orange Lodge and Ku Klux Klan believed 
the Roman Catholic Church’s ecclesiastical hierarchy was actively undermining the 
province’s British and Protestant traditions.  These groups responded by attacking what 
they perceived as the main elements of this threat, including separate schools, non-British 
immigration, and a creeping sectarianism within Saskatchewan’s public schools.  Unlike 
the province’s conservative farmers who resisted calls for state intervention into the 
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economy, nativists sought to harness the power of the state to ensure the preservation of 
an idealized British-Protestant province. 
Questions over the capitalist grain trade and the place of religious and ethnic minorities 
resulted in two distinct manifestations of conservatism, one economic and the other 
social.  As a result, it was possible for a voter to identify as an economic conservative but 
progressive when it came to accommodations for minority groups.  It would be a mistake, 
therefore, to view conservatism and liberalism as synonymous.  McKay argues that the 
liberal order treats “‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ and (above all) ‘the individual’ as the 
contestable and historically relative terms of a particular and probably transient political 
program.”45  It was from these “contested” elements that cleavages between Liberals and 
Conservatives emerged.   Conservatives and Liberals buttressed their worldview with 
appeals to individual values and freedoms but differed substantially on the best way to 
protect the people’s individualism.  These differences also shifted over time.  Prior to the 
Great Depression, the main divide between the parties lay in the openness of their 
ideology.  Both groups shared same adhesion to individualistic principles, which they 
often expressed in terms of the “British” tradition that included the sanctity of property 
rights, free speech, and the freedom of association.  Where they differed was in their 
approach to religious and racial minorities.   Liberalism—especially that offered by the 
Saskatchewan Liberal Party under Premiers Walter Scott, William Martin, Charles 
Dunning, and James Gardiner—articulated a socially progressive ideology that promoted 
religious freedom, political equality, and toleration for minorities.46  Liberals believed 
that, given the right training and opportunity, minorities would freely assimilate into the 
body politic.  Conservatives, in contrast, were hesitant to afford the rights of citizenship 
onto groups that they viewed with suspicion and distrust. 
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Chapter three examines the reasons for the Conservative Party’s failure to gain 
meaningful electoral support in light of these divisions.  The chapter details how the 
Liberal and Conservative Parties divided conservatives between economic and social 
issues.  The Liberal Party actively courted conservative farmers as a bulwark against calls 
for government intervention into the economy but rejected nativists’ expression of a 
chauvinistic Britishness in favour of close alliances with Saskatchewan’s Catholic and 
non-Anglo immigrants.  The Conservative Party, in contrast, appealed to nativists by 
opposing sectarianism and supporting increased assimilation.  However, the party’s 
failure to develop a program that appealed to the province’s farmers ensured the Liberal 
dominance of Saskatchewan politics into the 1920s. 
The political situation changed dramatically in 1929 when the Conservatives finally 
defeated the governing Liberals.  Chapter four argues that the Conservative Party’s 
victory was predicated on its ability to craft a message that appealed to conservative 
farmers and nativists alike.  The party had learned from its previous failures.  Under 
J.T.M. Anderson’s leadership after 1923, the Conservatives adopted a platform and 
campaign rhetoric that portrayed themselves as the defender and champion of 
Saskatchewan’s individualist tradition.  Anderson’s victory was truly a conservative 
victory. 
Anderson’s success, however, was overshadowed by the ravages of the Great Depression.  
It is widely assumed that people responded to the economic and environmental 
catastrophe by rejecting earlier notions of individualism in favour of co-operation and 
collectivism.  Chapter five, in contrast, argues that many responded to the crisis by 
retrenching their beliefs in society’s individualistic nature.  The chapter examines the 
creation and outlook of two religious schools, the fundamentalist Briercrest Bible College 
and the Roman Catholic Notre Dame.  Both schools articulated a theology that privileged 
a traditional individualism.  This message proved popular as both schools quickly 
expanded despite the decade’s hardships.  Although the leaders of these schools were not 




Chapter six examines how this continued adherence to a conservative individualism 
influenced political alignments during the Great Depression.  The Depression gave rise to 
a “new” politics wherein questions over the state’s role in responding to the crisis 
replaced assimilation and wheat marketing as the people’s primary focus.  It also gave 
rise to two new political movements, the CCF and Social Credit.  The Conservative 
Party’s leadership responded to the “contagion from the left” by moving its platform to 
the left in an effort to undermine growing CCF support.47   Contrarily, the Liberals under 
William Patterson retrenched their defence of the individualist ethic and self-reliance in 
the face of the CCF’s collectivism.  By defending individual values in the face of the 
CCF’s “socialist threat” and the Conservative Party’s ineffectiveness, the Liberal Party 
emerged from the Depression as Saskatchewan’s “conservative” party in all by name.   
The chapter argues that the Depression caused a realignment in Saskatchewan politics 
between ideas of individualism and collectivism as political parties adjusted their 
platforms to reflect the new political realities of the 1930s.  The Liberal victories in the 
1934 and 1938 elections were predicated on appeals that positioned the party as the 
defender of the people’s individualism.  Although the CCF moderated its initial socialism 
after early electoral defeats, it continued to call for increased government intervention 
and the creation of its “co-operative commonwealth.”   The Liberals emerged from the 
Depression as the champion of Saskatchewan’s individualist tradition, while the CCF 
stood for a collectivist reinterpretation of the role of government and the nature of the 
economy.  The Conservative Party and Social Credit, in contrast, were unable to gain 
meaningful electoral support and were largely relegated to obscurity. 
Chapter seven explores the CCF’s 1944 victory in light of this political realignment.  The 
Liberals approached the campaign with the same individualist appeals that had succeeded 
throughout the Depression.  Liberals spent the campaign portraying the CCF as a socialist 
threat that endangered people’s individual freedoms.  However, Tommy Douglas, the 
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CCF leader after 1942, had learned from his party’s earlier failures and refused to engage 
in the debate.  Douglas ignored the overtly collectivist aspects of the CCF’s program and 
campaigned on an image of a more just and equitable post-war future.  This message 
resonated with a population that had gone through the Depression and the Second World 
War.  The chapter accepts that the election was undoubtedly a victory for the CCF’s 
vision of a “co-operative commonwealth.”  However, it argues that the magnitude of the 
Liberal defeat has overshadowed the fact that appeals to individual freedoms continued to 
motivate large segments of the population.   Election defeats are not necessarily 
synonymous with the defeat of an ideology. 
The rise of the Saskatchewan CCF casts a long shadow over the political history of the 
inter-war period.  Conservatism, when mentioned at all, is commonly dismissed as 
“reactionary,” a “non-force,” or a “brake” on meaningful reforms.  Such dismissals, 
however, downplay the influence that conservative thought had on the development of 
Saskatchewan’s political culture.  Before it is possible to understand Saskatchewan’s 
conservative present, it is first necessary to abandon the outdated reliance on 
Saskatchewan’s supposed “social democratic” political culture.  Far from a “non-force,” 
conservatives organized in defence of their own interests and championed an 
individualistic worldview that placed them directly at odds with the collectivism offered 
by the left.  Conservatives failed to defeat the CCF in 1944, but their individualistic 







1 Masters of Their Own Fate: Conservative Farmers’ 
Opposition to Orderly Marketing 
The grain elevator stands as one of the most romanticized images of the Canadian 
Prairies.  “An unassuming structure designed as a facility to store and handle grain,” one 
popular history explains, “the simple country elevator has eclipsed its intended role and 
become a prairie institution that has been woven into the social and economic fabric of 
the Canadian heartland.”48  No less significant is the fact that many of these elevators 
have prominently displayed, at one time or another, the names of once-proud farmers’ co-
operatives—the Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company (SCEC), the United 
Grain Growers (UGG), and the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool.  It is from this association 
with the farmers’ movement that these “Prairie Sentinels” serve as the very embodiment 
of the farmers’ attempts to wrestle economic control away from the capitalistic grain 
trade, a tangible connection to the farmers’ “spit-in-your-eye determination” that allowed 
them to redefine their role in the wheat economy.49  This symbolism, however, is 
predicated on an assumption that farmers’ political actions lay in attempts to resist or 
reform the capitalist system.   
Other symbols, albeit less romanticized, demonstrate a fundamentally different 
understanding of farmers’ position within the capitalist economy.  William Motherwell 
constructed an opulent Victorian mansion, named Lanark Place, on his farm near 
Abernathy.  Containing a formal parlour, servants’ quarters, and a grand staircase, Lanark 
Place symbolized Motherwell’s ability to “triumph through adversity, of ‘making good’ 
against all odds.”50  Similarly, the Spring Rice farm, located south of Pense, contained 
formalized English gardens and a stately manor house filled with ornate woodwork and 
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stone carvings.  Like Motherwell, Gerald Spring Rice was a founding member of the 
Saskatchewan Grain Growers Association (SGGA) and, along with his two brothers, used 
his farm to exemplify his family’s success within the capitalist system.51   Others chose 
to demonstrate their accomplishments through the size and scale of their operations.  
Robert Allen Wright, the “biggest farm owner in Saskatchewan” in the 1920s, ran an 
early agri-business near Drinkwater.52  Wright’s “empire,” as the local history explains, 
was an “awe-inspiring sight,” consisting of two houses, an ice-house, silos, dormitory, 
and four barns, one of which was over two hundred feet long and had enough space to 
house eighty horses.53  Just as the Pool elevator represented farmers who viewed their 
position as exploited, these stately mansions and industrial operations symbolized 
farmers who not only viewed themselves as capable of competing within the capitalist 
system, but understood their very success as a product of this competition. 
These contradictory symbols reflect different interpretations of the farmers’ place within 
the capitalist economy.  On the one hand, early studies of Canada’s wheat economy 
depicted farmers as victims of the National Policy.  Vernon Fowke, for instance, argues 
that the development of a Prairie wheat economy was of secondary concern to Ottawa’s 
national project.  Many of the policies which went into securing a transcontinental 
nation—including the granting of a monopoly to the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR), 
the creation of protective tariffs for central Canadian industry, and the indiscriminate 
settlement of the Prairies—promoted national growth, not the economic welfare of the 
individual farmer.  The result was a National Policy with a “persistent disregard of the 
competitive inferiority of agriculture within” the capitalist system.54 The farmer, lacking 
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organization, was at the mercy of a monopolistic CPR and Grain Exchange.  This conflict 
forced Prairie farmers to band together in their collective self-interest, calling for 
“popular control of the political process” and emphasizing “co-operation rather than 
competition in the economic sphere in an apparent rebellion against the emerging 
industrial capitalist system.”55   Acting alone, farmers were unable to ameliorate their 
economic situation. 56   By group action, however, Prairie farmers could gain the critical 
mass necessary to affect change.  
Critics of this traditional narrative have stressed its overreliance on an assumed 
homogeneity among Prairie farmers.  Far from attacking capitalism’s competitive basis, 
Robert Irwin notes, many famers “made decisions within the capitalist system and sought 
to improve their position within it.”57  By envisioning themselves as independent agents 
capable of competing within the capitalist system, Paul Voisey adds, these famers 
exhibited the “aggressive, acquisitive societies” in which they were raised. 58  It was 
these farmers who sought returns on their investments beyond self-sufficiency, actively 
acquired more land, and built their mansions and large-scale operations as a testament to 
their own success.59 
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This focus on class divisions has resulted in a more nuanced consideration of the larger 
agrarian movement.  Lyle Dick, for example, found significant class divisions emanating 
from the settlement process in Saskatchewan.  Early Ontarian settlers, Dyck notes, 
constituted the “privileged elite” of Saskatchewan society.  Not only did their Anglo 
background provide them with cultural advantages in a “British” province, but federal 
land policies allowed these settlers to secure larger holdings of more productive land.   
Those arriving during the immigration boom at the turn of the century, in contrast, 
predominantly farmed smaller tracts, were less likely to own their own land or employ 
farm labour, and were too “preoccupied with the basic problems of subsistence” to focus 
on their status within society.60   
These divergent class positions resulted in significantly different understandings of the 
farmers’ place within the capitalist economy.  Conservative farmers viewed themselves 
as “masters of their own fates” and “entrepreneurs competing successfully in the overall 
free-enterprise economy.”  They also monopolized the executive of the farm movement.  
Far from challenging the capitalist nature of the wheat economy, these farmers sought 
reforms to the grain handling system—namely freight rates and access to transportation 
networks—that would limit monopoly abuse, thus levelling the playing field and 
allowing them to compete fairly.  According to Dick, the SGGA’s early reform program 
favoured farmers who could produce larger quantities of wheat and actually furthered the 
smaller farmers’ “competitively disadvantageous position.”61  Farmers were not an 
“organic entity,” Dick concludes, but a “house divided” over their understanding of their 
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own class positions.62  Similarly, studies of the post-1945 era detail how an increasing 
divergence in farm sizes fueled dramatically different political positions.63   
Such insights are absent from histories of the interwar period in Saskatchewan where the 
dominant conception of farmers’ political outlook remains one of a general leftward 
radicalization.  “All farmers,” Gerald Friesen argues, “rich or poor, confronted a different 
circumstance after the First World War.”  Whereas farmers were previously “in the van 
of economic progress, the admired pioneers of empire and nation; now they were 
perceived to be slow-witted, eternally bitching ‘sons of the soil.’  They had once 
possessed political influence; now they had to fight for every adjustment in national 
economic policy.”64  Nowhere was this more apparent than when the farmers’ movement 
abandoned its earlier focus on production costs in favour of reforming the entire capitalist 
wheat economy through a campaign for “orderly marketing.”  Predicated on the belief 
that the grain trade—comprised of the railroads, banks, grain elevators, and the Winnipeg 
Grain Exchange—colluded to force farmers to sell in the fall when prices were low, 
orderly marketing sought to replace the capitalist wheat economy with a planned system 
that would guarantee “fair” prices to all producers.65  Far from a mere question of the 
best system to sell the farmers’ wheat, the campaign is considered the defining moment 
in the farmers’ radicalization.  By uniting together in both their challenges to the 
capitalist nature of the grain trade and their attacks on the SGGA’s moderate leadership, 
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farmers supposedly developed a shared class consciousness.  “A common economic class 
situation,” Seymour Lipset argues, “was resulting in heightened consciousness and 
sharpened class attitudes.  Out of economic conflict, agrarian class unity was 
emerging.”66    This shared understanding of the farmers’ inferior economic position 
culminated in a form of “agrarian socialism” that catapulted the CCF to power in 1944.67  
While certainly a central element in the history of Saskatchewan’s farmers’ movement, 
this narrative ignores the large number of farmers who held firmly to their belief in the 
soundness of the capitalist system.  Far from a process of unanimity, the campaign for 
orderly marketing produced ruptures within the farm community as conservative farmers 
remained fundamentally opposed to what they viewed as a dangerous undermining of 
traditional values.  Historians, however, have failed to appreciate these divisions.  Rather 
than attempting to understand this opposition, they dismiss these conservatives for failing 
to “transcend” the “narrowness” of their ideology.68  No attempts have been made to 
understand how these farmers articulated their ideology, how they interacted with the 
broader society, or how their values shaped Saskatchewan’s political outlook.  This 
absence is especially problematic given that these farmers’ ideology served as one of the 
main pillars of Saskatchewan conservatism.   
This chapter examines opposition to orderly marketing between the end of the Great War 
and the onset of the Great Depression.  Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers understood 
orderly marketing and its collectivist and co-operative vision as a fundamental threat to 
the capitalist economy and, by extension, their place within society.  Their opposition, 
however, depended on how far the proposed system forced, or compelled, them to act 
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against their wishes.  The campaign itself consisted of two distinct phases, each with its 
own tactics and goals.  The first, occurring between 1918 and 1923, saw the province’s 
marginal farmers—suffering from increased debt loads and a post-war recession—
agitating for the reinstitution of a government controlled, compulsory Wheat Board.  The 
conservative farmers interpreted a mandatory board as undermining their individual 
freedom to choose how they operated their own businesses.  Conservatives successfully 
blocked its creation, but their opposition earned their radical counterparts’ enmity.  The 
failure of a compulsory board also precipitated the second phase, lasting from 1923 until 
the onset of the Great Depression.  Radical farmers, now in a position of power in the 
agrarian movement, turned their attentions towards the creation of a producer-controlled, 
contract pool.  Initially a voluntary organization, the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool did not 
elicit the conservatives’ ire to the same extent as a board.  Rather than directly oppose the 
Pool, these farmers decided not to participate in its operations, ushering in an era of 
uneasy peace.  Ultimately, the Pool’s inability to destroy the capitalist wheat economy 
led to renewed calls for compulsion and the conservatives’ visceral opposition.   
Opposition to compulsion provides a window into these farmers’ ideology.  At the 
foundation of this worldview was an emphasis on their own individuality.  Attributing 
their success to their individual efforts, these farmers opposed any movement that would 
limit their ability to act as master of “their own destiny.”69  One of the myths of the 
farmers’ movement rests on the idea that  shared hardships and deprivations “seriously 
compromised, if not shattered” the conception of farmers as “rugged individualists.”70  
Yet, conservatives’ opposition to orderly marketing was predicated on their continued 
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adherence to a belief in the power of their own individualism.  Orderly marketing was 
rooted in the notion that the capitalist system itself hindered progress.  Just as the 
conservatives considered their success the product of their own “rugged individualism” 
and self-reliance, they attributed failure to a lack of ability, initiative, and drive. 71  It was 
not systemic issues within capitalism that caused farmers to fail, they argued, but an 
individual’s inability to “make good.”  This continued adherence to the power of their 
own individualism placed these conservative farmers at the vanguard of McKay’s liberal 
order.  This belief structure, McKay argues, held individualism as an “abstract principle.”  
It was not a reflection of actual “living beings,” but was an ideal which every person 
should aspire to emulate.72  It did not matter that many farmers owed their success to 
factors outside of their own control or that they relied on government intervention to 
rectify the most blatant monopoly abuses in the grain trade. 73  What matters is that they 
attributed this success to their own individual efforts.  These farmers’ understanding of 
themselves as “self-made men” resulted in an ideology opposed to the collectivism 
offered by the farmers’ movement.74 
The concept of orderly marketing emerged during the First World War.  Farmers 
responded to increased demand and prices by dramatically increasing their wheat 
production, doubling their acreages between 1914 and 1919.75   Lacking their own 
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capital, farmers largely funded this expansion through high interest loans.  As early as 
1916, farmers’ publications began commenting on the “mountainous burden of debt” 
which required the artificially high wartime prices to sustain.76  It was, as John Herd 
Thompson explains, a short-sighted gamble.  The illusion of wartime prosperity placed 
Saskatchewan’s farmers on a “reckless course towards self-destruction.”77  Farmers 
hoped that increased land values and artificially high wheat prices would carry on 
indefinitely.  When the price of wheat dropped precipitously after the war, however, 
many found themselves at risk of bankruptcy and turned to increasingly radical solutions.   
While farmers were taking on record amounts of debt, wartime experiences also 
undermined traditional arguments against government intervention into the capitalist 
economy.  Since Saskatchewan’s founding in 1905, the SGGA’s conservative leadership 
and the province’s governing Liberal Party had entered an informal alliance designed to 
counter any attempt to undermine the capitalist grain trade.  One of the early debates 
within the SGGA, for example, pitted the conservative leadership against radical 
elements—led by E.A. Partridge, a socialist-leaning delegate—over the creation of a 
system of government-owned grain elevators.  Known as the “Partridge Plan,” the radical 
farmers hoped that government control of the grain-handling system would realign “the 
grain trade away from the principles of the competitive market towards an alliance of 
producers and government.”78  The conservative farmers, in contrast, viewed themselves 
as “effective competitors in a free market” and “conceived a minimal role for 
government.”79  William Motherwell, the SGGA’s first president and one of the plan’s 
most outspoken critics, considered government elevators “entirely visionary” and a “nice 
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fairy tale.”80  Not only was he confident that “private enterprise” could solve the farmers’ 
grievances, but government intervention posed a dangerous precedent.  “If the 
government was to step in every instance and provide every little want,” he queried, 
“where are they going to get off?”81  When the SGGA’s membership went against their 
leadership and passed a resolution calling for government ownership, the Liberals and the 
conservative farmers worked behind the scenes to push for the creation of the farmer 
owned Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company (SCEC).82  Not only would this 
lessen the financial demands on the young province, they argued, but it would preserve 
the farmers’ self-sufficiency by ensuring local “responsibility.”83   
In disarming these early calls for direct government intervention, the Liberals and the 
SGGA executive entrenched their own positions of power.  Although the Liberals did not 
act directly in accordance with the Partridge Plan’s calls for government ownership, the 
creation of the SCEC demonstrated that they were willing to support the farmers in 
helping themselves.  As David Smith notes, this reciprocal relationship allowed the 
Liberals to establish themselves as the farmers’ natural ally.84  The SGGA leadership, for 
its part, quickly took control of the SCEC and, through a system of interlocking 
directorships, ran the elevator company according to their own values. 85  Although they 
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sold it to the rank-and-file farmers as a cooperative alternative to the capitalist economy, 
it functioned like a traditional joint-stock company thus posing the smallest possible 
threat to the capitalist grain trade. 86  By limiting the influence of the rank-and-file 
farmers, Louis Courville argues, they “made a sham of…grass-roots democracy.”87  That 
Partridge and his followers considered the situation “undemocratic” and “autocratic” was 
immaterial.  The ultimate success of the SCEC blunted criticism and provided the 
conservative farmers with a power-base from which they dominated the organized 
farmers’ movement.88    
Wartime experiences, however, undermined the SGGA executive’s contention that 
government intervention into the economy was a fundamental danger to society.  The 
federal government initially hoped to allow the wheat economy to operate according to 
the status quo for the duration of the war, but skyrocketing prices led to British pressure 
for some form of price control.  Ultimately, the Borden government took unprecedented 
steps to regulate the wheat economy through its own form of orderly marketing.  It 
established the Board of Grain Supervisors in 1916 with the responsibility for selling 
Canada’s export wheat crop for the duration of the war, providing a fixed price to 
farmers.89  When attempts at re-establishing the open market following the Armistice led 
to a precipitous drop in prices, farmers called for a continuation of government control 
until the situation in Europe stabilized.  In July 1919, the government created the 
Canadian Wheat Board to operate as a compulsory pool for the 1919-1920 crop year.  By 
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all accounts, the mandatory pool was successful.90  Despite this success, however, Arthur 
Meighan’s Union Government was clear that Canada would return to the open market as 
soon as possible.  Meighen was adamant that the Wheat Board represented an 
unprecedented increase in government powers and infringed on individual rights, making 
it un-British in nature.91  The Winnipeg Grain Exchange reopened in August 1920.  
Almost immediately, Prairie farmers’ worst fears were realized.  From a high of $2.82 
per bushel in September, the price of wheat began a precipitous decline to less than one 
dollar the following year.92   
These wartime experiences had profound ramifications for Saskatchewan farmers.  
Although the board had little power to control world commodity prices, many farmers 
came to associate a regulated economy with higher prices.  This was especially the case 
for the province’s smaller producers who, having taken on unsustainable debt loads, were 
unable to meet their payments when global wheat prices collapsed.  Larger farmers, in 
contrast, did not experience nearly the same level of hardship after the war.  A 1935 study 
by the University of Saskatchewan found that the quality of soil and the size of a farmers’ 
operations greatly influenced their ability to survive long periods of low prices.  Even 
with high debt loads and decreased prices, farmers with more than a half section of high-
quality land continually posted a profit throughout the 1920s.93  Although all farmers 
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experienced a decrease in income, it was the province’s marginal producers who lost 
money.   
These divergent experiences directly impacted a farmer’s proclivity for continued 
government intervention into the capitalist economy.  Producers who faced the real 
prospect of losing their farms demanded that the government take dramatic action.  In the 
summer of 1920, SGGA locals in the Wynyard district began an active campaign to 
reinstate the Wheat Board.94  With an average improved farm size of less than a quarter 
section and high mortgage debts, these farmers could not hope to survive with the price 
of wheat under a dollar a bushel.95  From Wynyard the campaign spread throughout the 
north-central portions of the province, areas predominantly farmed by smaller producers 
from eastern Europe. 96  Driven largely by E.A. Partridge, these calls for a new board 
were predicated on an understanding of the farmers’ inherently inferior position within 
the capitalist economy.  The Wheat Board, Partridge argued, was the only entity that 
could “appreciably increase the returns to the farmer” whose “cost of credit is greater 
than the value of the service it renders to him.”97  At the same time, the SGGA’s 
conservative leadership, believing that the capitalist economy served the farmers’ 
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interests, had little desire to continue government intervention into the capitalist economy 
and pushed the federal government to abandon any plan for a 1921 board.98 
This division over the necessity of continued government interference in the grain trade 
fractured the farmers’ movement into conservative and radical camps in late 1921.  
Saskatchewan’s radical farmers, realizing that they would make little headway within an 
organization dominated by a conservative leadership, formed their own organization, the 
Farmers’ Union of Canada (FU).  With its main support base in the north-central portions 
of the province—areas dominated by marginal farmers of non-Anglo descent who had led 
the charge for government intervention in the past—the FU offered an alternative 
organization for Saskatchewan’s marginal farmers who believed the SGGA’s executive 
was unsympathetic to their plight.  Unlike the SGGA leadership, which viewed farmers 
as capable actors within the capitalist system, the FU was predicated on an understanding 
of class conflict and exploitation.  Borrowing heavily from the One Big Union’s 
conception of “pan-industrial” organization, the FU sought to organize class-conscious 
farmers into a collective force against the entrenched capitalists.99   “One of the basic 
principles of this Union,” they argued, “is that it recognizes and accepts the fact of the 
‘class struggle,’ and maintains that the farmers as a class have an unquestionable right to 
organize and to protect and further their interests.”100  Understanding the farmers’ 
relationship with the capitalist grain trade as essentially exploitative, the FU urged 
farmers to work towards creating a system that bypassed the private enterprise in favour 
of co-operatives and government monopolies.101 
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The FU’s focus on wheat marketing placed it at odds with Saskatchewan’s conservative 
farmers who were satisfied with the status quo offered by the SCEC competing within the 
open market.  J.B. Musselman, secretary of the SGGA from 1914 until 1922 and 
managing director of the SCEC from 1922 until 1924, was emblematic of this response.  
Moving to Saskatchewan from Ontario in 1902, Musselman purchased a 3,000-acre farm 
near Cupar, making him one of the largest farmers in the province.102   Musselman used 
his influential positions within the farmers’ movement to challenge the radicals’ plans.  
Not only had Musselman noted on numerous occasions that the Winnipeg Grain 
Exchange was “the best system that could be devised” for handling wheat, he was also 
emphatic that the creation of new marketing facilities, as envisioned by the FU, was 
wasteful, dangerous, and unnecessary. 103  Through the SCEC, Musselman argued, 
Saskatchewan’s farmers had already “built up elaborate machinery owned and operated 
by ourselves” and did not need to experiment with new solutions.104  This opposition 
transcended questions of economics.  By undermining the capitalist system, supporters of 
orderly marketing were weakening the individual’s freedom of action and, by extension, 
the very foundations of Saskatchewan society.  The fact that the FU modelled a great deal 
of its program from the One Big Union only cemented this belief.  Both organizations, 
Musselman argued, called “for the confiscation of all private property, including farming 
land, and the establishment of a communistic social order.”105 
A deep apprehension over the marginal and radical farmers’ ability to view the economy 
rationally underpinned this conservative response.  The problem was not simply that 
supporters exaggerated orderly marketing’s benefits, but that marginal farmers had little 
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ability to evaluate the system along “feasible and commercially sound” lines.  Musselman 
and other SGGA executives feared that promises of “revolutionary short cut methods” 
would lead the marginal farmers astray.  These promises, they argued, would destroy “the 
wheat together with the tares” and leave the farmer “more impoverished than before.”  
Delegates to the 1921 SGGA convention were warned not to “anchor their hopes and 
their faith in that which is new and spectacular,” or to forget the “solid and valuable 
benefits” which they were attaining through the SCEC.106   
At the same time, increasing radicalism amongst the farmers’ grassroots convinced the 
SGGA’s leadership that they had to make efforts to at least appear sympathetic to the 
marginal farmers’ plight if they hoped to retain control of the movement.107  In May 
1921, Musselman announced plans for the creation of a voluntary pool under the auspices 
of the SGGA.  Far from a capitulation, however, the voluntary nature of Musselman’s 
plan reflected the conservative farmers’ understanding of themselves as independent 
agents capable of competing within the capitalist economy.  By avoiding any hint of 
compulsion, Musselman’s proposal allowed farmers to decide for themselves what 
system was best for their own individual needs.  “There is nothing which can be done 
under a long-term binding contract pool,” Musselman argued, “which cannot also be 
done under a voluntary pool.”108  Musselman’s plan also posed the smallest possible 
threat to the capitalist grain trade.  Not only would this pool use the SCEC’s 
transportation facilities, but it would only sell wheat through the Winnipeg Grain 
Exchange.  Finally, Musselman set clear limits on the marginal farmers’ ability to control 
the pool’s operations.  The SGGA’s executive would run the voluntary pool’s day-to-day 
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operations and, at any point, could suspend the pool or force its merger with other 
organizations.109 
These attempts to undermine the grassroots’ growing radicalism also stretched to the 
political realm.  By the summer of 1921, farmers’ parties—largely campaigning on calls 
for reduced tariffs, the nationalization of railways and natural resources, and a wheat 
board—had secured provincial power in Ontario and Alberta and were on the verge of 
victory in Manitoba.110  In Saskatchewan, however, the province’s conservative farmers 
and the provincial Liberal Party avoided the same outcome.  The Liberals, under Premier 
William Martin, severed ties with their federal counterparts in early 1921, promising to 
refrain from taking part in federal organization or campaigns.  In return, the conservative 
farmers vowed to keep the SGGA out of provincial politics.111  To solidify the deal, J.A. 
Maharg—the long-serving president of the SGGA and Independent MP for Maple 
Creek—resigned his seat in Ottawa and joined Martin’s cabinet as Minister of 
Agriculture.  Maharg reasoned that he was entering Martin’s government “not as a 
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politician but as a representative of the farmers.”  It was a move whereby he could ensure 
his “first duty” of securing “better consideration of the needs of the farmers.”112   
Martin followed up by calling a snap election.  The Premier claimed that he timed the 
election so as not to interfere with the upcoming federal contest.  However, an early 
election had the added benefit of catching the government’s opponents off guard.  As one 
Liberal organizer noted: “When you have your amunition [sic] ready you are a fool to 
wait until the other fellow has his ready.”113  The timing was fortuitous.  The SGGA’s 
conservative executive was doing all it could to forestall the organization’s entry into 
politics.  Musselman insisted that the SGGA had “no grievance and no reason to oppose 
the Martin government,” but the more radical delegates were incensed by what they 
viewed as their executive’s betrayal of the larger farmers’ movement.  “The leaders of the 
association,” a disgruntled farmer argued, “have no more right to use the association for 
political purposes than the locals have.”114  In direct defiance of their executive, over 
twenty-five locals nominated their own independent candidates by May.  By calling an 
early election, Martin was able to go to the polls before these independents had time to 
mobilize, winning forty-six of sixty-three seats, sixteen by acclamation.115   
The political arrangement allowed the provincial Liberals to survive in office, but it led to 
the end of conservative control of the farmers’ movement.  The SGGA executive relied 
on the premier’s promise to refrain from federal politics to sell the deal to the general 
membership.  In the December 1921 Dominion election, however, Martin and other 
prominent Liberals openly campaigned for Liberal candidates, especially Motherwell 
who was running in Regina.  In a series of public speeches, Martin claimed that the 
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farmers’ platform was riddled with “contradictions.”116  Maharg realized the 
repercussions of Martin’s “betrayal” and resigned his cabinet position almost 
immediately, but the damage had already been done.117   
Fed up with their conservative executive’s obstruction, a group of more disgruntled 
farmers, including A.J. McPhail, George Edwards, and Violet McNaughton, launched an 
all-out attack at the 1922 SGGA convention.  Referred to interchangeably as the “ginger 
group” or the “secret meeting clan,”118 these radical farmers “ruled the convention in a 
way that has not been seen for several years.”119  The ginger group not only succeeded in 
passing a resolution bringing the SGGA into politics but began the process of removing 
conservative farmers from their positions of power and influence.  A.G. Hawkes, the 
seven-term vice-president, was replaced by George Edwards, a firm supporter of orderly 
marketing.120  As a visible member of the co-op elite, Hawkes’ defeat, the Saskatoon 
Daily Star reported, was “the principal outstanding sign-post of the change.”121  
Similarly, Musselman, realizing that his position in the SGGA was tenuous at best, 
accepted a position with SCEC.122  With Musselman and Hawkes’ departure, the 
conservative hold on the SGGA was fundamentally weakened.  Not only had the 
organization decided to enter provincial politics, but it also began actively offering its 
support toward orderly marketing schemes. 
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Having lost control of the SGGA, Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers turned to the 
Liberal Party as the main champion of their ideology.  Regina’s Morning Leader, widely 
considered the Liberal Party’s mouthpiece, quickly came to their support.  In a scathing 
editorial, the paper argued that the “old soul” had left the SGGA.  By deciding to enter 
provincial politics, the paper foretold, the SGGA had “taken up the sword by which they 
will perish.”123  Charles Dunning’s selection as Premier following Martin’s resignation 
also certainly met with their approval.  As far as conservative farmers were concerned, 
Dunning’s life exemplified the myth of the “self-made man.”  Having moved to 
Saskatchewan in 1902 as an itinerant farm labourer, Dunning established himself as a 
shrewd and successful farmer, businessman, and politician.  After working his way up 
through the SGGA, first as a director and then as vice-president, Dunning was appointed 
as the SCEC’s first general manager in 1911.  It was under Dunning’s leadership that the 
early elevator company established itself as one of the largest and most profitable grain 
handling enterprises in the country.124  In 1916, Dunning parlayed his successful 
management into a cabinet position in Martin’s government, serving terms as Minister of 
Agriculture, Finance, Railways, and Municipal Affairs.125   
Dunning brought to the Premier’s office an affinity for the conservative farmers’ outlook.  
Dunning was clear that he did not oppose a voluntary pool, but he did have “an 
instinctive distrust of the principle of compulsion as applied to trade.”126  He also 
believed that most farmers felt the same way.  Compulsion, he argued, was “repugnant to 
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the general attitude of our people.”  Farmers valued their individualism and would not 
“consent” to being ruled over by a “wheat marketing autocracy” which took away their 
basic rights and freedoms.127  Dunning also shared the conservatives’ disdain for 
radicalism.  Increased debt loads, he argued, were not caused by structural inequities 
within the capitalist system.  Rather, a farmer faced bankruptcy because he failed to pay 
“reasonably good attention to his business and especially to his creditors’ letters.”128  
This contempt for the marginal farmers’ business acumen was present throughout 
Dunning’s career.  In establishing the SCEC’s bylaws, for instance, Dunning took care to 
ensure that the rank-and-file had little influence on the company’s day-to-day 
operations.129   
Dunning only had to look to the FU’s rapid growth as confirmation for this belief.  
Throughout 1922, the Union made a name for itself among the province’s marginal 
farmers by organizing boycotts of sheriff sales and calling for a moratorium on all future 
foreclosures.130  Dunning had little sympathy for such tactics.  As he explained to 
Clifford Sifton, the FU was a “deadbeat organization,” which only appealed “to the 
impecunious and those who are so loaded with debt that they do not ever expect to get 
out of it.”131  For Dunning, debt moratorium was a direct challenge to people’s 
individualism.  By refusing to honour their debts, the province’s radical farmers were 
unwilling to live up to the obligations they entered of their own free will.  “The 
continuance of society’s guarantee of freedom to all of us,” Dunning argued, “demands 
that when we have signed on the dotted line, we shall stick to the obligation our signature 
conveys.”  Farmers’ individualism gave them the freedom to “do any fool thing” they 
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chose, but also required the farmer to live up to the “consequences of his own 
mistakes.”132   
Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers considered Dunning their natural ally against 
orderly marketing.  From the outset, they inundated the Premier with letters supporting 
his stance on compulsion.  An abiding faith in individual action was foundational to this 
support.  As a compulsory body, a farmer from Morse wrote, any board would deprive 
the farmer of his freedom to dispose of the product of his own labour.  Wheat, in short, 
belonged “to the farmer and should be as sacred as any other individual property.”133  Far 
from merely an economic question, compulsion’s threat to individual property rights also 
weakened Saskatchewan’s British foundations.  The Magna Carta, another writer noted, 
enshrined property rights as the central component of British freedoms.   Supporters of 
compulsion, therefore, were descendants “of the old world feudal Lords,” and were 
acting nothing short as “slave drivers.”134  Compulsion did not just challenge a farmer’s 
right to decide how to sell his own wheat; by undermining the freedom of individual 
action it sought to destroy the foundation of Saskatchewan society. 
Dunning certainly shared the conservative farmer’s sentiment, but his larger concern lay 
in disarming the SGGA’s entry into politics.  The first political contest between Dunning 
and the SGGA took place in a by-election for the Happyland constituency in the spring of 
1922.  Located in the dry-belt in the south-west of the province, Dunning considered 
Happyland the “breeding ground for almost every new political disease 
Saskatchewan…ever suffered from.”135  Although the Liberals managed to secure a 
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victory, it was at a substantially reduced margin from the last general election.136  These 
results deeply influenced how Dunning approached questions of orderly marketing.  
Dunning’s victory convinced the Premier that radical farmers could be contained, but 
their strong showing deeply concerned him.  “Happyland served to give us an illustration 
of the hard fight we may have four years from now,” he confided to Walter Scott, “unless 
the wave of class consciousness subsides before that time.”137  The only way to protect 
society—and the Liberal Party—from this rising class consciousness was to disarm the 
radical farmers’ main grievances: debt and wheat marketing.  Dunning’s main problem, 
therefore, lay in forming a policy that would neutralize the radicals while maintaining the 
conservatives’ allegiance.   
Of the two issues, the debt problem provided the Premier with the most room to 
maneuver.   From the outset, Dunning was clear that he would not support a general 
moratorium.  As far as the Premier was concerned, farmers had contracted debts of their 
own free will and had to live with the choices they made.  At the same time, Dunning 
also understood that poor harvests and depressed world prices were largely responsible 
for many farmers’ hardships.  The problem with a general moratorium, therefore, lay in 
the fact that it would protect the “crooks” along with the “deserving.”138  As such, the 
Premier worked towards a compromise whereby farmers would have flexibility in 
repaying their loans while wheat prices remained low.  Dunning hoped to avoid at all 
costs a situation where creditors would force farmers to liquidate the entirety of a good 
crop to pay for past debts, leaving them nothing to live on until the next harvest.  
Although he would not forgive the farmers’ debt, the Premier ultimately convinced most 
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of the farmers’ creditors to compromise on payment terms.139  By making practical gains 
in alleviating the debt burden, Dunning hoped to forestall the move towards more radical 
solutions by the province’s marginal farmers who were suffering under their debt loads; 
by refusing to adopt a moratorium, Dunning hoped to maintain the farmers’ self-
sufficiency. 
Dunning’s options were much more limited when it came to wheat marketing.  Although 
it was clear that the province’s conservative farmers expected Dunning to act as their ally 
against compulsion, the Premier understood that this was a minority position.  “In the 
course of my connection with public life,” he noted, “I have never known an issue upon 
which the people were so absolutely of one mind as is the case in connection with the 
present demand for a compulsory wheat board.”140  Dunning sympathized with the 
conservative opposition to compulsion, but these sympathies were largely immaterial 
given the Premier’s larger goal of disarming the SGGA.  The situation in 1922 was such 
that it was nearly impossible for Dunning to come out against compulsion and regain the 
SGGA’s political support.141   Faced with the choice, Dunning joined the campaign as 
part of his efforts at undermining the farmers’ “class consciousness.”  The conservative 
farmers may not have been happy with Dunning’s support for a compulsory board, but 
they were unable to prevent it. 
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Dunning assuaged the conservatives’ apprehension by noting that any compulsory system 
would be short-lived.  The extreme conditions farmers found themselves in, he reasoned, 
necessitated some form of action.  “None of us like to adopt the principle of compulsion,” 
he wrote to Liberal Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, “but, at the same 
time, we feel that the disorganized condition of people overseas…makes some form of 
mass selling desirable for the present if our producers are to receive anything like 
production costs for their wheat.”142  At the same time, Dunning noted that a board was 
an “experiment,” not a “solution,” which would only last so long as the present abnormal 
conditions in global trade persisted.143  Besides, Dunning had good reason to believe the 
demand for compulsion would be fleeting.  George Chipman, editor of the Grain 
Growers’ Guide, informed the Premier that if farmers “get the wheat board this year and 
the initial price is fixed at about 70¢…the wheat board will be damned right there and 
then.”144  Conservative farmers would only need to bide their time until economic 
conditions improved. 
In the end, conservative farmers had little to fear as the plans for a compulsory board 
never got off the ground.  King’s government, feeling the same pressure as Dunning, 
passed legislation in June that enabled the Prairie provinces to form their own board.   
Unlike the case in 1919, the new board would only cover the wheat grown in the Prairies 
and the provincial governments, not Ottawa, would be responsible for any financial 
liabilities arising from its operation.  Both Alberta and Saskatchewan quickly passed 
legislation enabling the creation of a board, but the financial risk necessitated caution.  As 
Dunning reasoned: “To place the entire credit of these two provinces in the hands of men 
who had not the necessary experience nor possessed the necessary measure of public 
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confidence, would be no less than suicidal.”145  The problem, however, was that any 
candidates with the necessary “experience” and “confidence” were largely employed in 
the capitalist grain trade and wanted no part in an orderly marketing scheme.  Two of 
Dunning’s top choices—John McFarland, president of the Alberta Pacific Grain 
Company, and James R. Murray, assistant general manager of the United Grain 
Growers—went as far as to publish a public letter outlining their opposition.146  With all 
potential candidates refusing the job and with time running short before the harvest, 
Dunning called off the search.  There would be no Wheat Board in 1922. 
Dunning was ambivalent over the failure.  Although he personally believed that a 
compulsory board was not the farmers’ solution, his concern that a failure to secure it 
would provide ammunition to his political enemies was also confirmed.  A.J. McPhail, 
Musselman’s replacement as secretary of the SGGA, believed that Dunning had 
purposely approached candidates whom he knew would not accept.147  Many of the 
province’s radical farmers shared this sentiment, and chastised Dunning for his perceived 
duplicitousness.  “Try and help the farmer,” one letter noted, “but don’t try & pull the 
wool over his eyes so much.”148  This criticism incensed Dunning.   Such a “slur” the 
Premier retorted, “comes pretty hard after a man has spent the last three weeks practically 
day and night attempting to get this business organized along the lines desired by the 
majority of our people.”149   Dunning bristled at such criticism, but he was not 
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heartbroken by the failure.  He was happy to let the issue die when further attempts to 
secure a board in 1923 met a similar fate.150 
This failure marked a shift in the campaign for orderly marketing.   For four years, 
Saskatchewan’s radical farmers sought a compulsory wheat board only to have their 
plans stymied by conservative opposition.  Rather than continue to rely on government 
intervention, these farmers instead used their newfound control of the SGGA to campaign 
for a producer-controlled, contract pool.151  The idea was not new in 1923.  The 
Canadian Council of Agriculture had proposed a contract pool as early as 1920 and it had 
remained a central plank of the FU since its founding in 1921.152  Unlike the previous 
campaigns, however, the SGGA’s new leadership offered its wholehearted support to the 
plan.  Whereas the conservative farmers had held the SGGA back from any plan that 
would limit a farmer’s freedom to dispose of their own grain, the “ginger group,” led by 
A.J. McPhail, placed its entire support behind the plan.153  Following a tour of the 
province by Aaron Sapiro, an American lawyer and “prophet” of the Pool movement, the 
executives of the SGGA and FU agreed to work together to form a contract pool.154  The 
Pool would be non-profit, non-speculative, and focused solely on the sale of wheat.  It 
was also entirely voluntary, only going into operation once farmers accounting for fifty 
percent of Saskatchewan’s wheat acreage signed a five-year contract.155 
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Historians have assumed that the successful Pool campaign was the product of nearly 
universal farmer support.  Opposition, they argue, was confined to the Winnipeg Grain 
Exchange and the province’s daily papers.156 As Lipset notes, “the almost evangelical 
appeal for farmers finally to destroy the middlemen in the grain trade and control their 
own economic destiny activated more farmers than ever before.”157  These 
characterizations oversimplify the conservative response.  As a voluntary organization, 
the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool did not threaten conservative farmers’ individualism.  As a 
result, most conservatives were content to let the experiment run its course so long as 
they were free to sell their wheat according to their own wishes.  As one farmer wrote the 
Premier: “let them pool their own wheat.”158  At the same time, it was also clear that 
Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers opposed the Pool’s ideological underpinnings and 
resented the challenge it posed to the competitive capitalist system.  For conservative 
farmers, the fact that the “weak and poorest farmers” were championing it was evidence 
enough of its questionable foundations.  Rather than working to improve their own 
holdings, they reasoned, the supporters of the Pool saw it as a way “to get a few easy 
dollars in their own pocket.”159  In both the Pool and Wheat Board campaigns, there was 
a clear sentiment amongst Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers that orderly marketing 
was merely an attempt to cover up the reasons for a farmer’s failure.  Supporters of the 
movement were “selfishly inclined.”  They were “jealous” by nature.  When they heard 
of a “neighbour getting a few cents…more” for their wheat, “they…think it unjust.”160   
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The capitalist system, in contrast, rewarded the farmer who was able to “market his grain 
intelligently.”161   
This opposition was reflected in conservative reactions to the Pool campaign.  Dunning, 
for instance, was concerned that Pool supporters were attempting to influence the 
province’s farmers by relying on emotion, not reason.  L.P. McNamee, president of the 
FU, freely admitted that he made up statistics about the benefits that a pool offered 
farmers.162  Similarly, McPhail, who had been excused from his position in the SGGA to 
head the Pool campaign, urged Protestant ministers to preach the benefits of the co-
operative Pool, going so far as to single out biblical passages detailing the Israelites’ 
escape from Egyptian slavery.  Such underhanded tactics were anathema for 
conservatives.  “The business of signing,” Dunning chastised, “is not for the 
emotionalists to direct.”163  Dunning took every opportunity to warn “the farmers against 
expecting more than was humanly possible.”164  The Pool supporters’ reliance on 
exaggeration and falsehood only demonstrated that they were not capable or suitable to 
decide Saskatchewan’s economic future. 
Conservatives were equally clear that, although voluntary, the Pool’s five-year contracts 
posed a threat to the farmers’ individualism.  For Dunning, a contract was evidence that 
the system itself was untested.  “If the scheme is not very sound,” he concluded, “you had 
better have a contract.”  The fact that many of the province’s smaller farmers were 
enthusiastically joining the Pool also worried the Premier.  Dunning’s experience with 
post-war debt convinced him that most financial troubles were caused by farmers signing 
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“contracts of the nature of which they were ignorant.”165  At the same time, Dunning’s 
own faith in the farmers’ individualism would not allow him to infringe their right to 
“sign any contract which is of a personal nature.”  Part of the individual freedoms granted 
in a British society included the right to make mistakes if people chose not to fully inform 
themselves of the matter at hand.  The only firm recommendation that the Premier would 
give was for farmers to be absolutely sure of what they were getting into.  “Before you 
sign,” Dunning warned a meeting in the town of Springside, “for God’s sake read it.”166 
Conservative’s expressed their objection to the Pool by following Dunning’s advice and 
refused to sign contracts.  Farmers had to pledge fifty percent of Saskatchewan’s wheat 
acreage to contracts by September 12th before a Pool could be operational for the 1923 
crop year.167  Despite an intensive campaign, the Pool only managed to secure contracts 
covering thirty-five percent of Saskatchewan’s wheat acreage.168  Significantly, 
Saskatchewan’s most developed and productive farms along the CPR line remained 
outside the Pool.  Farmers in the Milestone constituency, for example, only signed thirty-
five percent of their wheat acreage to contracts.   Located on the fertile Regina Plains, 
Milestone was the center of Saskatchewan’s large-scale wheat farming.169  Producers in 
Last Mountain, on the other hand, where acreages were less than half of those at 
Milestone, signed their entire wheat acreage to the Pool.170  The same trend held 
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throughout the province as a whole.  Areas where the larger and more affluent farmers 
dominated did not join the Pool.  Far from being a universal campaign as historians 
suggests, Saskatchewan’s larger and more conservative farmers remained outside the 
Pool.  “Some of the best, most progressive, most prosperous farmers in this locality” a 
farmer from Midale explained, “refuse to sign the wheat pool contract,” adding that they 
had “the best reasons for doing” so.171  Even Pool supporters acknowledged the 
geographic divide in support.  The weekly Progressive, first published in August 1923 as 
a mouthpiece of the Pool campaign, noted that the results proved what had “always been 
supposed.”172   
Pool supporters were clearly frustrated with their conservative counterparts.  When 
launching the 1924 campaign, the Progressive noted that, when the results of this new 
campaign were in, it hoped “the farmers of the south will not be ashamed” of their 
showing.173   This frustration boiled over at the 1924 SGGA convention when J.A. 
Maharg, the association’s long-serving president and last remnant of the “Co-op Elite,” 
was defeated.  Maharg shared conservative farmers’ skepticism of a contract pool, but 
Musselman and Hawkes’ departure in 1922 had left him powerless to stop the SGGA 
from supporting the campaign.174  Yet, as the Progressive noted, there was a strong 
suspicion among “ardent” Pool supporters, who made up the majority of the “rank and 
file” membership, that the executive was “not wholly unanimous in their attitude towards 
the pool.”  The final straw came with the revelation that Maharg failed to sign a Pool 
contract.  Although they could not force farmers to join the Pool, they could make it a 
prerequisite for office.  With Maharg removed from office, the SGGA could now use “the 
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whole strength of the organization” to secure a Pool for 1924.175  Having spent the winter 
continuing the educational program and ridding the SGGA of anti-Pool sentiment, the 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool finally reached the fifty percent threshold in June 1924.176   
Once again, however, the 1924 Pool campaign succeeded without the active participation 
of Saskatchewan’s largest farmers.  Throughout the Pool campaign, conservative farmers 
proclaimed that orderly marketing was a dangerous intervention into the capitalist 
market.  At the same time, their belief in the freedom of individual action meant that they 
would not stand in the way of others to act in their own interests.  Dunning summed up 
the sentiment of most conservatives by simply leaving the province for a two-month tour 
of Europe at the height of the Pool’s final organizational thrust.177  Pool supporters, in 
contrast, were not willing to reciprocate this sentiment.  Orderly marketing was to be the 
first step in the larger transformation of society.  “The Wheat Pool is only a beginning,” 
The Progressive argued.  “It is the beginning of the economic freedom of the 
agriculturalist.”178  The Pool’s ability to achieve this goal rested in the collective action 
of its contract holders.  Although non-Pool farmers did not actively work against the 
Pool, the fact that they withheld their strength from this crusade was viewed as aiding the 
capitalist grain trade.  As Louis Brouillette, a FU leader and Pool’s first vice-president, 
proclaimed, “he who is not with us is against us.”179   
This increasing animosity was reflected in the Pool’s relationship with the SCEC.  Pool 
supporters believed that, so long as the elevator company continued to function as an 
alternative form of wheat marketing, a minority of Saskatchewan farmers would never 
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sign a contract.  At first, the Pool sought to work with the SCEC to limit the ability of 
non-Pool farmers to access the company’s elevators.180  The proposal was a non-starter.  
Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers, who continued to control the SCEC, viewed the 
Pool’s suggestion for what it was: a blatant attempt to force them into the Pool by 
“making it as hard as possible for the non-pool farmer to market his grain.”181  Maharg 
and the other SCEC directors were clear that, as long as they controlled the company, 
those farmers “who had not seen fit to become pool members” would have their choice 
protected.182  Pool supporters greeted the SCEC’s intransigence with outright hostility.  If 
the conservatives would not agree to the Pool’s terms, they would be removed.  
Beginning in late 1924, the FU began a grassroots campaign within the pages of The 
Progressive and at farmers’ locals to convince SCEC shareholders to elect delegates who 
would forcibly remove the SCEC conservative leadership as they had done with the 
SGGA.183   
The SCEC’s executive met these attacks head-on.  In the fall of 1924, Musselman, now 
the vice-president of the SCEC, began sending employees into the country to “keep the 
shareholders informed” of the benefits provided by “their company.”  Musselman also 
tasked the “field service men” with reporting on the activities of the FU and Pool, and to 
“combat...the active propaganda” which threatened the “interests of the company.”184  
The SCEC, the leadership claimed, was superior to the Pool in every way and had “put as 
much money in the pockets of the farmers of the west as the pool would do in its next 
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five years.”185  At the same time, the SCEC’s executive was clear that peaceful co-
operation with the Pool was possible.  After surviving an attempted coup at the 1924 
SCEC convention, the executive remained adamant that “no reason exists for conflict 
between the two bodies.”186  Despite such claims, the balance of power shifted decidedly 
in the Pool’s favour over the course of 1925.  Not only had the FU outperformed the field 
service men in winning over the province’s marginal farmers, but the Pool also stole the 
momentum when it voted in favour of purchasing the SCEC outright at its first annual 
meeting.  In a reversal from the previous year, Pool supporters were a clear majority of 
the delegates at the 1925 SCEC convention.  The executive understood that they no 
longer had the numbers to forestall a Pool takeover of their company.  “You know what 
you want to do,” Musselman told the convention, “and you are going to do it.”187   
They would not, however, go down without a fight.  The Pool’s takeover of the SCEC is 
often presented as a straightforward affair, but the reality is that it occurred only after a 
bitter and acrimonious debate wherein conservative farmers defiantly articulated their 
opposition.188  Conservatives did not have the numbers to block the Pool’s takeover, but 
they could fight against the underhandedness with which it was achieved.  “The pool 
wants to compel others,” one delegate noted, “not only in wheat selling but elevators” 
too.189  This compulsion, another delegate added, would ultimately be in vain.  
Independent farmers may lose the SCEC, but they would not “be driven into the Pool.”  
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As “men,” they would not “lie down under the Pool offer.”190  This compulsion also 
severed any of the last vestiges of the conservatives’ belief that they could co-exist 
peacefully with the Pool.  The Pool’s actions, Musselman promised, would leave “in the 
hearts and souls” of non-Pool farmers “a rancour that will be hard to eradicate.”191   
This “rancour” did not take long to manifest.  The Pool launched in 1924 with 51,268 
contract signers and no facilities of its own to handle its wheat.192  Within two years it 
counted a membership in excess of eighty thousand and, having taken over the SCEC, 
operated over five hundred grain elevators and claimed assets totaling thirty-six million 
dollars.193  The meteoric rise, however, overshadowed a key weakness.  In 1928, the Pool 
accounted for roughly sixty-five percent of Saskatchewan farmers but only marketed just 
over half of the province’s wheat crop.194  Historians have suggested that bootlegging—
contract members selling outside the Pool—accounted for this discrepancy.195  Yet, as 
early as 1926, the Pool had begun using injunctions to force Pool members to honour 
their contracts.196  Bootlegging was on the decline in 1928 and could not have accounted 
for this inconsistency.  Rather, these numbers demonstrate that some of the largest and 
most productive farmers had remained outside of the Pool.  Although they accounted for 
less than a third of all farmers in Saskatchewan, they grew up to half of the province’s 
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wheat.  By withholding their wheat from the Pool, these farmers guaranteed the 
continued survival of the private grain trade.  The Pool’s immediate success also 
overshadowed the fact that, by 1930, its strength had plateaued.  The first five-year pool 
launched in 1924 with 51,268 farmers signed to contracts, reaching 80,418 in 1926.  By 
1930, however, this number had only climbed to 82,893.197  Every farmer who had 
wanted to join the Pool had done so.  Despite losing their positions of power within the 
farm movement, Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers had demonstrated that no level of 
coercion would convince them to join the Pool against their better judgement. 
This conservative intransigence precipitated the FU to begin advocating for legislation 
that would make the Pool compulsory.  Orderly marketing’s ultimate goal rested with the 
destruction of the capitalist grain trade, but it could not accomplish this without control of 
all of Saskatchewan’s wheat.  The FU, therefore, believed conservative farmers, as a 
minority, should not be allowed to hinder the Pool’s effectiveness.  This sentiment 
quickly gained strength following the merger between the FU and the SGGA into the 
United Farmers of Canada (Saskatchewan Section) [UFC] in 1926.198  By championing a 
“100% compulsory pool,” the UFC articulated a conception of society that privileged 
collectivism over individualism.  Individual freedoms, they argued, should not be allowed 
to “trump” collective progress.199  During a speaking tour in 1927, for instance, Aaron 
Sapiro noted that it was the best “Anglo-Saxon practice, to let the majority rule.”  The 
Pool, he continued, could not be “thwarted” by the minority of farmers “who did not have 
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the vision and had not seen the light.” 200  The UFC’s acceptance of compulsion also 
reflected a divergent understanding of the farmers’ relationship with the capitalist 
economy.  Whereas conservatives understood themselves as being able to compete 
effectively as individuals, the UFC believed that success would only come through 
“solidarity” with one another.  Through “an affirmation of the brotherhood of man,” they 
argued, the “social man” would triumph where the individual, “material” man had 
failed.201  In 1928, the UFC put these beliefs into practice and adopted a resolution 
calling on the provincial government to enact a law compelling every farmer to sell their 
wheat through the Pool.202   
Moderate Pool members, however, were not yet willing to follow the UFC’s lead.  Pool 
delegates overwhelmingly voted against a similar measure when it reached the floor of 
their 1928 and 1929 conventions.  Although moderate and radical Pool supporters 
believed that orderly marketing would ultimately replace the capitalist grain trade with a 
co-operative economic system, they differed on the pace of this change.  Moderates 
believed that all farmers would ultimately come to their senses and support the Pool.  
Compulsion, therefore, was not only an unnecessary expedient but a dangerous one as 
coercion was the antithesis of co-operation.  When you “induce compulsion,” McPhail 
argued, “you eliminate co-operation.”203  Moderates also feared the influence of new 
members who were forced to join the Pool without believing in its fundamental 
principles.  Such members, McPhail warned, could do “much more harm inside than 
outside our organization.”204  The only solution, therefore, was to continue the gradual 
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conversion of conservative farmers to the principles of co-operation.  It may take longer 
than the UFC hoped, but the moderates were willing to wait. 
The experimental nature of the pooling concept ultimately forced the issue.  Under the 
private grain trade, anyone in possession of wheat, be they elevator companies or the 
farmers themselves, could protect—or hedge—themselves against falling prices by 
selling contracts for future delivery on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange.  Although used for 
a distinct business purpose, the grain exchange was also susceptible to speculation.  
Supporters of orderly marketing believed that speculators, gambling on wheat prices with 
no desire to take delivery, contributed to depressed wheat prices during harvest.205  As a 
result, the three Prairie Pools’ Central Selling Agency conducted most of its business 
outside of the exchange, using bank loans, not the proceeds of the futures market, to pay 
farmers for their wheat.  Their only protection against a falling market was the spread 
between the initial price they paid farmers and the current market price.206  By the 
summer of 1929, the Pools were carrying roughly 52 million bushels of unsold, unhedged 
wheat for which they owed the banks $68.2 million.  This fact in and of itself was not 
worrying as the world price of their holdings amounted to $105.3 million.  Feeling 
confident, the Pools set their initial price for the 1929 crop year at $1.00 per bushel.207  
The first signs of trouble came that summer as an increasingly unstable European 
economy resulted in a sharp decrease in the world demand for wheat, making it 
increasingly difficult for the Central Selling Agency to dispose of its holdings.  By 
August 1930, the carryover had increased to 64.6 million bushels of unhedged wheat.  
Catastrophe hit that summer as the price of wheat plunged.  Whereas wheat sold for an 
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average of $1.80 in January 1930, it had collapsed to $0.55 by December, well below the 
initial price paid in 1929.  The Pool was bankrupt.  Only the provincial government’s 
guarantee of their loans saved them from complete financial ruin.  When the dust settled, 
the Central Selling Agency was responsible for a loss of $22.1 million, of which the 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool held the lion’s share of $13.3 million.208  The first large-scale 
experiment in orderly marketing had ended in catastrophe. 
Pool members, however, were not willing to accept the failure.  They did not believe that 
the crisis was the Pool’s fault for failing to hedge its wheat.  Rather, the blame fell on the 
conservative farmers who refused to join.  As the Western Producer argued: “the 
combined efforts of all the farmers and not fifty or fifty-five percent of them are 
absolutely required if the present situation is to be encountered with hope and 
courage.”209  The solution was not to abandon the orderly marketing, but to force 
conservative farmers to join in the crusade, against their wills if necessary.  Delegates to 
the Pool’s 1930 convention voted unanimously to push the provincial government for 
legislation that would make their organization compulsory for all farmers. 
Conservative farmers were outraged.  Compulsion, with its inherent disregard for the 
individualism and property rights of the non-Pool farmer, went against their 
understanding of how society functioned.  The problem they faced, however, was that 
they no longer had an organization to advocate for their values.  The Pool had forcibly 
seized the SCEC and the SGGA, even before its amalgamation with the FU, had ceased 
to speak for the conservative view.  They needed to organize if their opposition was to be 
taken seriously.  In early 1932, conservative farmers created an ad hoc “temporary 
association opposing compulsory pool” to petition against the proposed legislation.210  In 
a public letter addressed to Conservative Premier J.T.M. Anderson, the association 
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proclaimed that compulsion fundamentally weakened “personal rights” by forcing 
farmers to dispose of their own property against their wishes.211  Although the 
association maintained that they were not “opposed to co-operative pooling,” the 1929 
overpayment was dramatic evidence that the Pool could not be trusted with the entirety of 
Saskatchewan’s wheat crop.  “One mistake in judgement,” they argued, “would effect 
[sic] the whole West.”212  The arguments were not new.  Since the First World War, 
conservative farmers expressed their opposition to orderly marketing in the same terms.  
Not only did compulsory systems undermine the farmer’s individualism, but the very 
idea that capitalism was fundamentally unsound was a fallacy.  
In the end, the association’s petition had more symbolic than practical value.  Faced with 
the united demands of the Pool and the UFC, the provincial government had little choice 
but to act.  Elected in 1929, the Anderson “Co-operative Government” was a coalition of 
Conservative, Progressive, and Independent MLAs.  The Progressive members made 
their continued support contingent on the Premier introducing “legislation in conformity” 
with progressive principles.213  Given that the Progressives owed their electoral support 
to the province’s organized farmers, there was little doubt in Anderson’s mind that 
compulsory legislation fell under this stipulation.  At the same time, Anderson faced an 
insurgency within the Conservative Party that sympathized with the conservative 
farmers’ opposition.  Dr. D.S. Johnstone, President of the Saskatchewan Liberal-
Conservative Association, did not hide his antipathy with the proposed legislation.  “I do 
not believe that any government would be justified in submitting or passing legislation 
which would have the effect of creating a monopoly, to deprive the individual producer 
of the right to dispose of his product or transacting his private business as he is now 
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entitled to do.”214  Anderson was forced to take a middle position by ensuring that a 
government backbencher proposed the legislation as a private member’s bill.  The 
Premier hoped to avoid the bill’s association with his cabinet and was clear that farmers 
themselves would have the final say on compulsion through a referendum before the 
legislation went into force.  There was also significant doubt whether a provincial 
government could constitutionally legislate a compulsory pool, necessitating a court trial 
before it became effective.215  While Anderson supported compulsion by allowing the 
legislation to pass, conservative farmers were given two opportunities to oppose it: two-
thirds of Saskatchewan’s farmers had to agree, and the legislation had to survive a 
challenge in the courts.216   
Conservative farmers quickly began preparing for the upcoming referendum.  In March, a 
meeting of over 700 farmers gathered in Regina to reorganize their temporary association 
on a permanent basis, creating the “Permanent Association Opposing Compulsory Pool.”  
Membership was open to anyone in Saskatchewan, regardless of whether they owned 
farmland or not.  While the Pool and the UFC believed that this open membership made 
the association little more than a front for the capitalist grain trade, the association was 
clear that “no grain trade money” would ever be “accepted.”217  Membership was open to 
anyone who was “in sympathy” with the association’s “campaign to defeat the operation 
of the proposed legislation” and payed a one-dollar membership fee.218  Members only 
had to sign the association’s declaration of principles that maintained they were “opposed 
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to compulsion which in any way affects the private rights and liberties now enjoyed by 
our people.”219  The conservatives were equally clear that the time for compromise and 
diplomacy were over.  They vowed to resist “by every lawful means” any move that 
sought to “deny to citizens of this province the right of dealing in and disposing of the 
products of their labor.”220  The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool had declared war on the non-
Pool farmer and conservatives vowed to meet this attack in kind.   
To lead them in their defiance, the association chose a leadership made up of 
Saskatchewan’s more affluent farmers.  Robert Allen Wright, the association’s president, 
embodied the very image of the rugged individualist.  Born in Carroll County, Iowa in 
1888, Wright lived a privileged upbringing.  His father, a leading physician, owned 
several businesses in Iowa, while his mother was related to the American President 
Herbert Hoover.221  Wright had originally intended to follow his father’s footsteps as a 
doctor, but decided to move to Saskatchewan in 1909 to run the day-to-day operations of 
a farm his father had purchased in the Drinkwater district.  Wright eventually bought out 
his parents and expanded his operations to include over four sections of fecund land and a 
ranch near Big Muddy, making him one of the single largest landowners in the province.  
Wright was also active throughout the 1920s in several agricultural associations, 
including stints as a director of the Regina Exhibition Association, the Southern 
Saskatchewan Cooperative Stockyards, the Saskatchewan Stock Growers’ Association, 
and as president of the Western Canadian Livestock Union for nine years.  Wright moved 
freely between the worlds of agriculture and finance, serving as a member of the Regina 
Board of Trade, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, and the exclusive Assiniboia 
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Club.222  Although Wright did not run for political office, the provincial Liberals 
continually sought out his opinion on legislation. 223  The crowning achievement of 
Wright’s public career came in 1935 when he was elected to the Bank of Canada’s board 
of directors as a representative of primary producers.224  
The other executives were no less illustrious.  J.R. Green of Moose Jaw, the association’s 
vice-president, had originally trained as a teacher before making a fortune by speculating 
in land, especially the purchase of Métis scrip.  He was active in municipal politics and 
served as the president of the Moose Jaw Board of Trade.  Possessing a keen eye for 
business, Green foresaw the collapse of the Prairie real estate bubble in 1913.  Where 
others lost fortunes, Green sold out at the height of the market and invested his windfall 
in farmland.  By 1915, he owned three sections of land, the majority of which he rented 
to sharecroppers.225  The secretary-treasurer, Edgar H. Petersmyer, married into farm 
royalty, and helped his father-in-law run a massive farm located between Regina and 
Wilcox.  At over 32,000 acres, the family’s operations were considered the single largest 
wheat operation in North America.226  Other executives, including W.J. Orchard of 
Tregarva and Ira B. Cushing of Riceton, had served as directors in the SGGA and SCEC 
before being forced out when the radicals took over.    
With an executive dominated by the province’s most affluent farmers, the association 
expressed a clearly conservative opposition to orderly marketing.  The association used 
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public meetings, advertisements, and radio programs to affirm their vision of an 
individualist society.  At its basis was the belief that every man had a “natural right” to 
dispose of “his own property according to his own judgment.”  Compulsion flew in the 
face of this fact.  By limiting farmers’ ability to act in their own interests, the proposed 
legislation was “un-British in content and principle” and “repugnant to all citizens with a 
sense of freedom and justice.”227  Even more troubling was that, once started, 
compulsion would be difficult to stop.  “Why should it not also compel all citizens to 
attend one church,” they asked, “or buy clothes from one dealer?”228  Compulsion, in 
short, was an “ugly word.”  Should the legislation pass, they argued, the “peace of the 
country would be endangered” because there still existed farmers who valued “their 
British traditions and British liberties more highly than anything else.”229  With nothing 
left to lose, conservative farmers vowed to fight it to the very bitter end. 
This opposition was focused directly at the Pool.  One of the association’s first 
resolutions was to call for a public inquiry into the Pool’s operations “since its 
inception.”230  The Pool had given many “excuses for past failures,” the association 
argued, but had failed to acknowledge its own culpability in its collapse.  By refusing to 
hedge its wheat, the Pool had “engaged in the most colossal wheat speculation and 
gamble the world has ever seen” and the public deserved to know what other mistakes it 
had made.231  To make matters worse, the Pool expected the non-Pool farmer to help 
offset the costs of its failure to effectively market wheat.  The association represented 
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itself as the backer of the independent and able farmers.  The Pool, in contrast, broken 
and saddled with an insurmountable debt, hoped to cover up its own failings by forcing 
the non-Pool farmer into submission.  This outcome was not surprising.  After all, the 
Pool’s democratic focus had no place in business where the ablest, not the most popular, 
should lead.  Pool membership was made up of the province’s more marginal farmers 
who acted out of emotion, not reason, and had allowed “demagogues,” who were 
“miserable failures” in their own businesses, to dominate its operations.232  Contract 
holders had elected “the man of forceful personality and extreme views cleverly 
expressed” over “the thoughtful, careful, successful and possibly silent farmer.”233  This 
fact alone was enough evidence to convince conservative farmers that the Pool could not 
be trusted with their wheat. 
Figure 1 – Anti-Compulsion Cartoon234 
 
The association was also adamant that the proposed legislation would reward an 
organization based on a fundamentally flawed understanding of the economy.  Rather 
than view the private grain trade as something that should be overthrown, its competition 
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was good for the farmer as it allowed him to choose who would store, handle, and 
transport his crop and who would act as his agent in selling it.  If they were unhappy with 
the services provided, competition allowed them to find someone else to perform these 
tasks.235  Likewise, the association also took issue with the Pool’s critique of the futures 
market.  Far from a detriment, hedging was a form of insurance against fluctuations in the 
price of wheat.  As one pamphlet argued, farmers who did not hedge their holdings—as 
was the case of the Central Selling Agency—were being as reckless as those who 
gambled in the futures market.236  The Pool’s 1929 overpayment was evidence that the 
very premise of orderly marketing was a fairy-tale.  If not for the government bailout, the 
conservatives argued, the Pool would have “been in the hands of the receivers.”237   They 
could not then comprehend why the government would reward the Pool for its failure by 
giving it complete control of Saskatchewan’s wheat crop.  “If it cannot handle 50% of the 
wheat,” they questioned, “why should it be given 100% to meddle with?”238   
Although the association’s campaign against compulsion was largely staged in the court 
of public opinion, its victory came from legal challenges to the legislation.  In passing the 
legislation, Anderson was clear that the proposed referendum would wait for the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal’s decision on the legislation’s constitutionality.  Hearings 
began in early April with lawyers representing the Winnipeg Grain Exchange, the private 
elevators, and the Permanent Association Opposing Compulsory Pool arguing against the 
legislation on the basis that it infringed on Ottawa’s jurisdiction in matters of trade.  It 
was “really surprising,” the association’s lawyer argued, how far the Pool and the 
provincial government were willing to go to “deprive” the farmers of Saskatchewan “of 
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their own property.”239  The court agreed and declared the legislation ultra vires.  The 
association was jubilant, taking the decision as an affirmation of their individualism.  The 
decision, Wright exclaimed, was the only one that could be “expected in a British 
Country” where personal liberty was an enshrined right.240  Pool supporters, for their 
part, declared that the decision was only a minor setback and reaffirmed their desire to 
pursue the case all the way to Britain’s Judicial Committee of the Privy Council if need 
be. 241   
Despite this brave face, the appeal court decision placed the initiative firmly with 
Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers.  At the end of May, a delegation of farmers from 
Milestone presented a petition to the provincial government that, far from merely 
opposing compulsion, called for the Pool’s immediate dissolution.  The Pool’s continued 
existence, they argued, was “detrimental to the best interests of grain producers.” The 
Pool’s leadership was not “competent,” had lost the trust of the farmers, and had 
demonstrated that they were unable to “handle this business.”  The only solution was to 
replace the Pool and its weak leadership with “a commission of fully qualified grain 
men” who would operate the elevators on a similar basis to what had occurred under the 
SCEC.242  Likewise, the association also sponsored a series of legal challenges intended 
to limit the Pool’s ability to continue its compulsion campaign.  In June, a judge granted 
an injunction to W.A. Scott, a Pool member from Salvador who had been previously 
prosecuted for bootlegging, barring the Pool from spending any further money on the 
compulsion campaign.  Scott’s lawyers, supported by the association’s financial backing, 
successfully argued that the Pool had no legal basis for spending its member’s money to 
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support compulsion.243  The decision was the final act in the compulsion campaign.  The 
UFC was struggling financially, having been only able to weather the onset of the 
Depression with a $10,000 loan from the Pool, and could not carry on the fight alone.244  
Nor could the Pool rely on the provincial government.  Anderson had only backed the 
legislation because he knew the Progressives wanted it.  The court’s decision provided 
him with the opportunity to abandon the crusade.  Anderson quickly announced that his 
government had no intention of appealing the decision. 245    
The conservative farmers were victorious.  After suffering humiliating defeats at the 
hands of Saskatchewan’s radical farmers for a decade, they had ensured the end of the 
Pool’s experiment in orderly marketing.  On 20 July, the Pool unceremoniously 
announced that it was granting its contract signers “the privilege of deciding the method” 
by which their wheat would be marketed.246  Although the most idealistic farmers hoped 
to continue operating a pool on a strictly volunteer basis, it was clear that the experiment 
had failed.  The Pool ultimately transformed itself into a co-operative elevator company, 
largely indistinguishable in operations from the SCEC.247  The Saskatchewan Wheat 
Pool, once the hope of the province’s more radical farmers, remained a pool in name 
only.   
Despite this affirmation of their individualism, conservative farmers found little solace in 
their victory.  While Saskatchewan’s farmers were battling over compulsion, the province 
was falling deeper into the grip of an unprecedented economic and environmental 
calamity.  Unlike the post-war recession, which predominantly affected the marginal 
farmers, all grain producers felt the dual economic and environmental ravages of the 
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1930s.  Even if a farmer could grow enough wheat to sell, the price received was 
significantly below the cost of production.  Unlike the situation in 1928, the combined 
effects of the drought and drop in price were borne disproportionally by the province’s 
larger farmers who relied on mechanization and large land holdings to provide economies 
of scale in their operations.  This strategy had allowed them to survive relatively 
unscathed when prices dropped in 1920.  When the low prices combined with drought, 
however, the economies of scale worked against them.  All farmers lost money when 
their crops failed, but the larger farmers, with costlier operations, suffered significantly 
higher deficits.248  To make matters worse, the hardest hit drought regions were largely 
confined to the south, the very area that had the most intensive wheat production. 
Wright’s experiences during the Depression were indicative of the fate of many larger 
farmers.  Conservative farmers selected Wright as president of the Permanent Association 
Opposing Compulsory Pool because they considered him one of the most successful, 
largest, and ablest farmers in the province.  He was also a victim of his own success.  
Although Wright’s diversified operations allowed him to weather the early Depression, 
events caught up to him in 1936 when he lost his farm near Drinkwater to the Huron & 
Erie Mortgage Company.249  In 1941, Wright abandoned his wife and son and moved 
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back to Iowa where he would remarry and rebuild his fortune. 250  When he died in 1984, 
his obituary made no mention of his life in Saskatchewan.251   
Faced with day-to-day struggles of their continued survival, farmers were not able to 
influence the future of Canadian wheat marketing beyond petitioning the government for 
some form of price control.252  The collapse of the three Prairie wheat Pools, however, 
left the federal government with few options.  The Bennett government had agreed to 
market the Central Selling Agency’s carryover, not out of affinity for the Pools which the 
prime minister believed to suffer from mismanagement, but to protect the interests of 
Canadian bankers who had loaned the money.253  The Pools’ Central Selling Agency, 
now under the management of a government agent, adopted a policy of purchasing wheat 
futures on the open market to prop up the price of Canadian wheat.  When the 
government took control in November 1930, the Central Selling Agency had on hand 
roughly 37 million bushels of wheat.  By the end of July 1931, this number had increased 
to 75 million bushels.254  Increasingly, however, the government found that, when faced 
with an obstinate private grain trade, such moves were not enough to stabilize the price.  
The only solution was to take a further role in the wheat market.  In 1935, Bennett 
announced that his government would re-create the compulsory Wheat Board with 
complete government control over the entire grain trade.  Intense pressure from the 
Winnipeg Grain Exchange and the opposition Liberals, however, forced the Prime 
Minister to compromise.  The new Canadian Wheat Board would not be compulsory.  
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Rather, it would pay a minimum price to farmers who were free to sell to either the board 
or the open market, depending on which prices were higher.255   
The re-creation of the Canadian Wheat Board marked a turning point in the campaign for 
orderly marketing.  Once Bennett started guaranteeing the wheat price it was impossible 
for successive governments to stop.  The Mackenzie King Liberals, returned to power in 
October 1935, found that they were simply unable to pull the federal government out of 
the grain trade.256  The board also transformed the farmers’ relationship with the 
economy.  Since the end of the First World War, Saskatchewan farmers fought amongst 
themselves over the best method to market their wheat.  Once the government began 
guaranteeing a minimum price, however, the farmers’ attention shifted from debating the 
merits of differing economic systems to petitioning the federal government for higher 
guaranteed prices.  It would take a new generation of farmers to challenge the new status 
quo offered by the Canadian Wheat Board. 
These challenges, when they did emerge, offered the same individualist critique of 
compulsion.  In the summer of 2012, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced the end 
to the Canadian Wheat Board’s monopoly.  In so doing, Harper articulated an ideology 
which viewed Prairie farmers as independent, small-business owners, capable of making 
their own rational economic decisions free from government intervention.  The Wheat 
Board, he argued, destroyed the individual rights of Prairie farmers to dispose of the 
fruits of their own labour.  “Never, never, never again,” he promised, “will western 
farmers…growing their own wheat on their own land be told how they can and can’t 
market their products.”257   
Such a vision was not new in 2012.  Far from a monolithic class reacting against the 
abuses of the capitalist system, Saskatchewan’s farmers have always diverged sharply 
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over their understanding of the economy and their place within it.  Whereas the 
province’s radical farmers viewed themselves as victims of the capitalist system, 
conservative producers attributed their success to the competition of the system.  At the 
basis of this division lay a differing understanding of individualism.  For radical farmers, 
individualism was a deficiency that they needed to overcome if they ever hoped to reform 
the capitalist system.  Conservative farmers, in contrast, viewed their individualism as the 
defining element of their society.  Despite the dominant historical argument that 
individualism declined in the interwar period, visceral opposition to orderly marketing 
demonstrates that an individualist ideology continued to animate the actions of a large 
















2 British Nativism: The Ku Klux Klan and the Grand 
Orange Lodge 
On the night of June 7th, 1927, the flames from a 100-foot-tall burning cross lit Moose 
Jaw’s sky.  An estimated 10,000 people attended the Invisible Empire of the Knights of 
the Ku Klux Klan’s (KKK) first public meeting in the province.258  Although the 
Saskatchewan Klan borrowed heavily from the symbolism of its American counterpart, it 
was decidedly less virulent.  The Klan first entered Saskatchewan at the beginning of 
1927, selling itself as a fraternal, ultra-Protestant, and British organization.  According to 
the Moose Jaw Evening Times, those who came to the Moose Jaw rally hoping for 
diatribes on racial inferiority or calls to violence were disappointed.  The Moose Jaw 
crowd listened aptly as Rev. T.J. Hind, King Kleagle of the Moose Jaw Klan and minister 
at the city’s First Baptist Church, spoke of the need for “brotherly love” and a desire “to 
live at peace with all men.”  As the reporter concluded, the Klan rally “was to all intents 
and purposes an evangelistic gathering, called for the purpose of urging sinners to 
repentance.”259  The Klan, however, was far from altruistic in its messaging.  Over the 
period of three years, Klan speakers traveled to the furthest reaches of the province, 
preaching a message of British supremacy, fundamentalist Protestantism, and rabid anti-
Catholicism.   
The interwar period was a time of religious and racial turmoil in Saskatchewan, as 
nativist movements grew in strength.  Of these movements, the Klan, with its hooded 
figures and burning crosses, has captured the public’s attention and condemnation.  Yet, 
the Klan was neither the first nor the most important organization to offer Saskatchewan 
residents this message of racial and religious exclusion.  The Klan’s rapid rise to 
prominence was only possible given the earlier work of other likeminded organizations, 
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namely the Grand Orange Lodge.  For years, the Orange Lodge organized in 
Saskatchewan and spread its ultra-Protestant message.  When the Klan entered the 
province in 1927, it was greeted by over 36,000 Orangemen—the highest membership for 
any province outside of Ontario—who were already indoctrinated and receptive to the 
Klan’s religious and racial vision.260   
Although they retained their own organizational structures, the KKK and the Orange 
Lodge united in a campaign to promote their vision for an Anglo-Saxon and Protestant 
province.  Like the province’s conservative farmers, these organizations understood the 
basis of society as fundamentally individualistic.  Whereas conservative farmers 
expressed their individualism in their opposition to orderly marketing, the KKK and 
Orange Lodge articulated a racialized citizenship that equated one’s ability to act as an 
individual to their religious and racial background.  The Klan and the Orange Lodge 
believed that adherence to the British tradition—which they interpreted as parliamentary 
democracy, freedom of speech, and Protestantism—was the basis from which citizens 
possessed the ability to think for themselves and act in their own best interests.  Both the 
KKK and the Orange Lodge viewed Catholics and “undesirable” immigrants as lacking 
these basic values.  Considered “deficient individuals,” Catholics and non-Anglo 
immigrants were, at best, the focus of intensive assimilationist pressures and, at worst, 
condemned as a foreign force intent on destroying Saskatchewan’s British heritage and 
actively excluded from public life.261  This racialized citizenship led both organizations 
to articulate a form of British nativism that attacked any perceived threat to 
Saskatchewan’s “Britishness,” especially separate schools, bilingualism, and non-Anglo 
immigration.  As a result, Saskatchewan society fractured along racial and religious lines 
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as nativism and anti-Catholicism rivaled wheat marketing as the primary political 
discourse of the 1920s. 
This nativism fits uncomfortably within the province’s political historiography.  
Historians first began paying attention to the Klan in the 1960s and 1970s.262  These 
early histories viewed the KKK as an anomaly in an otherwise harmonious province.  
They acknowledged the eruption of religious intolerance in 1927 with the onset of the 
Klan but concluded that the Great Depression relegated these racial antagonisms to the 
dustbin of history.  The KKK, in short, was depicted as “exotic and marginal.”263  More 
recently, historians have begun to view the Klan as being a symptom of the larger 
religious and racial tensions inherent to Saskatchewan’s heterogeneous population.  “The 
Klan was not something alien to Saskatchewan,” James Pitsula notes, “it was 
Saskatchewan.”264  For Pitsula, the Klan served as the main protagonist in a battle over 
the nature of the British heritage.  Britishness, he argues, “was an open, fluid concept, the 
meaning of which was highly contested.”265  Just as the province’s conservative farmers 
contested the individual’s freedom of action in the dominant wheat economy, the Klan 
challenged the province’s racial and religious foundations articulating a citizenship that 
was limited to Anglo-Saxon Protestants.   
Pitsula may have brought the Klan into the historical mainstream, but his narrative 
maintains the traditional assumption that the KKK’s influence and significance were 
confined to the years between 1927 and 1930.  For Pitsula, the Klan’s collapse in 1930 
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meant the failure of its nativist message.  “In the long term,” he alleges, “the Klan lost the 
battle for the soul of Saskatchewan.  The British Canada it believed in faded away.”266  
While there is some merit to this claim, Pitsula’s conclusions miss the larger significance 
of the Klan’s legacy in Saskatchewan.  Far from being on the losing side in a contest over 
what it meant to be British, the Klan’s characterization of Catholics and non-Anglo 
immigrants as “deficient individuals” transcended the organization itself.  The Klan’s 
direct influence may have been limited to the late 1920s, but its conception of a racially-
limited citizenship was widely shared.  By focusing solely on the Klan, Pitsula and the 
earlier histories downplay the extent that racial and religious exclusionism both preceded 
and outlived the KKK. 
Historians of Saskatchewan have failed to appreciate the connections between the KKK 
and the Orange Lodge.  This is not to say that networks between these organizations have 
been ignored.  Even the earliest studies on the Saskatchewan Klan acknowledged this 
connection.  The Orange Lodge, William Calderwood notes, “contributed more to the 
Klan’s success in Saskatchewan than any other body.”267  Similarly, Pitsula recognizes 
that “the organizations were complementary and overlapping, not competitive or 
mutually exclusive.”  Rather, historians have insisted on treating these organizations in 
isolation.268  Noting that the Klan “offered a populist type of British Protestant 
nationalism, such as the Orange Lodge did not provide,” Pitsula introduces the Lodge and 
then spends the rest of his study ignoring it.269  Downplaying these connections is 
especially problematic given the fact that, by the mid-1920s, the messages offered by the 
Klan and the Orange Lodge were indistinguishable.  Both organizations used their large 
followings to champion a racially-limited citizenship wherein Britishness existed as the 
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sole litmus test for a person’s ability to think and act as an individual.  Studying the Klan 
in isolation not only ignores its similarities with the Orange Lodge, it also portrays this 
nativist ideology as foreign to Saskatchewan.   
The Orange Lodge, far from an anomaly, was central to Canada’s political and social life.  
First emerging in late-eighteenth century Ireland, the Orange Lodge took its name from 
King William of Orange whose victory at the Battle of Boyne on July 12th, 1690—
celebrated by the Lodge as the Glorious Twelfth—ensured Protestant domination of 
Britain and Ireland.  Orangemen envisioned themselves as following in William’s 
footsteps and sought to defend the interests of Protestant settlers against the native Irish 
Catholics.   For Orangemen, this defence entailed a “strident monarchical Britishness, 
defensive Protestantism and resolute anti-Catholicism” which fused “political and 
religious beliefs.”270  A secret society, the Orange Lodge used ritualism and symbolism 
to bind British Protestants together in ethnic and religious solidarity.  From humble 
origins in County Armagh in 1795, the Orange Lodge spread to all corners of the British 
Empire wherever Protestant Irish could be found.  Canada’s first lodges appeared in 
Montreal and Halifax in 1800 before spreading with the rapid influx of Irish immigrants 
following the War of 1812.271   
Although initially an Irish-sectarian organization, the Grand Orange Lodge of British 
America—formally organized in 1823—dedicated itself to defending the interests of all 
British Protestants.  The Canadian Orange Lodge, Cecil Houston and William Smyth 
note, possessed an inherent “chameleon-like quality,” allowing itself to adapt to local 
conditions.  This flexibility enabled lodges to appear in areas with limited Irish settlement 
by fostering a sense of community around a shared religion and an uncompromising anti-
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Catholicism.272  By the late-nineteenth century, the Orange Lodge had become one of the 
dominant political and social forces in Protestant Canada.  Not only did local halls serve 
as schools, town halls, and meeting places, but membership within the Lodge was widely 
considered a prerequisite to securing work and political office.  Between 1860 and 1910, 
one-third of English-speaking Canadian men were active in the Lodge at one point in 
their lives. 273 
The Orange Lodge first emerged in Saskatchewan in the late nineteenth century.  The 
province’s first locals appeared in Regina in 1891 and Prince Albert in 1892, following 
settlers from Ontario and Great Britain.  As railways began crisscrossing the province, 
the Orange Lodge followed.  By 1905, for example, lodges had formed along the Soo 
Line through Moose Jaw, Drinkwater, Milestone, Yellow Grass, Weyburn, and Estevan, 
and along a parallel line south-east of Regina.274  Between 1892 and 1905, the Orange 
Lodge expanded from sixteen to fifty-seven lodges, with an estimated membership of 
1,424.  The largest period of growth, however, occurred after the First World War.  
Under the guidance of W.H.G. Armstrong, Grand Organizer for Saskatchewan during the 
1920s, membership increased from the second-lowest to the second-highest in Canada.275   
The reasons for the Orange Lodge’s expansion in Saskatchewan are multifaceted.  For 
many members, the Lodge served a social need in a frontier society.  With immigrants 
pouring in from all corners of Canada and the British Empire, the Orange Lodge 
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“provided mythology, conviviality, and a sense of identity.”276  Whether one was born in 
Dublin, Edinburgh, or Toronto, the Orange Lodge offered a welcome site of stability and 
familiarity.  Membership also offered immigrants a sense of respectability.  In a society 
divided by distinctions between urban and rural, large and small farmer, the Orange 
Lodge’s fraternalism worked to break down discrepancies of wealth, residence, and 
privilege.  The Orange Lodge was “not restricted in class and creed.” 277  The only 
stipulations for membership required an applicant to be British, loosely defined, and 
Protestant.  In fact, elites encouraged membership from the “middling sorts” as a means 
of moral uplift for their fellow Protestants.  Religious instruction, lending libraries, and 
speakers’ series all formed part of the local lodge’s activities.278 
Membership also came with its own set of material rewards.  The Orange Lodge 
functioned as a mutual-aid society, with members swearing to provide each other with 
assistance ranging from informal connections— helping newcomers secure work, 
housing, and good farmland, assisting with harvest, and making introductions—to a more 
formalized network of the Lodge’s extensive life-insurance policy guaranteed to all 
members.  Membership came with the assurance that, whatever hardships frontier life 
presented, their fellow Orangemen would support them.  The Orange Lodge, a familiar 
sight in many small Prairie towns, also provided a much-needed service to the local 
community, acting as a gathering place, town hall, and school.  The highpoint in the 
social calendar of many of Saskatchewan’s rural communities came as the Orange Lodge 
celebrated the Glorious Twelfth, bringing the community together for parades, picnics, 
speeches, and dancing.279   
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In return for these services, the Orange Lodge required members to live up to its ideals of 
Protestant citizenship.  “We need numbers in our Order,” an officer noted, “but, more 
than numbers, we need men of the right stamp, men of the kind that will prove a credit to 
the Order, who will manifest its principles in their own lives and will assist in placing it 
in the van of every movement making for social purity, civic righteousness, and national 
honor.”280  Orangemen were expected to support the Lodge in its quest to maintain 
Saskatchewan’s traditional racial, religious, and cultural makeup. These “principles”—
often expressed in its informal motto “One Language, One School, One Flag”—served as 
the guiding force behind the Lodge’s attacks on French Quebec and Saskatchewan’s 
separate schools.  They also acted as the lens through which Saskatchewan’s sizable 
contingent of Orangemen understood and reacted to the world around them. 
The Orange Lodge understood its mission as protecting the people’s British 
individualism.  When it came to religion, for example, the Saskatchewan Orangemen 
were firm in their sectarian denunciations of the Catholic Church.  This was not merely a 
theological distinction.  For Orangemen, the Catholic Church’s ritualism, secrecy, and 
hierarchy threatened the people’s personal liberty and freedoms.  “The teaching of the 
Roman Catholic Church,” S.A. White, the Lodge’s field secretary in the late 1920s, 
noted, “and the history of every country in which Roman Catholicism has been 
established prove conclusively that Roman Catholicism is the foe to human progress, its 
spirit is autocratic and it has ever sought to impose shackles upon the free spirit of 
man.”281  Even more worrisome for Orangemen was the belief that, once the Catholic 
Church gained a foothold, it was impossible to remove.  Nat Given, Grand Master in 
1928, warned that “the shackles of the Roman Church are strong and hard to cast asunder 
once the soul is tied up with them.”282 In light of this threat, the Orange Lodge 
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understood its central purpose as protecting personal freedoms by fighting the first signs 
of the “the ascendancy and encroachment” of Catholic influence within the province.283  
Ironically, the Lodge’s attacks on Roman Catholicism in the name of freedom actually 
limited the individualism of its members.  Strict penalties existed for members who failed 
to live up to expectations.  Expulsion for marrying Catholics and failing to honour debts, 
for instance, occurred regularly throughout the 1920s.284  For Orangemen, to marry a 
Catholic was akin to forsaking one’s British Protestant heritage; such men were no longer 
worthy of membership. 
A sense of urgency permeated this defence.  Orangemen believed Catholics were actively 
working against Saskatchewan’s British traditions.  As W.J. Kernaghan, Grand Secretary 
in 1892 argued: “The Rome today is the same as the Rome of centuries ago, and [is] busy 
endeavouring to plant their Romish settlements throughout our country.”285  Adding 
weight to this belief was the fact that Saskatchewan’s Catholic population was growing at 
a faster rate than other areas in Canada.  In 1901, less than 18,000 Catholics resided in the 
province, accounting for roughly twenty percent of the population.  By 1921, in contrast, 
Increased numbers of non-preferred, largely Catholic immigrants swelled their number to 
147,000, significantly larger than either Alberta or Manitoba whose populations were 
97,000 and 105,000 respectively.286  Orangemen responded to this increase with a 
visceral anti-Catholicism.  “Better wake up before it is too late,” the Lodge argued, “and 
we have a revolution, for as sure as you are alive, blood will be spilled if the Protestant 
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people don’t band together.”287  For Orangemen, the threat of revolution and bloodshed 
were not mere rhetorical flourishes.   
A conspiratorial mindset dominated the Orange Lodge.  Orangemen truly believed that 
the Pope was intent on replacing Saskatchewan’s freedom loving Anglo-Protestant 
citizens with the “dregs and off-scourings of Central and Southern Europe.”288  As Rev. 
A. Walker, the provincial Grand Master for 1931, argued: “Rome is striving with all the 
power she has to get control of this Canada of ours.”289  Orangemen, for example, 
viewed any encroachment of bilingualism as a Quebec-Catholic plot to gain control of 
Canada.  References to bilingual stamps, postage forms, and radio publications filled the 
provincial Lodge’s annual meetings as evidence of Quebec’s aim to “not only force 
bilingualism upon the whole of Canada, but if possible to make French the dominant 
language.”290  Within this conspiratorial mindset, any perceived decline in Anglo-
Protestants’ position was a gain for their Catholic enemy.  Orangemen had to stand on 
constant guard.  “If we are to continue as free, enlightened, and progressive people,” the 
Lodge’s field secretary argued in 1930, “we must be keen to see and quick to repulse the 
first gesture of ecclesiastical aggression.”291   
Orangemen saw Catholicism’s creeping influence everywhere they looked.  This was 
especially the case with the province’s youth.  Orangemen believed individual freedoms 
emanated from the province’s British traditions.  It was essential, therefore, to ensure that 
the province’s education exemplified these values so that Saskatchewan’s youth would 
carry the traditions forward.  The Catholic Church, they argued, was doing everything 
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possible to destroy these young people’s individualism before it had a chance to take 
root.  Since 1905, for example, the Catholic Church ran the lion’s share of the province’s 
orphanages.  This was an intolerable situation for Orangemen who viewed it as Rome’s 
attempt to subvert Protestant youth, weakening their British values.  According to Dan 
Malcomson, Grand Master in 1930: “the hands of the Romanist is out so that they may 
grab the orphan children of this Province irrespective of their faith.”292  In 1923, the 
Saskatchewan Lodge established its own orphanage in Indian Head—the “Orange 
Home”—to ensure that Protestant children were not lost to Catholicism.  This institution 
provided a much-needed public service, but its impetus and the substantial resources the 
Lodge placed into its operations were predicated in this pervasive fear of a Papist 
conspiracy to “grab” Protestant children.   
This focus on protecting youth was also central to the Orange Lodge’s denunciation of 
Saskatchewan’s separate schools.  In 1905, Wilfrid Laurier’s Liberal government passed 
the Saskatchewan Act, setting out the constitutional framework for the province’s 
creation.  Even though the British North America (BNA) Act made education a 
provincial responsibility, section 17 of the Autonomy Bill guaranteed Saskatchewan’s 
Catholics the right to form their own publicly-funded separate schools.  For Orangemen, 
the fact that Ottawa “foisted” this “iniquitous system of Separate Schools” onto 
Saskatchewan was evidence of a Catholic conspiracy.  The Pope, they argued, pushed 
separate schools as a means of furthering the “ascendency, extension, and encroachment 
of the Church of Rome” onto the minds of Saskatchewan youth.  Laurier, as a Catholic, 
had simply “bowed” to his master’s command. 293  The Orange Lodge was unequivocal 
in its opposition.294  Unless Protestants stood fast at any sign of Catholic aggression, 
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Saskatchewan would become “a second Quebec with the Roman hierarchy dictating our 
policies and language.”295   
Although Orangemen championed this conspiratorial anti-Catholicism, they also 
understood that they were fighting a losing battle in their quest to limit Catholic influence 
in Saskatchewan.  Majority support for abolishing separate schools never materialized.296  
Yet, the Lodge did not interpret this fact as a deficiency in their platform, but as a 
weakness in Saskatchewan’s mainstream Protestantism.  Beginning in the early twentieth 
century, Canadian Protestantism underwent a modernization process.  Theological 
liberals, located in the nation’s church-affiliated universities, sought to keep 
Protestantism relevant by accommodating biblical criticism and evolutionary theory, 
rejecting biblical literalism, and switching focus from personal to societal salvation.  
Many Canada’s mainstream Protestant denominations—including Methodists, 
Congregationalists, Presbyterians, and the Anglicans—were swept up in this 
modernization.  Not everyone, however, was content or comfortable with these changes.  
By the 1920s, conservative Protestants began challenging this liberalization, arguing for a 
revitalized Christianity based upon biblical literalism, traditional ethics, and the need for 
an individual, personal salvation.  These conservative-minded Protestants organized both 
inside mainstream denominations—most notably in the Baptist and Presbyterian 
churches— and in their newly created independent “fundamentalist” networks of schools, 
conferences, and churches.297   
The Saskatchewan Orange Lodge played a central role in this fundamentalist-modernist 
controversy.  Although the Lodge did not require its members to adhere to a specific 
Protestant denomination, it actively endorsed a fundamentalist outlook.  S.A. White 
informed his fellow Orangemen in 1927 that liberal Christianity was to blame for a great 
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deal of the Catholic Church’s successes in the province.  “Roman Catholic aggression,” 
he argued, “will continue just so long as we allow ourselves to be cajoled into that false 
tolerance which is rather weakness.”  Even more troublesome, Orangemen believed this 
liberalism weakened individual action and future generations’ ability to stand up to this 
aggression.  As Stuart Muirhead, Grand Master in 1932, proclaimed: “we are raising a 
generation who have no conviction…and the position of the great mass of Protestant 
clergymen seems to be that we must be liberal, broadminded, etc., and not cause strife or 
religious prejudices, but if we forget what it cost to give us the liberties we now enjoy, 
then the result of such spineless teaching can easily be prophesized.”298  The only 
solution, therefore, was a return to their theological-conservative roots.  Protestants had 
to “tighten up all along the line and have our Protestantism definite, clear-cut, and 
unashamed.”299   To this end, the provincial Lodge provided “a program of Protestant 
education and enlightenment” with the ultimate goal of “a Protestant awakening in the 
province.”300  The Orange Lodge also actively courted conservative clergy hoping that 
they would “declare themselves in their endorsation of our aims and principles.”301  By 
1930, the Saskatchewan Orange Lodge included over 300 clergymen among its 
members.302 
This conservative Protestantism influenced the Orange Lodge’s understanding of 
individualism.  For Orangemen, to be British was to be Protestant.  Orangeism, White 
argued, “is firmly based upon the true foundation of religion and liberty and is definitely 
pledged to do its utmost to maintain the dominance of British ideals and Protestant 
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principles.”303  These “British ideals,” including “loyalty to our free institutions, and love 
for justice, fair play, toleration and individual liberty,” not only sprung from the Anglo-
Protestant tradition, but were also a guarantee of Protestantism’s continued ascendency in 
Saskatchewan.304  “British Supremacy, British Prestige, British Customs, the English 
Language, the Common Law and the Union Jack,” Grand Master Adams argued, “are 
essential to the future well-being of this Dominion.”305  For Adams, this belief was 
immutable: “The Principles and Objectives we profess are the same today as they were at 
the commencement of the Orange Association.”  No matter the time or place, Orangemen 
would continue to stand behind the same motto as William of Orange: “THE 
PROTESTANT RELIGION AND THE LIBERTIES OF ENGLAND.”306 
Separate schools were not just the Papacy’s attempts to convert the people of 
Saskatchewan, but a direct attack on the personal freedom granted by the province’s 
British tradition.  As White explained this logic: “The Roman Catholic Separate School is 
under the domination of the priesthood, the priesthood is under the absolute dictation of 
the Papacy, the Papacy is an institution which derives its being from all that is most 
diametrically opposed to liberty and progress, is itself an autocracy and depends on 
autocracies for its very existence.”  Separate schools weakened the Protestant and the 
British nature of society.  As such, they posed a “menace to the development of true 
Canadian citizenship.”307  The inverse of this point, they asserted, was equally true.  Any 
threat to the British nature of Saskatchewan constituted an attack on its Protestant 
identity.  The Orange Lodge interpreted attempts to foster a distinctly Canadian identity 
at the expense of the nation’s British heritage as a process of Catholic aggression.  “The 
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Province of Quebec,” White noted, “is dominated by the Catholic Church, and because of 
their national aims and their church affiliations, a subtle campaign of disintegration has 
been carried on for many years which in these latter days has emerged into the open.”308  
The Orange Sentinel, the national Lodge’s newspaper, went so far as to equate these 
challenges as a fight over Saskatchewan’s very essence, informing readers of “The Battle 
to Preserve Saskatchewan as a British Province.”309  As a part of this battle, Orangemen 
considered attempts to replace “God Save the King” with “O Canada,” adopt a distinctly 
Canadian flag in place of the Union Jack, introduce bilingual postage stamps, or weaken 
in any way Canada’s legal ties to the British Empire a part of this Catholic plot.310   
The interconnectedness of Protestantism and concepts of Britishness shaped how 
Orangemen understood race.  The Orange Lodge divided society along a racial hierarchy 
based upon the perceived ability of different ethnicities to adopt the English language, 
profess a Protestant faith, and internalize British values, especially their capacity to act as 
individuals independent of outside control.  Anglo-Saxon Britons, who had the language 
skills and cultural heritage necessary to fully integrate into Saskatchewan’s British-
Protestant society, were at the top of this hierarchy.  “No better citizens can be found,” 
Grand Master Malcomson argued, “than our own flesh and blood.”311   People of 
“Teutonic” background—including Scandinavians, Germans, and Danes—were next on 
the list.  Not only did these peoples “speedily learn English…and Canadian customs,” 
their “standards of education” and “manner in organizing life” made them almost 
indistinguishable from “people of the British Isles.”  On the other hand, Slavs and 
“Mongolians” (i.e. Finnish, Magyar, and Hungarian) were not welcome.  “They come 
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from countries of retarded civilization,” White argued, “holding ideals and standards of 
life vastly different and undoubtedly lower than our own.”  While White conceded the 
possibility of assimilating small numbers of these people, the “long process of educating 
and training” necessary to make them “British” made the attempt hardly worth the effort.  
In fact, the amount of resources required lowered “the standard of living in this 
country.”312  Visible minorities and Indigenous peoples, in contrast, never even merited a 
mention by the Orange Lodge.  This absence is a clear indication of the Lodge’s 
racialized thinking.  Whereas the Orangemen believed European immigrants could be 
assimilated, visible minorities would never belong and were ignored altogether. 
The Saskatchewan Orange Lodge was not alone in adhering to this racial hierarchy.  The 
province’s conservative farmers disparaged their counterparts from eastern and central 
Europe for their perceived proclivity towards radical economic theories.  In fact, a racial 
hierarchy was widespread throughout the province.313  The women’s arm of the SGGA, 
for instance, buttressed much of its work on the belief in the superiority of Anglo-Saxon 
races.314  Similarly, Clifford Sifton, as Minister of the Interior in Wilfrid Laurier’s 
cabinet, adhered to a racial hierarchy similar to that offered by the Orange Lodge.315  
Even Tommy Douglas, Saskatchewan’s future CCF Premier and the nation’s “greatest 
Canadian,” once advocated for the forcible sterilization of “defective” immigrants from 
central and eastern Europe.316   
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What is different, however, is the extent that this racial theorizing dominated the Orange 
Lodge’s outlook, feeding its conspiratorial anti-Catholicism and fears of a weakening of 
British individualism in the province.  Unlike Sifton, who welcomed continental 
European immigrants—whom he referred to as “stalwart peasants in a sheepskin coat”—
the Orange Lodge opposed any immigration from non-preferred countries.317  
Orangemen understood immigrants from Central and Eastern Canada were 
disproportionately Catholic.  As in the case of separate schools and orphanages, the 
Orange Lodge portrayed the presence of these people in Saskatchewan as part of the 
same sinister Catholic plot.  “The Roman Catholic Church,” Grand Master Given argued, 
“has been especially active in promulgating and rigorously so, a system to fill this 
country with people of their own faith, regardless of nationality.”318  Likewise, the 
Orange Lodge was insistent that, because of the difficulty in assimilating these 
newcomers, they posed a direct threat to the future of the Anglo-Protestant makeup of the 
province.  If the government allowed these non-preferred “foreigners” to enter the 
province, the Orange Sentinel warned, British citizens would “be surrounded by people 
who know nothing, and care less, about British ideals, and who have names which take 
three sneezes and a yodel to pronounce.”  Even worse, Orangemen would “probably have 
to learn to talk bohunk in Lodge to carry on a conversation with [their] future son- or 
daughter-in-law.”319 
In response, the Lodge urged a complete overhaul of the immigration system.  Under 
Sifton’s system, Saskatchewan received a “preponderance of immigrants from the 
countries of Central and Southern Europe,” who “know nothing and care less for our 
British ideals, but tend to cling to their own language and perpetuate their own 
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customs.”320  Instead of continuing to accept “dregs and off-scourings,” Canada needed a 
system preferential to “immigrants from the British Isles and Northern Europe 
instead.”321  As in all matters relating to this conspiratorial anti-Catholicism, Orangemen 
considered immigration a matter of life-or-death.  The “danger” existed that “full rights 
of citizenship may be conferred upon those whose principles are opposed to our British 
ideals and whose sole aim is to subvert the constitution of the country.”322  Saskatchewan 
ran the risk of becoming “another Balkans or worse” if the Catholic Church succeeded in 
flooding the province with non-preferred foreigners.323 
The Saskatchewan Orange Lodge presented itself as both a fraternal organization 
providing real benefits to a frontier society and as the champion of a nativist British 
nationalism.  While its social and communal benefits were important to the Orange 
Lodge’s popularity overall, its uncompromising religious and racial stances were 
responsible for the timing of the Orange Lodge’s rapid expansion after 1918.  Heightened 
racial and religious tensions characterized the inter-war period.  Massive immigration 
increases during the first three decades of the century expanded the province’s population 
ten-fold from 91,000 in 1901 to 921,000 in 1931.  With this expansion, Saskatchewan’s 
Anglo-British population witnessed a weakening in their relative position.  On the eve of 
the Great War, 54% of Saskatchewan’s population identified with a British ancestry.  By 
1931, this position declined to 47%.  Of the three Prairie provinces, Saskatchewan’s 
British population was the only one to lose its majority position.  Equally concerning, the 
religious makeup of the province underwent a similar shift as increased immigration from 
“non-preferred” countries increased the province’s Roman Catholic population from 19% 
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in 1921 to 25% in 1931.324  While the province’s Anglo-population continued to hold a 
privileged place in Saskatchewan society—controlling the levers of political and social 
power—the decline of their relative position vis-à-vis racial and ethnic “others” caused 
apprehension over the future of the province.   
Religious and racial issues that were tolerated a decade earlier now took centre stage in 
the public’s mind.  The most vicious debate centered on the public school’s ability to 
serve as a site of assimilation.  Controversies surrounding race, language, and religion in 
Saskatchewan’s schools were not new in the inter-war period.  The Saskatchewan Act, 
when first introduced in 1905 with protections for religious and language instruction, 
infuriated elements of the province’s British population.  Sifton went so far as to resign 
his cabinet position in protest.325  Under the guidance of Premier Walter Scott, however, 
the British and “foreign” elements within the province entered a period of uneasy 
compromise.  Public schools were free to offer instruction in foreign languages for a half-
hour at the end of the day or in French for the first two years.  Likewise, Saskatchewan 
developed a system of separate schools under the nominal control of the provincial 
Department of Education.   Although some issues continued, such as the controversial 
decision in 1913 to require all Catholics to assign their taxes to separate schools if they 
existed in their district, Scott’s compromise lasted until his retirement in 1916.326  
This period of tolerance ended with the war’s rising racial tensions.  In February 1918, a 
fiery meeting of the provincial school trustees replaced the moderate president with 
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James F. Bryant, an unyielding anti-Catholic and future Conservative cabinet minister, 
who claimed English was the only means of uniting Saskatchewan’s disparate ethnic 
groups 327  Under Bryant’s leadership, trustees voted overwhelmingly in favour of 
making English the “sole language of instruction in the schools of the province.”328  The 
Orange Lodge fueled this apprehension.  J.T.M. Anderson, an Orangeman and future 
Conservative Premier, published The Education of the New Canadian in 1918 which 
detailed his experiences working with immigrant families during his tenure as a school 
inspector for the Department of Education.329  Anderson argued that widespread 
immigration was bringing newcomers into the province faster than the schools could turn 
them into British citizens.  For Anderson, the provincial Liberal party, buoyed by the 
non-British immigrants’ votes, compounded this problem by refusing to act.  The result, 
he argued, posed a threat “to our national existence” and made Saskatchewan the 
“laughing stock of all enlightened peoples.”330  For Anderson and the Orange Lodge, the 
only solution was a fundamental reordering of how the province treated its foreign 
population.  Immigration had to be immediately curtailed, English had to be the only 
language of instruction in the province’s schools, and the citizenship rights of “new 
Canadians” had to be limited until they fully accepted “our language, customs, and 
ideals.”331   
Anderson’s treatise spoke to the fears felt by a significant proportion of the province’s 
Anglo-Saxon population.  The SGGA, the Anglican Synod, and the Baptist Convention 
also lent their voices to the Orange Lodge and school trustees, passing a series of 
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resolutions calling for an English-only education system.332  Backed with this support, 
the Orange Lodge flooded the province with flyers calling for a settlement of the 
“language question” and helped institute a letter writing campaign that inundated the 
Premier with hundreds of letters urging him to act.333  Martin, under pressure from all 
sides, capitulated and passed legislation forbidding all foreign language instruction 
except for French in the first grade or for one hour at the end of the day if the local school 
board desired.  Going further, the government also appointed Anderson to the newly 
created office of Director of Education among the New Canadians.334  The Orange 
Lodge’s racialized vision was now mainstream. 
This widely-shared nativism further fueled apprehension over sectarianism and the 
presence of Roman Catholic separate schools in the province.  The Saskatchewan Act did 
not distinguish between Catholic and Protestant religious minorities when it granted the 
right to form separate schools.  Most of these schools were Catholic, but several isolated 
pockets existed across the province where Protestants were in the minority.  Although 
they had the same right to form separate schools afforded to Catholics in minority 
positions, many were unable to afford the costs associated with such an enterprise.  
Instead, most of these Protestant students attended public schools administered by 
Catholic trustees.  In the climate of intensified racial and religious tensions, rumours 
circulated among the province’s Anglo-Protestant population of the apparent 
depravations these children endured.  Nuns and priests employed as teachers, the 
prominent display of Catholic symbols, and degrading punishments, including forcing 
students to kneel in front of the crucifix for hours on end all served to fuel Anglo-
Protestant outrage.  “As soon as the French element get control of the Public School,” the 
Orange Sentinel opined, “they proceed to make it a Roman Catholic school.”335  Matters 
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reached a climax in 1928 when a group of Protestant parents in the Gouverneur School 
District—located west of the French Catholic community of Ponteix—made headlines for 
refusing to send their children to the local school.  During their trial on charges of truancy 
where Bryant served as their attorney, the parents substantiated many of the rumours, 
claiming that their local Catholic school trustees replaced the Union Jack with a Crucifix 
and forced Protestant students to learn the catechism.  Although the courts acquitted the 
parents, the Gouverneur case enflamed anti-Catholic and anti-immigration sentiments.336   
The Gouverneur case provided an opportunity for the Orange Lodge to popularize its 
anti-Catholic message and spread it across Saskatchewan.  For Orangemen, the trial was 
the latest attempt by the Pope’s “hidden hand” to “forcibly…destroy our public school in 
the province.”337  As a result, the Orange Lodge did its utmost to drum up opposition.  
“Would you like to have a black-skirted ‘she-cat’ of a Nun teach your children in a public 
school that you are a heretic,” they questioned, “then when chastising your child make it 
kiss the forbidden image, the Crucifix?” 338  The Lodge’s defence of the province’s 
public schools played off Anglo-Protestants’ fears of their future place within an 
increasingly heterogeneous Saskatchewan.   
This strategy paid off.  In a decade of heightened racial and religious tensions, the 
Lodge’s unequivocal position resonated with Saskatchewan’s Anglo-Protestant 
population and fueled the organization’s exceptional growth.  Prior to the Great War, 
Saskatchewan accounted for only fifty-seven lodges and a membership of less than 1,500.  
Simply put, the organization lacked the grassroots support to push its controversial 
positions into the mainstream.  It was not that Saskatchewan’s Anglo-Protestants were 
uninterested in this vision, but that they did not fear their position eroding.  As anxieties 
increased in the 1920s, however, the Orange Lodge capitalized on Protestant fears.  The 
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Lodge’s stance on immigration, language, schools, and religion resonated with 
Saskatchewan’s Anglo-Protestant population, providing a sense of security in otherwise 
apprehensive times.  In return, the Lodge became one of the province’s largest social 
organizations with over 200 lodges in 1929 and a membership exceeding 60,000.  
Although the Orange Lodge’s reach spread across the entire province, the strongest 
representation occurred in the rural areas of central and south Saskatchewan, especially 
those areas adjacent to large Catholic and foreign settlements.339  From 1922 until 1929, 
the Lodge’s R. Dawson Shield—awarded annually for the county with the largest 
increase in membership—was awarded to areas with significant Catholic and foreign 
populations.340   
Despite this dramatic increase in membership, the Saskatchewan Orange Lodge found it 
difficult to translate its newfound size into direct political action.  Fearing that a direct 
political stance would alienate it from both government and the citizenry, Orangemen 
adopted an official position of non-partisanship.  “The supreme thing in our national 
life,” White argued, “is not the political party which may control our government, nor is 
it the material wealth we may be able to display, but it is the character of our citizens, the 
moral life we develop in our churches, our homes and our streets.”341  This did not mean, 
however, that Orangemen did not think or function politically.  In 1910, the provincial 
Lodge adopted its first political platform that exemplified its dream for a “British” 
province.  Under this vision, English was to be the “only official language,” only “non-
sectarian” schools would receive “aid from the public treasury,” immigrants from non-
preferred countries would undergo “close supervision,” and the province would maintain 
the “British connection” at all costs.342  Yet, the Lodge never intended its policies to 
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transform the organization into a political party.  Rather, the platform—as well as the 
annual resolutions passed in its support—provided members with an overview of the 
Lodge’s beliefs against which it could judge the province’s political parties.   
Even without an official endorsement, the similarities between the Lodge’s platform and 
Saskatchewan’s conservative parties were clear.  Frederick Haultain, the former territorial 
Premier and leader of the Provincial Rights Party, campaigned in 1905 and 1908 for a 
single non-sectarian “national” school system “with equal rights to all and special 
privileges to none.”343  Likewise, the 1916 Conservative Party platform joined the 
Orange Lodge in calls for a “clear cut policy” of English-only schools.344  Prominent 
conservatives at both the federal and provincial levels—including J.T.M. Anderson and 
John Diefenbaker—were avowed Orangemen, appearing often at Lodge meetings to 
drum up support for their parties.  So close was this connection that conservative 
politicians often felt pressured to take out Orange Lodge membership as a prerequisite to 
receiving their nomination.345 
Although the Lodge did not tell its members who to vote for, it left little doubt as to who 
they should vote against.  The Liberal Party, both federal and provincial, could not be 
relied upon to defend Protestant and British interests in Saskatchewan.  The provincial 
party, in office from 1905 until 1929, relied heavily on the Catholic and immigrant vote 
to retain power, while the federal party under Wilfrid Laurier and Mackenzie King relied 
heavily on Quebec.346  For Orangemen, this constituted nothing less than a 
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“prostitut[ion]” of “our Canadian ideals of citizenship in order to gain temporary political 
advantage.”347  R.J. Gibson, Grand Master in 1914, vowed that the Lodge would “put a 
Liberal party out of power” for saddling “this province with separate schools.”348  
Orangemen went a step further during a meeting with the Premier in early 1916.  The 
delegates avowed that the Lodge would only support political parties opposed to separate 
schools and insinuated that Orangemen had turned out governments in other provinces 
that “tampered with the public schools.”349  The federal party, in the Lodge’s estimation, 
was just as corrupt.  Orangemen believed Ottawa was “under the control of the solid 
Quebec Roman Catholic block,” fueling fears that the Papacy directly controlled the 
Liberals.350  At the same time, communists and socialists also received the Orange 
Lodge’s scorn for their unabashed secularism.  Communism, Grand Master Walker 
noted, was a “hydra-headed monster” that struck at the very “roots of Christianity.”351  
As the CCF rose to prominence during the Great Depression, the Orange Lodge was 
quick to inform its members of the danger posed by the new party.  “Romanism,” Grand 
Master Stanley M. Wilson warned the Lodge in 1935, “is not the only enemy in our 
midst.”  The CCF was “trying hard to raise its head.”  The Lodge had no choice but to 
“fight this menace” with any means possible.352 
These critiques and warnings notwithstanding, the Lodge’s inability to accomplish its 
stated goals dissatisfied many of its new members.  By the mid-1920s, the Saskatchewan 
Orange Lodge had successfully capitalized on Anglo-Protestants’ fears to become one of 
the province’s largest special interest groups, surpassing even the UFC(SS) and SGGA at 
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their height.  For members who believed that the Lodge would do something to 
ameliorate their weakening positions, however, the usual tactics of lobbying and 
education were not going far or fast enough.  Although the Orange Lodge could point to 
the English-only amendments to the Education Act, minority groups continual flouting of 
the law angered Orangemen.  The Orange Lodge had encouraged religious and racial 
antagonisms but could not take the next step and translate this antagonism into further 
reform.   
This failure opened the door for the KKK’s blistering expression of the same nativist 
British nationalism.  The Klan first emerged in the southern United States during 
Reconstruction.  The organization helped re-establish white supremacy through its 
proclivity for violence and intimidation against newly freed slaves, including rapes, 
lynching, and beatings.353  After disbanding in the 1870s, the Klan re-emerged in 1915 
with a more moderate focus.  Although it retained the symbolism of its earlier 
manifestation—including regalia, peculiar naming, and cross burnings—the second Klan 
reinvented itself as a fraternal and social organization dedicated towards engaging white 
citizens in building stronger communities.  The Klan was still a racist and sometimes 
violent organization, but it disdained overt actions of violence in favour of uniting all 
white Protestant Americans in a social crusade.354  This new focus allowed the Klan to 
spread across the nation from its original heartland in the American south.  Indiana, for 
example, had a larger membership in the 1920s than Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi 
combined.  With a black population of less than three percent, the racial violence 
commonly associated with the southern Klan was almost entirely absent in the Hoosier 
state.  Rather, the Indiana Klan gained the support of one-third of all native born white 
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men by emphasizing an “ethnic nationalism” which “concerned itself primarily not with 
persecuting ethnic minorities but with promoting the ability of average citizens to 
influence the workings of society and government.”355  Although virulently anti-Catholic 
and anti-Semitic, the new Klan abandoned the violence of its earlier form, calling instead 
for social reform, a return to traditional morality, and the cleaning up of corrupt politics.   
It was this “reborn” Klan that spread from Indiana to Saskatchewan.  In late 1926, Lewis 
Scott, his son, Harold, and Hugh Emmons—all from South Bend, Indiana—arrived in 
Saskatchewan with a warrant to organize a provincial Klan.  Earlier attempts to set up 
local Klaverns in Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, and Calgary had met little success.  In 
Saskatchewan, in contrast, the Klan took root.  The Scotts established themselves in 
Regina, while Emmons went to organize in Moose Jaw.  Of all Klan centres in 
Saskatchewan, Moose Jaw proved the most fruitful.   As a railway divisional point, 
Moose Jaw’s large transient population earned the city a reputation for corruption, 
violence, and vice.  The police force, often implicated in the crimes themselves, did little 
to rectify the situation.  Emmons portrayed the Klan as a civic organization dedicated to 
“cleaning up” the city.  A charismatic speaker, Emmons asserted that Moose Jaw would 
be a fine city if not for the “painted ladies [plying] their obnoxious trade and other visible 
offences against God.”356  With eighty-five percent of the population claiming British 
ancestry, Emmons singled out the remaining fifteen percent as the cause of this vice, 
especially the Chinese population.357  Under Klan pressure, police began raiding Chinese 
cafes, the stories of which made for spectacular headlines in Moose Jaw’s papers, further 
increasing the Klan’s popularity.  Buoyed by these results, Emmons quickly expanded 
membership in the city.  By mid-1927, Emmons sold 1,400 memberships to Moose Jaw 
residents, donating an additional 800 to prominent politicians, business leaders, and 
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clergymen.  Of a city with a total population of only 20,000, at least 2,200 belonged to 
the Klan.358   
While successful in recruiting members, Emmons’ anti-vice campaign was a means to a 
more lucrative end.  Initiation in the Klan cost ten dollars, plus three dollars for the first 
three months’ dues.  The Klan promised prospective members that their thirteen-dollar 
fee would cover organizing costs, the remainder of which would be turned over to the 
local Klan once it received its formal charter.  Under their contracts with the Indiana 
Klan, however, each organizer received a percentage of their membership sales.  
Emmons, for example, initially received eight dollars for every membership he sold.  In 
April 1927, this share expanded to include the entirety of Moose Jaw sales and two 
dollars for every membership sold outside the city at events where he spoke.  By 
September, Emmons had sold 4,700 Klan memberships for a total income of $21,800.359  
Emmons later claimed that, after deductions for expenses, he earned a total of $1,650 
during his residency in Saskatchewan.360  Regardless of the amount, the three organizers 
absconded from the province with the Klan’s money in September 1927.361 
This scandal proved fortuitous for the Saskatchewan Klan as it allowed the organization 
to re-emerge under local leadership.  The first task lay in regaining Klan members’ trust.  
The Klan’s reorganization convention, held in Moose Jaw in October 1927, passed 
several resolutions intended to limit the possibility of continued dishonour.  Henceforth, 
the Klan would act as a provincial body with no outside affiliation to any other 
organization.  Likewise, delegates limited American organizers’ influence.  The new 
executive, for example, was one hundred percent Canadian-born.  J.W. Rosborough, 
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elected Imperial Wizard (leader), was a Regina accountant and Orangeman.  Born in 
Ontario, Rosborough lived in Buffalo for some time before moving to Saskatchewan 
during the war.  He worked for the provincial Education and Treasury Departments 
before his close connections to the Conservative Party put him at odds with the governing 
Liberals.362    Although well respected by Klan members, Rosborough was not their first 
choice for Wizard.  Rather, delegates preferred W.D. Cowan, a dentist and former 
conservative Mayor of Regina and Unionist MP for Regina from 1917-1921.  To the 
Klansmen’s chagrin, however, Cowan turned the job down as he believed that his 
association with the Conservative Party would limit the Klan’s effectiveness.  Cowan 
instead agreed to serve as Klan treasurer.363  Delegates also limited their organizers’ 
ability to unduly profit from their work.  Newly hired organizers and lecturers—including 
James J. Maloney, a rabid anti-Catholic who once studied in the seminary, and James 
Hawkins, a Klansman from West Virginia—were paid on a strict salary basis.  All 
proceeds from membership sales would go directly to the organization itself.   
These moves proved popular, and the reorganized Klan quickly surpassed its strength 
under Emmons and the Scotts.  Between 1927 and the end of 1928, the Klan added forty 
local Klaverns and expanded its membership to a conservative estimate of 25,000.364  
Rather than collapsing, as its detractors may have hoped, the provincial Klan emerged 
from the scandal a much stronger and more united organization.  “The Ku Klux Klan,” 
Charles Ellis, secretary for the Regina Klavern, promised, “is not dead yet.”365   
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Historians have posited several explanations for the Klan’s success in Saskatchewan.  For 
William Calderwood, the Klan owed its growth to the province’s unaddressed racial and 
religious tensions.  The Klan, he argues, “was nurtured on sentiments and prejudices 
which had been latent in Saskatchewan society for years.”366  Although Saskatchewan 
certainly had its share of racial and religious antagonisms, Calderwood’s explanation fails 
to appreciate that every province had these same tensions.  Racial and religious strife, 
including questions over separate and public schools, were not unique to Saskatchewan.  
Rather, the Klan’s success in Saskatchewan was the result of its close connections with 
the Orange Lodge.  In Ontario, for instance, the Orange Lodge had a series of informal 
alliances with the ruling Conservative Party which ensured that the Lodge’s platform 
received favourable political treatment.  In Saskatchewan, on the other hand, the Orange 
Lodge’s nativism alienated the ruling Liberal Party.  “Ontario Orangemen had no need of 
the Klan,” Pitsula concludes, “while those in Saskatchewan had an interest in having the 
Klan succeed.”367  The relative success or failure of the KKK rested on the level of 
support it received from other like-minded organizations.368   
As the Klan established itself in Saskatchewan, it found enthusiastic support from the 
provincial Orange Lodge.  In many locales, Orange Halls served as meeting places for the 
nascent Klan with the two organizations sharing speakers and lecturers.369  Likewise, the 
publications of the organizations—the Orange Order’s Orange Sentinel and the KKK’s 
The Klansman and The Western Freedman —ran stories outlining and praising each 
                                                 
366
 Calderwood, “The Rise and Fall of the Ku Klux Klan in Saskatchewan,” iv. 
367
 Pitsula, Keeping Canada British, 109. 
368
 Allan Bartley makes a similar argument.  See, Allan Bartley, “A Public Nuisance: The Ku Klux Klan in 
Ontario, 1923-1927,” Journal of Canadian Studies 30, no. 3 (1995), 156-75. 
369
 In Tisdale, for example, the Ku Klux Klan used the local Orange Hall to hold an organizational meeting 




other’s activities.370  Most striking, however, was the overlap in membership.  The 
limited records that do exist point to Orangemen’s proclivity for joining the Klan.  The 
town of Kincaid, for example, had forty-three Klansmen, of which fifteen also belonged 
to the Orange Lodge.  Of Hazenmore’s fourteen Klansmen, two belonged to the 
Lodge.371 
With this overlap in membership, the activities of the two organizations intertwined.  In 
early 1927, the Klan and the Orange Lodge coordinated their opposition to the 
Saskatchewan French Catholic Association’s proposal to have French-language teacher 
training in the provincial Normal School.  In identically-worded telegrams sent to the 
Premier, both organizations stated their uncompromising opposition: “We will oppose in 
every way possible the enforcing of bilingualism in this province.  We believe in UNITY 
of the Canadian People and that in this great NATION we should have ONE 
LANGUAGE, and do not wish to see this part of Canada divided by language as found in 
other parts of the world.”372  In a follow-up campaign, both the Klan and the Orange 
Lodge inundated Liberal Premier Jimmy Gardiner with hundreds of letters in opposition 
to bilingual training. 
Although historians have acknowledged this affinity between the Klan and the Orange 
Lodge, their primary focus on the KKK leaves the impression that the organizations were 
separate entities.  Unlike the Orange Lodge, Pitsula argues, which jealously guarded its 
“elite” status and respectability, the Klan specialized in offering a “boisterous, vibrant, 
populist” form of British nativism.373  This portrayal of the Klan and Orange Lodge as 
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similar, but separate organizations, has significantly impacted our understanding of 
Saskatchewan conservatism.  On the one hand, historians have dismissed the provincial 
Orange Lodge as politically ineffective, arguing that the Klan’s arrival was the 
prerequisite for Conservative victory.  “Above all, the Klan was present,” Pitsula argues.  
“It filled a vacuum, offering leadership and inspiration in a way the Orange Lodge failed 
to do.”374  This interpretation has resulted in an understanding of the Klan as an alien 
import into the province despite recent attempts to write it into the “mainstream of 
Canadian history.”375  Whereas the Klan was only active in Saskatchewan for a short 
period of time, the Orange Lodge established itself over a period of decades.  
Downplaying the connections between the two organizations only serves the fallacy that 
the Klan was a racist anomaly.  The Orange Lodge, in contrast, remains a respectful, if 
prejudiced and ineffectual social organization.  Historians have failed to appreciate that 
the differences between the Orange Lodge and the Klan were much more a matter of 
degree and optics than symptomatic of an ideological or organizational cleavage.  This is 
especially problematic given the fact that contemporaries clearly associated the two 
organizations.  La Survivance, Saskatchewan’s leading French-language newspaper, 
ominously warned that the province’s “hot-headed Orangemen,” had allied with the 
“grotesque and cynical K.K.K.”376 
The KKK shared the Orange Lodge’s conspiratorial anti-Catholicism.  Saskatchewan 
may be nominally “under the flag of Britain,” a Klan speaker argued, “but we are under 
the heel of Rome.”377  For Hawkins, the Catholic Church was behind a plot to destroy the 
very essence of British individualism.  “We have the principle of persecution and 
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compulsion, and the approval of torture and every kind of maltreatment endorsed,” he 
argued, all “blessed by a Church which cares little for the individual, but desires only 
world-mastery and enslavement of the human soul to what she conceives to be the 
truth.”378  The only option, therefore, was for Saskatchewan’s Anglo-Protestants to 
oppose the Catholic Church at every opportunity.  “Eternal vigilance,” a speaker argued, 
“is the price of liberty and we must be on our guard that the hand of the Pope is not 
permitted to grip and throttle this province.”379  These sentiments, although spoken by 
avowed Klansmen, could easily have come from their counterparts in the Orange Lodge.  
In fact, Klansmen reiterated many of the Orange Lodge’s main criticisms of Catholic 
attempts to undermine the province’s individualist heritage, including preferential 
immigration for Catholics, public funding for Catholic orphanages, and Catholic 
influence in public schools.380 
Unlike the Orange Lodge, however, the Klan felt no need to moderate the sensationalism 
of its anti-Catholicism.  Klan speakers routinely fabricated stories of papal plots to gain 
support for their anti-Catholic crusade.  Maloney, for example, told a Regina crowd that 
the Pope planned to build a “residential palace” for himself in Montreal.  “Mussolini of 
Italy,” Maloney explained, “is a strong man, a just man, a right man.  He won’t permit the 
Pope of Rome to run Italy’s affairs much longer,” leaving Canada as the prime alternative 
for the Holy See.381  Similarly, Maloney warned that Catholic priests, trained in 
“mesmerism and hypnotism,” had “a terrible hold” on Catholic women.382  In the same 
vein, Maloney alleged that priests used this power over their female parishioners for 
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nefarious ends, filling Saskatchewan’s Catholic orphanages with their “illegitimate 
children.”383  The Klan even equated campaigns for birth control with a Popish plot to 
“keep down the Protestant children and augment the Roman families.”384  The Klan was 
also more willing than the Orange Lodge to advocate extreme measures to prevent these 
Catholic conspiracies.  Maloney was willing to “shed his blood” in opposition to papal 
domination.  “We will demonstrate,” Maloney told an “overflowing” crowd at 
Kerrobert’s Orpheum Theatre, “even if we must take up arms.”385   
Both organizations promoted a dogged anti-Catholicism and conservative Protestantism.   
Hawkins, like his Orangemen contemporaries, promised the people a “Protestant revival” 
by turning back the liberalization of mainstream religion.386  The KKK “exists to uphold 
the Christian faith in its initial purity” and would not rest until Saskatchewan returned to 
“God and Christianity, pure and undefiled…for which our fathers bled and died.”387  The 
Klan also borrowed the Orange Lodge’s tactic of recruiting like-minded Protestant 
ministers to join its ranks and participate at Klan rallies.  Reverend William Surman of 
Regina’s Cameron Memorial Baptist Church, for example, served as Regina’s Exalted 
Cyclops, or chief organizer, where he used his position as a religious leader to persuade 
people to join the Klan.  “I am a Minister of the Gospel,” he told a Regina Klan meeting, 
“and, as Minister of the Gospel, I see nothing Contradictory in the principles which I 
teach and the principles of the Klan, to which I belong.”388  Similarly, Reverends S.P. 
Rondeau (a Woodrow United Church Minister), T.J. Hind (Moose Jaw’s First Baptist 
Church), T. Bunting (Saskatoon’s Third Avenue Methodist), and R.G. Simpson all 
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received speaker fees on behalf of their work for the Klan.389  These efforts paid 
dividends.  Outside observers often portrayed the Klan primarily as a Protestant, not anti-
Catholic, organization.  The Kinistino Representative reported that a Klan rally at Melfort 
attended by upwards of 7,000 was evidence that “…a great Protestant movement is 
working for the uplift of all mankind.”390 
In addition to its Protestantism, the KKK also mirrored the Orange Lodge’s British 
nationalism.  The Saskatchewan Klan readily advocated for the British connection as a 
bulwark against Catholic tyranny, domination by “non-preferred” foreigners, and a 
decline in the people’s individualism.  Provincial leaders freely mixed British and 
Protestant symbols with those of the Klan.  The May 1929 cover of  The Klansman, for 
example, prominently displayed a hooded Klansman brandishing a Union Jack in defence 
of a cross and the Bible.391  These symbols, the paper explained, served as a poignant 
reminder that the Klan swore to uphold the protections offered by the British tradition in 
Canada, including “Free Speech, Free Press, Free Schools, Freedom to worship our God, 
right of citizenship and all constitutional laws.”392  The Catholic Church, on the other 
hand, sought only to weaken ties with Britain as a means of dominating Saskatchewan’s 
people.  As one Klansmen noted in a letter to the Saskatoon Star: “It is surely apparent 
from history, ancient and modern, that Rome is the only existing power that today 
threatens our democratic rights and privileges.”393 
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Figure 2 - The Klansman, 15 May, 1929394 
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For Orangemen and Klansmen alike, maintaining the British connection was the only 
way of guaranteeing the continued supremacy of Saskatchewan’s Anglo-Saxon peoples.  
The Klan did not baulk at the idea that it was an inherently racist organization but reveled 
in its perpetuation of “white supremacy.”395  Klan speakers criss-crossed the province 
spreading a message of race exclusion.  “I believe that Almighty God,” Hawkins argued, 
“created the white race as superior to any other race.”396  At the same time, the Klan 
played on Anglo-Saxon fears of “foreign” men corrupting white women.  The Klan, 
Hawkins noted, refused “to be the god-father of a tribe of mongrelised children,” and 
would continually oppose the right of a “colored man to marry a white woman.” 397  Such 
an idea, he argued, was against God’s plan: “If God had intended a mongrelised race, he 
would have created one.”398  The Orange Lodge may not have spoken directly of a 
“mongrelised race,” but the same beliefs underlay its prohibitions on the intermarriage of 
Protestants and Catholics. 
Despite the Klan’s sensationalist message, the foundations of KKK and Orange Lodge 
racism were indistinguishable.  Both organizations adhered to the same racial hierarchy 
which privileged Anglo-Saxons and northern Europeans.   Not only did eastern European 
“continentals…live cheaply” and “underbid labor, forcing the Canadian and Britisher out 
of work,” Hawkins argued, but they also stubbornly “cling together, form their own 
communities and do not become Canadianized.”399  Hawkins’ racism found a receptive 
audience in Saskatchewan whose citizens had already internalized these ideas.  Even 
Klan detractors spoke in the language of white superiority.  The Maple Creek News, for 
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example, criticized Hawkins’ disdain for continental Europeans by noting that the Klan 
merely added “Germans, Russians, Austrians, Frenchmen, and Spaniards” to the category 
of undesirables which already included “niggers, Chinks, Jews and Catholics.”400  No 
single group had a monopoly on racism in interwar Saskatchewan, but the Klan and the 
Orange Lodge—albeit less overtly—differentiated themselves by making racial 
categories central to their understanding of society. 
As the KKK and Orange Lodge’s nativism were largely indistinguishable from one 
another, it is not surprising that the Klan echoed the Lodge in its stance on public issues.  
Immigration, for example, dominated the Klan’s messaging.  “The Klan takes the stand,” 
Hawkins told a crowd of over 1,300 people at Regina’s City Hall, “that the admission of 
any race of people who cannot become assimilated is a danger to Canada.”401  Similarly, 
the Klan also condemned Catholic interference in Saskatchewan’s public schools.  A 
special issue of The Klansman dealt solely with the issue facing the Protestant minority in 
Gouverneur, featuring the headline: “Protestant Children Compelled to Kiss the Crucifix 
as Form of Punishment.”402  Reverend Rondeau, addressing the same Regina crowd as 
Hawkins, summed up the Klan’s position: “When the child goes to the public school, 
sectarianism must be left outside.”403  The Klan went so far as to hire James F. Bryant to 
defend the Gouverneur parents in their legal case.404  Like the Orange Lodge, the Klan’s 
attacks on Catholic education included a condemnation of separate schools themselves.  
A single “common school,” Imperial Wizard Rosborough argued, was the only way to 
“break down race prejudice” and assimilate “children of different nationalities.”405  Far 
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from being separate entities, as historians maintain, the Orange Lodge and the KKK were 
united in their response to every major racial and religious controversy Saskatchewan 
experienced during the 1920s. 
The only substantial difference between the Saskatchewan Lodge and the Klan was their 
stance on partisanship.  Despite the close connections between the Orange Lodge and 
provincial conservative parties, the Lodge refrained from engaging in partisan politics, 
preferring to rely on subtle hints and reminders to its followers on the best course of 
action.  In the lead up to Saskatchewan’s 1929 election, for example, the Orange Sentinel 
simply stated that Saskatchewan’s voters “will have to work out their own salvation if 
they desire to escape…[papal] domination.”406  While the implication that this “work” 
entailed voting out Jimmy Gardiner’s Liberal government was clear, the Orange Lodge 
did nothing to directly state its position to the electorate.  The Orange Lodge, White 
noted, was strictly “non-partisan” in that it did not pledge itself to “any particular 
political party or creed.”  Membership did not require a political test, and the Lodge was 
willing “to support any measure” that helped further its vision for a staunchly British and 
Protestant society.407   
The Klan, in contrast, had no qualms about directly entering the political arena.    
Although it did not release a political platform in the same manner as the Orange Lodge, 
Klan leaders openly expressed the political ramifications of their nativism.  According to 
Rosborough, “the Klan believes in Protestantism, racial purity, gentile economic 
freedom, just laws and liberty, separation of church and state, pure patriotism, restrictive 
and selective immigration, freedom of speech and press, law and order, higher moral 
standards, freedom from mob violence, and one public school.”408  Klansmen were clear 
that they would put their full support behind any political party which actively promoted 
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these principles.  “The members of the Ku Klux Klan,” J. Cox, secretary for the Regina 
Klavern, explained, “are not so much concerned about which political party endorses 
their principles as they are about getting them put into practice.  They feel that sound 
policy is never at variance with substantial justice, and it is safe to say that the party 
which comes nearest to the adopting [sic] this attitude will receive the major portion of 
Klan votes at the next election.”409  Yet, Klan leaders followed the Orange Lodge’s lead 
in refraining from endorsing a specific political party.  While the Klan would not “tell a 
man how to vote,” Hawkins explained, “it does urge the exercise of the franchise” and 
told its members to vote for the “best man.”410  Much of the Klan’s political activities, 
therefore, were dedicated towards explaining which men did not deserve Klan support.   
From the outset, the Klan was clear that the provincial Liberal Party under Jimmy 
Gardiner was unfit for leadership.  With a Liberal government in power since 
Saskatchewan became a province in 1905, the Klan had many grievances—both real and 
imagined—upon which to attack the Gardiner Liberals.  On the one hand, the Klan 
argued that the Liberal Party’s long tenure in office made them arrogant and corrupt.  It 
was well known that the Liberal Party “machine” was a primary reason for the party’s 
continued success.411  It was “degrading” for the people of Saskatchewan, the 
conservative Regina Star reported, that their government was kept in power “by a party 
organization, maintained with their money…for the simple purpose of wholesale bribery 
and corruption.”412  For Klansmen, the Liberal machine undermined Saskatchewan’s 
British values of “law and order” and “high moral standards.”413   
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Klansmen were also adamant that the Liberals used their undemocratic party apparatus to 
further Catholic interests over those of Saskatchewan’s Anglo-Saxon Protestants.   Klan 
speakers continually referred to the idea that the Gardiner Liberals were too friendly to 
Roman Catholics.  The “Roman Catholic Church,” Reverend Rondeau argued, is 
“permeating the public…life of the province in defiance of the law and the expressed 
wishes of the people.”414  The reasons for this abuse, Maloney added, was that Gardiner 
was “trying to get Henry VIII’s title of ‘Defender of the Faith.’”415  Rather than stand up 
for Anglo-Saxons, the Gardiner Liberals were catering to the Catholic minority.  The 
Liberal machine, according to Maloney, was the “Liberal Jesuit Machine.”416  Not only 
did “Rome run our government at Ottawa,” Maloney told a packed crowd in Regina, but 
it also ran the “government at Regina.”417  For Klansmen, this fact was evident in 
Gardiner’s response to many of the alleged abuses.  Papal control of Saskatchewan’s 
public schools, for example, was not only tolerated by the Liberals, but encouraged.  As 
The Klansman editorialized: “Either…Roman Catholic majorities may at will crush our 
weak minorities, in which case an immediate amendment is urgently required to the 
School Act; or the Department has full powers to correct this nefarious outrage and 
refuses to do so.”418  Whatever the case, the Klan urged that it was “time for the free and 
fair-minded citizens of Saskatchewan to open their eyes” and vote out the Liberal 
government.419 
The divergence of the Klan and Orange Lodge on direct partisan politics is reflected in 
the Liberal response.  Gardiner had little respect for either the KKK or the Orange Lodge.  
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For the Premier, both organizations were nothing more than a Conservative Party front.  
It was no coincidence, he wrote to a Liberal supporter, that Klan organizers focused their 
activities “in the Conservative centers of the province, and more especially where Orange 
Lodges were located.”420  Despite this fact, Gardiner limited his public criticisms to the 
Klan itself, ignoring the Orange Lodge entirely.  Both organizations shared a similar 
nativism, but only the KKK openly attacked the Liberals.  Gardiner distrusted the Orange 
Lodge, but he could not condemn a well-respected organization without just cause.  
Unlike the Klan, the Orange Lodge had a long history in Canada and was viewed by 
many as a central element of the country’s British heritage.  By not appearing openly 
hostile, the Orange Lodge could rely on its aura of respectability to limit Gardiner’s 
response.  When Gardiner’s opponents attempted to portray his attacks on the Klan as an 
assault on the Lodge, the Premier immediately issued a forceful denial: “Let me say this 
in the clearest language of which I am capable, neither I or any other member of the 
government have ever at any place or time made any statement that would reflect upon 
this organization.”421  While Gardiner’s public stance may have ignored the fact that the 
religious and racial messages of each organization were almost entirely interchangeable, 
the public nature of the KKK’s partisanship allowed Gardiner to respond in kind.   
Gardiner’s rejoinder was dictated by two competing factors.  Firstly, Gardiner was 
convinced that the KKK’s anti-Catholicism was a ploy by Conservatives to drum up anti-
government support.  “The whole intention of those who work by Maloney’s methods,” 
the Premier argued, “is to create an atmosphere of suspicion with regard to the 
Government and anyone who apparently supports the Government.  They have chosen to 
make their attack along religious and racial lines, and are only making use of the K.K.K. 
to further that end without coming into the open and saying that it is a move to defeat the 
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government.”422  Secondly, Gardiner was deeply concerned about the ultimate outcome 
of Saskatchewan’s increased religious and racial tensions.  The province’s Catholic 
population was demanding a response from the government.  “We regard the tolerance 
towards the K.K.K at the present time,” Patriote de l’Ouest editorialized, “only as an 
incident of a systematic campaign against us in which the Government is liable to 
sacrifice its friends instead of muzzling a band of fanatics.”423  Not only did Gardiner 
receive warnings that Catholics were “boiling over and threatening reprisals,” but the 
Premier believed that the “very nature” of the Klan itself “encourages a sense of 
lawlessness.”424   
Something had to be done before violence broke out.  The Premier believed that the 
province had nothing to fear from a Catholic conspiracy.  In fact, it was Saskatchewan’s 
Catholic minority which “have far more to complain about than the Protestant people 
have.”425   Yet, Gardiner understood that he could not hope to defeat nativism itself.   
Rather than confront the Klan’s anti-Catholicism—which was promoted just as 
vehemently by the Orange Lodge and found widespread support across Saskatchewan—
Gardiner focused his efforts on attempting to discredit the Klan.   
Launching his attack from the legislature in early 1928, Gardiner hoped to portray the 
Klan as a violent American institution completely incompatible with the British values of 
law and order.  The Klan, he argued, “left a trail of bloodshed in its wake everywhere it 
has gone in the USA and a trail of lawlessness as well.”  Gardiner explained that any 
organization “parading about the country wearing hoods over their heads” has “no place 
in British institutions of government.”  Focusing on the Emmons-Scott controversy, 
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Gardiner concluded that the Klan was nothing more than a scam concocted by American 
adventurers who sought to “get an easy living” by taking “people’s money.” 426  The fact 
that the re-organized Klan had already remedied all of Gardiner’s criticisms, including 
American control, the wearing of hoods, and the collection of money, was entirely 
ignored by the Premier.  Gardiner’s refusal to combat the root of the Klan’s nativism 
indicates the ideology’s power by the late 1920s.427 
Gardiner followed up his speech in the legislature by turning the entire power of the 
Liberal machine against the Klan.  The Premier hoped to convince the electorate that, in 
addition to constituting a foreign organization, the Klan was also a tool of the 
Conservative opposition.  In May, government agents brought Pat Emmons from his 
home in Indiana to testify on charges of embezzlement.  It was clear from the beginning 
that the case against Emmons was frivolous.  Emmons had a signed contract which 
promised that he could keep the money he collected.428  Yet, it was in the government’s 
interest to have Emmons testify in support of Gardiner’s attacks on the Klan.  Throughout 
his testimony, Emmons strayed considerably from the charges against him to allege 
collusion between the Klan and the Conservative Party.  “The Klan,” Emmons argued 
under oath, was “a Christian fraternal organization” until “Dr. J.T.M. 
Anderson…snatched it out of my hands.”  It was the Conservatives, he continued, who 
decided to vilify Roman Catholics.  Feigning innocence, Emmons claimed he wanted no 
part of this as it “meant bloodshed and they would cause the Klan to be built up the same 
as in the United States…I said it was a shame to let them go on and allow them to build 
up an organization which means religious war.”429   
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Conservatives and Klansmen alike were aghast at what they considered a political trial.  
Anderson, fearing that Emmons would cast a “slur upon him,” employed James F. Bryant 
to attend court and speak on his behalf.  Bryant claimed that Anderson was “not a 
member of the organization, was not at any time and never attended any meetings.”430  
Justice Heffernan, a Liberal appointee, ruled Bryant out-of-order, adding that Emmons’ 
testimony was interesting and he wanted to hear more of it.431  Similarly, Heffernan’s 
closing remarks directly attacked the Klan and its membership.  The magistrate lamented 
that Emmons had “full authority” from the Klan’s “big mogul” to collect the entirety of 
the funds he could from the “suckers” willing to pay.  Heffernan found it “unbelievable 
that, in the Great dominion of Canada, a gang of adventurers can come here and do what 
they have done, take thousands of dollars out of the pockets of innocent men.”  Heffernan 
further questioned the “manhood” of Saskatchewan residents who allowed “this gang 
from the United States…to tell us what the Union Jack stands for.”432  Clearly Heffernan, 
like Gardiner, had little affinity for the Klan. 
Klan supporters, however, did not need evidence to establish that Emmons’ trial was 
political and not criminal.  Maloney, addressing a crowd in Regina, claimed to have 
possession of an affidavit wherein Gardiner “promised to pay [Emmons’] expenses” in 
return for favourable testimony.433  While the affidavit was never produced, Bryant 
believed Gardiner was behind the whole spectacle.  In an open letter to the Regina 
Leader, Bryant alleged that Liberal agents interviewed Emmons before his return to 
Canada and that the Liberal machine had the trial transcript edited to reflect negatively on 
the Conservative Party.  Given Gardiner’s “political tactics,” Bryant concluded, 
thousands of Saskatchewan “suckers” will be “eager to pay their $13.00 to join” the Klan.   
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Even if Liberals had nothing to do with the Emmons case, the party attempted to use it 
for political advantage.  Saskatchewan’s Liberal-controlled newspapers vilified the Klan 
and the Conservative Party for its alleged involvement.   “It may well be that no 
‘snatching’ was required,” the Moose Jaw Times argued, “and that instead the 
‘organization’ really belonged to Dr. Anderson all the time, and that the political-
religious group within the Conservative party were responsible for using Emmons for 
political purposes.”  If nothing else, the paper concluded, the trial proved that the Klan 
was the “very essence of Toryism.”434  The Regina Leader, for its part, found that while 
Gardiner was trying to protect “the people against handing over their money to Klan 
adventurers,” Anderson and the Conservative Party were “encouraging the organization 
in this province of a movement, which, on its record, has been subversive of British 
ideals and institutions.”435  Gardiner believed that the attacks on the Klan served their 
intended purpose.  The anti-Klan campaign, he confided to a supporter, had “been a very 
successful one,” and it appeared that the Klan could “accomplish very little more in this 
Province.”436   
This bravado notwithstanding, Gardiner utterly failed in his attempts to discredit the 
Klan.  The Premier’s portrayal of the Klan as an American import and Conservative 
political tool was a grave miscalculation.  Gardiner underestimated the extent that the 
Klan’s nativism resonated with a large segment of the Saskatchewan electorate.  Rather 
than a menace, the Klan was providing what many residents believed was a much-needed 
service.  As the Regina Standard argued, the fact that Gardiner hid “behind a sect in 
parliament” and defamed “a society who has done so much to suppress immorality and 
vice here with false and malicious charges, that he dare not utter publicly appears both 
ungentlemanly and cowardly.”437  So long as the Klan was willing to stand up for the 
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province’s Anglo-Saxons, it did not matter if it was a political tool or had American 
origins.  Saskatchewan residents indoctrinated into its brand of British nativism simply 
did not care whether the Klan was a Conservative Party tool or not.  As the Birch Hills 
Gazette noted: “It may be an attempt to make all Protestants believe that the Catholics 
control the Liberal party.  (That statement circulates freely all through the Province.)  No 
doubt it would be great to see the present government unseated.  A change of government 
would raise the life of the people all over the province.”438  Gardiner’s attacks also failed 
to adequately deal with the charges the Klan was making against his government.  Far 
from discrediting the KKK, the Premier simply gave them free publicity.  “It will be well 
for those in high places to bear in mind,” the Wadena Herald warned, “that it is the 
charges rather than the ‘soap-box agitator’ we are likely to consider.  It would seem to 
call for something more convincing than the mediated insolence of an unmannerly 
attorney or the childish equivocation of a misfit minister to answer charges half proved 
by the savage anger of the accused.”439  The Klan, unlike the more established Orange 
Lodge, was actively helping to defeat the Liberal government and received a great deal of 
support from Gardiner’s opponents for doing so. 
Klan leaders also capitalized on Gardiner’s attacks to further raise their organization’s 
profile.  Hawkins began following the Premier around the province challenging him to a 
debate.  After numerous encounters throughout early 1928, a frustrated Premier agreed 
with a date set for the evening of June 19th in Lemberg, Gardiner’s home town.  The 
debate, as Pitsula notes, was a “coup for the Klan” as it “put Hawkins on the same 
platform as the Premier, as though Hawkins were the leader of the opposition.”440  Given 
its significance, a crowd of over 1,500 packed into the skating rink to hear the two square 
off.  Hawkins spoke first for an hour and a half, maintaining that he was an honourable 
British subject, not an American adventurer.  Although he happened “to be born across 
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the Border,” Hawkins asserted that he was British through and through, with the Grand 
Master of the Orange Lodge of British North America vouching for his character and 
loyalty.  Hawkins also took issue with Gardiner’s attempts to portray the Saskatchewan 
Klan as bloodthirsty and lawless.  These characterizations were “justified as far as the 
Klan in the States was concerned,” but the Saskatchewan Klan had “removed every 
objectionable feature” and was “in compliance with every law in Canada demanding 
equal rights for all men.”441  The Saskatchewan Klan, Hawkins concluded, stood for the 
interests of the province’s Anglo-Saxon population by opposing the “intermingling of 
races, separate schools, and a government beholden to religion for support.”442  Far from 
being intimidated by Gardiner’s attacks, Hawkins used the opportunity to reiterate his 
charges against the Liberal Government and the “threat” it posed to the people of 
Saskatchewan. 
Gardiner continued the same line of attacks from his speech in the legislature.  The 
Premier claimed that he attacked the Klan because “they first attacked the Liberal party 
of which I am the leader” and the “government of which I am head.”  Rather than defend 
his government from Hawkins’ charges, Gardiner reiterated his assertion that the KKK 
was a violent, American organization.  The Klan, he noted, sought to “supplement the 
law courts of this province, to admit which would be to recognize lynch law, which 
prevails in that part of the United States from which the lecturer of the organization 
comes.”  Gardiner also restated his claims that the Klan was a fraud, designed to part 
people from their money.  Despite evidence to the contrary, Gardiner argued that the 
Klan had not changed since its previous leaders absconded with its funds.  “When $13 
fees ceased to roll in,” the Premier concluded, Hawkins and other leaders in the 
Saskatchewan Klan “would soon leave” as well.443   
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Gardiner received “three cheers and a tiger” from the crowd at the close of his remarks, 
but his performance at Lemberg was another miscalculation.  Hawkins and other Klan 
leaders had spent the previous months attacking the Liberal government.  By not using 
the opportunity to defend his government against Hawkins’ charges, Gardiner appeared 
evasive.  Gardiner’s remarks, on the other hand, did little to reassure the “thousands of 
citizens” who did not fit into the Klan’s vision for an Anglo-Saxon society.444  By 
sharing the platform with Hawkins without challenging his characterization of 
Saskatchewan’s Catholics, visible minorities, or foreign-born population, Gardiner gave 
legitimacy to the Klan’s nativist ideology.   
Most observers—outside of the Liberal-controlled press at least—viewed the debate as a 
Klan victory.  Not only did Gardiner fail to respond to the charges levelled against his 
government, but he was also misguided in his characterizations of the Klan as American- 
controlled and violence-prone despite evidence to the contrary.  As the Esterhazy 
Observer explained: “Everything that does not run on all foure[sic] with Mr. Gardiner’s 
view is very gravely wrong, so that his extreme views on the K.K.K. are quite 
understandable and must be taken with a quantity of salt.”445  Gardiner’s public attacks 
on the KKK were alienating Saskatchewan’s Anglo-Saxon population, many of whom 
had never been members of the Klan or had known much about it prior to the beginning 
of the Premier’s crusade. 
Gardiner’s fear of the Klan’s growing power is evident in his continued private attacks on 
the organization.  The Premier had no real proof that the Klan was either lawless or that 
its leaders were fraudsters.  The solution, therefore, was to find or manufacture the 
needed proof.  Following the Lemberg debate, both the provincial and federal authorities 
brought a series of questionable legal actions against prominent Klansmen in 
Saskatchewan.  The first target was a R.C. Snelgrove, a Klan organizer from Regina.  As 
the Lemberg debate began, a police officer approached Snelgrove and questioned him as 
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to whether he was in possession of a firearm.  Snelgrove admitted that there was a 
handgun locked in the trunk of his car but claimed that he had a permit to carry it.  
Snelgrove’s gun was confiscated and he was released without charge, leading him to 
believe the matter was closed.  It took authorities a full month to bring charges.  Despite 
Snelgrove’s claim at his trial that he had purchased the gun for self-defence after a “gang 
of drunken Roman Catholics” threatened his life, the presiding judge found that the 
permit was invalid and sentenced Snelgrove to two months in jail and a seventy-five-
dollar fine, lowered to one month’s imprisonment and a fifty-dollar fine on appeal. 446    
Given the apparent political nature of the trial, Snelgrove’s supporters rushed to his 
defence.  Snelgrove was not a hardened criminal, the Klan argued, but a respected 
member of the community.  He served in the 28th Infantry Battalion during the Great War 
and was an executive member of the Great War Veterans’ Association.  He was also 
active in his trade union local and was a former member of the Regina Young Liberals 
Association.447  As Maloney explained at a Klan rally in Yorkton, “Snelgrove is a 
returned soldier who at one time carried a gun for $1.10 a day for the country which 
afterwards sent him to jail.”448  To his supporters, Snelgrove was the unjust victim of 
Gardiner’s political attacks.  “There is ground for great disquiet of mind in the thought 
that not even our courts are free from the baleful influence of a party machine,” the 
Regina Daily Star argued, “and that they are being degraded, their dignity lowered, and 
public confidence weakened in their integrity, because of the needs of partisanship.”  
Gardiner, the paper concluded, “has allowed his fear of opposition to outweigh his 
common sense.”449  Far from being a discredit to the Klan, as Gardiner had intended, 
Snelgrove received a parade in his honour upon his release from prison.  
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Other Klansmen faced similar legal troubles.  On June 28th, police charged Thomas 
Pakenham, a former police chief in Melville, with the illegal possession of a firearm.  Not 
only did Pakenham believe that, as a former police office, he could legally carry the 
weapon, but the gun itself was not loaded.  As with the other cases against the Klan, 
however, the presiding judge took the opportunity to opine on the KKK’s lawless nature.  
Even if a man were a “lecturer” for the Klan “and might stir up an audience,” Justice of 
the Peace Stewart Gordon intoned, “it was quite unnecessary for any man in Canada to 
carry a gun for protection.”450  Given the “serious matter” of the charges, Gordon 
sentenced Pakenham to two months in jail and a fifty-dollar fine.   
Imperial Wizard Rosborough also came under legal scrutiny.  While Rosborough was 
standing for re-election in late 1928, charges emerged that he had embezzled two hundred 
dollars during his work as a chartered accountant for the rural municipality of Mountain 
View in 1923 and 1924.  Rosborough testified that his charges were politically motivated, 
swearing under oath that the deputy attorney promised to have the charges dismissed if he 
agreed to disband the Klan.  Refusing to defame the Klan, Rosborough preferred to go to 
trial where he was acquitted of all wrongdoing.  As a show of continued support and 
defiance of Gardiner and the Liberal machine, Klansmen re-elected the Imperial 
Wizard—customarily an annual position—to a two-year term.451 
The most overt political attack came against the Klan’s most visible spokesman.    
Shortly after his debate with Gardiner, Hawkins received a deportation notice from the 
federal government.  Hawkins’ last visit to the United States had been for a period of 366 
days.  Legally, however, he could only be absent from the country for 365 days.  Given 
that Hawkins had only been overdue by a single day, and that more than a year had 
passed before the matter caught the government’s attention, many supporters believed 
that the Gardiner Liberals had pushed the federal government to deport Hawkins in 
retribution for the Klansman’s attacks.  Had it not been for “pressure from Premier 
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Gardiner,” the Regina Daily Star reported, the federal government would never have 
acted.  J.F. Bryant, representing Hawkins in his appeal, declared that the deportation 
order was “nothing but a cheap political trick.”  Even though Hawkins was the “most 
desirable immigrant” imaginable, a legal “technicality” resulted in his removal from his 
adopted home.452  After exhausting all appeals, Hawkins was forced from Canada. 
If authorities hoped that these legal cases would weaken the Klan, they were mistaken.  
Each case only strengthened the organization and increased its attacks on the Liberal 
government.  The common perception at the time was that the Liberal machine, with the 
Premier at the wheel, was pulling the strings and pushing for the charges.  The Orange 
Lodge used the political nature of the charges to break its customary non-partisan stance 
when dealing with the provincial government.  Gardiner “has put Saskatchewan politics 
in ferment,” the Orange Sentinel reported, by adopting the “Prussian method of disposing 
of an inconvenient political opponent.”453  Even more troublesome, the legal campaign 
reinforced the Orange Lodge and KKK’s belief that Saskatchewan’s Anglo-Saxons were 
victims of a Catholic-controlled conspiracy.  “I am really sorry for Premier Gardiner,” 
Hawkins told a crowd in Regina on the eve of his departure, “but I understand that he has 
had to obey His Master’s Voice.”454 
Although the Klan differed with the Orange Lodge in its willingness to overtly attack 
Saskatchewan’s Liberal government, both organizations benefited from Gardiner’s 
response.  Historians estimate Klan membership at 25,000 in 1929.455   The Orange 
Lodge also saw impressive gains, with its meteoric rise during the 1920s culminating in 
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1930 with over 60,000 members.456  In comparison, the SGGA accounted for a total 
membership of only 35,000 at its height.457  With locals in every corner of the province, 
the Lodge and Klan capitalized on their newfound notoriety to promote their nativist 
message in the lead-up to the 1929 election.  The Klan, far from being curtailed by the 
legal attacks on its members, went on the offensive.  Meeting at their annual 
Klanvocation in Saskatoon, Klansmen passed a series of resolutions continuing the 
organization’s attacks on the Gardiner government and Saskatchewan’s educational 
system.  If the Klan had its way, it would eliminate provisions protecting Catholic 
positions on local school boards, it would require all school trustees to be able to read and 
speak English, and it would eliminate all constitutional protections for separate schools.  
If not for “weak-kneed poltroon Protestant politicians” in the Liberal Party, Reverend 
Rondeau told a crowded meeting during the convention, “much of the grief in the 
country” would have been avoided.458  The Orange Lodge’s 1929 convention also 
intensified its attack on the Liberal government.  Orangemen passed a resolution 
congratulating “our Brother J.T.M. Anderson” on his attempts to prohibit “the use of all 
clerical garb and sectarian symbols in the Public Schools.”  In the same breath, the 
convention noted that it “deeply regretted the action of the house in rejecting the 
resolution.”459  Understanding that 1929 was also an election year, the Lodge’s political 
platform reappeared in the report of the convention proceedings after an absence of 
several years. 
Gardiner’s attempts to discredit the Klan failed.  Although the Premier spent most of 
1928 attacking the Klan, using every tool available to his government to discredit its 
membership, the Klan entered 1929 more united and visible than at any point in its brief 
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history in the province.  Gardiner failed understand that many voters were captivated by 
the Klan and Lodge’s articulation of a British nativist message.  Far from an anomaly, 
much of the province’s British population fundamentally adhered to this brand of anti-
Catholic nativism.  This was not the product of Klan “populism” as Pitsula maintains, or 
a new manifestation of racial hatred as Calderwood alleges.  The Klan neither invented 
this ideology nor was it the first to bring it to Saskatchewan.  It is only by understanding 
the close connections in membership, organization, goals, and ideology between the Klan 
and the much older Orange Lodge that it is possible to appreciate the extent that this 
brand of nativism served as a major foundation of Saskatchewan’s conservative thought 
in the inter-war period.    
A fundamental adherence to their own individualism animated Saskatchewan’s 
conservatives.  Conservative farmers, understanding themselves as masters of their own 
fate, viewed their successes, and failures, as a product of their own individual efforts.  
The capitalist grain trade’s competitiveness, far from a menace, was central to these 
farmers’ understanding of their own business.  This same individualism, albeit in an 
extreme form, was central to the nativist British nationalism articulated by both the Ku 
Klux Klan and the Orange Lodge.  Understanding individualism as the corner-stone of 
Saskatchewan’s British tradition, these organizations articulated a worldview wherein 
race and religion functioned as the main litmus test of citizenship.  Since the settlement 
period, this nativism manifested itself in challenges to any deviation from an idealized 
British and Protestant society.  It was also vital to the program of Saskatchewan’s 








3 The Politics of Division: The Saskatchewan 
Conservative Party, 1905-1921 
Conservative farmers and nativists constituted the two main elements of Saskatchewan 
conservatism prior to the Great Depression.  Both groups articulated a conservative 
ideology that was predicated on defending individual rights and freedoms.  Both groups 
were also deeply influential in the major economic and social problems facing 
Saskatchewan.  Conservative farmers used the SCEC, SGGA, and the Permanent 
Organization Opposing Compulsory Pool to promote an economic individualism that 
resisted the compulsory elements of orderly marketing.  Similarly, British nativists 
believed that individual freedoms were racially and religiously based and used the 
Orange Lodge and the KKK to advocate for a racially-limited citizenship.  Despite their 
shared focus on defending individual rights, these conservative movements were not 
natural allies.  Ideology is fluid and often contradictory.  It was possible, therefore, for a 
conservative farmer to identify as a conservative in economic matters but a progressive 
when it came to questions of race and religion.  Conservative farmers’ belief in their 
ability to compete effectively as individuals within the capitalist system fueled their 
opposition to orderly marketing.  However, this economic focus but did not naturally 
align with nativists ideas of a racial and religiously-based individualism.  There was 
certainly overlap between the two groups.  The Orange Lodge’s membership, after all, 
was primarily made up of farmers, many of whom opposed orderly marketing.  Similarly, 
some conservative farmers may have remained outside of the Lodge and the KKK shared 
these organizations racialized thinking and believed that eastern Europeans’ racial 
background contributed to their support for marketing schemes. Yet, there were many 
who did not overlap between the two manifestations of conservative thought.  When it 
came to politics, therefore, Saskatchewan’s conservatives were not predisposed to 
support the same party.   
The Saskatchewan Liberal Party actively exploited these divisions.  Since 
Saskatchewan’s creation in 1905, the Liberals forged alliances with Saskatchewan’s 
conservative farmers and brought several leading producers—including William 
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Motherwell and Charles Dunning—into government.  This alliance entrenched 
conservative farmers in positions of power within the farmers’ movement and ensured 
that the government would avoid costly experiments in state intervention into the wheat 
economy.  Attempts by the Conservative Party to weaken this alliance were largely 
ineffective.  At the same time, Liberals rejected nativists’ racial and religious views in 
favour of a close relationship with Saskatchewan’s Catholic and newcomer populations.  
The Conservative Party, unable to win over farmer support, turned to British nativists as 
their main electoral base.  Far from a single political movement, Saskatchewan’s early 
conservative history is one of division.     
These divisions have shaped the dominant understanding of Saskatchewan conservatism 
prior to the Great Depression.  The Liberals, galvanized by their base among conservative 
farmers, Roman Catholics, and recent immigrants, won every election between 1905 and 
1944 except one.  The Conservative Party, in contrast, was plagued by disorganization, 
electoral failure, and personal animosities.  Whereas the Liberals became the “tap-root of 
Saskatchewan politics,”460 the Conservative Party was “a succession of legions plodding 
an indefinite, long march from disappointment to disappointment and ending in a last 
confusion and surrender.”461  Yet, the failure of a single political party is not akin to the 
failure of an entire ideology.  The fact that the Conservative Party only won a single 
election prior to the Second World War does not mean that conservatism itself was not a 
vibrant and powerful political force in Saskatchewan.      
This chapter examines the Saskatchewan Conservative Party’s development from its 
origins as the Provincial Rights Party during the autonomy debates until the 1921 
election.  This was a period of frustration for the Conservative Party as it sought to break 
the Liberal monopoly on government.  From its inception, British nativists formed the 
Conservative’s primary support base, but they lacked the numbers and the geographic 
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reach to win power on their own.  Conservative success at the polls was only possible by 
uniting this nativist base with the province’s conservative farmers.  The Liberal 
government, however, jealously guarded its connection with the farmers’ movement.  
The Conservatives responded by attempting to win over the province’s radical farmers 
who advocated for increased government intervention.  Not only did this further alienate 
conservative producers, but these attempts foundered through Conservatives’ association 
with their high tariff federal counterparts after 1911.  The Conservative Party failed to 
make inroads with the province’s farm population prior to the late 1920s.  Although the 
Conservative’s experience during this period was one of defeat, it did provide valuable 
lessons that they used to successfully challenge the Liberals in 1929.  The Conservative’s 
adherence a nativist rhetoric throughout this period also demonstrates the strength of this 
strain of conservatism.  Throughout every electoral defeat, the Conservatives maintained 
and nurtured this association, steadfastly defending a shared sense of British 
individualism.   
The party system came late to Saskatchewan politics.  The region favoured a non-partisan 
political stance during the territorial period.  Led by Frederick Haultain after 1897, 
politicians believed that rejecting partisan labels would allow the region to negotiate with 
Ottawa more effectively regardless of which party held power federally.  As Grant 
MacEwan explains, Haultain did not oppose “the principle of opposition in government,” 
but believed that the party system “tended to destroy the independence of elected 
individuals.  Perhaps the party system was justifiable on the national scene, he reasoned, 
but it would be a liability on the frontier.”462  Haultain’s political sympathies lay with the 
federal Conservative Party, but he was determined throughout his career that party labels 
would only weaken the territory’s bargaining position with Ottawa.463  This non-partisan 
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stance, however, does not  mean that territorial politics were without divisions.  
“Opposition to the shape and detail of Haultain’s administration,” Stanley Gordon 
explains, “existed throughout his regime, and grew stronger as time went on.”464   By the 
early twentieth century, it was increasingly clear that local Conservatives and Liberals 
were intent on introducing the two-party system.  In 1903, a group of Conservatives 
formed the Territorial Conservative Association with the expressed purpose of contesting 
the next territorial election on a party basis.  Although Haultain disapproved of the 
resolution, his acceptance of honorary president of the association angered Liberals.  
Similarly, Haultain’s fierce support of the Borden Conservatives during the 1904 federal 
election, only earned him further distrust.465   
This growing tension between Haultain and the Liberals was also on display in the 
debates over the terms upon which the region would enter Confederation.  Haultain 
maintained that the entire region, consisting of present-day Alberta and Saskatchewan, 
should enter as a single province.  “We do not want a single province made up of one big 
wheat field,” he argued, “or one big cattle ranch and coal mine.  We want wheat fields, 
cattle ranches, and coal mines, and every other thing that goes to make up a big, rich 
country.”466  Laurier, in contrast, believed that such a province would “upset the balance 
of power in Confederation” and provide Haultain, a Conservative, with “a tremendous 
power base.”467  The most controversial aspects of the discussion came down to the 
region’s rights within Confederation.  Haultain believed that the territory should have 
complete control over its crown lands and natural resources, a right granted to provinces 
under the BNA Act but withheld from Manitoba in 1870.  Laurier and his Minister of the 
Interior, Clifford Sifton, claimed that uniformity with previous homesteading policies 
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required their continued alienation.  Similarly, Haultain believed that the region should 
have the power to decide its own educational system, another right granted to the 
provinces under the BNA Act.468   Laurier, fearing the provinces would use the power to 
limit separate schools as had been the case in Manitoba, sought guarantees “that the 
minority shall have the power to establish their own schools and that they shall have the 
right to share in the public moneys.”469  The Autonomy Bills, passed by the House of 
Commons in 1905, rejected Haultain’s claims.  The region would enter Confederation, 
but it would do so as two provinces, lacking control of their natural resources and the 
ability to decide on the nature of education systems.470  Haultain was furious.  By 
refusing to accept Alberta and Saskatchewan as equal partners in Confederation, he 
intoned, Laurier had created an “unwilling, inferior, and imperfect organization.”471   
The Liberals responded to Haultain’s public intransigence by actively excluding him 
from power.  The Saskatchewan Act allowed the federal government to select the 
provinces’ first Lieutenant Governors and Premiers before holding popular elections.  
Many observers believed that Haultain—as the man most intimately connected with the 
quest for regional autonomy—should have the honour of leading one of the new 
provinces’ first governments.472  The Liberals were not convinced.  Far from ceremonial 
positions, the first Premiers were responsible for filling valuable patronage positions.  
“The federal Liberals,” Gordon Barnhart notes, “believed it was vital to have control of 
patronage for the first election.  To have given Haultain the Premiership would have been 
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like giving him the keys to the store.”473  Haultain’s association with the Territorial 
Conservative Association and federal Conservative Party, as well as his opposition to the 
Autonomy Bills made his selection “an impossibility.”474  Instead the Liberals appointed 
Walter Scott, a Liberal Member of Parliament (MP) and owner of the Moose Jaw Times 
and Regina Leader, as Premier.  Saskatchewan’s first Liberal convention, held in Regina 
in August, unanimously endorsed the decision and established plans to hold the 
upcoming election on “straight party lines” with Scott as their leader.475  Scott’s selection 
as leader placed Haultain in a precarious position.  Haultain intended to contest the 
upcoming Saskatchewan election, but the Liberals controlled the government and the 
patronage that went with it.  Haultain was popular, especially among older settlers in the 
south-east, but admiration alone could not overcome the Liberals’ advantages.  Haultain 
needed an issue that transcended party divisions and allowed him to steal support of 
erstwhile Liberals.   
Rather than fight the election on “straight party lines” as the Liberals intended, Haultain 
attempted to transform it into a referendum on Saskatchewan’s inferior position within 
Confederation.  “We want governments,” Haultain argued, “which are quite independent 
of Ottawa.  We want men who when Western interests are involved will work with a 
single eye to those interests without regard to party interest or convenience.”476  It was a 
novel plan.  By turning the election into a referendum on autonomy Haultain believed he 
had an issue that would appeal to all of Saskatchewan’s residents regardless of party 
affiliation.  Under Haultain’s guidance, provincial Conservatives chose to abandon their 
party label in favour of a Provincial Rights Party, open to anyone regardless of federal 
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party affiliation who desired “full provincial rights” for Saskatchewan.477  If elected, 
Haultain promised to appeal the Autonomy Act’s education and natural resources 
provisions to Canada’s courts at the earliest opportunity.478   
Haultain’s stance on autonomy began the process of dividing Saskatchewan’s 
conservative farmers and British nativists between the Liberal and Provincial Rights 
Parties.  For the Orange Lodge, separate schools were a Catholic plot to undermine the 
country’s British heritage.  The Lodge was equally clear that it would support any party 
that opposed them.  Haultain, for his part, was clear that his opposition to separate 
schools was constitutional, not religious.  It was not the presence of separate schools that 
he took issue with, but the fact that the federal government, in granting them in the 
Autonomy Act, infringed on a fundamental provincial right.  Once the courts overturned 
these unconstitutional laws, Haultain would “leave it to the people to say whether we 
shall have separate schools or not.”479  The Liberals, in contrast, only promised to 
maintain the status quo.  If the province reopened the separate school question, they 
argued, Saskatchewan could very well end up with “clerically controlled schools such as 
existed” at the territory’s creation.480  Choosing which plan to support was not a difficult 
decision for Orangemen to make.  Neither party fully supported the Lodge’s position on 
separate schools, but Haultain at least held out the possibility of limiting Catholic 
influence at a future date.  Meeting at their annual convention in Regina, Orangemen 
announced that they would “oppose the re-election of any member” who supported the 
“unwarranted and tyrannical” educational clauses in the Autonomy Act.481   
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Whereas Haultain’s opposition to the education provisions within the Autonomy Act 
endeared him to Orangemen, the Liberals focused their attention on Saskatchewan’s 
Roman Catholic and “foreign” populations.  The 1896 immigration boom transformed 
Saskatchewan’s racial makeup, as thousands of “non-preferred” continental European 
immigrants settled the province.  The Liberals consciously sought these newcomers’ 
support.  In the lead up to the 1905 election, Liberals wrote leaders in the German and 
Ukrainian communities reminding them that it was the Laurier Liberals who were 
responsible for their settlement.  The Liberal Party also published campaign material in 
German, Ukrainian, and other foreign languages, and organized naturalization drives so 
that all eligible immigrants could vote.  Additionally, Scott warned Roman Catholics that 
the Provincial Rights education policy posed a direct threat to legal protections for 
Catholic separate schools.482  The province’s Catholic hierarchy agreed.  At the height of 
the election campaign, Adélard Langevin, the archbishop of St. Boniface, issued a 
pastoral letter condemning Haultain and urging all Catholics to “unite and vote for those 
who are in favor of the actual system of separate schools.”483  Haultain and the Provincial 
Rights Party may have earned the support of Saskatchewan’s British nativists, but the 
Liberals were able to effectively counter by developing relationships with recent 
immigrants and Roman Catholics.   
In contrast, farmers’ political loyalty remained an open question.  British nativists, recent 
immigrants, and Roman Catholics could sway election outcomes, but they did not have 
the strength to win them on their own.  Both Scott and Haultain understood that the only 
sure measure of future electoral success lay with the province’s farmers.  Unlike 
questions over separate schools, however, both parties promised the same agricultural 
policies to win farmers’ support.  The Liberal platform contained provisions for improved 
transportation facilities—including the completion of roads and bridges, a rail line to 
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Hudson Bay, and the expansion of branch lines to newly settled districts—and to provide 
general assistance to farmers to “advance in every way possible the prosperity of the 
Province and its citizens.”  For Scott, Saskatchewan’s “illimitable rich acres,” when 
combined with a Liberal administration, left little doubt that the province would shortly 
become “the banner province of Canada.”484  Not to be outdone, Haultain also vowed to 
complete an extensive system of roads and bridges, encourage the development of branch 
lines, and provide “general assistance” to the province’s farmers.485  Both leaders also 
promised to challenge federal control of natural resources and the Canadian Pacific 
Railway’s exemption from provincial taxation, both elements of the Saskatchewan Act 
that farmers universally despised.486   
With both sides promising a similar agricultural program, the only differentiation 
between them came from their ability to deliver results.  The Liberal’s main advantage 
lay in their control of government which they used to demonstrate their party’s dedication 
to the farmers’ cause.  Upon entering office, Premier Scott selected William Motherwell, 
the President of the Territorial Grain Growers, as his Commissioner of Agriculture.487  
By accepting the leader of the organized farmers into his cabinet, Scott demonstrated his 
party’s commitment to actively work in their interests.  At the same time, Scott used 
Haultain’s association with the federal Conservatives to argue that, given the chance, 
Haultain would continue the National Policy’s high tariffs and monopoly protections.  
Haultain, they argued, would “leave the C.P.R. Co. forever in the enjoyment” of its 
“unjust” privileges.488  Although at a disadvantage, Haultain relied on his reputation from 
his time as territorial leader convincing several leading farmers to join his new party. 
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With the Liberals and Provincial Righters offering similar agricultural policies, racial and 
religious issues dominated the 1905 campaign.  Haultain spoke directly to the Orange 
Lodge when he claimed that a “conspiracy” existed between Liberals and Catholics 
which posed a “menace to our school system, and to the sound principles upon which it 
has been established.”  The only “safety for our educational system,” he urged, lay “in 
once and for all establishing it on an absolutely national basis, with equal rights to all and 
special privileges to none.”489  The Liberals, for their part, pointed out that no evidence 
existed that linked them to a Catholic conspiracy.  Evidence, however, mattered little to 
those whose worldview centered on a conspiratorial anti-Catholicism.  Haultain’s stance, 
Clifford Sifton noted, won over voters “who were sore on the question.”490   
Haultain won the nativist vote but lost the election.  A clear geographic division existed 
in the results.  Liberal support was strongest in the more recently settled areas north of 
the CPR main line.  Haultain, in contrast, dominated areas where “old-timer” Anglo-
Saxons proliferated in the south and around Prince Albert.  While it is not possible to 
make concrete statements as to how the different racial and religious groups voted, there 
is a clear pattern in these results.  Scott fared best in areas with high proportions of 
Roman Catholics and continental Europeans, winning every seat that possessed a 
Catholic majority as of 1901.  In contrast, the Provincial Righters, who did not even 
bother nominating a candidate in the German-Catholic-dominated riding of Humboldt, 
won every riding with a Protestant majority except for Moose Jaw.491  Even here, 
however, the results rested entirely “upon the Willow Bunch poll” where the large 
Catholic population voted solidly for the Liberals.492   
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Figure 3 - Electoral Map, 1905 
 
The results convinced Provincial Righters that they had wisely supported the British 
nativist cause.  Editorials comforted the party faithful by claiming they had succeeded “in 
the old settled districts where the true Canadian vote” resided.493  Liberals, on the other 
hand, only won “where development is crudest, where the foreign element is most 
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pronounced, and where reliable news and views were least accessible.”494  Their defeat, 
therefore, was not a failure in tactics.  Rather, they argued that the Liberal’s unscrupulous 
tactics stole the election from the province’s Anglo-Saxons.  In the follow-up to the 
election, opposition newspapers were filled with accounts of the Liberal “machine.”  Not 
only had the Liberals used the levers of government patronage to gerrymander ridings 
and ensure an increased foreign vote, but Liberal agents spent election day stuffing ballot 
boxes and “buying votes at $5.00 each.”495  Although many of these claims could not be 
corroborated, some vindication occurred when it emerged that Peter Tyerman, the Liberal 
Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) for Prince Albert County, received 151 
votes from polls which were not even held.  The ensuing investigation found that at least 
two deputy returning officers—both federal government officials—and Tyerman 
colluded in stuffing ballot boxes.496  If not for “systemic corruption, the work of Federal 
office-holders and the misuse of naturalization papers,” Provincial Righters concluded, 
they would have formed the government.497  
While such conclusions certainly comforted Provincial Righters in their defeat, they did 
little to spur organization.  The party spent the interim between the 1905 and 1908 
elections moribund, offering little in the way of organization.  Haultain had never been 
comfortable with the machinations of party politics, relying instead on “his supporters 
organizing his electoral machine on his behalf.”498  As a result, Provincial Righters 
neglected the behind-the-scenes maneuvering that was required to keep a party 
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functioning and win elections.  Fundraising, constituency organization, and candidate 
recruitment were all neglected. 
The Liberals had no such qualms.  Even before the 1905 election, Scott and his chief 
lieutenant, James Alexander Calder, began building what David Smith terms a “well-
oiled machine.”499   The “machine” existed to ensure electoral victory, using all available 
tools at its disposal.  Through their constituency organizations, Liberals kept a constant 
tally of each eligible voter’s political affiliation.  It was the machine’s job to ensure that 
Liberal voters remained committed, that undecided voters were won over, and the 
opposition’s influence was minimized.  In 1907, for example, the machine funded the 
creation of Der Courier after the province’s German population demanded their own 
newspaper.500  The machine also used government powers to actively influence political 
allegiance.  “When it could not win converts by legitimate persuasion,” Escott Reid 
notes, “it did not shrink from using corrupt methods.”501  Positions in the civil service, for 
example, were limited as much as possible to the party faithful.  “Any man or woman 
who benefited from the government’s largesse,” Smith explains, “was expected to work 
for the party when requested.”502  The machine also used government money to buy 
support.  Printing contracts were actively funneled to friendly newspapers, and many 
local businessmen were told that “if he and his family did not transfer their allegiance 
from the Conservatives to the Liberals they would get no government business.”503 
The power of the Liberal machine was on full display in the 1908 election.  Scott called 
the election a year early to take advantage of Provincial Righters’ disorganization.  
Whereas Scott could rely on the machine to fight an election with short notice, Haultain 
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had not even begun selecting candidates.  Haultain was outraged at Scott’s tactics.  
“There was a good British sense of fair play among the people of this province,” he 
argued, and did not think that the “springing of an election…would appeal to that 
spirit.”504  Even without the timing of the election, however, the Liberals were once again 
unmatched.  Whereas the Liberals had their local machine in place to get their issues in 
front of the electors, the Provincial Righters were forced to rely on an “army of workers 
sent in from Manitoba.”505  It was this organizational advantage that decided the contest 
for the Liberals.  With only 50.5% of the popular vote, the Liberals secured twenty-seven 
of the forty-one seats in the newly expanded legislature.  Significantly, the Liberals won 
eleven ridings by fewer than 100 votes.  In comparison, only three of Haultain’s fourteen 
victories were within the same margin.  Had it not been for the superior Liberal 
organization, the results would have been much closer.506 
As was the case in 1905, results in 1908 came down to questions of religion and race.  
The Liberals won nineteen of the twenty-five seats north of the CPR, dominating in areas 
with high concentrations of Roman Catholics and newcomers.  As a Liberal organizer 
explained to Scott: “as long as our torry [sic] friends use the word foreigners so much as 
they do we are sure of the German vote.”507  Scott was unapologetic in courting the 
“foreign” vote.  “These back settlements,” Scott proclaimed, were home to the “bone and 
sinew and the best intelligence and true foundation of the development of this 
province.”508  Provincial Rights candidates, in contrast, held on to the Anglo-Saxon 
regions around Prince Albert and in the south of the province.  Despite their defeat, it was 
a positive showing for Haultain.  The party declined in its share of seats, but the close 
popular vote demonstrated that victory was within its grasp. 
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Figure 4 - Electoral Map, 1908 
 
Saskatchewan’s first two election campaigns solidified the Provincial Righters as the 
champion of Saskatchewan’s nativists.  The relative parity in the popular vote, however, 
demonstrates that neither party had yet won over the province’s farmers.  Both sides 
promised the same things: better transportation, efficient administration, and a 
sympathetic ear for their grievances.  Farmers split over who to support.  In 1905, half of 
the seats south or adjacent to the CPR—the heart of the settled farm district—were 
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decided by a margin of less than 100 votes.509  Similarly, Provincial Righters nominated 
the same number of farmers as the Liberals in 1908 but elected more as a percentage of 
their total strength in the Legislature.510   
The central political issue prior to the Great War rested on which party won the farmers’ 
support.  This contest was evident in debates over the creation of a provincial telephone 
system.  In early 1907, delegates to the SGGA annual meeting, upset with the Bell 
Telephone Company’s monopoly on long-distance service in Canada and lack of 
development of rural lines, passed a resolution calling for the creation of a provincially 
operated telephone system.  “Because of its ability to conquer space and time,” Ronald 
Love notes, “the telephone was seen as a potential means, better than railways and good 
roads, to overcome the farmer’s customary isolation by connecting him directly with the 
towns where he sold his grain, bought his goods, and formed his social relationships.”511  
Rural telephone systems, however, were not only expensive to build, but no private 
company was willing to take the financial risks associated with servicing a sparsely 
populated province.  Haultain quickly jumped on the issue to demonstrate his party’s 
support for the farmers.  The Bell Company, he argued, constituted “one of the most 
grasping and tyrannical monopolies” in Canada, and he urged the Legislature for “the 
early establishment” of provincially “owned and operated telephones.”512  Taking a stand 
in line with the SGGA’s expressed demands, Haultain reasoned, would earn farmers’ 
support. 
Scott sidestepped the issue of public ownership altogether.  While it would be “simply 
suicidal” from a financial standpoint to develop a provincial system of telephones, he 
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confided to Sifton, it would be “better to keep clear of the matter entirely” if his 
government could not “hold out hope of the telephone system to the farmers.”  Scott 
understood that the farmers wanted rural telephones and did not particularly care how a 
system was achieved.  In fact, the SGGA’s conservative leadership was ideologically 
predisposed against government ownership.  Any system, Scott argued, had to bring 
practical results to the farmers “while still leaving enough responsibility on the country 
people themselves to keep the government free from the danger of being swamped.”513  
After commissioning a report on the telephone situation in Saskatchewan, the Liberals 
brought legislation which avoided government intervention and ensured the conservative 
farmers’ support.  The government would take responsibility for building and 
administering the capital-intensive long-distance service, while leaving local service up 
to the municipalities or resident controlled co-operatives.  Under the government’s plan, 
farmers received rural telephone service, the province avoided ownership, and the 
Liberals received all the credit. 
Haultain’s attempt to win farmer support backfired.  The Provincial Righters were on the 
record as supporting a government-owned system.  They were now in the uncomfortable 
position of opposing what proved to be a popular program.  Haultain had no choice but to 
double down on government ownership.  Upon the bill’s final reading in the legislature, 
the leader of the opposition proposed an amendment expressing regret that “the principle 
of provincial ownership of telephone lines had not been applied for the benefit of the 
rural portions of the province.”514  Whereas the Liberal government was able to provide 
farmers with a practical scheme of rural telephone development, the opposition was only 
able to offer empty criticisms. 
A similar situation occurred during the elevator debate.  Questions of the public 
ownership of grain elevators divided Saskatchewan’s farmers along class lines.  The 
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larger and more conservative farmers, led by Motherwell and the executive of the SGGA, 
were “diametrically opposed” to the “fairy tale” of the Partridge Plan, while the smaller 
and more radical farmers viewed it as the only way to compete against the monopoly 
interests in the grain trade.515  With the Liberals proposing legislation to implement a co-
operative system, the Provincial Rights party came out firmly in favour of government 
ownership.  Haultain contended that he was “more convinced than ever” that the public 
ownership of elevators was the only workable solution to the farmers’ grievances. 516  
Haultain promised farmers the exact plan they demanded, but SGGA delegates voted 
unanimously to support the Liberal plan.  A co-operative system was not their first 
choice, but most farmers followed their conservative executive’s lead and supported a 
Liberal plan that offered some solution to their grievances.  Outmaneuvered, Haultain 
again confirmed his policy of government ownership.  Renewing the debate in the 
Legislature, Haultain “re-affirmed his belief in the principle of government ownership,” 
claiming that the decision of the SGGA was “immaterial.”  Farmers, he argued, had 
“asked for a loaf” but were “given what he would call a stone.”517   
Haultain hoped that his continued opposition to the co-operative scheme would exploit 
the fissures present within the SGGA.  It was increasingly clear that the Liberals and the 
province’s conservative farmers were inseparable.  Yet, Haultain reasoned that he may be 
able to win the support of the more radical farmers who supported the Partridge Plan.  
“Because of the looseness of its organization,” Duff Spafford notes, the Provincial Rights 
Party “could embrace both Tories and farm radicals without putting a strain on the 
principles of either.”518  The Liberal plan, Haultain warned, would only serve to create a 
“scheme of glorified farmers’ elevators,” where “the central directors controlled 
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everything” leaving the small individual farmer with “little local control.”519  Even here, 
however, Provincial Righters miscalculated the support for the co-operative scheme.  “If 
the two proposals were placed before the people,” Scott boasted, “I am sincere in 
doubting whether Government elevators could obtain the approval of two hundred men in 
the whole Province.”520  Faced with a losing hand, Haultain moderated his position.  The 
Provincial Rights Party, he announced, would “accept the bill not as something they 
believed the farmers wanted, but as something which was aimed at removing evils under 
which the farmers suffered.”521  Haultain was clearly frustrated with the farmers’ 
continued rejection, but swallowed his pride in the hopes that he would eventually gain 
their support.  However, it was clear that the Liberals were winning the contest for 
farmers’ support.  As David Smith explains, “The statute books contained tangible 
Liberal policies which appealed to the electorate but demoralized the opposition.”522 
Questions over reciprocity drove the final wedge between Haultain and Saskatchewan 
farmers.  With his long history in territorial politics, Haultain was intimately aware of the 
western farmers’ struggles against the protective tariff.  John A. Macdonald’s National 
Policy installed protective tariffs as part of a larger effort to develop central-Canadian 
industry.  Over time, farmers viewed this protectionism as both “an imposition and an 
iniquity.”523  Protective tariffs did nothing to increase the price Canadian wheat received 
on the world market and they cost the farmers money by artificially raised the farmers’ 
production costs.  Any promise to lower or eliminate these protective tariffs received 
favourable attention from Prairie farmers.  Wilfrid Laurier, for example, won three of the 
North-West Territory’s four seats in 1896 in part by equating protection to the “bondage” 
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of “American slavery.”524  When the Liberals failed to act in office, over 500 Prairie 
farmers joined a “Siege of Ottawa” to bring their demands directly to Laurier.525  It is 
difficult to understand, therefore, how Haultain could misread the political situation in 
Saskatchewan when Laurier announced a reciprocity agreement in January 1911.  
Initially, Provincial Righters joined with the Liberals in urging the passage of the deal.  
The “benefits to be derived from reciprocity,” Haultain noted, “were so great as to cause 
all considerations of party to sink into insignificance.”  The deal, if adopted, would speed 
up Saskatchewan’s “inevitable destiny” of becoming the largest food producer on the 
continent.  Nor did it pose a threat to Canadian sovereignty or development.  Haultain 
argued that he would “be willing to forgo tariff reductions” to protect his “British 
birthright,” but assured the Legislature that “he was not prepared to set up his British 
proclivities when there was no necessity for so doing.” 526  Although the reciprocity issue 
would ultimately become the central dividing line between Liberals and Conservatives in 
the 1911 Dominion election, Haultain clearly did not believe that it posed a threat to 
Canada’s British connection. 
Not all Haultain supporters felt the same way.  Reciprocity proved popular with 
Saskatchewan’s farmers, but significant portions of Haultain’s base were less 
enthusiastic.  Editorials in newspapers otherwise friendly to Haultain warned that the deal 
would destroy any hope of Saskatchewan developing secondary industries, such as grain 
milling.  Rather than fill western cities with “an army of workers,” the Saskatoon Capital 
reported, reciprocity promised a “death-blow” for the “the one single industry which 
might reasonably be expected to flourish in western Canada.”527  More worrying for 
Haultain, however, was the Orange Lodge’s opposition.  Speaking at the Lodge’s annual 
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convention only a week after Haultain endorsed the plan, Grand Master Daniel Ellis 
warned that “patriotic” citizens could not ignore the dangers the deal posed to the “future 
of our beloved Dominion.”  Reciprocity, he thundered, “means annexation.”  Either 
Canadians would “rise above party affiliations and stand steadfastly by Canada and the 
Empire,” or they would “undo the work of the past thirty years for the doubtful benefits 
of this pact.”  The decision was an easy one for nativists to make.  British traditions were 
the foundation of Saskatchewan society and they would oppose reciprocity even if it was 
popular among Saskatchewan’s farmers.  Although the Grand Master maintained that he 
was not commenting on how reciprocity “affects political parties,” the message for 
Haultain was clear.  Politicians could not support reciprocity and “proclaim their loyalty” 
to the Lodge’s ideals.528  Haultain faced a difficult choice.  Either he could continue to 
support reciprocity and lose a substantial portion of his base, or he could change his 
position and risk the wrath of the province’s farmers.   
Haultain ultimately decided alienating farmers was worth the risk.  The Provincial Rights 
Party had yet to find a wedge issue from which it could separate the province’s farmers 
from the Liberals.  During the telephone and elevator questions, Haultain hoped to win 
farmer support by promising the SGGA direct government intervention.  In both 
instances the SGGA, guided by their conservative leadership, ended up supporting the co-
operative system.  By opposing reciprocity, Haultain gambled that he could win over 
farmers who favoured free trade but placed more emphasis on their adherence to the 
British tradition.  It was the very tactic that federal Conservatives were adopting.  As 
Conservative leader Robert Borden announced to the Manitoba Grain Growers: “I am 
absolutely opposed to the reciprocity agreement.  And if you gentlemen in the West were 
prepared to make me prime minister tomorrow if I would not support that agreement, I 
would NOT do it.”529  At the same time, Borden used his opposition on reciprocity to 
express his solidarity with farmers’ other grievances.  Borden spent the summer touring 
the Prairies with promises to redress long-term grievances, including construction of the 
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long-awaited Hudson Bay Railway, development of inland terminals, and turning over 
control of natural resources to the provinces.  All the electors had to do was vote against 
the Liberals.  Borden’s opposition held out the hope of providing the Provincial Righters 
with an issue to differentiate themselves from the Liberals.   
The opportunity proved too tempting for the party to pass up.  In July, delegates to the 
Saskatchewan Conservative Association convention unanimously agreed to an anti-
reciprocity stance.  Going a step further, delegates also decided to amalgamate the 
Provincial Rights Party and federal Conservative Association into a single organization.  
Haultain, now leader of a party officially opposed to reciprocity, distanced himself from 
his earlier support.  Although free trade “appealed” to him “strongly as a Western man,” 
he reasoned, Laurier’s plan meant ruin for Canada.   Appealing directly to the farmers’ 
British nationalism, Haultain noted that reciprocity threatened Canadian sovereignty: 
“There are only two ways in which Canada can be annexed to the United States, by direct 
conquest or by a deliberate act of the people of Canada.  So long as I am alive and able to 
shoulder a gun it will have to be by conquest.”530  In forming a provincial Conservative 
Party, Haultain and Provincial Righters wagered that there was more potential upside to 
opposing reciprocity.  The gamble failed.   
Conservatives underestimated farmers’ desire for reciprocity.  Although Borden used the 
issue to dethrone the Laurier Liberals in the 1911 federal election, Saskatchewan’s 
electors voted overwhelmingly for Laurier and reciprocity.531  Haultain’s position on 
reciprocity also alienated the farmer support he had developed since 1905 as leading 
farmers began defecting from the new Conservative Party.   F.C. Tate, a Provincial 
Rights MLA and director of the SGGA, for example, broke ranks and actively supported 
                                                 
530
 Morning Leader, 6 July, 1912. 
531





an independent farmer candidate during the campaign.532  Matters went from bad to 
worse for the Conservatives during the provincial election the following year.  
Conservatives were initially buoyed by a friendly government in Ottawa and the renewed 
organizational zeal that flowed from control of federal patronage.  “Our opponents are 
active in a thousand different directions,” a Liberal cabinet minister confided, “every day 
bringing forth fresh evidence of the creation of an organization on an extensive scale.  
From appearances, the weight of their money is beginning to count and goodness knows 
where the end may be.”533  Even with federal patronage, however, the Conservatives 
were unable to overcome the alienation of the province’s farmers.  Haultain realized that 
his new party was in a precarious position and refused to discuss reciprocity during the 
campaign, declaring it a federal matter out of the provincial purview.534  Conservatives 
instead focused on other issues important to the farmers and offered a “progressive, 
populist package” of railway development, reduction in freight rates, low interest loans, 
rural road construction, the Hudson Bay Railway, and a rural power scheme.535   
The Liberals, in contrast, would not let the reciprocity issue die.  Scott declared that the 
election was “the second engagement in the struggle between the producers of Western 
Canada on the one hand and the Big Interests and Monopolies of Eastern Canada.”536  
Whereas the Liberals sought to protect the farmer, the Conservatives were completely out 
of touch with reality.  Haultain, Liberal propaganda noted, had paraded himself as the 
defender of provincial rights, but, at the first opportunity, sacrificed provincial interests 
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for party favour.  “Farmer Haultain,” Liberals mocked, was no farmer at all, but a 
Conservative lackey working “for the interest of Eastern Tories.”537   
Figure 5 - Electoral Map, 1912 
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The election results solidified the Conservatives’ worst fears.  It would have been an easy 
fight, a supporter noted without any trace of irony, “if it were not for reciprocity and the 
cry that Mr. Borden is hostile to the west.”538  Conservative representation in the 
legislature was cut nearly in half, from fourteen to eight, while their share of the popular 
vote dropped dramatically from a high of 49.5% in 1908 to 42% in 1912.  Even more 
alarming, however, were the Conservative losses in farming districts.  Whereas the 
previous two elections demonstrated Haultain’s strength in the south-east, his association 
with the anti-reciprocity movement nearly wiped out Conservative support in that corner 
of the province, winning only five of the twenty-one seats either south of or adjacent to 
the CPR. 
After battling the Liberals since 1905, Haultain’s stance on reciprocity and connection to 
the Conservative Party destroyed any chance of gaining farmer support for the 
foreseeable future.  These results also demonstrated the relative weakness of Haultain’s 
nativists message.  In the previous two elections, Haultain’s stance on racial and religious 
issues resonated with the Anglo-Saxon “old-timers” in the south-east.  When these 
farmers were forced to choose between reciprocity and appeals to a British nationalism, 
they chose the former.  Haultain may have retained the Orange Lodge’s support, but he 
could not win an election without wider inroads into the farming community.  His party 
was left reeling.  Haultain had failed in three elections and announced his retirement from 
politics, taking a position on Saskatchewan’s Supreme Court.539  It fell to Wellington 
Willoughby, a largely unknown lawyer from Moose Jaw, to rebuild the “shattered” party.  
Willoughby focused on organization which Haultain had neglected.  Under new 
leadership, the party greatly expanded its fundraising, membership, and constituency 
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organizations.540  Improved organization, however, would not win elections by itself.  
The Conservatives had lost the fight for farmers’ support.  What they needed, therefore, 
were issues that appealed to their British nativist base.   
The Conservatives did not have to wait long for their opportunity.  In 1912, the Scott 
government amended the School Act to require minority ratepayers to assign their taxes 
to separate schools if they existed in their locality.  This was the general practice since 
the territorial period, but a court decision the previous year decided that ratepayers could 
support whatever system they chose.  In passing the amendment, Scott was reacting to the 
fact that many Protestants were assigning their taxes to Catholic schools with lower tax 
rates, imperiling public schools.541  The by-product, however, reignited fights over 
separate schools in the province.542  The Orange Lodge viewed the amendments as akin 
to forcing separate schools on an unwilling population.  Rather than merely challenge the 
amendments, however, nativists used the opportunity to attack the existence of separate 
schools.   “When Roman Catholics demand separate schools in this province,” Grand 
Organizer Armstrong informed a Glorious Twelfth rally numbering over 4,000, “they are 
demanding special privileges and every Roman Catholic school in this province is a 
standing advertisement of unfair treatment.”543   
The Liberals unleashed a firestorm.  While it was obvious that the Lodge would oppose 
these moves, moderate Protestants also expressed their displeasure.  In a series of 
vociferous attacks extending the better part of three years, Reverend Murdoch 
MacKinnon of Knox Presbyterian in Regina denounced Premier Scott, one of his own 
                                                 
540
 Michael Cottrell, “Willoughby, Wellington Bartley,” in Saskatchewan Politicians: Lives Past and 
Present, ed. Brett Quiring (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 2004), 244. 
541
 In 1914, a second amendment forced corporations to divide their taxes on the proportion of their 
ownership’s religious affiliation.   
542
 Raymond Huel, “Pastor vs. Politician: The Reverend Murdoch MacKinnon and Premier Walter Scott’s 
Amendment to the School Act,” Saskatchewan History 32, no. 2 (May 1979): 62-64. 
543




parishioners, from the pulpit.  In passing the laws, MacKinnon told his congregation, 
Scott was allowing Catholics within the Liberal government to whip their co-religionists 
“into line.”544  The amendments allowed the Catholic Church to introduce “non-Anglo-
Saxon ideals and features” into Saskatchewan’s education system and were a “a lapse 
into the atmosphere of pagan slavery.”545  The only solution, MacKinnon concluded, lay 
in being “true to our heritage” of individual freedom and choice.546 
The Conservatives quickly joined MacKinnon’s assault.  Willoughby believed that 
Catholics voted en masse for the Liberals.  “The people of the province,” therefore, had 
the right to “know why any denomination found it fit and proper to give its united support 
to any political party.”  Since 1905, the Conservatives had dedicated themselves to 
protecting Saskatchewan’s hard-won British freedoms, but “working against us is the 
solid vote of a corporate church.”547  The only solution rested on Conservatives taking a 
firm stand against this Catholic influence.  “There is nothing to be gained by conciliatory 
methods,” the Evening Province announced in support of Willoughby’s plan.  “The 
Conservative party has everything to gain and nothing to lose by boldly declaring its 
opposition to such interests as are already openly opposed to it.”548  The party’s 1916 
convention passed a platform they hoped would resonate with nativists.  Delegates 
pledged to not only rescind the Liberal amendments to the School Act, but also vowed to 
establish English as the sole language of instruction.  The direction clearly appealed to 
the party hopeful.  After announcing the new platform, “the two hundred delegates 
cheered themselves hoarse.”549 
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Despite the growing sense that Conservatives could regain momentum through renewed 
religious and racial tensions, they struggled to find a platform that would win farmer 
support.  The Liberal Party’s alliance with the SGGA’s conservative leadership, and its 
unqualified support for reciprocity, made it a “farmers’ party” in all but name.550  
Willoughby wanted to differentiate himself from the Liberals, but was stuck with 
supporting programs that had ceased to be issues for many years.  For example, the 1916 
platform swore to nationalize the province’s telephone system.551  Not only was the issue 
long-dead, but most farmers were perfectly content with the co-operative system 
established by the Liberals.552   It was equally clear that the Conservatives remained 
susceptible to attacks on reciprocity.  Liberal propaganda included veiled references to 
the Conservative’s earlier stance on the issue well into the 1920s.553   
Conservatives responded to their lack of popular policies by campaigning directly on the 
farmers’ individualist ideology.  The Liberals may have supported co-operatives and 
reciprocity, the Conservatives argued, but their corruption was undermining the farmers’ 
freedom.  It was in this vein that Conservatives began attacking the Liberal machine as an 
anti-democratic institution that used bribery, blackmail, and outright fraud to undermine 
the sanctity of the farmers’ vote.  “Shameless Representatives of the People,” 
Conservatives proclaimed, “Sold Themselves For a Few Hundred Dollars to Thwart the 
Popular Will.”554  Liberal corruption was also stealing valuable funds that could 
otherwise support Canada’s war effort.  “Money collected,” a Conservative advertisement 
claimed, “goes to pay fat salaries to favored civil servants…while the patriotic fund 
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suffers.”555  The message was simple.  If the farmers of the province valued their 
individualism and hard-won British freedoms, there could be “No Compromise with 
Wrong.”556  The Liberal army of “party hacks doing nothing but party work at the 
expense of the people of the province” had to cease.557  By focusing on the farmers’ 
individualism, the Conservatives hoped to use the Liberals’ organizational strength 
against them.  
These tactics were on full display as the Conservatives brought formal charges against 
the Liberals.  As early as 1915, Conservative newspapers began hinting at government 
corruption, noting that there was a “need of a house cleaning in a certain Augean 
stable.”558  As the election approached, J.E. Bradshaw, Conservative MLA for Prince 
Albert, tabled a motion in the legislature alleging “wholesale graft and corruption.”  
Bradshaw purported to have evidence that Liberal MLAs accepted bribes to oppose 
temperance, that hotel operators had funneled money into Liberal party coffers, and that 
the government had paid over $50,000 to friends for “pretended contracts for road 
work.”559  Bradshaw kept up the pressure with further charges over the coming days.  
Leading cabinet ministers—including J.A. Calder, W.F.A. Turgeon, the Attorney General 
and Roman Catholic representative in cabinet, and P.A. McNab, Minister of Public 
Works—were alleged to have accepted bribes from the liquor interests.560  Bradshaw also 
contended that the government, “through graft, incompetence, and connivance of 
government officials,” dramatically overspent on the construction of the Battleford 
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Asylum.561  The Liberals, reeling from the charges, hoped to deal with the issues through 
a select committee.  The Conservatives wanted as much publicity as possible and pushed 
for a royal commission to fully investigate the serious charges.  Faced with opposition 
entrenchment, mounting charges, public outrage, and the threatened defection of 
prominent Regina Liberals, the government caved and ultimately referred the charges to a 
series of Royal Commissions.562   
It proved to be a fleeting victory.  After intensive investigations, the commissions 
completely absolved Scott of wrongdoing.  Several civil servants and four Liberal 
backbenchers were found guilty of fraud, but the commissioners found that the corruption 
did not reach the Premier or his cabinet.563   Willoughby maintained that the commissions 
vindicated Conservative charges.  “If the Conservatives are put in place of the Liberal 
ministers,” he noted, “who can tell what else may be revealed when the records of 
departments are investigated and the employees freer to tell of what they know.”564  For 
most people in Saskatchewan, however, the issue was settled.   
Conservatives found some solace when Scott announced his retirement in October.  After 
years of depression and ill-health, Scott’s feud with MacKinnon and the Conservatives’ 
all-out attack on his government proved too much to bear.  “The actual fact,” journalist 
J.W. Dafoe confided to Sifton, “is that for at least four years Walter has been neither 
physically nor mentally capable of carrying the burden of the premiership.”565  Yet, it was 
a disappointment for Conservatives who were quietly holding out hope for a repeat of the 
situation in Manitoba wherein Rodmond Roblin’s Liberal government resigned over 
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allegations of corruption in the construction of the province’s Legislative building.566  
William Martin, the new Liberal Premier, rewarded farmers’ continued support, bringing 
Dunning—then general manager of the SCEC—into his government and pledging to do 
everything possible to “lighten the burden” on Saskatchewan producers.567   
The Conservative Party’s continued failure to win farmer support was on full display in 
the 1917 election.  Once again, the “stone broke” Conservatives went face-to-face with 
the “well oiled” Liberal machine.568  Organization, however, was only part of the 
problem.  Conservatives’ inability to differentiate themselves from the Liberals continued 
to confound the party.  Both parties pledged to assist the province’s farmers through low 
interest loans and assistance in purchasing additional land, provide for a form of mother’s 
allowances, improve the working conditions of the newly enfranchised women of the 
province, acquire rights to the province’s natural resources, and assist the returned 
soldiers’ adjustment to civilian life.569   
With no substantive policy differences, the Conservatives hoped that appeals to the 
farmers’ individualism would resonate with the voters.  The Liberal machine figured 
prominently in Conservative campaign literature.  With titles ranging from The Big Steal, 
to Phantom Roads, to The Old Gang Still Stands, the Conservatives reinforced the idea 
that the Liberal party had betrayed farmers’ trust.570  In contrast, the Conservatives were 
prepared to fight the “political jobbery, the graft and corruption with which every 
department of Government has been honeycombed, and which has resulted in bringing 
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disgrace on our Province.”571  The Conservative platform vowed to undermine the 
machine’s sources of patronage by instituting entrance exams for the civil service, a 
complete prohibition on the sale and consumption of alcohol to limit the “liquor 
interests,” and the adoption of the initiative, referendum, and recall so that the people had 
power over corrupt governments.572  It was a campaign designed to characterize the 
Liberals as inherently untrustworthy.  Unfortunately for Willoughby, however, 
Saskatchewan farmers were unconvinced.  Martin had chosen wisely in selecting 
Dunning for his cabinet.  Not only had Dunning established a reputation above reproach 
in the SCEC, but he was, as far as Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers were concerned, 
the very embodiment of the self-made man.573  The conservative farmers’ relationship 
with Liberals was as strong as ever. 
At the same time, the province’s radical farmers were organizing their own party to 
combat the Liberals.  The Non-Partisan League (NPL)—a socialistic farmers’ 
organization dedicated to building class consciousness and undermining the party 
system—had spread to Saskatchewan following a sweeping victory in North Dakota in 
1915.  The NPL called for a system of direct democracy wherein farmers would take the 
power of government into their own hands.  The League hoped to capture the radical 
farmers by calling for the government’s complete ownership of the agricultural industry, 
the purchase of farm machinery for farmers at cost, and the creation of a system of rural 
credit banks.  It was also critical of the SGGA’s refusal to enter politics and the close 
relationship between conservative farmers and the governing Liberals.574  Yet, to call the 
League a political movement, as David Smith notes, “grants this fragmented and 
disorganized rural unrest a measure of unity and coherence that it most assuredly lacked.”  
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The Liberals marshalled the full weight of their machine against the NPL, but “aside 
from scattered instances of enthusiasm for an independent or NPL candidate, the 
government faced no real threat.”575  After organizing for over a year, the League only 
managed to appoint eight candidates, winning a single seat by acclamation.576  Even with 
its relative weakness, the NPL proved more successful than the Conservatives at gaining 
farmers’ votes.  By appealing to conservative farmers’ individualism, the Conservatives 
were battling the Liberals head-on; it was a fight that they could not win.  The NPL, in 
contrast, catered to the farmers who felt alienated by the main parties.  The Conservatives 
only managed to outpace the NPL in two of the six ridings where they faced off.577 
The Conservatives’ only successes in 1917 lay in their continued appeal to 
Saskatchewan’s British nativists.  Conservative advertisements urged the people to “vote 
for the Opposition Candidate and Banish the Monster of Polylingualism from 
Saskatchewan forever.”578  Likewise, the party’s platform called for an English-only 
school system.579  The Orange Lodge, following through on its pledge to oppose any 
party that supported separate schools leant its support to the Conservatives.  In the lead 
up to the election, the Lodge queried all candidates on their position regarding racial and 
religious issues, including their stance on the creation of “one system of public and 
nonsectarian school,” their opposition to “all bilingual teaching,” and their support for 
requirements that all trustees be “able to read and write the English language.”  Only 
candidates who accepted the Lodge’s positions were deemed a “suitable person” worthy 
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of support.580  The Lodge did not openly endorse the Conservatives, but their 
questionnaire was a thinly-veiled-ploy to undermine Liberal support amongst the nativist 
population.  
Without farmer support, however, the election was not even close.  Conservatives 
received thirty-six percent of the popular vote and seven seats scattered across the 
province.  The Liberals, in contrast, elected fifty-one candidates with fifty-seven percent 
of the vote.  Once again, Conservatives attributed their failure to the Liberal’s corruption 
of the foreign vote.  “At all the polls where the foreign born voted,” a Conservative 
organizer reported, “were Interpreters who were overzealous in their maters’ cause.”581  
There was some evidence to back up these claims.  Areas with large Catholic and non-
Anglo-Saxon residents—primarily in the central portions of the province—went 
overwhelmingly Liberal, providing margins of over 1,000 votes in nearly half of the 
ridings.  The Conservatives deluded themselves into thinking this was the reason for their 
failure.  It was not the Liberal Party’s connection with Catholics and immigrants that 
defeated the Conservatives, but the party’s inability to gain farmers’ support.  The south, 
where Conservatives hoped their appeals to the farmers’ individualism would win 
support, provided only four seats.  The Liberals, in contrast, won nearly half of the 
southern seats by a margin of at least 300 votes.582   
Farmers did not believe that the Conservatives provided the answer to their troubles.  No 
matter what the Conservatives tried, they could not overcome their earlier lapses in 
judgement and the Liberal’s superior organization.  In elections where racial and 
religious issues dominated, the Liberals and the Conservatives were relatively evenly 
matched.  The Liberals secured clear majorities in both the 1905 and 1908 election, but 
the number of seats in Saskatchewan’s first-past-the-post electoral system did not fully 
reflect the popular vote.  Gerrymandering, combined with the concentration of 
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Conservative support in the south, disproportionately favoured Liberal candidates.  In 
1908, for example, the Conservatives secured nearly half of the popular vote but only a 
third of the seats.  In 1912 and 1917, the Conservative’s fatal mistake in opposing 
reciprocity was clear.  Conservative strength in the legislature dropped by more than half, 
and their share of the popular vote decreased precipitously.  Although they retained 
nativist’s support, even the increased racial tensions of the First World War could not 
make up for Conservatives’ reverses among farmers.    
Table 1 - Results for Liberal and Conservative/Prov. Rights Parties, 1905-1917583 




















1905 34,090 25  52 16 64  47 9 36 
1908 58,687 41  50.5 27 68  49.5 14 34 
1912 87,786 54  57 45 85  42 8 15 
1917 187,976 59  57 51 86  36 7 12 
           
The continued inability to make inroads with Saskatchewan’s farm population fractured 
the Conservative Party.  Willoughby was forced to take the blame for the stunning defeat 
and abandoned the province for a position in the Senate.  Leadership of the party passed 
to Donald Maclean, a Saskatoon lawyer whose only claim to fame lay in polling the 
largest majority of any Conservative MLA in the 1917 disaster.  Maclean faced an 
impossible task in rebuilding the party.  The previous four elections had clearly 
demonstrated the extent that the Liberals would go to secure their relationship with the 
province’s conservative farmers.  At the same time, the rise of the NPL, followed by the 
Progressives after 1921, limited the Conservative’s ability to pivot and attract the smaller 
and more radical farmers’ vote.  To make matters worse, the Conservatives could not rely 
on British nativist support in perpetuity.  Maclean continued to champion English-only in 
the province’s schools and restrictions on rights of minority religious groups, but his 
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stance on prohibition alienated the Orange Lodge.584  Since at least 1914, the Lodge had 
placed itself on record in support of temperance.585  Maclean, however, used the rampant 
disregard for the law to attack the Liberals.  Prohibition, he proclaimed, proved to be “a 
mockery and a farce” under Liberal management.  Rather than continue prohibition after 
the war’s end, the Conservatives advocated for a system of government-run distribution 
houses.586  Maclean assumed that, given Liberal connections with the province’s 
Catholics, nativists had no choice but to support the Conservative Party.   
It was another miscalculation.  The Orange Lodge had never openly endorsed the 
Conservatives.  Instead, Orangemen emphasized a policy of supporting any politician or 
political party that closely adhered to their ideals.  The rise of the Progressive Party 
provided another outlet for their grievances.  As Leo Courville notes, three dominant 
factions made up the Saskatchewan Progressive movement: the “conservative” Provincial 
Righters who abandoned the party when it aligned with the federal Conservatives; a 
“Liberal partisan group alienated from federal liberalism by regional issues;” and the 
more radical English and Anglican “non-partisan” element.587  The “conservative 
Provincial Rights” faction, Courville argues, carried with it the same “religio-racial 
defensiveness” and “white Anglo-Saxon superiority complex” that animated 
Saskatchewan’s nativists.588  They also vigorously argued against the evils of alcohol.  If 
the Lodge could not count on the Conservatives, they could easily turn to the 
Progressives. 
The Conservatives could not compete with the Progressive movement.  Both parties 
could turn to the province’s British nativists for support, but it was only the 
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Progressives—with their central message of agricultural reform and “economic class 
advancement”—that appealed directly to large segments of the province’s farmers.589  
The Conservatives found it increasingly difficult to position themselves in the debates 
over debt amelioration and grain marketing that dominated the immediate post-war era.  
With the Liberals under Martin and Dunning championing conservative farmers’ 
individualist ideology, and the loose coalition of farmers in the progressive movement 
articulating a non-partisan system of group government, the Conservatives floundered 
without a clear direction or message.  Saskatchewan held eight by-elections between 
1917 and 1921, and the Conservatives did not contest one.590   
The Conservative Party reached its nadir in the 1921 election.  Martin may have used the 
election to disarm the Progressives before they had a chance to fully organize, but the 
results were even worse for the Conservatives.  Maclean realized the party did not have a 
chance and announced his retirement on the eve of election, leaving Conservatives 
rudderless.   Delegates to the 1921 convention realized the party’s hopeless position and 
decided to only field candidates in ridings where “conditions give it hope of success.”591  
The Conservatives fielded four candidates, electing three—including one who ran as an 
Independent-Conservative.592  In comparison, electors returned six Progressives, seven 
Independents, and one Labour MLA.  For the first time in their history, Conservatives 
failed to form the official opposition.593  The rise of the Progressive movement made the 
Conservative Party largely irrelevant to post-war political debates.   
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The Conservative Party ceased to function as a result.  Federal Conservatives maintained 
a bare-bones organization, nominating a full slate of candidates for the 1921 federal 
election, but did not bother to appoint a new provincial leader and ignored all 
organizational work at the local level.  The party could not even rely on friendly 
newspapers to carry its message.  From a position of relative equality with the Liberals in 
1905, the decline of Conservative-orientated newspapers mirrored the decline of the party 
itself, as editors either changed their political allegiance or went bankrupt.  The last 
Conservative daily in the province, Moose Jaw’s News, ceased publication in 1920, 
leaving the party with a single weekly in Meflort.594  Supporting a membership in the 
legislature of only three, an almost complete decline in party organization, and the loss of 
any reliable means of getting their message to the electorate, local Conservatives could be 
forgiven for expressing their doubts about the party’s future revival.595 
The Saskatchewan Conservative Party struggled for relevance in the two decades 
following the province’s entry into Confederation.  Since 1905, the party formed a close 
connection with Saskatchewan’s nativist element.  Conservatives consistently articulated 
a message in-line with the Orange Lodge’s opposition to separate schools and the French 
language.  Orangemen rewarded this support with their votes.  While a significant force 
within Saskatchewan conservatism, British nativists’ conception of a racially-based 
citizenship was not widespread enough to overpower Liberal support amongst the 
farming community, recent immigrants, and Roman Catholics.  The Conservatives’ only 
path to power lay in winning larger segments of Saskatchewan’s farmers to their cause; a 
feat they consistently failed to achieve.  By the end of the decade, however, the 
Conservatives had overcome their early weakness to defeat the Liberals for the first time 
in the province’s history.  They achieved this feat by relying on the lessons they had 
learned in their earlier struggles. 
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4 A Conservative Victory: J.T.M. Anderson and the 1929 
Election 
From a position of irrelevance in 1921, the Saskatchewan Conservative Party defeated 
the Liberals in the 1929 election.  It was a meteoric transformation.  The Liberals’ series 
of unbroken electoral successes since 1905 had made them Saskatchewan’s “natural 
governing party,” while the Conservatives struggled for relevance.  This, however, was 
not a result of conservatism’s irrelevance but divides within the movement itself.  The 
Conservative Party had proved adept at capturing British nativist support, but every 
attempt to make inroads amongst Saskatchewan’s farmers failed miserably.  The reasons 
for this dramatic change in Conservative fortunes have never been adequately explained.  
Not surprisingly, the most common explanation focuses on the shocking emergence of 
the KKK and its hard line racial and religious positions.  Klansmen certainly viewed the 
Conservative victory as a vindication for their ideology.  As election results poured in on 
the night of June 6th, numerous communities reported sightings of fiery crosses and 
Klansmen jubilantly parading down Regina’s streets.596   
Historians have followed the Klan’s lead, maintaining that the Conservative victory was 
the product of the racial antagonisms stoked by the Klan.  According to David Smith, the 
KKK “unified opposition to the Liberals by successfully holding them responsible for the 
non-English problem.”597  Similarly, Pitsula alleges that the Klan “changed the political 
climate to pave the way for the Conservative victory in the provincial election, an 
outcome that had seemed highly unlikely, if not absolutely impossible, before the Klan 
arrived on the scene.”598  Patrick Kyba takes this argument furthest and alleges that the 
Conservatives did not offer a concrete program, but waged a campaign “born of 
desperation.”  For Kyba, the Conservative Party’s 1929 victory was only made possible 
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by building “on the emotionalism stirred by the Klan.”599  Despite the consensus, not all 
historians are convinced.  Peter Russell argues that race played a minor role at best.  “A 
systematic examination of official Conservative Party statements issued throughout the 
election,” he argues, “shows little evidence of an appeal to religious (or ethnic) 
prejudices.”600  The fact that the Klan was pleased with the outcome does not mean that 
they played a pivotal role in the victory. 
These explanations for the 1929 election have failed to appreciate the dynamics of 
Saskatchewan conservatism.  The argument that the Klan was the primary factor in the 
Conservative’s victory is predicated on the idea that the Klan’s message was unique to 
the late 1920s.  Polarization on religious and racial issues was neither unique to the late 
1920s or solely the product of the Klan.  The Orange Lodge articulated the same nativist 
British nationalism since the turn of the century and Conservatives had appealed to these 
tensions since 1905 to no avail.  The Klan, simply put, was not solely responsible for the 
Conservatives’ success.   Racial tensions were certainly heightened in 1929, but they 
were not powerful enough to topple the Liberals on their own.  At the same time, 
Russell’s assertion that the Conservatives did not appeal to “religious prejudices” is a 
fallacy.  Nativists, after all, had served as the Conservative’s base since 1905.  It is 
therefore improbable that the party would fail to use rising racial and religious tensions to 
their benefit.  The secret to the party’s success lay in its articulation of a message that 
united conservatives, both economic and racial, into a single anti-Liberal coalition. 
The Conservative Party had learned valuable lessons in their earlier defeats.  On the one 
hand, Conservatives understood their main body of support lay with the province’s 
nativist elements.  Any future success would be based on continued appeals to this base.  
It is not a coincidence that J.T.M. Anderson was the Conservative leader that led the 
party to victory in 1929.  Anderson had long been associated with the Orange Lodge and 
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nativists apprehension over the pace of assimilation.  The party’s platform was never as 
radical as Orangemen and Klansmen would have liked, but the choice of Anderson as 
leader demonstrated the party’s continued dedication to assimilation and a limit to 
Catholicism’s influence.  British nativists, however, did not constitute a large enough 
electoral block to ensure victory on their own, even in the heightened tensions of the late 
1920s.  The second element of the party’s victory lay in their successful appeal to 
Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers.  Throughout the 1920s, Conservatives depicted the 
Liberal machine as a fundamental threat to the people’s individual freedoms.  By 
appealing to these two elements, the 1929 election was a conservative victory. 
It took until late 1923 for the Conservative Party to show signs of life.  Over the winter, 
leading Conservatives began the process of rebuilding the party.  The new executive—
headed by James F. Bryant—faced the daunting task of establishing a platform and 
appointing a leader that could provide a reasonable hope of electoral success.  Bryant 
faced the same problem that plagued the Conservatives since 1905: how to balance a 
nativist base with the need to attract widespread farmer support.  Bryant’s ultimate 
strategy was to divide these issues between the leader and the platform.  To signal their 
continued support of their base, Bryant and the executive selected J.T.M. Anderson as the 
leader apparent.  Not only had Anderson established his credentials through his work 
with non-Anglo immigrants and the Orange Lodge, but his treatment by the Liberal 
government had antagonized British nativists across the province.  In 1918, the Martin 
government appointed Anderson as the province’s Director of Education Among New 
Canadians.  Dunning eliminated the role in 1922.  For Orangemen, the Premier was 
attempting “to please the Ruthenians and others for political reasons” needing “their 
support at the next election.”601  The real reason, according to Dunning, was more 
nuanced.  Most of the complaints against Anderson’s stance on assimilation, he wrote to 
a supporter, had come from those “connected with the non-partisan league, whom I can 
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only describe as ‘REDS’ of the very worst variety.”  While the Premier did not wish to 
“please such people,” he did hope that his move would ensure the support of “those of 
foreign extraction who resist” the League’s radical “doctrines.”602  Regardless of 
Dunning’s justifications, conservatives considered Anderson’s treatment as continued 
evidence of Liberals favouring the foreign vote.  Although Anderson had never held 
political office, and some expressed doubts on his loyalty to the Conservative Party, 
delegates unanimously endorsed him as the new leader in March 1924.603  The 
enthusiasm behind this choice was palpable.  As one delegate put it, Anderson was “the 
modern Moses we have been looking for in this province to lead us out of the political 
wilderness which we have been wandering in for the last 20 years.”604   
Having signaled the party’s continued support of the nativist cause with Anderson’s 
appointment, the Conservative’s platform abandoned its earlier focus on sectarianism.  
Drafted by a committee headed by Bryant, the new platform was the party’s attempt to 
rebrand itself as a viable option for the province’s independent farmers.  As Dunning 
feared, the Conservatives were attempting to win over the “saner and more level-headed 
farmers” who opposed the NPL, FU, and Progressive Party’s radicalism.605  Borrowing 
from Conservative tactics in the 1917 election, Bryant attacked the Liberals’ 
trustworthiness in handling the province’s affairs in the post-war recession.  “In view of 
the orgy of extravagance of the Dunning Government,” he proclaimed, “the first and 
foremost point of our platform should be that of economy.”  Saskatchewan’s economic 
woes did not stem solely from the global state of agriculture.  Rather, “the ‘Pork Barrel’ 
politicians who for 19 years have ruled in Saskatchewan, have put us where we are today.  
                                                 
602
 QUA, 2121, Dunning, Box 1, File 10, Dunning to Rev. C. Endicott, 25 October, 1922. 
603
 Morning Leader, 26 March, 1924. 
604
 W.D. Dunlop to Arthur Meighen, 5 March, 1924, quoted in Brennan, “A Political History,” 587-88. 
605




To them any expenditure was justifiable and expedient, so long as it succeeded in 
keeping them in power.”606 
Bryant hoped that attacks on the Liberal’s mishandling of the economy would appeal to 
the business sense and entrepreneurialism of the province’s larger farmers.  The 
Conservatives, he promised, would reorganize the government on “sound business 
principles.”  The “cost of government” would be “materially and in great measure 
reduced,” and capital expenditures would be limited to only those “absolutely necessary 
and vital and to the interests of the producers of our province.”  As for the important 
question of grain marketing, the Conservatives understood the divisions within the 
farmers’ movement and sidestepped any pronouncements on a pool.  Instead, the party 
advocated for “the practical application of the principle of co-operative effort in all sound 
co-operative undertakings.”607  The Conservatives had learned their lessons in their 
earlier failures to win the farmer’s vote.  Rather than taking a stance on farmers’ 
demands, as they had to no avail with the telephone and elevator questions, they instead 
appealed to conservative farmers’ ideology, leaving the details for later discussions.   
The first test of the rejuvenated party’s strength came with the 1925 election.  Anderson 
had initially hoped to nominate between forty and fifty candidates, but a lack of 
constituency organization continued to plague the fledgling party and they only fielded 
sixteen candidates as opposed to the forty Progressives and sixty-two Liberals.608  
Anderson and Bryant had only just begun to rebuild the party and had no choice but to 
focus on constituencies where the party had some hope of success.  The Conservatives 
ran a full slate of candidates in the cities but limited their rural candidates to ridings in the 
south where conservative farmers predominated.  The Conservatives realized they could 
not win the election, but they could test their new platform.  Throughout the campaign, 
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speakers articulated the same theme: “Time for a Change.”609  Anderson also continued 
to advocate for nativist policies and announced plans to require school trustees to be 
fluent in English.  “I do not think there is a district in this province no matter how 
backward the district may be,” he reasoned, “that could not find three men who speak 
English.  No man should take over the management of a school and not be able to read, 
write and speak English.”610  Although Orangemen regretted that “no party or politician” 
was willing to make “Separate Schools and the One Language a definite issue before our 
electorate,” they supported Anderson as a known quantity in their fight for non-sectarian 
and English public schools.611 
Despite their efforts to rebuild the party, the Conservatives only managed to win three 
seats.  While this was undoubtedly a blow (the Progressives won six seats while the 
Liberals secured fifty-two) there was some reason to remain optimistic.  The revived 
Conservative Party increased its share of the popular vote to eighteen percent from a low 
of four percent in 1921. 612   The results also do not tell the whole story.  Anderson 
worried that three-way contests would benefit the Liberals and approached the 
Progressives early in the campaign to come to an arrangement to avoid splitting the 
opposition vote.613  A formal agreement was not reached but the fact that three-way 
contests occurred in only five of the province’s fifty-five rural constituencies gave weight 
to Liberal charges of a conspiracy.  Dunning, for example, explained to Motherwell that 
he was “in for a hard fight” owing to the “arrangement between the Tories and the so-
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called Provincial Progressives whereby Tories are nominated to run as progressives.”614  
Similarly, the Morning Leader informed its readers that “over thirty of the forty 
candidates nominated as ‘Progressives’ are rank Tories.”615   
The appearance of a Conservative-Progressive agreement forced Dunning and the 
Liberals to take the Conservatives more seriously than would have otherwise been the 
case.  With only sixteen candidates, Anderson did not pose as significant of a threat as the 
forty Progressives.  However, Dunning was convinced that many Progressive and 
Independent candidates were secret Conservatives and directed much of his attention 
towards discrediting Anderson.  For example, Dunning responded to Anderson’s stance 
on English school trustees by noting that he “may be guilty of sins as a government 
leader,” but he would “never be guilty of the outrage of pitting race against race and 
creed against creed.”616  Similarly, Liberal organizers toured the province’s “foreign” 
settlements handing out copies of Anderson’s book in an attempt to shore up the 
“newcomer” vote.617  Dunning also refuted Conservative attacks on his administration of 
the province’s finances.  After spending eight years reining in expenses, he noted, it was 
hard to be told that he had been on “a drunken bat of expenditure.”618  Dunning stressed 
that the people of the province had more to fear from a Conservative than Liberal 
administration: “When they ask you to discharge the captain and crew of the good ship 
Saskatchewan, you have the right to know who is going to lead the new crew and where 
they are going to take the ship.”619   
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By singling out the Conservatives for attack, Dunning gave the party legitimacy over the 
struggling Progressives.  The creation of the Wheat Pool, controversies resulting from the 
hostile takeover of the SCEC, the merger of the SGGA and FU into the UFC(SS), and 
failures at the federal level to effect change sapped the Progressives of both strength and 
organizational unity.  Between 1925 and 1929, a quasi-civil war waged within the 
progressive movement as its different constituent groups fought for control.  The more 
radical leadership, on the one hand, sought to move the party in line with the ideas of 
group government emanating from Henry Wise Wood in Alberta.  The more conservative 
rank-and-file opposed these moves.  The leadership called a “monster” rally in 1927 to 
discuss “the question of placing the organization on an economic group basis.”620  They 
expected over 5,000 delegates to attend, but only 250 showed up.621   
At the same time, a small number of the more radical farmers—the self-styled “left wing 
of the farmers’ movement”—organized the Farmers’ Educational League which 
advocated for outright class conflict.622  Although limited in membership, the League’s 
focus on gaining control of the Pool and the UFC(SS) channeled the energies of the more 
radical elements of the progressive movement away from questions of political 
involvement.623  As a result, the “Provincial Rights conservatives” were given a wider 
berth within the party. 624  The weakening of the Progressives, as Courville notes, led to 
“the ascension of the Conservative party from a junior to senior partner in the anti-Liberal 
conglomerate.”625  Given this ascension, Anderson’s claim that “10 of the 11” opposition 
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MLAs elected in 1925 were “Tories” was not just the leader’s attempt to justify the 
Conservative’s defeat.626  Yet, it was not all rejoicing for the Conservatives.  They may 
have emerged as the dominant opposition party, but they still were a far cry from the 
level of support the Liberals enjoyed.  It would be an uphill battle for Anderson to form a 
government.   
The Conservatives’ path to victory lay in exploiting the racial and religious turmoil 
surrounding immigration and Saskatchewan’s schools.  As late as 1927, leading 
Conservatives had attempted to pivot the party away from its close association with the 
British nativist vote.  Only by attracting the foreign and Catholic vote, they argued, could 
the party defeat the Liberals.  Anderson undermined these efforts.  Not only did Catholics 
view his work among new Canadians as “proselytizing,” but he had made little progress 
in “getting as many Catholic leaders as possible to assist him.”627  These, however, were 
minority voices.  Many Conservatives welcomed the continuation of racial and religious 
tensions.  The Klan, Bryant explained to Bennett, was “going very strong and will be of 
great assistance in defeating the present Government.”628  Rather than viewing the 
dramatic expansion of the Orange Lodge and the Klan in the mid-1920s as a danger, it 
was widely considered a harbinger of future Conservative success.   
The exact relationship between the Conservative Party and the Klan is difficult to 
measure.  Jimmy Gardiner and the Liberals certainly considered it a Conservative 
organization and used every means at their disposal—both legitimate and otherwise—to 
convince the public of that “fact,” but the actual connections were never clear cut.  Dr. 
Cowan, the long-time Conservative and Klan treasurer, insinuated a high level of 
unofficial support when discussing the matter with R.B. Bennett: “The one [scribbled 
out] is the most complete political organization ever known in the west.  Every organizer 
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in it is a Tory...I know it for I pay them.  And I never pay a Grit.  Smile when you hear 
anything about this organization.  And keep silent.”629  Yet, if the Klan was a 
Conservative tool as Cowan insisted, the relationship was not widely known.  Bryant, the 
Klan’s own lawyer, dismissed any connection.  Bryant declared that the relationship was 
more akin to the strong support that “the Knights of Columbus or any other similar 
organization” gave to the Liberals.630  Regardless of who provided the backing, another 
leading Conservative explained, the party “would be foolish not to profit by the Klan 
movement as the Conservative Party does not owe any thanks to the Church for by it we 
have been kept in the opposition.”631  Most Conservatives were content to have the 
organizations work together to defeat the Liberals.   
This working relationship was on full display at the 1928 Conservative convention.  Not 
only was the meeting attended by leading Klansmen and Orangemen, but the major 
platform policies adopted “met with the entire approval of the Protestant 
organizations.”632  Immigration would be “based on the selective principle” catering to 
people of Protestant and British backgrounds.  Similarly, delegates promised that the 
province’s schools would actively serve as sites of assimilation by forbidding religious 
emblems and garb as well as eliminating textbooks with a denominational bias.  “We 
want the spirit of British liberty and justice and loyalty,” Anderson explained, “to breathe 
from the covers of our textbooks.”633  More ominously, delegates also took steps to 
actively limit the role of Catholics within the party.  A.G. MacKinnon, the Regina 
Conservative who had proposed shifting the party’s focus away from religious issues, had 
his name withheld from a list of nominees for positions in the party’s executive.  
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Likewise, J.J. Leddy, a Saskatoon insurance agent, refused to withdraw his candidacy for 
an advisory position and was defeated on the convention floor.634  Conservatives were 
clear in their commitment to the British nativist cause. 
Finding a program that resonated with the province’s farmers proved more challenging.  
The 1928 convention made it clear that the party would continue its tactics of painting the 
Liberals as extravagant and corrupt.  With cries of “break the machine,” Anderson 
demanded the government free civil servants “from the chains of bondage of political 
service.”  The party pledged itself to a civil service commission, thus ensuring that 
“selections shall be made on merit and efficiency, and not by reason of political 
affiliations.”  Similarly, the convention also discussed ways to remove “political 
interference” from government spending on infrastructure.635   
Although unsuccessful in the past, the convention had reason to believe that their attacks 
on Liberal corruption would carry more weight going forward.  In 1926, Charles Dunning 
joined Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s federal cabinet in Ottawa as the representative 
for Saskatchewan.  Jimmy Gardiner took over as Liberal leader in the province.  
Dunning’s service to the SCEC and his handling of the Wheat Board and Pool 
movements entrenched him as the defender of the conservative farmer.  Gardiner, in 
contrast, was a Liberal partisan who, in the estimation of many farmers, favoured his 
party over the needs of agriculture.  When Dunning was setting up his first cabinet, for 
example, Musselman warned that Gardiner was “decidedly unpopular with the Grain 
Growers generally.”636  This disdain only increased as the new Premier reversed 
Dunning’s strategy in dealing with the Progressive threat.  As William Brennan notes, 
Dunning walked a fine line by discrediting “the move to agrarian political action through 
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the S.G.G.A. without seeming to discredit the S.G.G.A. itself.”637  Gardiner, however, 
“frowned upon men who compromised party principles” and reversed Dunning’s position 
by directly attacking both the Progressives and the SGGA.638  T.A. Crerar, the former 
leader of the federal Progressives, noted that “Gardiner’s tactics in his efforts to 
annihilate them lost thousands of these people who are nominally Liberals and are sore 
and angry.”639  
Gardiner, unlike Scott, Martin, and Dunning, also retained control of the Liberal machine 
after ascending to the Premiership.  Although the province’s earlier Premiers maintained 
nominal control over the party’s organization, they delegated the day-to-day elements to 
trusted lieutenants.640  Gardiner, however, refused to relinquish control.  Since taking 
over as Minister of Highways in 1922, Gardiner built the machine into a formidable 
political force, making himself in the process “synonymous with the Liberal organization 
in Saskatchewan.”641   Under Gardiner’s leadership, Dunning confided to Dafoe, the 
machine was “no longer the party’s agent, but its master.”642  Conservatives may not 
have been able to discredit Dunning’s government with charges of corruption, but 
Gardiner’s close connections to the party’s machine was another matter entirely.643 
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Conservatives were equally aware that they continued to struggle in separating 
themselves from other opposition parties, especially in rural areas.  The Progressive 
Party, influenced by its “Provincial Rights wing,”  also updated its platform to reflect the 
rise in nativist sentiment, vowing selective immigration, non-sectarian public schools, 
and a general promise of “equal rights for all, special privileges for none.”644  Faced with 
the prospect of losing votes to the Progressives, Anderson and Bryant called on “all 
forces in the province opposed to the present government to join together to defeat the 
government.”645  In the lead up to the convention, the Conservative and Progressive 
Parties held secret negotiations wherein it was decided to saw-off the opposition vote.  
Conservatives would contest half of the constituencies while the Progressive candidates 
would run where their chances of winning were strongest.  The strategy, Bryant informed 
Bennett shortly before the Conservative convention, also had the party’s platform 
incorporate “all the planks which we could conscientiously take from the Progressive 
platform…from the resolutions passed at the farmers [sic] convention, the conventions of 
the Rural Municipalities and the Trustees’ Convention during the last eight or ten 
years.”646  Conservatives, intended to “defeat the government of the day,” even if it 
meant adopting the “group system of government” favoured by the more radical 
Progressives to do so.647   
The plan was simple.  The Conservatives, as sole opposition candidates in many ridings, 
required a platform that appealed to the largest number of farmers.  By borrowing 
policies directly from farmers’ organizations—including the return of natural resources, 
diversifying agriculture, improving labour conditions, developing a government-owned 
power scheme, encouraging co-operative enterprises, promoting temperance, 
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reorganizing the farm loan board, reducing taxes, and eradicating bovine tuberculosis—
the party hoped to appeal to the “level headed” farmers who had turned their backs on the 
corrupt Liberals.648   
In the end, however, the agreement was never formalized.  Co-operation had the support 
of Dr. C.E. Tran, the Progressive House Leader and leading member of the party’s 
conservative wing, but it faced stiff opposition from the party’s leadership.  Major 
Coldwell—the future leader of the CCF and member of the Progressive Association 
Board—later explained that he could not join Anderson because of the support he 
enjoyed from “the Klan organization which I regarded as subversive and dangerous and 
divisive.”649  The Progressive convention, held in June, resolved to oppose “any 
arrangements or negotiations with either the Liberal or Conservative political parties in 
the selection of a candidate or the conducting of an election.”650  It was a setback.  Yet, 
the fact that the Conservatives demonstrated their willingness to co-operate with the 
Progressives and adopt the major elements of their platform went a considerable way 
towards fulfilling the party’s main goal of winning farmer support.   
The first test of the Conservatives’ strategy occurred in the Arm River by-election in the 
fall of 1928.  Conservatives focused the campaign on three main campaign planks: 
maintaining its close relationship with British nativists; discrediting the Gardiner 
government as corrupt and undemocratic; and securing as much farmer support as 
possible.  On the first point, Arm River provided one of the fertile constituencies in the 
province to appeal to religious and racial divisions.  Not only were two-thirds of the local 
communities home to Orange Lodges, but the Klan had been active throughout the region 
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in the lead up to the by-election.651  Capitalizing on this sentiment, the Conservatives 
selected Stewart Adrain, a former Grand Master of the Orange Lodge, as their candidate.  
Adrain, like Anderson, appealed to the nativist vote and campaigned continuously on the 
Lodge’s motto of “one flag, one language, one school.”652  Adrain maintained that 
“thousand[s] upon thousand[s] of foreign born Roman Catholics” were streaming into the 
province with “scarcely a single Protestant” among their numbers.653  Anderson, for his 
part, warned of the “hordes of continental peoples” that were responsible for the “ousting 
of native born and British settlers from employment.”654  The Conservatives’ message 
was also amplified when the Regina Daily Star began publishing in time for the election.  
Established with R.B. Bennett’s considerable financial backing, the paper claimed a 
circulation of 17,000 by the end of the year.  For the first time since 1920, Conservatives 
could rely on a friendly editorial stance to get its message to the electorate.655   
The province’s schools also featured prominently in Conservative speeches.  John 
Diefenbaker, then a promising criminal defence attorney, warned that “Sectarian 
influences” were “pervading the entire educational system.”656  In attacking sectarianism, 
Conservatives appealed directly to the conspiratorial mindset fostered by the Lodge and 
the KKK.  Bryant maintained that French Catholics were working against the interests of 
the people: “There has been no clearer issue on the page of history.  The Liberal Party at 
Ottawa and the Gardiner Government in Saskatchewan have lined up with the forces of 
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the Church of Rome in this struggle for supremacy.”657  Unless something was done to 
turn the tide, he foretold, “Roman Catholics will be in the majority in Saskatchewan, and 
the French will control the political destinies of Quebec, Saskatchewan and all of 
Canada.”658  There was no doubt that the Conservatives stood as the champion of the 
province’s British nativists.   
The Conservative Party was equally clear on its position regarding the “Gardiner 
machine.”  Corruption within the civil service, they argued, was destroying 
Saskatchewan’s good name.  The province’s highway inspectors, for example, stood at 
the polls “whispering to people as to how they should mark their ballots.”  As a result, the 
province’s roads were the “rottenest in the Dominion”659  Even worse, the machine had 
allegedly stuffed ballot boxes and bribed voters to steal previous elections.  Appealing 
directly to the farmer’s individualism, Anderson maintained that the Liberals “had 
willfully violated the principles of British fair play and the sacredness of the ballot.”660  
Nor could farmers trust the Liberals to maintain British values of law and order.  
Conservative speakers repeatedly referred to the Liberals’ unwillingness to prosecute 
their political friends.  The Bronfman family, for example, established a system of mail-
order liquor warehouses in Saskatchewan with the sole purpose of bypassing prohibition 
laws on both sides of the international border.661  The inquiry into the 1925 customs 
scandal recommended charges, but the provincial Liberals claimed it was a federal matter 
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and failed to follow through.662  “One or two things has happened in the Bronfman case,” 
M.A. Macpherson, Conservative MLA from Regina, maintained.  “Either the Gardiner 
Government is not taking steps to prosecute Bronfman…or else the Dominion 
government is withholding or delaying prosecution to convenience the Gardiner 
Government.”663  The charges against the “Gardiner machine” went much further than 
simple questions of justice.  Taken together with the Liberal Party’s favoritism towards 
Roman Catholics and the “foreign vote,” the Conservatives painted an image of a 
government that was fundamentally undermining the people’s personal freedoms and 
British traditions.   
The Liberals were forced onto the defensive.  Gardiner had initially hoped to campaign 
on the strong Liberal record.  “We appeal to you on our record of administration,” he told 
the large crowd assembled to kick off the campaign.  “We appeal to you on the financial 
standing of our province.”664  Yet, as the campaign progressed, Liberal speakers spent 
more time defending the party from Conservative attacks than offering constructive 
proposals for the future.665  Their main target was the alleged collusion between 
Anderson and the Klan.  If the charge that Anderson “associated himself with the Klan” 
proved true, the Morning Leader editorialized, “it will brand him as being thoroughly 
unfit for his position.”  Gardiner fully endorsed the tactic.  Not only had the Premier 
intended the timing of the by-election to “strike a blow at the movement which has been 
on foot in the province stirring up religious prejudice,” but he also privately maintained 
that the Liberals were facing the “the whole stock in trade of our opposition composed of 
Conservatives and Ku Klux Klan combined.”666  For voters attracted to this 
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conspiratorial anti-Catholicism, however, Gardiner’s claims that the Conservatives were 
inciting “religious intolerance” for attacking sectarian schools and open immigration was 
not a negative.  Rather than discredit the opposition, Gardiner’s strategy served to boost 
Conservative support. 
The election was close.  The Liberals managed to retain the seat, but with a margin of 
only fifty-nine votes.  In 1925, in contrast, the Liberal candidate received over three 
hundred more votes.  Gardiner maintained that the success, regardless of the margin, 
constituted a victory for his record and justified his attacks on the Klan.  “I think we have 
met the brunt of the attack in the most favourable rural constituency which they had in 
the province,” the Premier confided, “and will therefore be in a position to withstand such 
an attach[sic] in any general election in the future.”667  Anderson, on the other hand, 
viewed the close results as a vindication of the party’s platform.  Borrowing from 
Provincial Righters’ complaints over Catholic influence in 1905, Anderson publicly 
attributed Adrain’s defeat to the single Lakeside poll where “the majority of the electors 
are Roman Catholics and are working hand in glove with Premier Gardiner.”  Anderson 
vowed to continue the fight against the Liberals, but was adamant he would not debase 
himself or his party by soliciting “the support of any individual or organization whose 
aims and objects do not emphasize the Union Jack and 100 percent Canadian 
citizenship.”668  While disappointed in the result, Anderson found comfort in the fact 
that, after years of trial and error, the Conservatives had finally settled on a strategy that 
promised some success, especially in straight contests with the Liberals.  The 
Conservative message was also working to galvanize its base.  In 1925, only fifty-three 
percent of voters cast a ballot in Arm River; in 1928, the Conservative attacks on the 
Gardiner machine, and support for religious and racial issues, prompted a turn-out of 
eighty-eight percent.669   
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Encouraged by the Arm River results, Conservatives continued their three-part strategy in 
the lead up to the 1929 election.  From the beginning of the campaign, Anderson, Bryant, 
and other Conservative speakers were clear that they were the champions of the nativist 
vote.  “We cannot halt the aggression of any religious sect too soon,” Anderson told a 
crowd in Saskatoon.670  The party also insinuated that, whereas Conservative supporters 
were being left off the voter lists, “Liberals and Catholics” were not, leaving the 
opposition “in the lurch, to the joy of the Government.”671  Hardline anti-Catholics also 
used the campaign to denounce the Catholic Church directly.  F.W. Turnbull—a 
Klansman and future Regina MP—called for a reorganization of the laws surrounding 
separate schools so that children “of whatever race or religion that they may profess” 
could attend public schools.672   Most Conservative speakers, however, qualified their 
racial and religious message.  Anderson, for example, maintained that the “separate 
school question was not an issue in the campaign,” focusing instead on the anger aroused 
by sectarianism within the province’s public schools.673  “What is protested against,” the 
Conservatives explained, “is that public schools of the province should be used for 
proselytizing and for the propagation of any particular sectarian teaching.”674  Anderson 
reminded rallies that he had spent his career urging the people of Saskatchewan to “make 
a stand to protect the public school, where children of every race and creed were moulded 
into Canadian citizens.”675  The Liberals, in contrast, were allowing sectarianism to 
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triumph in an effort to win over “anti-British elements” at the expense of the “rights 
of…British residents.”676   
Conservative speakers also moderated their stance on immigration.  The party was not 
“anti-foreigner,” they argued, but simply wanted to ensure that those who arrived were 
given every opportunity to “make good.”677  They did not “oppose Europeans coming 
into the province,” the Regina Daily Star noted, but “protested only against the over 
importation of ‘Central Europeans’ into Canada.”678  Instead of the system of unrestricted 
immigration, as practiced under the Liberal regimes in Ottawa and Regina, the 
Conservatives encouraged the people to decide “who they are, where they come from, 
and what they are going to do here.  We do not want people to come here and take the 
bread and butter out of the mouths of those who are here.”  Whereas the Conservatives 
wanted British immigrants, the Liberal government had “no idea of an immigration 
policy.”679 
In restraining the tone of their attacks, Conservatives hoped to capture the moderate vote.  
Many voters were apprehensive about Catholic influence and increased immigration, but 
they were alienated by the Klan and Orange Lodge’s extremism.  Since 1905, the 
Conservatives had positioned themselves as the champion of British nativist voters; there 
was little chance that the Lodge and the Klan would abandon them in 1929 by not 
attacking separate schools directly.  On the other hand, their moderate and “reasonable” 
attacks on sectarianism and immigration had the opportunity to win over former Liberals 
who had become warry of the party’s close connection with the Catholic Church and 
foreigners.  It was Gardiner’s lack of support for non-sectarian public schools, 
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Conservatives reminded the voters, that caused the rise in racial and religious tensions in 
the first place:  
no protest has ever been made by Protestants until the limits set to separate 
schools has been infringed and exceeded.  This has occurred whenever 
nuns have taught in our public schools; crucifixes and other religious 
paraphernalia affixed to the fabric; sectarian teaching been given to the 
children, and the garb of the religious worn by the teachers of the 
young.”680   
The party selected its candidates to appeal to moderates.  In the constituency of Cypress, 
for example, divisions between Scandinavians and Roman Catholics prompted the 
Conservatives to replace their candidate with a Norwegian, John E. Gryde.  The Catholics 
voted firmly in favour of the Liberal candidate, but Gryde received enough of the 
Protestant vote to win a narrow victory.681 
This moderation also allowed the Conservatives to campaign directly towards the 
conservative farmers’ individualism.  Party speakers maintained that they stood for the 
perpetuation of the British rights of “religious tolerance…a claim to personal 
freedom…and a claim to impartial justice.”682  The Gardiner government, by giving 
special privilege to Roman Catholics and foreign languages in the public schools, had 
allowed British “liberty” to “degenerate into license,” and resulted in British subjects 
“not getting our rights.”683  The Regina Daily Star was especially forceful on this point, 
informing its readers that the Gardner machine was solely responsible for exploiting 
“race hatred in the present election” by refusing to stand up for a non-sectarian school 
and giving special privileges to its Roman Catholic and foreign supporters.684  At the 
                                                 
680
 “Election Forum,” Morning Leader, 31 May, 1929. 
681
 Brennan, “A Political History,” 762. 
682
 Morning Leader, 30 May, 1929. 
683
 “Election Forum,” Morning Leader, 31 May, 1929, Morning Leader, 30 May, 1929. 
684




height of the campaign, the paper published a widely-circulated cartoon depicting 
Gardiner and Dr. J.M. Uhrich—the “papal knight of the Gardiner cabinet”685—using 
sectarianism to divide the province’s public schools.  The symbolism was unmistakable.  
The Conservatives were the only party willing “to keep sectarian interference out of the 
public school” and stand up for Saskatchewan’s liberal-individualist heritage.686 
Figure 6 - “Hands Off Our Public Schools!” 687 
 
This same message was apparent in Conservative attacks on the Gardiner machine.  As 
Peter Russell notes, the Conservatives spent more time and effort on detailing “the 
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Liberal’s corrupt use of power and the need for civil service reform” than any other 
single issue, including education and immigration.688  Every Conservative rally, 
publication, and newspaper editorial carried the same message: “It’s time for a change, 
smash the Gardiner machine!”689  Yet, the claim that the prevalence of these issues 
proved that the Conservatives did not cater to anti-Catholic sentiment misses the mark.  
The Conservatives had previously positioned themselves as the party of Saskatchewan’s 
British nativists.  The reason they focused heavily on Liberal corruption, therefore, was 
part of their efforts to win over the conservative farmers by demonstrating how the 
Liberals had undermined their individual freedoms and British traditions.  The Regina 
Daily Star, for example, kept a running tally of the number of days that lapsed since T.C. 
Davis, the Attorney General, had promised that Bronfman’s prosecution would be 
“carried through to the end.”  The lack of action, the Star editorialized, constituted “A 
Mockery of Justice.” The central issue was not that Bronfman was a Liberal supporter 
and a prominent bootlegger, but that the Liberals, in refusing to prosecute their erstwhile 
supporter, had brought the whole Canadian legal system “into contempt.” 690   
Conservative rallies also featured speeches from those who had worked inside the 
Gardiner machine.  Anderson shared the platform at his first public meeting of the 
campaign with T.G. McManus, a former clerk in the provincial Motor License 
Department.  Speaking at length, McManus outlined his work on behalf of the “Liberal 
machine,” including undermining opposition candidates, campaigning for Liberals in the 
Manitoba election, and soliciting funds from political friends.  “This machine under 
Gardiner’s control,” he concluded, 
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 is like an immense octopus which has spread its tentacles and left its 
slimy trail over every town, village and municipality, even in the remotest 
parts of our province and beyond.  It has drained the public till, spent 
large sums of public money for political purposes, interfered and 
influenced the administration of justice, until it has become a powerful 
instrument for perpetuating the Gardiner administration.691 
The controversy surrounding the McManus charges was further enflamed when R.M. 
Johnson, Progressive candidate in the 1926 federal election, publicly acknowledged that 
McManus was among a group of Liberal agents who had attempted to bribe him into 
resigning.  Johnson refused and went to the press with the story, but the Liberal friendly 
Regina Leader and Moose Jaw Times refused to publish his account.   This was yet 
another instance of the Gardiner machine violating British freedoms.  A free press was 
essential to the maintenance of a British society, the Regina Daily Star editorialized, but 
both daily papers had “prostituted themselves to the purpose of the Gardiner machine in 
return for...job printing patronage.” 692  This corruption undermined the people’s freedom 
to choose their own government.   “Machine-made and Machine-controlled government,” 
the party argued, “is contrary to all British principles in the administration of the affairs 
of the people.”693 
In appealing to these ideas of British freedom and individualism, Conservatives 
attempted to steal the support of erstwhile Liberals.  The litany of “malpractices which 
have been perpetrated,” they argued, had earned for the government “the execration of all 
honest men and women in Saskatchewan.”694  The solution was simple.  “All true 
Liberals” must join “with other forces…to free the province from the grip of a machine 
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that is dragging liberty…into the mire.”695  To reinforce this sentiment, speakers 
continually referred to the “hundreds of Liberals” that were abandoning the “Gardiner 
machine” for the Conservatives.696  Reporting on a meeting in Lumsden, the Regina 
Daily Star noted that “Liberals who never before departed from party ranks are doing so 
this election and furthermore they are not backward in expressing the reasons for their 
actions.”697  Likewise, McManus, after detailing Liberal machinations, informed the 
audience that, because he considered himself “still a Liberal, a believer in Liberal 
principles,” he could fairly say “the party led by the Honorable J.G. Gardiner…is not the 
party in operation that Liberals should be proud to support.”698  The number of defectors 
is unknown, but Gardiner received numerous warnings throughout the campaign.  “I have 
spoken to people who live among Catholics, Norwegians and Swedes,” one letter noted, 
“who have always voted Liberal but…seeing and hearing how the Priests were lining up 
their people to all vote a solid Liberal, they the Vikings of the old Protestant faith, would 
as little think of voting with them as they would vote for Mussolini.”699  Even the 
machine was worried that the Conservatives’ tactics were undermining Liberal support. 
Conservatives were equally successful in their efforts to capture the farmer vote.  The 
Conservative platform promised the farmers redress for most of their longstanding 
grievances.  However, such promises had not proven successful in gaining farmer support 
in the past.  Learning from their previous mistakes, the Conservatives borrowed from 
Dunning’s approach to the Pool and spoke to the conservative farmers’ ideology.  
Conservatives depicted the Farm Loan Board as an inefficient waste of taxpayers’ 
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money.  Far from providing the low interest loans farmers had initially demanded, the 
board had “broken faith with the farmers of this province” by providing land to Liberal 
supporters well below market rates.  If elected, the Conservatives vowed a “thorough 
reorganizing of this department with the object of putting it on a more sound business 
basis.”700  Similarly, the Conservatives appealed to farmers’ optimism for the future in 
their discussion of natural resources.  In the lead up to the election, Gardiner announced 
that the federal government had agreed to turn over control to the province, but he had 
declined the offered compensation.  Under the terms of the Autonomy Act, Saskatchewan 
received a set annual grant based on the province’s population.  Gardiner argued that 
Saskatchewan, owing to the large acreage of alienated land, should continue to receive 
grants in perpetuity.  Although Prime Minister King agreed with Gardiner’s position, 
both agreed that the deal could not be concluded until agreement had been reached in 
Alberta and Manitoba.701  Conservatives portrayed the Premier’s refusal as a sign that 
Liberals did not have faith that direct control would ultimately make up the difference in 
subsidies.  While the Conservatives were “seized with the vision of what would be the 
result were the resources in the hands” of the people, the Liberals were busy with “the 
necessity of providing sectarian schools.”702   
Despite these appeals to the province’s farmers, the danger still existed that the 
opposition parties would end up dividing the province’s farmers in three-way contests.  
Anderson maintained his willingness to work with the Progressives to avoid this 
outcome, but their leadership stood firmly against co-operation.  As the campaign 
progressed, however, the prospects of defeating the Liberals proved too tempting for the 
party’s “conservative” wing to pass up.  Conservatives and like-minded Progressives 
divided ridings based on which party had the most probable chance of winning.  In 
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Rosetown, Progressives did not field a candidate, but Conservative rallies were addressed 
by William Loucks, “a prominent farmer…and outstanding in the Progressive party.”703  
Similarly, Progressives spoke in favour of the Conservative candidate in Moosomin, 
telling the voters that the “Conservative platform aimed at giving legislation in keeping 
with Progressive ideals.”704  In situations where an agreement could not be made, 
opposition parties jointly selected an independent candidate.  Anderson’s first rally 
during the campaign was in support of J.V. Patterson, the Independent candidate selected 
by the Conservatives and Progressives to run in Milestone.705   
This strategy limited the potential of a split vote, but it was not ideal.  Conservatives ran 
their own candidate in ridings where the Progressive nominee refused to co-operate with 
a future Conservative government.  In other cases, local Progressives steadfastly refused 
to have any dealings with the Conservatives.  Additionally, the more radical elements 
within the Progressive movement nominated third-party candidates under the label of 
“Economic Group” in three ridings where opposition groups had reached an 
agreement.706  The Conservatives also failed to win over the support of the Progressive 
leadership.  C.E. Little, Progressive Association President, spent the campaign 
disparaging the Conservatives as being no different than the Liberals.  “Replacing one 
political machine for another, equally as bad,” he maintained, “will not put into effect 
those policies so vital to your economic welfare, for then you will have to fight doubly 
hard to gain your rightful inheritance.”707  With three-way contests occurring in only 
twelve of the province’s fifty-five rural constituencies, Little and the Progressive 
leadership could disparage the Conservatives all they wanted.  Not only had the 
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Conservatives developed a plan that appealed to the province’s farmers, but they also 
successfully limited the possibility of the Progressives splitting the opposition farmers’ 
vote. 
The Liberals tried in vain to stem the rising Conservative tide.  As was the case in Arm 
River in 1928, Gardiner initially intended to wage the campaign on the Liberal 
government’s record: “A RECORD of Substantial Achievement—A Sound Financial 
Position, Unprecedented Growth and Wise Progressive Administration.”708  Liberal 
speakers fanned out across the province stressing the people’s favoured position because 
of their leadership.  “I believe the Liberal government has given our province splendid 
government,” F.N. Drake, a candidate in Regina, argued, “that we have prosperity under 
it, that we stand first in per capita progress, lowest per capita debt and largest per capita 
wealth.”709  Likewise, Liberal speakers reminded the province’s farmers of their debt to 
the Liberal Party.  The party, they argued, had always provided “a real service to the 
agricultural community” through its promotion of co-operative enterprises, the farm loan 
board, the establishment of an agricultural college, the Hudson Bay Railway.710  Liberals 
also vigorously defended their educational and assimilationist policies, reminding voters 
that attacks on the public schools were not based in fact.  French-language instruction 
only occurred in three schools and the proportion of Catholic instructors was decidedly 
lower than every other province.  “Saskatchewan is a province with many races and 
religions,” they maintained.  “On the whole the verdict of time will be that they are all 
being made into pretty good Canadians.  They are living together in peace and 
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goodwill.”711  Despite these attempts, the opposition’s well-planned campaign raised the 
distinct possibility that the Liberals could lose the election.   
Gardiner had no choice but to directly confront the Conservatives.  In terms of 
agricultural policy, the Liberals shifted from claims they supported farmers to portraying 
a Conservative victory as “THE MOST DAMAGING BLOW POSSIBLE” to the 
interests of the province’s farmers.712  “The only traditional Conservative policy in 
Saskatchewan,” the Morning Leader concluded, “is the policy that flows to the 
Conservative party of Saskatchewan through its affiliation with the Conservative party at 
Ottawa.  The Conservative party at Ottawa has a traditional policy of high tariff, of high 
freight rates…of sympathy for the ‘Big Interests.’”713  This “fact” also gave weight to 
Liberal criticisms against the “unholy” alliance between the Conservatives and 
Progressives.  “Never were the ideals and the objectives of two political parties more 
diametrically opposed than in the case of the Conservative and Progressive parties,” they 
argued.  “The Conservative party in Canada stands for high tariffs…Progressives, on the 
other hand, are committed to low tariffs, even lower than the Liberals favor.”714  The 
message was clear.  With the Progressives abandoning their principles, farmers could 
only trust the Liberals to look out for their interests. 
The Liberals attempted to counter Conservative efforts to sway the more moderate 
Protestant vote by contesting the opposition’s understanding of citizenship.  Nativists 
adhered to a limited conception of citizenship, with race and religion acting as a litmus 
test of belonging.  The Liberals, in contrast, maintained that a toleration for minority 
rights was central to British values.  The province’s Jewish population, for example, 
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immigrated to “escape from religious and racial hardships and persecution,” but were 
now afraid the violence and intolerance in Europe was coming to Canada.715  
“Enlightened citizens imbued with British ideals of fair play and sportsmanship,” they 
argued, recognized Conservative tactics as “a deliberate attempt…to cover the 
deficiencies of its own platform and conceal the weakness of its own case.”  
Conservatives, in short, would “find nothing too low or ignoble” to promote for political 
gain regardless of the cost it had on respectable “British” citizens.716  Neither party held a 
monopoly on what it meant to be British.  Although the Liberal calls for tolerance would 
not sway ardent Orangemen and Klansmen, they hoped it would appeal to moderate 
Protestants. 
Despite the Liberals’ best efforts, they failed in persuading either the farmers or the 
moderate Protestants to remain loyal.  The Liberals maintained that there was no 
foundation to the criticisms leveled against them: “Dr. Anderson has always been a false 
prophet.  He is merely whistling to keep up his own courage and in an endeavour to 
hoodwink his followers.”717  Yet, the fact that they spent most of the campaign 
attempting to disarm Conservative “slander, mistreatment, and mud-raking” only gave 
weight to these attacks.718  The question over natural resources, for example, featured 
prominently throughout the campaign.  The Liberals, therefore, felt they had achieved a 
singular coup when Bran Thompson, a well-respected lawyer associated with the issue, 
publicly declared that only Gardiner could satisfactorily handle the issue.  The 
opposition, Thompson argued, were “Reaping Where They Have Not Sown.”719   
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Conservatives turned Thompson’s criticism into yet another manifestation of the Liberal 
machine corrupting the people of the province.  “Deep immersion in the principles of 
abstract law for forty years,” the Regina Daily Star argued, “would unfit the most 
scholarly mind for combat with such practical politicians.”720  Similarly, the Liberals 
commissioned a pamphlet, published in both English and French, that detailed 
Conservative attacks on the Roman Catholic Church, sectarianism, and the public 
schools. 721  While the party hoped that the pamphlet would galvanize Catholics to vote 
Liberal, organizers quickly found that it was having the opposite effect on Protestants.  
“For every vote it held for the Gardiner machine,” the Regina Daily Star argued, “it was 
making three votes for the opposition candidates.”722  The Liberals ordered the pamphlet 
destroyed, but the damage had already been done. 
Liberals experienced a similar outcome in their attempts to discredit former machine 
workers.  Gardiner responded to McManus’ charges by insinuating he was rightfully 
dismissed for impropriety.  “While his home and his wife and children were in Moose 
Jaw,” Gardiner alleged, “and he was supposed to be out at work on the roads of the 
province, he actually was living with another woman in Regina, and was not contributing 
to the support of his real wife.”723  The Regina Daily Star, in response, published 
McManus’ wife’s denials and a letter suggesting that he “was not dismissed but tendered 
his resignation.”724  Gardiner hoped that accusations of adultery would discredit 
McManus, but they actually provided more ammunition for the Conservatives to 
disparage the machine.  “Perhaps never in the political annals of the country,” the party 
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argued, “has a more degrading spectacle been witnessed than the Premier of the province 
endeavouring to cast disbelief…by making accusations of domestic trouble which have 
no foundation.”725   
The Liberals’ attempts to win over moderate Protestants also backfired.  Bishop George 
Lloyd, the outspoken Anglican Bishop for the Diocese of Saskatchewan, entered the fray 
on the eve of the election.  Noting that he was a life-long Liberal, Lloyd nevertheless 
proclaimed that he “shall vote against the Gardiner government” because it was “non-
British if not anti-British” in its handling of immigration, administration of the school 
laws, and its unwillingness to limit “religious emblems in the public schools of the 
province.”726  It was a remarkable coup for the Conservatives’ strategy.  Liberals may 
have been able to paint Conservatives’ racial and religious ideals as anti-British, but they 
would have a harder time convincing Saskatchewan’s moderate Protestants that the 
leader of Saskatchewan’s “British” church was wrong in his position as well.727 
After a quarter century of struggle, the Conservatives had finally found an electoral 
strategy that worked.  The Liberals entered election day confident of victory, but as the 
results began pouring in, the prospects of remaining in government diminished.728 The 
cities, the first ridings to report, went entirely to the Conservatives.  The Liberals retained 
only Prince Albert, a mixed urban-rural riding, with a narrow victory by T.C. Davis, 
Gardiner’s Attorney General.  Although the Liberals fared better in rural ridings 
(Gardiner increased his margin of victory from 1925 in his riding of North Qu’Appelle) it 
was clear that the Conservative strategy paid off.  Conservatives were particularly 
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effective in two-way fights against the Liberals, winning fourteen of the twenty-two 
contests.  In comparison, Progressives won five of six direct contests with Liberals, while 
the Independent candidates fared the worst, securing five of fourteen seats.  It is also 
clear that the Conservatives were shrewd in avoiding multiple candidate fights.  Of the 
twelve ridings with three or more candidates, the Liberals won eight, the Conservatives 
four.  Yet, there was some vindication for Conservative attempts at co-operation as 
disgruntled Progressives lost every race where they entered against another opposition 
candidate.729 






Cast % of Vote 
Candidates 
Elected % of Ridings 
Liberal 63 130,404 52.58 51 81 
Conservative 18 45,515 18.35 18 3 












Liberal 63 164,487 45.56 28 44 
Conservative 40 131,550 36.44 24 38 
Independent 17 32,729 9.07 6 10 
Progressive 16 24,988 6.92 5 8 
Economic Group 3 1,942 0.54 -  -  
 
It was a remarkable, conservative victory.  The Conservative-Progressive-Independent 
coalition captured thirty-five of the province’s sixty-three ridings and more than half of 
the popular vote.  Although the Liberals still received the largest number of votes, they 
were also the only party to field candidates in every riding.  The opposition’s popularity 
was also evident in the fact that their vote was less concentrated than previous elections.  
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In 1925, both the Conservatives and the Progressives won a substantially lower 
percentage of ridings than their share of the vote would suggest.  In 1929, however, the 
division of ridings was no different than would have been the case under a system of 
proportional representation.   Not only had the Liberals witnessed a dramatic decline in 
their total support, but the opposition was able to spread its appeal across wider swaths of 
the province.     
The secret to this success lay in Conservative manipulation of British values.  On the one 
hand, the increased anxiety among the province’s Anglo-Saxon population, as seen in the 
rise of both the Orange Lodge and the KKK, allowed the Conservatives’ message of a 
non-sectarian school system and limited immigration to find traction.  The geographic 
distribution of seats corroborates this fact.  Liberal support was highest in areas with high 
proportions of recent immigrants and Roman Catholics.  In the late 1920s, these peoples 
were predominantly located in Saskatchewan’s south-western borderlands, with its large 
population of German and French Catholics, the north, and the area south-east of 
Saskatoon stretching to the Manitoba border, containing concentrations of Poles and 
German-Catholics.731  The Liberals won twenty-two of the roughly twenty-five ridings in 
this area.732  Well over three-quarters of Liberal seats were from ridings dominated by 
the Catholic vote.  The inverse is also true.  Opposition candidates fared best in central 
and south-eastern portions of the province where Anglo-Saxon Protestants dominated.  
Not since 1905 had the geographic distribution of seats so clearly mirrored these racial 
and religious divides. 733   
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The second element of Conservative success in 1929 lay in their ability to retain the 
nativist vote while also branching out among the province’s conservative farmers.  
Although it is difficult to estimate with any accuracy the number of individualist farmers 
that switched their allegiance from the Liberals, it is possible to make some 
generalizations.  Opposition candidates, for example, were successful in the flatlands 
surrounding Regina where large-scale operations dominated.  Not only was the region 
home to a large concentration of British settlers, but its topography and settlement 
patterns also promoted intensive wheat production and provided the bulk of the 
Organization Opposing Compulsory Pool’s support.  Gardiner admitted in the election’s 
aftermath that the Conservative attacks on the Liberal machine resonated with these 
voters.  Liberal organization, he confided to Motherwell, was “a little overdone and 
people began to think that their views were being made for them...[and] seemed to feel 
that the time had come when the lessening of the strength of the Liberals in the Province 
would do no harm.”734  There is also evidence that the Conservative-Progressive alliance 
finally won over the “more level-headed farmers” as Dunning had feared in 1925.  
Election results indicate that in constituencies where no Progressive candidate ran in 
1929, the Conservatives received the bulk of their support from 1925.  Likewise, half of 
the three-cornered fights saw votes for the Progressive candidate drop, while the 
Conservative candidate’s support increased disproportionately to the Liberal.735  The 
Conservatives failed to win over all of Saskatchewan’s Protestant farmers—the Liberals 
still polled forty-five percent of the vote—but they won enough to turn the tide in their 
favour.  
The Conservative Party finally adopted a set of policies and electoral tactics that brought 
together enough of Saskatchewan’s conservative forces to defeat the Liberals.  It had 
been a long struggle.  Since 1905, the party had served as the main political outlet of 
Saskatchewan’s British nativists.  The Conservatives’ early electoral defeats and poor 
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policy decisions, in contrast, alienated the province’s conservative farmers.  It took a 
quarter of a century to rebuild the party among the province’s farm community.  In the 
end, it was not their platform policies that bridged the divide, but a skillful articulation of 
the farmers’ fundamental values.  Rather than view the two conservative constituencies 
as separate entities, the Conservatives united them in their shared sense of Britishness.  




After a series of joint conferences between the newly elected opposition MLAs, the 
Conservatives announced an agreement forming a coalition, what they termed a “co-
operative,” government.  Independents, Conservatives, and Progressives pledged 
themselves to reform the civil service, were adamant that each group would retain its own 
identity, and pledged freedom to every member in the federal realm.736  Having agreed to 
work together, they issued a joint statement calling on the Liberals to “resign 
immediately.”737   Gardiner refused.  With the most elected members, the Premier held 
out hope he could come to an arrangement with enough Progressive and Independent 
MLAs to maintain power.  It was a fruitless endeavour.  The united opposition quickly 
defeated the Liberals when the Legislature reconvened in September.  The triumph was 
complete. 
The celebrations, however, did not last.  The 1929 election proved to be a pyrrhic victory 
for the combined opposition.  The Progressives were never able to overcome the internal 
divisions caused by the decision to co-operate with the Conservatives.  The party’s 
radical elements held their own convention where they decided that, while the elected 
MLAs would vote non-confidence in the Liberals, they would refuse any formal co-
operation with the Conservatives or positions in Anderson’s cabinet.  The only problem 
to the plan was that no one had bothered to ask the elected MLAs what they thought.  
When M.J. Coldwell subsequently presented the resolutions to the Independent and 
Liberal caucus, only Jacob Benson, the Progressive MLA for Last Mountain and an 
ardent Pool supporter, agreed to go along.738  All others threw their lot in with Anderson.  
“Look,” declared A.C. Stewart, the Independent MLA from Yorkton, “you people can get 
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out, it has been decided.”739  Stewart entered the cabinet as Minister of Highways and 
Reginald Stipe served as the Progressive representative as a Minister Without 
Portfolio.740  The decision destroyed the Progressive Party as the more radical elements, 
including M.J. Coldwell, joined the Farmers’ Educational League in taking control of the 
UFC(SS), ultimately culminating in the creation of the CCF in 1932.741  Nor would the 
Conservatives fare any better in the long-term.  The party relied on appeals to British 
nativists and conservative farmers’ shared values to portray the Liberals as a malignant 
force intent on destroying Saskatchewan’s British traditions.  Within months of taking 
office, however, the Great Depression struck Saskatchewan, fundamentally altering the 
nature of Saskatchewan politics for a generation.  The party quickly discovered that the 
tactics that united the province’s conservative forces in the 1920s were no longer relevant 
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5 Conservative Christianity and the Great Depression: 
The Briercrest Bible Institute and Notre Dame 
The economic and ecological catastrophe of the “dirty” thirties devastated Saskatchewan.  
For a decade, the province shifted between localized and all out drought conditions.  In 
1929, the south-central portion of the province—the very heart of Saskatchewan’s wheat 
empire—experienced its first in a series of crop failures.  The situation grew worse in 
1930 when the dried-out areas reached the parkland north of Saskatoon.  By 1931, 
drought conditions prevailed over half the province and Premier Anderson was forced to 
make an infamous declaration that “no one will starve.”742 In 1935, the rains returned, 
but grasshoppers and rust proved to be as effective at killing crops as drought.  The worst 
year proved to be 1937 when two-thirds of farmers reported crop failures.  While the 
province’s farms were literally blowing away, residents were also dealing with economic 
disintegration.  The bottom fell out of wheat prices in 1929 and did not recover until the 
Second World War.  Even if farmers could grow wheat, they could not sell it for a price 
coming close to their input costs.  In 1928, farm income in Saskatchewan was a record 
$185 million; it was minus $31 million in 1931.743  It was a catastrophe.  The once 
“banner province” was now the poorest in the nation.  Between 1928 and 1933, 
Saskatchewan’s per capita income dropped seventy-two percent compared to a forty-
eight percent drop for Canada as a whole.744   Statistics, however, only tell half the story.  
The Depression’s psychological effects were just as pronounced as the economic 
realities.  As Greg Marchildon argues, “Caution replaced optimism, saving and risk-
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avoidance replaced past eagerness to invest in new ventures, and a sense of foreboding, 
even dread, replaced the sunny optimism of the past.”745 
The Great Depression altered the nature of Saskatchewan politics.  The combined 
environmental and economic catastrophes undermined the province’s early conservative 
movements.  It is an irony of the 1930s that those farmers who were central in 
formulating the myth of the self-made-man were the ones to suffer the most when the 
bottom fell out.  Studies of farm income from 1932 and 1934 indicate that the vast 
majority of farmers lost money on their operations, but those who cultivated larger 
acreages were significantly worse off.746  Robert Allen Wright’s path from success to 
ultimate failure is but one in thousands of examples where the province’s larger farmers 
faced ruin.  At the same time, the Depression signalled the end of the ascendency for 
Saskatchewan’s British nativist movements.  Questions of “survival,” Pitsula notes, “took 
precedence over identity politics.”747  The rapid decline of the KKK after 1930 occurred 
as fast as its rise.  From a membership numbering over 20,000 in 1928, the Klan ceased 
to function by the middle of the decade.  The Orange Lodge, with its more established 
history in the British world, outlived the Klan, but could not stem the same type of 
decline.  As the British connection ceased to matter after the Second World War, so too 
did the Orange Lodge. 
The Depression gave rise to new political questions and movements.  As dust storms, 
foreclosures, and breadlines became the norm, people turned to religion to offer both 
solace and solutions to the environmental and economic ravages.  Historians commonly 
associate the response of all Christians with the liberalized theology and social reform 
efforts of the province’s mainstream Protestant denominations.  The “social gospel” 
movement of these churches first emerged at the end of the nineteenth century as leaders 
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sought to keep Christianity relevant in the face of an increasingly urban, industrial, and 
modern nation.  As Richard Allen explains, the social gospel “rested on the premise that 
Christianity was a social religion.”  It was a call to “realize the Kingdom of God in the 
very fabric of society.”748  Rather than fight against the modernism of an industrializing 
society, social gospellers used insights gathered from biblical criticism, the social 
sciences, progressivism, and Darwinism to accommodate Christianity with modernity.   
This millennial vision was central to the CCF’s founding in 1932.  While nominally 
socialist, the CCF adhered to the social gospel’s belief in the ability to transform society 
into a utopia—a New Jerusalem—which would usher in God’s kingdom on earth.749  The 
rise of the CCF, Lewis Thomas notes, was predicated on the party’s association with the 
“Christian socialism” of the social gospel.750 Tommy Douglas, a Baptist minister and 
early leader in the new party, reflected this outlook.  Douglas received his seminary 
training at the Baptist affiliated Brandon University where he came under the tutelage of 
Harris MacNeill, a leading modernist and rationalist voice within the Baptist Church.751  
Douglas’ education provided him with a foundational belief in the transformative power 
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of the social gospel.  According to Thomas and Ian McLeod, Douglas’ political vision 
was predicated on creating a society “where the strong would bear the burdens of the 
weak, and the desire for social justice would overshadow the hunger for economic 
gain.”752  This vision was central to the CCF’s conception of a “co-operative 
commonwealth.”  By replacing competition with co-operation, the party argued, society 
had the opportunity to “create a new social order.”753   
Historians have had comparatively little to say on how a conservative Christianity 
informed people’s politics during the Great Depression.  Although the connection 
between the KKK and fundamentalist Christianity has long been established, the political 
influence of this theology is largely ignored beyond the KKK’s prominence in the late 
1920s.754  Similarly, historians have depicted the Catholic Church’s opposition to the 
CCF’s early socialism, but they have failed to detail how Catholics internalized and used 
this condemnation in their response to the Great Depression.755   
In order to explore how conservative theology influenced the political discussion of the 
Great Depression, it is first necessary to establish what these groups believed and how 
they responded to catastrophe.  This chapter details the foundation and growth of two 
religious schools: the fundamentalist and non-denominational Briercrest Bible Institute 
(BBI) and the Roman Catholic Notre Dame College.  Both groups were founded amid the 
trials of the Depression but did not share in the Social Gospel’s quest to ameliorate the 
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inequalities and depravations of the capitalist system.  Rather, they viewed the social 
gospel and its collectivist and socialist challenges to the status quo as a danger to 
traditional values.  They responded to this threat by running educational institutes aimed 
at training Saskatchewan’s youth to reject the collectivist mentality of the social gospel 
and reaffirm society’s individualist nature.  Both schools instructed students to be leaders 
in their communities and placed a primacy on an anti-modern world view.  Both schools 
also became immensely popular in their constituencies and shaped the ideologies and 
political actions of their followers. 
Although these schools trace their founding to the height of the Depression, theological 
differences and religious bigotry negated any meaningful collaboration between them.  
Briercrest and Notre Dame were products of decidedly different theological backgrounds 
with divergent interpretations of scripture, the nature of God, and the proper relationship 
between Christians and secular society.  Briercrest emphasized biblical orthodoxy, the 
doctrine of adult or “believer” baptism, and the belief that personal salvation was 
reflected in the lives and actions of the converted. 756  Notre Dame, on the other hand, 
used the “unwritten” traditions of the Catholic Church to inform its belief structure.  
Similarly, religious prejudice, especially the anti-Catholicism which raged across 
Saskatchewan in the 1920s drove a wedge between the schools.  In 1929, for example, 
the Klan, which espoused a fundamentalist theology, threatened to destroy a statue of 
Jesus prominently displayed in the Wilcox Parish.757  The legacy of this lingering anti-
Catholicism, along with their theological incompatibility, prevented co-operation 
between fundamentalists and conservative Catholics until well after the end of the Second 
World War.  Yet, the message espoused by these schools was remarkably similar.  They 
viewed the Great Depression as constituting a fundamental threat to society’s traditional 
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values and articulated an educational program intended to promote an individual ethic 
amongst their students.  In so doing, both actively resisted the collectivism of the social 
gospel and CCF.   
Christian fundamentalism developed as part of an early twentieth-century neo-orthodox 
response to the emergent liberalism of mainstream Protestant denominations.  It 
represented a desire to return to the “fundamentals of the Christian faith, including belief 
in salvation through Christ alone, the inerrant Bible, and the premillennial return of 
Christ.”758  Across the Prairie West, fundamentalists shared the same orthodox Christian 
beliefs and concerns over the “secularization” of Canadian society.  They viewed the 
adoption of higher criticism in colleges and seminaries, as well as the formation of the 
United Church of Canada, as a process whereby people were led away from true 
salvation.759  This anti-modernism was fueled by fundamentalists’ proclivity for 
premillennial dispensationalism, an eschatological belief that periodized the Bible into 
specific “dispensations” and held that Christ would return prior to the advent of the 
Millennium.760  The liberalization of mainstream religion and society, they argued, 
proved God’s displeasure and signaled the coming Apocalypse.761   
Although fundamentalists agreed on the corruption of mainstream religion, their 
responses underwent significant shifts throughout the inter-war period.  Militant anti-
modernism defined 1920s fundamentalism.  Conservative leaders, including William 
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Aberhart in Alberta and T.T. Shields in Ontario, publicly attacked the leading signs of 
religious modernity, including evolutionary theory, female ministers, and a decline in 
biblical inerrancy.762  Likewise, the KKK’s rapid rise in Saskatchewan was partly a result 
of the organization’s anti-modern religious message which resonated with Protestants 
who “craved a return to simple fundamentalism.”763  By the 1930s, however, 
fundamentalists abandoned militancy in the face of increased ridicule as mainstream 
society reacted against their “backward” beliefs.764  The ravages of the Great Depression, 
often interpreted as a sign of the End Times, also promoted a retrenchment and a renewed 
concentration on evangelism.  Fundamentalists organized themselves into networks of 
churches and schools and dedicated themselves to spreading their “uncorrupted” 
Christianity to regenerate society through a modern-day great awakening.765   
Briercrest’s history was intrinsically linked to this fundamentalist anti-modernism.  In the 
early 1920s, Annie Hillson, a teacher from Ontario and former missionary to Bolivia, 
began organizing Sunday school classes and weekly Bible study sessions in the rural 
village of Briercrest, located twenty-five miles southeast of Moose Jaw.  Hillson believed 
that a trend towards liberal theology was corrupting the local Methodist church and 
gathered a small group of like-minded Christians around her.  Isabel Whittaker, an 
emigrant from Nova Scotia, soon began aiding Hillson and took a correspondence course 
with the fundamentalist Moody Bible Institute, based in Chicago.  Sinclair, Isabel’s 
husband, became born-again at the urging of his wife, and used his standing as a 
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prominent businessman and Conservative MLA to offer credibility to the group.766  From 
the outset, the small “congregation” made it their mission to promote a fundamentalist 
interpretation of scripture to members of the surrounding community.  Frequent Bible 
study conferences and revivals were held at the Whittakers’ home, with notable 
fundamentalist preachers from across the Canadian Prairies and the United States in 
attendance. 
These meetings raised doctrinal issues that were increasingly at odds with the liberalism 
of the local church.  The local Methodist church’s decision to join the United Church of 
Canada in 1925 precipitated a backlash against the small group of fundamentalists, 
dividing the local community along fundamentalist and modernist lines.767  By the mid-
1920s, Hillson found herself “excommunicated” for refusing to back down from her 
fundamentalist beliefs, and Sinclair Whittaker’s business suffered as long-time customers 
refused to continue purchasing from his stores.768   The final break between these two 
sides came in the late 1920s when the local United Church, swayed by the social gospel, 
decided on a modernist interpretation of scripture and forbade the teaching of 
fundamentalist materials at the Sunday School.769  “I was astonished,” Hillson later 
recalled, “as I realized that I had been going step by step, down the road of modernism…I 
saw for the first time that all my years of Sunday school teaching and work in the church 
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had been wasted.”770  Unwilling to compromise, Hillson, the Whittakers, and other 
likeminded Christians left the United Church and formed the Briercrest Gospel 
Assembly. 
These parishioners succeeded in separating themselves from the liberalism of the United 
Church, but the small group quickly found that it lacked the necessary spiritual leadership 
to effectively develop their biblical training.  The onset of the Great Depression 
compounded this problem, as young people could no longer afford to travel for a 
“proper” Bible education.  Initially, the new church hoped to find the necessary support 
through an affiliation with a larger fundamentalist institution, but the Moody Bible 
Institute quickly dismissed the possibility.771  The congregation then turned its attention 
towards recruiting a minister to lead their new church and help launch a Bible school 
where the young people of the community would receive a fundamentalist education.  In 
early 1934, Sinclair Whittaker wrote Henry Hildebrand, a 23-year-old student at the 
Winnipeg Bible Institute and circuit-riding preacher for the Canadian Sunday School 
Mission (CSSM), to convince him to join the congregation.  “We fully realize,” 
Whittaker wrote, “that under the economic conditions prevailing here it will require a 
great deal of faith to proceed.  We have had six crop failures.  Ninety percent of the 
people are on relief.  We are, however, blessed with some dozens of praying Christians 
who are endowed with enough faith to move mountains.”772  Hildebrand initially 
believed that he lacked the experience necessary to lead the congregation.  Through 
further correspondence, however, Whittaker convinced him that Briercrest could serve as 
“God’s witness” against “the liberalism that swept the field of the prairies.”773  
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Hildebrand took up Whittaker’s offer of employment in the winter of 1934 and began 
organizing the new church and school. 
Hildebrand brought a decidedly conservative outlook to Briercrest.  Hildebrand’s family 
immigrated to Manitoba as part of the Russlander Mennonite influx during the Russian 
Revolution.  Although Hildebrand came of age in a religious household, he was not “born 
again” until he attended a summer camp sponsored by the CSSM in 1929.   “I knew the 
gospel from my childhood,” he recalled, “but I was wrong in the manner in which I tried 
to receive it, in which I tried to be saved.”774  For Hildebrand, the only path to salvation 
lay with developing a personal and individual relationship with Christ.  Following his 
conversion, Hildebrand studied at the Winnipeg Bible Institute and eventually began 
working for the CSSM.   Hildebrand’s training in what historian Bruce Hindmarsh terms 
the “Winnipeg fundamentalist network” deeply influenced his theological outlook.  This 
web of individuals, churches, and schools believed fundamentalism’s main purpose was 
the conversion of their neighbours before the Apocalypse, not the defence of “Christian 
civilization against the onslaught of theological modernism, evolution, and communism” 
which dominated the earlier movement. 775   Although Hildebrand sympathized with the 
anti-modern concerns of earlier Aberhart and Shields, his commitment to home missions 
and evangelism took precedence. 
Hildebrand made it clear that the school’s purpose was to spread fundamentalist doctrine 
and evangelize the province.  An early prospectus, for instance, lamented the “ever-
increasing ignorance of the pure word of God prevails throughout our land today.”776  
Similarly, Hildebrand was firm in the notion that BBI would indoctrinate students in 
                                                 
774
 Briercrest College and Seminary Archibald Library (BCS), 92003 A 008, H. Hildebrand Radio 
Messages, Galatians-Philippians, “God’s Workmanship,” 29 December, 1946. 
775
 Bruce D. Hindmarsh, “The Winnipeg Fundamentalist Network, 1910-1940,” in Aspects of the 
Canadian Evangelical Experience, ed. G.A. Rawlyk (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997), 
304. 
776




proper beliefs.  Students would “weigh and consider” fundamentalist doctrines, not 
“criticize and refute” them.777  Students enrolled in a three-year diploma program 
designed to provide the religious foundations to effectively evangelize and adhere to a 
fundamentalist worldview.  Students took courses on child evangelism, public speaking, 
church history, missions, systematic biblical theology, dispensational truth, and modern 
cults, “a survey of the doctrines of modernism and the leading false religious cults as 
contrasted with historic Christianity.”778  Part of their training had students practice these 
evangelical skills by holding Bible study sessions with children in the local schools.779  
Courses on fundamentalist doctrine taught students what to believe and how to act; 
courses on evangelism showed them how to spread these beliefs to others.   
At the same time, there was a clear sense that this fundamentalist orthodoxy, while 
important, was merely a means to the greater end of spreading the gospel to 
Saskatchewan’s unconverted.  Hildebrand insisted that BBI would function as a trans-
denominational institute, open to anyone who professed an acceptance of theology 
regardless of church affiliation: “To bring man to Jesus--O be this our aim.  Not to bring 
them to baptism, not merely to a meeting house, nor to adopt our form of worship, but to 
bring them to the dear Savior.”780  This emphasis set BBI apart from other fundamentalist 
organizations in Saskatchewan that developed ministers for individual denominations or 
sought to forestall the assimilation of immigrant children into mainstream Canada.781  In 
contrast, BBI’s explicit goal was to bypass this denominational focus to “meet the need 
                                                 
777
 BCS, 008, BBI Catalogues: 1941-60, “Fellowship Flashes, 1940-41,” 1. 
778
 BCS, 008, BBI Catalogues: 1941-60, “Prospectus, 1950-51,” 10-11. 
779
 BCS, 008, BBI Catalogues: 1941-60, “Prospectus, 1940-41,” 8. 
780
 BCS, 92003 A 008, Radio Messages, John, “A Testimony at Home,” 13 June, 1943. 
781
 Bruce Guenther, “The Origin of the Bible School Movement: Towards an Ethnic Interpretation,” 




of trained workers of the Prairies.”782  Hildebrand was not concerned about his students’ 
backgrounds and entrance requirements were vague.  So long as students were “of 
approved Christian character,” “considerate of others,” and, most importantly, “obedient 
to those over them in the Lord and willing to submit to the discipline and order of the 
school,” they could study at BBI.783   
For Hildebrand, biblical orthodoxy and evangelism were not mutually exclusive.  “Sound 
doctrine and a spiritual life,” he noted, “go hand in hand.”784  On the one hand, 
fundamentalist dogma filled Hildebrand’s writings and sermons.  Hildebrand’s deity was 
a personal, all-powerful God that ordained the course of human history by actively 
intervening in the day-to-day lives of professing Christians.  The story of BBI, 
Hildebrand recalled in his memoirs, details “how God overruled infirmities and 
weakness.”  Hildebrand equated the entirety of his life as a process wherein God shaped 
“a servant to become His instrument in founding a college.” 785  Similarly, Hildebrand 
was steadfast in his defence of an inerrant Bible.  The Bible was the literal “Word of 
God,” containing the immutable “facts of history.”786   As such, Hildebrand had little 
patience for liberal Christianity and its propensity for biblical criticism.  “Some have 
suggested that it [the Bible] should be rewritten,” he noted.  “This is folly, what is needed 
to-day is that it ought to be re-read, not rewritten.”787  Hildebrand also interpreted the 
“decay” of modern society as a warning of the approaching Rapture, often pointing to 
juvenile delinquency, rising crime rates, a breakdown in traditional gender roles, and the 
                                                 
782
 BCS, 008, BBI Catalogues: 1941-60, “Prospectus, 1951-42,” 4. 
783
 BCS, 008, BBI Catalogues: 1941-60, “Prospectus, 1940-41,” 12. 
784
 Hildebrand, In His Loving Service, 184. 
785
 Hildebrand, In His Loving Service, 10. 
786
 BCS, 92003 A 008, Radio Messages, 1 John-Revelation, “God’s Little Children,” 23 October, 1938; 
BCS, 92003 A 008, Radio Messages, Matthew-Luke, “The Unchangeable Word,” n.d. 
787




increasing secularization of Canadian society as evidence of a “perverse and crooked 
generation” which was prophesized as ushering in the End Times.788  “If the clouds are 
already arising upon the horizon,” he questioned, “how near the Second Coming of Christ 
be?”789  He therefore viewed his role as spiritual leader not to change society, but to save 
as many souls as possible before the Apocalypse. 
At the same time, Hildebrand’s ministry lacked the militancy often associated with 
fundamentalist Christianity.  Whereas earlier ministers challenged the leading signs of 
modernism, Hildebrand remained above the fray.790  Hildebrand simply did not feel that 
his beliefs needed defending.  Fundamentalism was the only true Christianity and, there 
was no room for debate.  Salvation could only come through Christ alone.  “A man must 
be born again,” Hildebrand warned, “or he is no child of God.”791  Hildebrand held that 
his role as a minister was to help the unsaved understand their wickedness; it was up to 
them to receive salvation for themselves “lest their last opportunity of accepting Christ is 
gone forever.”792 He believed that militancy alienated more people than it saved.  He 
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would not allow a misguided militancy to distract from the ultimate purpose of 
committing “faithful men to the Word of God.”793 
Under Hildebrand’s command, BBI promoted an individualist theology.  According to 
Clark Banack, an emphasis on personal freedom was central to the fundamentalist 
project.  Aberhart’s ministry, for example, was “individualistic” in that he “understood 
personal conversion to be an act of free individual choice.”  Protecting personal freedoms 
was therefore essential to ensure salvation.794  Similarly, Hildebrand’s fundamentalism 
divided society into groups of saved and unsaved, but this distinction was not immutable.  
People had the ability to save themselves if they formed a personal relationship with 
Jesus.  The impetus for this salvation, however, rested in individual initiative.  
Hildebrand commonly ended his sermons with an altar call urging people to accept 
Christ, but he was equally clear that the ultimate choice between salvation and damnation 
was up to the individual sinner.  “Oh awake and be saved,” he urged, “lest the judgement 
day…will arise and condemn thee for neglecting so great a salvation.”795  People could 
not be forced to accept Jesus; they had to come to the decision of their own free will.  It 
was because of this belief that Hildebrand championed individual freedoms in all areas of 
society.  Hildebrand believed that modern society was leading people to damnation but 
refused to contemplate any measures which would threaten a person’s ability to decide 
their own fate.  “If you really think the follies of this world are the best,” he told his 
listeners, “and believe that a fine fashionable life, a life of frivolity and gaiety, flitting 
from flower to flower but getting honey from none, if such a life is most desirable, carry 
                                                 
793
 Hildebrand, In His Loving Service, 253. 
794
 Banack, “Evangelical Christianity and Political Thought in Alberta,” 70, 85. 
795





it out to its bitter disappointment and shame.”796  In order for people to find true 
salvation, they had to make the choice of their own free will.   
This personal freedom, however, was a double-edged sword.  Like Aberhart, 
Hildebrand’s belief in original sin translated into an understanding of human nature 
wherein “the individual was a fallen creature and therefore possessed inherent tendencies 
towards evil.”797  As much as Hildebrand emphasized individual action in the conversion 
process, he was deeply concerned that this individualism, if left unchecked, would 
undermine salvation.  “All that glitters is not gold,” he argued, “all that profess to be 
followers even in our evangelical bodies are not Christ's own.  They may have been 
moved under the spell of emotion, and come forward, but by and by the newness wears 
off and they drift back into the world.”798  To guard against this “backsliding,” 
Hildebrand placed severe restrictions on his student’s behavior.799  Hildebrand expected 
Briercrest students to live a “Christian life” which exemplified their personal conversion 
and piety.  BBI’s lengthy list of rules included bans on the use of tobacco, attending 
dances and the theatre, as well as getting married “without consulting the Principal and 
obtaining permission from the Board of Directors.”800  While these rules limited 
individual action, the severity of BBI’s discipline also recognized student’s free-will.  
Hildebrand believed that personal liberty was necessary to have people make their own 
connection with God, but he was firm that they needed to exemplify their personal 
salvation in their day-to-day actions.  Becoming a “born-again” Christian was not a one-
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off event; it took consistent action and resolve on the part of the individual.   The 
scriptures, he argued, taught that Christians had to be “converted” and continuously 
“regenerated” or else one had “sadly backslidden” and needed “to be restored.”801  
Although BBI limited the personal action of its students, the very existence of these rules 
reflected the primacy that Hildebrand placed on the power of individual action to both 
ensure and imperil salvation.   
Evangelism was central to BBI’s existence, but early attempts to minister to local schools 
were unsuccessful.  On a practical level, Briercrest’s rural location in south-central 
Saskatchewan restricted its students’ ability to spread the gospel.  Saskatchewan had yet 
to build an all-weather road system, limiting BBI’s reach in the winter months to a small 
radius around the Briercrest.802  More importantly, BBI’s school visits also drew 
attention and opposition from the local community who believed BBI was “splitting” the 
local United Church.803  The anti-Catholic rhetoric of the KKK and the election of J.T.M. 
Anderson’s Conservatives in 1929 compounded this antagonism.804  Once in office, 
Anderson’s first major legislative activities included banning the display of religious 
emblems and the instruction by religious officials in the province’s public schools.805  
Although BBI was not Catholic, its opposition to the status quo offered by mainstream 
Protestantism posed a similar threat.806  In 1937, school trustees used the precedent set by 
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the Anderson Government and voted to ban BBI from local public schools.807  Not 
willing to abandon BBI’s emphasis on rural evangelism, BBI had to find a way to 
overcome both its geographic isolation as well as the local opposition its efforts 
generated. 
Radio offered the solution to both issues.  As Hildebrand indicated, radio allowed BBI to 
“go over the heads of our objectors.”808  This is not to say, however, that religious 
broadcasts failed to generate opposition.  In 1928, for example, hostility to the featuring 
of the Klan’s brand of fundamentalism on a radio station run by the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
in Saskatoon led to the withdrawal of the station’s broadcast license.809  Although the 
potential for opposition remained if broadcasts became too controversial, radio was much 
less antagonistic than direct school visits.  By shifting the location of BBI’s evangelism 
from the public sphere to the privacy of people’s homes, radio lessened BBI’s threat to 
the religious status quo of the province’s schools.810  More importantly, radio also had 
the potential to expand the reach of BBI’s ministry.  Whereas school visits were restricted 
to a small radius around Briercrest, the only limits to a radio ministry were the number of 
people that owned a receiver and were willing to tune in.  By 1929, Saskatchewan was 
home to eleven commercial stations and had sold over 27,000 receiving licenses, the third 
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highest in Canada.811  Even if BBI reached only a fraction of the households that owned 
radios, the number of potential converts was significant.   
In adopting a radio ministry, BBI experimented with a medium which had already proved 
its value for evangelization.  In the early 1920s, religious broadcasts on the Canadian 
Prairies were limited to mainline Protestant churches that transmitted regular Sunday 
services over the air.812  This changed in 1925 when William Aberhart’s Back to the 
Bible Hour began engaging directly with its radio audience.  By designing programs 
specifically for his radio listeners, Aberhart transformed them from outsiders into active 
participants in his ministry.  His success was not lost on other fundamentalists, and 
similar radio ministries began to appear across the West.813  BBI’s radio ministry—The 
Young People’s Hour—was based on the Aberhart model.  The program featured the BBI 
choir singing gospel songs and students conducting mock classroom lessons, with 
broadcasts typically ending with a sermon from Hildebrand.814 
Despite these similarities, Hildebrand’s sermons diverged from Aberhart’s in their 
characteristic lack of militancy.  For Aberhart, the adoption of radio was an extension of 
his militant position in the fundamentalist-modernist debate.  As one observer noted, 
Aberhart “made some very bitter remarks” and was “stirring up all the trouble” he 
could.815  Hildebrand avoided this controversy, believing that militancy would detract 
from BBI’s evangelical mission.  The Young People’s Hour’s goal was not to defend 
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fundamentalism, but to explain it and lead non-believers to Christ.  Key theological 
concepts were not up for debate.   
Fundamentalist positions were introduced as a set of facts which, when accepted, would 
allow people to find their own salvation.  The foundation of Hildebrand’s Christianity 
remained an inerrant Bible, but he did not use this position to attack modernism in the 
same way as Aberhart.  “The Gospel,” he told his listeners, “is…not a new law.  It is not 
a code of morals and ethics.  It is not a creed to be accepted.  It is not a system of religion 
to be adhered to…It is a divinely given message concerning a divine Person, the Son of 
God, Jesus Christ our Lord.”816  Similarly, Hildebrand’s fundamentalism led him to 
believe that the basis of modern society was corrupted by sin:   
Sin has blasted and blighted every noble flower that would have bloomed 
in moral happiness.  Homes are broken, families are separated, children 
are left destitute, characters are degraded, and sorrow or sweat marks 
every brow.  We cannot fathom the crimes committed in this world nor the 
sorrows that have swept across it since the first advent of sin.  Hearts are 
broken--lives are bleeding.  This world has become not only a place of 
tears, yea, a field of blood!817 
Rather than rail against the leading signs of modernity, Hildebrand presented his listeners 
with a simple choice that they had to make of their own free will.  “One way or another,” 
he cautioned, “you must have God and His Christ, or you must be the servants of Satan.  
The power of God must hold you or sin will bind you; Heaven must win you and attract 
you to itself, or hell will mark you for its own, and downward you will descent[sic].”818  
People could either accept they were living in sin and be saved, or deny the fact and be 
damned.  It was up to them to choose. 
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Despite the different focus on militancy, Hildebrand’s radio ministry was just as popular 
as Aberhart’s.  From the outset, BBI was inundated with letters and donations from 
listeners across Saskatchewan who were moved by the program and its offer of salvation 
from their worldly concerns.819  In 1938, BBI joined with the Prairie Bible Institute in 
Three Hills, Alberta in sponsoring an evangelistic campaign by the noted American 
evangelist Oscar Lowry.820  For six weeks, Lowry held daily revival meetings in Moose 
Jaw which BBI broadcast across the province.  Prairie Bible Institute’s Prairie Pastor 
reported on the “wonderful soul winning campaign” in Saskatchewan, noting that over 
2,500 letters were received and “hundreds of conversions were reported.”821  Buoyed by 
this success, BBI further expanded the Young People’s Hour in 1945, making it Canada’s 
first coast-to-coast gospel program, broadcasting on 22 stations from Vancouver, B.C. to 
Sydney, Nova Scotia.822   
BBI used this popularity to expand its influence amongst Saskatchewan’s fundamentalist 
Christians.  Enrollment in the Bible school grew exponentially.  From an initial class of 
eleven students in 1935, BBI grew to over one hundred in its first decade, prompting the 
institute to move to a decommissioned British Commonwealth Air Training Plan base 
near the village of Caron in 1946.  At this new “Caronport” campus, BBI expanded its 
offerings to include a high school, general store, post office, and an elementary school.823   
Its expansion, however, came at the expense of other more denominationally-based 
schools.  Of the over thirty Bible schools that opened in Saskatchewan prior to 1940, only 
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eleven were still in operation by the mid-1950s.824  At the same time that other schools 
were closing, Briercrest experienced unprecedented prosperity, transforming it into the 
central force in Saskatchewan fundamentalism. 
While fundamentalists warred against their liberal counterparts, the Catholic Church 
underwent a similar struggle as it sought to reassert its primacy in the secular world by 
adopting an anti-modernist outlook.  Throughout the nineteenth century, movements 
within the church began experimenting with theological modernism and biblical criticism 
in an effort to reconcile Catholicism with modernity.  Rather than accept the new 
situation as the status quo, however, the Papacy responded by reasserting its own 
authority through anti-modernism and biblical orthodoxy.825  In the 1879 encyclical 
Aeterni Patris, Pope Leo XIII outlined his belief that doctrinal relativism and biblical 
criticism had divorced philosophy from faith, led to the rise of secularism, and threatened 
to undermine the very foundations of Catholic belief.  Modernists, Leo argued, presumed 
that dogma and belief were historically contingent, and weakened the church through 
their calls for ecclesiastical reform.  Leo maintained that reason without faith undermined 
the supernatural basis of Catholicism and led people away from God.  Modernist 
writings, therefore, gave rise to “false conclusions” about the nature of man, the state, and 
the divine.826  In response, Leo proposed to return to the teachings of the Scholastics—
specifically those of St. Thomas Aquinas.  As one observer notes, Leo hoped that 
“philosophical renewal…would lead to social and political renewal.”827  Leo believed 
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that a return to the teachings of the Church’s fathers would reconcile reason with faith, as 
well as offer answers to modernity’s ills, thus preserving Catholicism’s relevance and 
active guidance within “Christian society.”828   
Unlike fundamentalism, which remained outside of the Protestant mainstream, this neo-
scholastic movement emerged as the dominant expression of Roman Catholic theology.  
Following the release of Aeterni Patris, neo-scholasticism and the study of the writings of 
St. Thomas Aquinas—known as Thomism—quickly spread throughout Catholic 
universities, both in Europe and North America.829  From this base, neo-scholastics 
emphasized a “perennial philosophy” founded on the belief that the world “was 
essentially static, not dynamic or developing.”  Central to this was the concept of natural 
law, the belief that the universe was a divinely “ordered hierarchy of being.”830  Natural 
law held that, just as humans use reason to accept the presence of the divine, the same 
rational mind also prescribes a set of actions which are moral and just.   
Neo-scholasticism attacked modernity over its propensity to cause humans to act in ways 
contrary to the natural law that God had ordained.  They denounced secular humanism 
for divorcing humans from divine inspiration.  Instead, neo-scholastics offered a vision of 
integral humanism—otherwise known as authentic or natural humanism—which argued 
that a “true” person existed as both a material and spiritual being.831  Neo-scholastics 
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fostered a philosophy which downplayed doctrinal relativism, defended Catholic 
orthodoxy, and privileged an all-knowing and all-powerful God.  However, this neo-
scholasticism was not as stridently anti-modern as fundamentalism, calling instead for a 
“prudent adaptation to the modern world.”832  Neo-scholasticism attempted to keep the 
Church relevant in the modern world by rejecting the excesses of modernity and 
secularism, all while accommodating the Church to modern political, social, and 
economic realities.833 
Just as BBI emerged as a part of Christian fundamentalism’s anti-modernism, the 
Catholic Church’s neo-scholasticism influenced Notre Dame’s development.  The college 
began modestly.  In 1920 the Sisters of St. Louis in the rural village of Wilcox, located 
forty kilometers south of Regina and approximately the same distance east of Briercrest, 
established a convent school for local children.  The college, and its Thomist focus, grew 
out of the activities of its long-serving president, Father Athol Murray.  Murray was born 
in Toronto in 1892 to a life of wealth and privilege.  Murray’s father made his fortune as 
a carpet manufacturer, was a founding member of the Argonauts Rowing Club, and 
served as the honorary secretary-treasurer of the Royal Ontario College of Art.  The 
family settled in the Rosedale area of Toronto and spent the summers vacationing on the 
Saint Lawrence River.  Murray looked back on this time fondly, but the untimely death of 
his mother in 1896 threw this idyllic life into turmoil.  Unable to care for his young 
family, Murray’s father sent him to live with an aunt before shuffling him through a 
series of boarding schools.  Murray’s mother had been a devout Catholic, and his father 
ensured that Murray would receive a Catholic education.  At eight years old, Murray 
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spent a year studying under the Jesuits at Loyola College in Montreal, followed by two 
years at St. Michael’s in Toronto before enrolling for the next ten years at the French 
language St. Hyacinthe near Quebec City.  Following high school, Murray completed an 
undergraduate degree at Laval University.  Initially interested in a journalism career, 
Murray returned to Toronto after graduation and worked for the Toronto Star and as a 
law clerk before entering the St. Augustine Seminary in Toronto.834 
This classical French-Catholic education had a profound effect on Murray’s 
understanding of the world.  Both Laval and St. Hyacinthe were deeply involved in the 
neo-scholastic revival and provided Murray with the desire to bridge faith with reason.835  
True education, Murray argued, requires each student to “grasp, not just with faith, but 
with rational reason and full certitude, the existence of God.”836  This education also 
convinced Murray of the necessity of Catholic activism.  Catholic schools, he argued, had 
the “lofty and proud responsibility” of showing “the world the product of true Christian 
education.”837   It was not enough to learn about Thomism and the natural law; students 
had to use scholastic philosophy to guide their everyday lives and better their society. 
Murray’s time in Quebec not only left him fluently bilingual, but also instilled in him an 
appreciation for Canada’s racial heritage.  “There is nothing better in the world,” Murray 
argued, than a “good solid French Canadian Catholic.”838  Yet, Murray also believed that 
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French Canadians were naturally unstable and prone to emotionalism.  Murray attributed 
the rise of the KKK in Saskatchewan, for example, as a response to the “childish 
indiscretions and effervescences perpetrated by French Canadians themselves.”839  
Although Murray respected Quebec for its maintenance of Catholic faith, he also 
believed that the British influence after the Conquest was necessary to create a successful 
and prosperous nation.  The British tradition, he argued, “is quite literally something far, 
far more than a mere abstraction, than an idealism.  It represents that splendid discipline 
of ‘reality’, of ‘authority’, of ‘Almighty God’ that makes for law and order and has 
shaped what we freedom loving people know as our culture and civilization.”840    
Murray’s appreciation for this British tradition directly influenced his stance on the racial 
and linguistic makeup of Canada’s Catholic Church.  Quebec clergy had traditionally 
dominated the Canadian church and its expansion onto the Prairies.  According to 
Raymond Huel, the Quebec-dominated ecclesiastical hierarchy jealously guarded their 
position.841  For English-speaking Catholics, especially the sizeable number of Irish, 
Quebec’s control was intolerable.  This division was on full display at the Twenty-First 
International Eucharistic Congress held in Montreal in the fall of 1910.  During the 
proceedings, the Archbishop of Westminster argued that, although Catholics owed a great 
debt to Quebec for safeguarding Canada’s Catholic heritage, the future of the Church in 
Canada was English.  Henri Bourassa, in contrast, noted that three hundred years of 
shared history in North America intrinsically linked the Catholic Church and Quebec 
society. 842  The conference did not settle the language question, but it did have a 
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significant impact on a young Murray whom the Toronto World commissioned to report 
on the conference.843  Upon returning to Toronto, Murray dedicated himself to promoting 
British influence within the Catholic church.  Murray decided to study at St. Augustine’s 
Seminary in Toronto, a newly-formed English-language seminary, and spend his career 
championing the Catholic Church as a beacon of British values on the Prairies.   
The French-English division within the Catholic Church pushed Murray to move to 
Saskatchewan in 1923.  Formed in 1911, the Archdiocese of Regina was caught within 
the bitter French-English divide affecting Catholic communities across the Prairies.844  A 
census conducted at the diocese’s creation found that of 73 clergymen, 54 were from 
Quebec.845  This Quebec majority trained in a theological and cultural milieu that held 
the French language as inseparable from Canada’s Catholic Church and refused any 
concessions to their English counterparts.  In contrast, English Catholics believed the 
only way to assimilate the French, German, and Polish immigrants into a single religious 
community was to privilege the English language.   
The Quebec clergy won an initial victory, confirming Oliver Mathieu, a French-Canadian 
Catholic and rector of Laval University, as the diocese’s first bishop in 1911.  It was, 
however, a losing battle.  Bishop Mathieu found that his appointment did little to quell 
the English-French tensions within his diocese and borrowed Murray from the 
Archdiocese of Toronto to act as his chancellor and appease the English factions.  Over 
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the next four years, Murray and Mathieu developed a strong relationship.  When Mathieu 
became increasingly ill in 1927, the French clergy, still a majority in Regina, actively 
campaigned for a French bishop to replace him upon his death.  For Murray, another 
Quebec bishop “would be a disaster,” as it would only serve to increase Catholic 
sectarianism and weaken Catholics’ ability to lead in modern society.846  Murray actively 
opposed the clergy’s plans.  The French-speaking priests responded by attempting to 
force Murray back to his home diocese in Toronto.  Rather than leave the Prairies, 
Murray convinced Mathieu to appoint him to the Wilcox parish. 
Murray did not choose this parish by accident.  Wilcox’s rural location and convent 
school provided him with the necessary freedom to conduct an educational experiment 
which combined Murray’s neo-scholastic philosophy with his adoration of Canada’s 
British tradition.  Murray believed that the future of the Prairies would be English-
speaking and British.  He also feared that modern society was not preparing the 
province’s British youth for their future leadership roles.  Murray spoke often of the 
“fleeting idealism” of youth.  “If you catch it at the right moment,” he argued, “you can 
sweep it on to great achievement.”  Yet, if you did not catch this youthful idealism in 
time, “it goes into mediocrity.”847   
Murray’s experiences as Chancellor in Regina led him to this conclusion.  In 1923, 
church authorities caught a group of Protestant boys breaking into the cathedral.  Murray 
overruled the Quebec priests who wished to make an example of the boys, personally 
taking responsibility for their conduct.  Murray did not believe these boys were inherently 
delinquent.  Rather, modern society itself was to blame for this bad behaviour because it 
had failed to allow the boys to reach their full potential.  Murray decided that the boys 
needed structure and turned to sport as the vehicle to provide it.  For eight years, Murray 
organized the Regina Argos sports club, whose hockey, baseball, and lacrosse teams 
                                                 
846
 Quoted in Gorman, Pere Murray, 27. 
847




toured around the Prairies and eastern Canada.848  When he moved to Wilcox in 1927, 
several of his Argos followed with him, providing the nexus for his educational 
experiment. 
Whereas Hildebrand shaped BBI to train missionaries, Murray intended Notre Dame to 
prepare Saskatchewan’s future public leaders.  Murray initially operated Notre Dame as a 
preparatory high school for his Argos and local children who would take their post-
secondary studies elsewhere.  With the onset of the Great Depression, however, it was 
clear that students would no longer have the funds to continue their education elsewhere.  
Murray considered it a “tragedy” that the province’s youth, “just arriving on the threshold 
of life,” would find “every avenue closed to their initiative.”849  In response, Murray set 
out to create a university in Wilcox and sought affiliation with the University of 
Saskatchewan.  From its founding, the provincial university jealously guarded its degree-
granting monopoly, but reluctantly affiliated with several junior colleges, including the 
Jesuit led Campion College in Regina, allowing them to offer the first two years of 
university classes.  Murray hoped to gain the same recognition for Notre Dame but, after 
investigating the facilities available, the University of Saskatchewan refused Murray’s 
application.850  Undeterred, Murray turned to the University of Ottawa, then a Catholic 
University under papal charter that had a history of affiliating with smaller Catholic 
schools across Canada.851  After a brief period of struggle between Murray and the 
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recently appointed Bishop in Regina, James McGuigan, Notre Dame affiliated with the 
University of Ottawa in 1933.852     
Notre Dame’s affiliation with Ottawa provided legitimacy for the new school but Murray 
was clear that it would not alter his vision of a Catholic education.  Murray focused his 
students’ education towards developing leadership.  This could only be accomplished by 
building the character and values of his students through indoctrination into Catholic 
scholastic philosophy and instilling a firm belief in British individualism.  “Under the 
guidance of almighty God,” Murray noted, Notre Dame “may serve, in the generations to 
come, the highest interest of Saskatchewan…[by] arming youth with strength and 
suppleness of limb, with clarity of mind and depth of understanding, and with a spirit of 
true religion and high endeavour.”853  Murray was careful to point out that students were 
not born great.  A person made themselves great by stimulating their “intellect towards 
the understanding and acceptance of spiritual values.”854  His goal, therefore, was to 
transform the English-speaking youth of the Wilcox district—whom he termed “the finest 
element in the province” and the “best blood in Saskatchewan”—into the province’s 
“patrician class,” a “classe dirigeante.”855  Notre Dame would ensure that its students 
were “sufficiently spiritualised in vision to lift themselves out of group and position to 
lend help to the struggling ‘better influences.’”856  Under Murray’s vision, the Anglo 
elements in Saskatchewan would be given the education, confidence, and tools needed to 
fulfill Pope Leo’s vision of a traditional and hierarchical society, albeit one based on 
British values. 
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Notre Dame’s curriculum was focused towards building what Murray termed “free men.”  
This was not freedom solely in the liberal sense of the word.  Notre Dame’s students 
would use their classical education, Catholic theology, an understanding of the “natural 
law,” and an appreciation for British freedoms to live their lives with a sense of higher 
purpose, moral strength, and desire to lead.  Although the University of Ottawa set the 
curriculum along the lines of a classical liberal arts education, Murray maintained that his 
vision of “personal formation” would dictate the college’s operations.857  A university 
degree was important, but Murray’s main goal was to provide students with “a vision of 
greatness” that they could model their own lives after.858  Murray rooted this vision in the 
“thin red line” of the British tradition.   “Either the British scheme of things is false,” he 
noted, “and completely misrepresents the realities of human rights and values; or if it is 
true, its maintenance in this changing world must have supreme consequences.”859  
Through this education, students would be taught to “cherish freedom for himself, and for 
others, not just from concentration camps, but from ignorance and passion and 
prejudice.”860  Notre Dame students “should make a better friend, a better husband, a 
better father; free men do.  He will in short be better prepared to live; and when his hour 
comes, whether through illness or civil disaster, or in war, he will know better how to die; 
free men do.”861  This focus on creating “free men,” Murray argued, was unique in an 
age when “mass regimentation and formalism” threatened British civilization.862 
Murray’s opposition to “regimentation and formalism” was a product of his 
understanding of British freedoms.  For Murray, Britain left Canada a legacy of greatness 
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which rested on the values of “the Christ,” “the primacy of the human person,” and “the 
moral law—and truth and freedom.”863  To fulfill their destiny as leaders, the province’s 
youth needed to have a foundation in all three.  Murray was deeply concerned that the 
Depression posed a direct threat to the individualistic outlook which made Britain great.  
“The most wonderful creature on earth,” he argued, “is the individual man with a body 
and a soul.”864  Saskatchewan’s Anglo farmers, however, were being forced to “carry on 
in the condition of serfs.”865  The solution, therefore, rested in building “individuals 
instead of robots.”866  At Notre Dame, an observer noted, “a student must be an 
individual or he is nothing.”867  Unlike Hildebrand, who believed that depraved human 
nature required strict rules of behaviour, Murray believed that his student’s British 
heritage, combined with the natural law, provided his students with a moral compass 
from which they could guide themselves.  Murray limited rules and discipline to an 
absolute minimum.  Notre Dame’s education focused on “building character,” and the 
“only discipline worthwhile comes from the individual.” Murray was “opposed to 
regimentation” wherever possible.  “We want youngsters to develop without any 
compulsion or restriction,” Murray argued, “other than a sense of honor, and loyalty to 
God, to his creed, to the Padre, and to the gang.” 868   
Murray’s focus on promoting his student’s leadership and individualism was evident in 
the extraordinary emphasis he placed on athletics.  Beginning with the Argos in Regina, 
sports were central components of Murray’s educational system.  The school’s motto 
“Luctor et Emergo—Struggle and Emerge” and Notre Dame’s first crest, with crossed 
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hockey and lacrosse sticks, were designed to openly acknowledge Notre Dame as a 
sporting institution.869  For Murray, sport not only provided students with much needed 
structure, but it also instilled in youth the values of “honesty”, a “sense of fair play”, and 
a “desire for that perfection in performance which is attained only through untiring 
effort.”870  Sport was not about material reward.  Murry intended athletics to bring 
students closer to an understanding of the neo-scholastic goal of “authentic humanism” 
by forcing them to dedicate the entirety of their effort “toward a definite goal.”  Sport 
also ensured winners and losers.  For Murray, competition was where you saw “humanity 
at its best.”871 
The competitiveness that sport offered was at the basis of Murray’s educational 
experiment.  Murray maintained that he could prove his students’ superiority by pitting 
his Argos (later renamed the Hounds) against the best that Saskatchewan and Canada 
could offer.  As the novelist Rex Beach commented in 1937: “they prefer to play older, 
heavier, more famous teams than theirs,” with Murray “urging his load of assassins to lay 
off the lady-like capers and get down to the serious business of murder, mayhem, and 
sudden death.”872  Despite the obvious editorial flourish in Beach’s account, Murray’s 
desire to see his students and his school succeed in every facet, including sport, is clear.  
These competitions also provided Murray with the opportunity to spread his sense of 
British nationalism.  “My pet theory,” he wrote R.B. Bennett, “is that in a country of 
Canada’s immensity…it [is] sane policy to have Sport properly organized…in order that 
youngsters from Truro and Yamaska and Orilla to know well those of Yorkton and Taber 
and Westminster.”  Such a plan, Murray promised, “would bear fruit.”873  Murray’s 
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attempts to develop the Anglo youth of southern Saskatchewan into a leadership class 
was only the first step.  Introducing these students to other like-minded youth across 
Canada would strengthen British ties across the country and ensure the dominance of 
Canada’s British values. 
Education served as BBI and Notre Dame’s primary focus throughout the Great 
Depression.  Yet, despite the differences in outlook and theology between the two 
institutions and their founders, they espoused a remarkably similar ideological position.   
Both Murray and Hildebrand articulated a political outlook premised on the supremacy of 
the individual, a hierarchical vision for society, and a rejection of the collectivism 
inherent within socialism.  Although the schools did not communicate or co-operate with 
one another, the shared elements of their world view created a sizeable constituency that 
rejected the CCF’s vision for Saskatchewan and answer to the Great Depression. 
Unlike the egalitarianism of the CCF, both Hildebrand and Murray believed God’s plan 
for the world included social stratification.  Hildebrand’s eschatological belief in the 
imminent Apocalypse divided society into two distinct categories.  The Bible, he argued, 
“declares that there are just two classes—There are those who are lost and there are those 
who are saved.”874  This distinction was universal and absolute.  “God will not have his 
cleansed ones defiled by the presence of the unbelieving.”875  Murray’s Catholicism and 
understanding of British values resulted in a hierarchical understanding of society.  He 
did not believe that God created all people equally or endowed them with the same 
natural ability to succeed.  Rather, Murray maintained that God favoured British peoples.  
It took “twelve generations of progressive culture,” he argued, to perfect the British 
“breed.”  Yet, the danger existed that these youths would be “submerged in a flood of 
young yahoos…the off-spring of the peasantry of Europe.”876  Notre Dame’s main 
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purpose, therefore, was to instill in British youth a belief in their inherent superiority vis-
à-vis the European “flotsam of the prairie towns.”  Murray believed that the British youth 
at Notre Dame were the only ones who could “exercise far reaching influence in the 
coming ‘Canadian’ mentality of West.”  To this end, Murray lent “what orthodox 
nurturing” he was “capable of towards shaping that intellectual and ‘dirigeante’ 
ascendancy” of his Hounds.877 
Murray and Hildebrand viewed personal freedom as the means to an end.  Murray 
believed that creating his “classe dirigeante” would strengthen society’s British and 
spiritual makeup.  To this end, Murray encouraged his students to achieve their own 
personal greatness.  Yet, Murray also expected his Hounds to use their privileged position 
to sacrifice for the betterment of society.   Individual greatness without a sense of duty to 
the community divorced the individual from God.  “It took some ruminating,” Murray 
noted, “for me to realize that after all Christ means primarily self-sacrifice.”878  Murray 
expected his students’ success to glorify God.  Additionally, as members of the patrician 
class, Murray instructed his students to exemplify the meaning of British citizenship to 
their inferiors.  Citizenship had its benefits, but it also required sacrifice.  The British, 
Murray concluded, “are the only folk in the world who would sacrifice their everything 
for an altruistic motive.”879  Murray took great pride in the fact that sixty-seven of his 
students paid the supreme sacrifice during the Second World War.880   
Hildebrand, while less concerned about the betterment of the “corrupt” modern society, 
also expected self-sacrifice as a reflection of his followers’ individualism.  Just as it was 
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necessary to come to one’s own personal relationship with Jesus before the Apocalypse, 
born-again Christians had to use their conversion experience to help lead the lost to 
salvation.  When Christ returns, Hildebrand told his followers, “may he find us ready, 
serving Him one way or another, at the counter, in the workshop, on the farm, but above 
all taking time to teach your children, win the wayward, and everywhere tell out the 
sweet story of Jesus and his love till He comes.”881  Hildebrand did not expect this 
service to be easy, but their struggle and sacrifice would serve a greater purpose.  “If 
there is no conflict in a life,” Hildebrand argued, “we may well become suspicious and 
ask ourselves whether we are not living in a dishonourable peace, whether we are not 
being gradually overcome.”882  It did not matter how much sacrifice or ridicule 
Christians were forced to endure, their reward would come from the presence of the Lord.  
“True, it will not screen you from envy, from temptation, from slander and suffering,” 
Hildebrand conceded, “but it will give you victory through them all and a double portion 
of the Heavenly Father’s inheritance—His presence in blessing here below and your 
presence with Him blessing hereafter.”883  For Hildebrand, true Christians chose to suffer 
and give all for their faith. 
Murray and Hildebrand’s beliefs in the hierarchical nature of society and the primacy of 
the individual were foundational to their political outlooks.  Although both leaders came 
to these beliefs through different Christian theologies, the overlap in their political 
principles were clear.  Both men were deeply ideological, rejecting all forms of 
collectivism as the antithesis of Christian action and Canadian values.  Hildebrand 
disdained socialism and communism.  Much of this hostility can be traced to his youth in 
Russia during the revolution.  In his memoirs, Hildebrand recounted various instances of 
the barbarity of the Red Army.  These depravations were allowed because the “atheistic” 
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and “anti-Christian” communists turned the nation away from God.  The lesson, 
therefore, was that a nation without God was a nation based on sin; it was doomed.  Such 
a situation could happen in Canada, he concluded, should the nation “turn away from 
God” as well.884   
Hildebrand communicated this anti-socialism in his radio ministry as he subtly reminded 
his followers of Christianity’s incompatibility with socialism, the social gospel, and the 
provincial CCF.  Hildebrand argued that the collectivization promoted by socialism and 
communism was in direct opposition to Christ’s teachings.   “Anyone acquainted with 
Christianity on the one hand,” he noted, “and communism on the other hand does not 
speak of Christian Communism… Christianity works on the principle of 
consecration…Communism on the principle of coercion…Christianity is the communion 
of the saints, Communism is confiscation by the select.”885  Similarly, Hildebrand 
challenged the social gospel’s theory that it was possible to legislate a new moral order.  
These people, he argued, “hold the moral code with its precepts before the sinner and 
expect him to keep it, but such labour is in vain.”  Teaching “men to walk who have no 
feet is a hopeless task, and just such is an instruction in morals before grace implants in 
the heart a desire for holiness.”886  As the ills of modern society were a product of sin, it 
was folly to believe that a secular law could fix them. 
Murray’s opposition to socialism was equally unequivocal.  “Man feels cowed and 
crushed,” he argued, “before the roar of manned machines and the machine-like masses 
of the ‘socialists’--he shrinks from this mechanism of soul as did Pascal ‘before the 
silence of infinite spaces.’”887  The basis for this anti-socialist ideology lay in Murray’s 
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Catholicism.  Beginning in the late 19th century, the Catholic Church wholeheartedly 
denounced socialism as a political philosophy.888  In 1891, for instance, Pope Leo XIII 
decried socialists’ collectivization policies as being “emphatically unjust, for they would 
rob the lawful possessor, distort the functions of the state, and create utter confusion in 
the community.”889  Likewise, Pope Pius XI’s 1931 encyclical, “On Reconstruction of 
the Social Order,” condemned socialism’s secularism, concluding that “no one can be at 
the same time a good Catholic and a true socialist.”890  Murray took these condemnations 
to heart.  “Rome had spoken,” he recalled, “for Catholics there was no alternative” but to 
openly oppose any mention of socialism in Saskatchewan.891   
At the same time, Murray’s anti-socialism was also influenced by his interpretation of 
British individualism.  All the values inherent in the British tradition—including “free 
governments, family rights, individual liberty, property rights, [and] freedom of 
education”—stemmed from the initiative and freedom of individual people who dared “to 
be great.”  Socialism’s egalitarian focus negated these values by promoting a 
“mediocracy of thought.”  Socialists killed “the creative fire of the individual.”892  
Canada may be “the greatest country in the world,” Hildebrand warned, but socialism and 
collectivism threatened its “patrician touch; the patrician desire to be great.”893  Because 
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socialism formed the antithesis of what it meant to be British, Murray viewed it as an 
alien import into Saskatchewan.  Socialism was the product of the province’s “large 
foreign-born population” which lent “attractive ears to the ‘isms that have swept 
Europe.”894  As a result, Murray was resolutely opposed to socialism.  “It matters little 
under what forms, with what methods, weapons, words—enticing or menacing—and in 
what disguise communism hides itself,” he urged.  “No one can be excused for remaining 
with folded arms, bowed head and trembling knees.”895 
Despite the unequivocal nature of their shared anti-socialism, neither Hildebrand nor 
Murray entered politics directly.  They both opposed the rise of the CCF, but the 
existence of their schools took precedence.  Hildebrand feared that political participation 
would detract from his evangelistic mission.  Legislation did have a role to play.   “The 
devil gets people into all kinds of scrapes,” he noted.  “Therefore God instructed 
governments, parents, laws, restriction, and civil ordinances.  At least they help to tie the 
devil’s hands so that he does not rage up and down the earth.”896  At the same time, 
Hildebrand was convinced that legislation could not save society or lead people to Christ.  
“There is a tendency for us to get occupied with times and seasons and neglect our main 
business.  Legislation has its place, but God’s program to-day is not to propagate his 
word by legislation, but rather by evangelization.”897  This stance put Hildebrand at odds 
with William Aberhart in Alberta who used his fundamentalist ministry to promote his 
Social Credit Party.  In a letter to Aberhart in 1937, Hildebrand warned that many 
Christians thought Aberhart took “a step down” when he entered politics.  Because 
Hildebrand believed that sin produced Canada’s economic and social problems, he was 
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“confident that no new ism or political party” could have “any effect on the root cause of 
the disease.” Aberhart responded to this criticism by noting that he “wouldn’t give much 
for a Christianity that has no effect upon the environment of a person.”898  Aberhart 
believed that Social Credit reforms were necessary to ensure the individual freedom 
required for personal salvation.  Hildebrand did not consider politics a valid evangelistic 
tool and chose to remain non-partisan in his ministry. 
This decision to remain neutral was tested when Social Credit “invaded” Saskatchewan in 
1938.  Premier Aberhart initially believed that Social Credit would prove its worth to the 
rest of Canada by virtue of its successes in Alberta.899  When Prime Minister Mackenzie 
King disallowed Social Credit legislation in early 1938, however, Aberhart decided that 
Social Credit needed a regional powerbase to force Ottawa to back down.  A strong 
showing in the upcoming Saskatchewan election would do just that.  As he told a rally in 
Moose Jaw, “if Saskatchewan says so maybe the Dominion government will take 
heed.”900  Hildebrand’s fundamentalist constituency and Sinclair Whittaker’s background 
in politics made them perfect allies to help lead the charge.  Both men refused to take 
part.  Whittaker later recalled that, although he believed that Aberhart and his lieutenant, 
Ernest Manning, were “good Christians,” he was skeptical that political reforms were the 
answer to the Depression.901  Whittaker’s fundamentalist beliefs convinced him that 
modern society could not be saved.  After running as an independent candidate and losing 
in 1934, Whittaker largely abandoned politics for the remainder of his life.902  Hildebrand 
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was just as clear in his response.   “A truly honourable man,” he reminded his listeners, 
“is never an office-seeker.”903 
This does not mean that Hildebrand sat back as the CCF gathered strength.  Hildebrand’s 
anti-socialist attacks grew more overt in the early 1940s as the provincial CCF gained 
support.  In November 1943, he criticized the CCF’s plans for a guaranteed minimum 
income.  “You may give everybody ‘a living wage’ however extravagant his notions of a 
living wage may be,” he argued, “and the world will groan still, because you have not 
dealt with the root of all mischief.”904  The CCF’s policies repulsed Hildebrand because 
they provided charity to those who would not help themselves.  As he reminded his 
listeners, “Christianity does not only dole out alms to needy humanity.”  Rather, it heals 
humanity from sin so that it “can walk on its feet and earn its own living,” and help 
others do the same.905  Hildebrand disdained the CCF leaders, whose false message of 
creating a “New Jerusalem” only led people astray at the very moment their personal 
salvation was paramount.  Every so often “some new luminaries flash across the sky, 
professing to have the light,” but “time has eclipsed them all and they amounted to no 
more than a meteor flash that burns itself out by its own velocity.”906  For Hildebrand, 
the only time-tested and true salvation from the economic ravages of the Depression lay 
in a personal and individual relationship with Christ. 
Unlike Hildebrand, Murray did not have personal or theological qualms about 
partisanship.  The CCF’s socialism went against everything that Murray stood for.  
“Tommy Douglas is a wonderful guy and a grand fellow,” Murray noted, “but I abhor 
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and detest and with all my heart abjure, any suggestion of sympathy for his 
philosophy.”907  Nor was Murray alone in this sentiment.  In the lead up to the 1934 
election, the Archbishop of Regina, James McGuigan issued a pastoral letter declaring 
that all forms of socialism were entirely irreconcilable with the faith.  The Archbishop 
did not mention the CCF by name, but its applicability was clear.908  Murray believed 
that his opposition to the CCF was in accordance with both his own conscience and the 
Church’s teachings.  Shortly after the publication of McGuigan’s letter, it came to 
Murray’s attention that several Notre Dame students had joined Wilcox’s Young 
People’s CCF Club.  Murray gave the boys a choice.  Either they would immediately 
resign from the club, or face expulsion from Notre Dame and a potential ex-
communication.  “Notre Dame philosophy,” Murray recalled, will “not hear of Catholics 
professing socialism.”909   
Murray’s ecclesiastical superiors, in contrast, were much less willing to take a direct 
stand.  The CCF used Murray’s actions to attack the provincial Church’s anti-socialist 
position.  “We would like to know,” an open letter in the Leader-Post asked, “if this is to 
be the official attitude of the Roman Catholic toward the C.C.F. or is it merely an 
individual viewpoint.”910  Major James Coldwell, the first leader of the Saskatchewan 
CCF, also intervened on behalf of the Notre Dame students, calling on McGuigan to rein 
in Murray.  Although the Archbishop was equally opposed to socialism, his pastoral letter 
had carefully refrained from referring to the CCF by name.  Murray, in directly attacking 
the party, had crossed the line.  McGuigan feared such actions could spark a repeat of the 
KKK’s “fire of prejudice and campaign against the church,” and publicly condemned 
Murray.  “The Church,” he maintained, “has never favoured or disfavoured, approved or 
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condemned any political party.”911  McGuigan informed Murray in no uncertain terms 
that he was not to act politically.  “The welfare of God’s Church is concerned,” he 
warned, “and you must do absolutely nothing or say absolutely nothing that would make 
things more difficult and perhaps draw the Church into discussions which at this time 
might seem political no matter how good your intention.”912  McGuigan believed Murray 
was “a good priest,” but, fearing Murray’s “unbalanced judgement” and difficulty falling 
“in line with the ecclesiastical order of things,” followed up his reproach with a veiled 
threat. 913  In the same letter, McGuigan ridiculed Murray for referring to his “institution 
as a university,” but stated that he did not wish to discuss the matter at “this time.” 914  
The implication of this was clear.  Either Murray stopped making political trouble, or his 
educational experiment would come to a swift end.  Believing the long-term work of 
Notre Dame was more important than short-term politics, Murray acquiesced and did not 
publicly challenge the CCF until well after the end of the Second World War.  
Historians maintain that the Depression caused a general leftward radicalization in 
Saskatchewan as people responded to the crisis in capitalism.  The rise of the CCF lends 
weight to these assertions.  The ultimate success of the CCF, however, has overshadowed 
other reactions.  BBI and Notre Dame were part of a process wherein conservatives 
retrenched their faith in the power of individual action and British values in the face of 
the decade’s rising collectivism.  Murray and Hildebrand believed that the Depression 
was weakening people’s faith in the power of individual action.  They responded by 
articulating a hierarchical, individualistic, and anti-modern worldview.   
Unlike the situation in Alberta, where Aberhart used his popularity as a religious figure to 
fuel his political career, Murray and Hildebrand placed their school’s success ahead of 
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political success.  This does not mean that their ideology failed to impact Saskatchewan 
politics.  Murray and Hildebrand were unwilling to enter politics, but this does not signify 
a weakness for the ideology.  Political neutrality is not synonymous with weakness.  The 
success of these schools demonstrates that conservative values continued to animate 
portions of the population.  What this neutrality did mean, however, was that political 

















6 The Politics of Individualism: Political Realignment 
During the Great Depression, 1929-1938 
During the hot and dry summer of 1933, Sinclair Whittaker, the co- founder of BBI and 
then Conservative MLA for Moose Jaw County, organized a series of meetings with his 
constituents.  The Depression was devastating the area.  In 1933, over ninety percent of 
Whittaker’s constituents were on some form of relief.915  Whittaker, however, claimed 
that he had found a solution to their problems.  The panacea did not lie in a radical shift 
in economic policy or “social legislation,” as proposed that July in the CCF’s “Regina 
Manifesto.”  Instead, Whittaker borrowed from his fundamentalist background, informing 
his constituents of his spiritual awakening that “changed his outlook on life.”  The only 
solution to the “setbacks” the people were suffering came through their own personal 
initiative.  An individual’s salvation, Whittaker maintained, only came through a personal 
acceptance of the saving grace “offered by Christ in the Bible.”916  Whittaker did not call 
for government intervention or reforms to the capitalist system.  It was only an individual 
relationship with Jesus Christ that provided true relief. 
No record exists as to how Whittaker’s constituents responded to his “solution,” but it 
speaks to how the Great Depression altered the province’s political discourse.  The “new 
politics” of the Depression era replaced earlier discussions of wheat marketing and 
separate schools with questions of debt moratorium and the utility of the capitalist 
system.  The issues in both the 1934 and 1938 elections, Andrew Milnor notes, “were 
primarily rooted in the Depression, and were the product of debates on solutions to the 
provincial economic crisis.”917  On the one hand, the 1930s witnessed radical challenges 
to the status quo.  The central component of this new society lay in the dismantling of the 
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capitalist system.  “No C.C.F. Government will rest content,” the Regina Manifesto 
declared, “until it has eradicated capitalism and put into operation the full programme of 
socialized planning.”918  In contrast, conservatives emphasized individualism and 
personal responsibility in the face of a growing collectivist and socialist trend.  Both 
Notre Dame and BBI responded to the Depression by articulating a conservative 
worldview that retrenched traditional values.  Social Credit joined in this crusade, 
offering reforms to the capitalist system, not its eradication.  As Clark Banack notes, 
“protecting individual freedom” was central to William Aberhart and Ernest Manning’s 
“support for social credit economics in general and their passage of social democratic 
legislation in particular in the heat of the Depression.”919 
Historians, however, have presented Saskatchewan’s Depression-era politics as the story 
of the remarkable rise of the CCF and its Social Gospel inspired-message of reform and 
co-operation.  “What began in the Great Depression as an agrarian movement for 
fundamental social, political and economic change,” J.F. Conway argues, 
“metamorphosed into the natural governing party of Saskatchewan with a record of 
success to rival that of the Liberal Party.”920  Social Credit may have swept to power in 
Alberta in 1935, but historians largely confine its role in Saskatchewan politics to a 
potential foil for the CCF, a final obstacle to overcome before they successfully 
challenged the Liberals in 1944.921  Likewise, the conservative response to the 
Depression is only discussed as far as it influenced the CCF’s development.   David 
Smith, for example, argues that the Conservative victory in 1929 began a “shift in 
electoral alignments” that culminated in “the displacement of all opposition parties by the 
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CCF.”  The “threat to the Liberals,” he concluded, “required only time to be realized.”922  
As a result, historians have underestimated the strength of a conservative individualist 
worldview, even in the face of unprecedented hardship.  The fact that Conservatives 
adhered to a traditional individualism and belief in the sanctity of the capitalist system is 
portrayed as “reactionary” and evidence of the “failure to cope effectively.”923  
Radicalism, not conservatism, is viewed as the natural response to the Great 
Depression.924   
The CCF’s rise and the growing popularity of its vision of a “co-operative 
commonwealth” was a central element of Saskatchewan politics.  Yet, it was only part of 
the story.  This chapter examines conservative influence on the politics of the Great 
Depression.  The CCF emerged in 1932, championing a radical reinterpretation of 
property rights, the role of the state, and the nature of the economy.  Conservatives 
viewed the CCF’s “co-operative commonwealth” as the antithesis to individual values 
and aggressively opposed the new party.  This hostility made conservatives receptive to 
political appeals that privileged traditional values, but the CCF’s rising popularity 
demonstrated the strength of a radical solution to the “crisis in capitalism.”  This 
polarization ushered in a period of political realignment as the Conservative and Liberal 
Parties divided between an individualist and collective focus.  Anderson’s 1929 victory 
was predicated on appeals to a conservative individualism.  Their resounding defeat in 
1934, however, prompted the party to abandon this individualist focus.  It was a decision 
that led to internal divisions and electoral irrelevance.  The party failed to elect a single 
candidate in both the 1934 and 1938 elections.  The Liberals, in contrast, repositioned 
themselves as the champion of Saskatchewan’s traditional individualism.  The Liberals 
returned to office in 1934 and, under William Patterson’s leadership, adopted a platform 
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and rhetoric that framed the party as the protector of the province’s personal freedoms.  
Patterson’s tactics allowed the Liberals to defeat the CCF, steal electoral support from the 
Conservatives, and repel William Aberhart’s Social Credit “invasion.”  Far from a 
“reactionary” response to the CCF, conservatives’ continued adherence to their 
individualist outlook shaped Saskatchewan’s Depression-era politics 
Anderson won the 1929 election by framing a message that forged independent farmers 
and British nativists into a single coalition.  The co-operative government spent its first 
year in office rewarding this support.  Anderson campaigned on the premise that Liberal 
corruption undermined the voters’ personal freedom.  Once in office, the Premier moved 
quickly to “smash the Gardiner Machine.”    In late 1929 the government tasked M.J. 
Coldwell, then a member of the Progressive Association executive, with recommending 
changes to the Civil Service Act to prevent its use for political purposes.  Under 
Coldwell’s guidance, the updated legislation restricted the government’s ability to 
interfere with appointments below the deputy minister level.  Competitive examinations 
overseen by a powerful, but non-partisan, Public Service Commission would fill all other 
positions.925  The government also hoped to perpetuate voters’ anger against the Liberal 
machine.  In early 1930, James Bryant launched a Royal Commission to investigate the 
allegations raised during the election.  The subsequent investigation, Peter Russell notes, 
uncovered “a shocking record of corruption and political favouritism.”926  Unlike the 
Bradshaw charges, the Bryant Commission found Liberal cabinet ministers culpable in 
Liberal corruption.927  Anderson’s efforts to eliminate the basis of the Liberal machine 
while using the powers of government to investigate the Gardiner machine’s past abuses 
were designed to reinforce conservative voters’ faith in the new government.   
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The same strategy figured prominently in Anderson’s approach to religious and racial 
issues that figured prominently in the 1929 campaign.  In 1930 the government amended 
the School Act to forbid the display of any religious emblem and the wearing of religious 
garb in the province’s public schools.  Further amendments in 1931 removed French 
instruction in the first grade and the half-hour of permitted religious instruction.  The 
government also required all candidates for trustees to be able to read and write in 
English.  As Keith McLeod notes, “the rout was virtually complete.”928  Anderson did 
not interfere with the operation of Saskatchewan’s separate schools, but he did fulfill his 
promise to the province’s nativists that his government would protect Saskatchewan’s 
non-sectarian public schools.  Klansmen voiced their appreciation by passing a resolution 
“in hearty accord” with the measure, congratulating “the Premier on his stand.”929 
Anderson’s early actions demonstrated his desire to reinforce his government’s 
connection with Saskatchewan conservatives, but it was not the only focus.  The co-
operative government contained a mix of Conservatives, Progressives, and Independents 
and the Premier was aware of the need to placate the progressive elements within his 
coalition.  The government created the province’s first Cancer Commission and 
established a provincially-funded School for the Deaf.  In addition to limiting French and 
Catholic influence in the province’s schools, Anderson created an early system of 
teachers’ pensions and passed measures to place the entire educational system outside the 
control of party politics.  Labour relations also featured prominently as the government 
legislated on workplace safety and increased workers’ compensation and the minimum 
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wage. 930  It was a “productive” government, Ward and Smith note, that “in happier 
circumstances might well have left an enviable record.”931 
Economic and environmental deprivation forced Anderson to abandon his earlier focus 
and crippled his coalition.  Between 1929 and 1931, drought conditions were confined to 
the south of the province.  The entire province experienced the dramatic drop in wheat 
prices, but Anderson believed that the crisis was manageable.  The government’s first 
throne speech, for example, downplayed the seriousness of the economic and 
environmental conditions the province faced.  “Adverse climatic conditions” were 
wreaking havoc “in certain sections of our province,” Anderson conceded, adding that he 
was confident the “ever-present spirit of optimism among our people…still prevails.”932   
The government believed the crisis was temporary and focused its efforts on providing ad 
hoc relief through existing government departments.  The hardest hit municipalities 
received direct aid, cash advances helped farmers continue their operations through crop 
failures, and the Wheat Pool was saved from bankruptcy by guaranteeing bonds to cover 
its overpayment.933  In 1931, however, the drought conditions spread across the entirety 
of the province’s agricultural region.  With an almost universal crop failure, Anderson 
was forced to assure the people that “no one will starve.”934  It was clear that the 
catastrophe would not be temporary.   
Anderson’s declaration pledged the government to an interventionist policy.  The scope 
of relief was such that ad hoc arrangements were no longer able to keep up with demand 
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for aid or administer it efficiently.  In September 1931, the government centralized relief 
under a single agency, the Saskatchewan Relief Commission.  Under the chairmanship of 
Henry Black, a well-respected businessman and former mayor of Regina, the commission 
was responsible for the administration of all aid in the province, including the supply of 
food, heating fuel, feed, fodder, seed grain, medical and dental aid, the maintenance of 
the province’s schools, and supplementing teacher’s salaries.  With a budget in the 
millions of dollars, the Relief Commission was a powerful government agency. 935  
However, this interventionism did not signify a weakening in society’s individualistic 
ethic.  The commission considered its aid a loan and required recipients to sign 
promissory notes.  There existed a “frequently expressed opinion,” the commission 
reported, “that to take an obligation from the recipient for repayment of the cost of 
assistance received would enable him to maintain his self-respect.”936  Despite 
unprecedented hardships and an increasingly interventionist government, conservatives 
feared that aid would undermine traditional values of self-reliance and the individualist 
work ethic.  Treating relief as loans reassured conservatives that the government would 
not undermine society’s individualism.   
Anderson was less inclined to reassure conservatives that his government would practice 
fiscal restraint.  The co-operative government initially borrowed heavily to maintain its 
pre-Depression expenditure levels and fund the province’s share of relief costs.  “Money 
should be spent freely on public works,” the party whip explained.  “The time for a 
government to retrench, is when prosperity returned, for then private interests will once 
more be in a position to embark on large expenditures.”937  Not all members of 
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Anderson’s coalition were content with the reliance on debt financing.  In early 1931, 
Sinclair Whittaker proposed a motion calling for a drastic reduction in civil servant and 
MLA salaries.  “Spending one’s way to prosperity,” he reasoned, “is the cause of our 
troubles today.”938  Whittaker’s resolution was soundly defeated, but it speaks to the 
growing tensions within the Anderson coalition.  Progressive forces were willing to 
abandon fiscal conservatism in the hopes of maintaining government services.  
Conservatives, in contrast, considered the reliance on debt financing to pose as great a 
threat to society’s traditional values of self reliance as the provision of relief.   
The conservative view won out.  By 1932, the provincial government was facing 
bankruptcy.  Revenue from sales taxes and licensing fees had plummeted while demands 
on relief continued to grow.  Saskatchewan was forced to turn increasingly towards 
financial support from Ottawa and central Canadian financiers to make up the difference.   
At the federal level, Conservative Prime Minister R.B. Bennett responded to the growing 
federal deficit by “slashing expenditures” and “relentlessly” raising taxes.939  The Prime 
Minister expected Anderson to follow the same financial “orthodoxy” as a prerequisite of 
continued financial aid.  Beginning in the 1932 legislative session, what Russell terms the 
“retrenchment session,” the government instituted a collective reduction in civil service 
salaries, cut funding to the farm loan board and highway departments, increased the 
gasoline tax, and instituted the province’s first income tax.  Even this was not enough.  In 
1933, Anderson cut school grants in half, eliminated maternity grants, and dramatically 
decreased mothers’ allowances and old-age pensions.940  These measures ensured 
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Bennett’s continued goodwill, but they did little to stop the bleeding.  Between 1929 and 
1934, the provincial debt skyrocketed from $65,000,000 to $145,000,000.941 
Tensions between progressives and conservatives were also apparent in Anderson’s 
handling of the farmers’ debt.  Since the settlement period, Saskatchewan was a debtor 
province.  Farmers relied on credit to provide the capital necessary to expand and 
improve their holdings.  Widespread crop failures and depressed wheat prices made it 
impossible for farmers to meet their payments.  Provincial officials estimated that interest 
payments alone constituted two-thirds of crops harvested after 1930.942  Tens of 
thousands of farmers faced the real prospect of losing their farms to foreclosure and 
urged Anderson to bring forward a program of debt moratorium or adjustment. 
Anderson’s response was complicated by conservative opposition to any debt solution 
that undermined personal responsibility.  Questions of debt moratorium and adjustment 
were not new during the Depression.  Dunning faced a similar, albeit less severe, debt 
crisis in the early 1920s.  He responded by reaffirming his government’s stance that all 
debtors were required to honour agreements they had entered of their own free will.  
Anderson initially followed the same strategy.  The government urged the use of 
voluntary conciliatory boards that negotiated a postponement of payments until 
conditions improved.  As a stopgap measure, the legislation did nothing to treat the 
underlying debt and allowed for a continuation of interest charges against the principal.  
Farmers could postpone their payments but doing so only put them further into arrears.  
As the Depression deepened, an increasing number of farmers faced bankruptcy.   
Anderson responded to the worsening conditions by abandoning his government’s earlier 
adhesion to individualistic ideals.  Amendments in 1932 gave the province’s conciliatory 
boards the power to make the debt “reasonable” by overriding financial terms in the 
                                                 
941
 SAB, F65, Gardiner, X.II.33, “Facts (1934).” 
942
 G.E. Britnell, “Saskatchewan, 1930-1935,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 2, 




contracts and to declare individual moratoriums.  The 1933 Debt Adjustment Bill and the 
Bill for the Limitation of Civil Rights went even further requiring creditors to submit all 
debts to a newly established Debt Adjustment Board prior to legal action.  This board had 
the power to force the creditor to accept a renegotiated contract and moratorium.943   
The government justified the move as necessary to protect farmers’ freedoms and 
independence on the land.  “The effect of this act should be to restore the confidence of 
our people of this province to carry on,” the attorney general reasoned.  “They will 
acquire that confidence knowing that a fair adjustment of their debts added to, and 
compounded by factors they could not control, will be made…that as long as they 
continue their own efforts to work out their own livelihood and that of their families their 
homes are safe.”944  Anderson hoped that conservatives would accept that this 
infringement on individual responsibility was necessary for the greater good. 
Conservatives, however, were not convinced.  The Regina Daily Star, usually supportive 
of the Anderson government, worried about the outcome of undermining the sanctity of 
contracts.  Using the opportunity to attack the government’s controversial guarantee of 
the Wheat Pool’s overpayment, the newspaper questioned what would happen if the Pool 
decided not to pay its bills.945  Similarly, the province’s legal and business communities 
attacked the legislation for undermining the province’s traditional values  “From time 
immemorial,” the Saskatchewan Bar Association argued, “it has been a basic principle of 
British law that contractual rights, acquired for valuable consideration…will not be taken 
away by the Legislature.”946  The Liberal Party fueled this opposition.  Although the 
Liberals voted unanimously for the legislation, Gardiner noted that “he and many other 
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Liberals disagreed with the bill.”947  Similarly, the Leader-Post joined conservatives in 
attacking the legislation’s threat to individualist values.  “The old idea that there was a 
moral obligation to fulfill a contract or a bargain so long as it was humanly possible to do 
so has been put aside,” the paper editorialized.  “Every citizen who feels that he should 
escape from the terms of a contract is provided with machinery to make a battle to obtain 
amelioration.”948  Anderson believed that the debt legislation was the only way to deal 
with a worsening situation, but conservatives viewed it as a betrayal of the trust they had 
placed in the Premier.   
Anderson’s election was predicated on appeals to a conservative individualism, but he 
increasingly found himself forced to act against this ideology to combat the electorate’s 
growing radicalism.  Since the settlement period, Saskatchewan’s farmers divided over 
their understanding of the nature of the capitalist economy.  Conservative farmers, 
inspired by a belief in their own individualism, had used their position of power prior to 
the 1920s to promote a reform program designed to limit monopoly abuse, not transform 
the capitalist grain trade.  The province’s smaller farmers, in contrast, viewed the grain 
trade as fundamentally exploitative and pushed for the creation of the Wheat Pool and the 
amalgamation of the SGGA with the FU into the UFC(SS) in 1926.   By the onset of the 
Depression, the most radical elements of the former FU succeeded in taking control of 
the new organization.  Led by George Williams, an avowed socialist and  former FU 
organizer, these radicals self-identified as the agrarian movement’s “left wing” and 
increasingly pushed a socialist program within the UFC(SS) calling for “the abolition of 
the present competitive system of manufacture and public ownership and democratic 
operation of public utilities and natural resources.”949  In 1931, the left wing succeeded in 
bringing the UFC(SS) into politics on a platform calling for the nationalization of farm 
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land and the social ownership of production.  In 1932, the UFC(SS) aligned with the 
province’s fledgling Independent Labor Party to form the Farmer-Labor Group (FLG).  
The new party sent a delegation to the CCF’s organizational convention the same year, 
affiliating as the provincial wing of the national socialist movement.950 
Some historians have questioned the extent of the early party’s radicalism, but all agree 
that its land policy was on the extreme end of popular solutions to the province’s debt 
problem.951   The party’s “use-lease” scheme called for the abolition of private land 
holding.  Under the Torrens system, farmers possessed title to their land and could 
borrow against its value to fund their operations.952  It provided the farmer with needed 
capital, but the resulting debts were the reason that many faced the prospect of losing 
their farms to mortgage companies.  The FLG proposed to absorb famers’ debt through 
long-term, interest free bonds.  In return, the farmers would surrender title to their land to 
the government.  The government would then “lease” the land back to the farmers’ in 
perpetuity.  The system, a supporter noted, would protect the “land which we are 
supposed to own, but which we know is practically owned by the big mortgage 
companies…”953  The FLG’s radicalism resonated with farmers who viewed their 
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situation as hopeless.954   Anderson’s debt legislation gambled that conservatives were 
willing to accept a slight infringement on the sanctity of contracts if the alternative was 
the nationalization of their farms.   
It was a miscalculation.  Even this relative moderation earned the Premier enemies 
among the hardliners within his own party.  Calling themselves “True Blue 
Conservatives,” this faction attacked Anderson for abandoning conservative principles.  
Dr. D.S. Johnstone, president of the Saskatchewan Conservative Association between 
1930 and 1932, was the most vocal critic.  Johnstone believed Anderson’s policies were 
fundamentally undermining the people’s individualism.  “Someone has to have the 
courage to call a halt on paternalism,” he urged the 1932 Conservative convention, “just 
as soon as times approach normal once more.  The necessity for a self-reliant family unit 
was never more in evidence.”955  The “True Blue” opposition was indicative of an 
uncompromising adherence to a conservative individualism.  This was not a majority 
opinion.  The convention repudiated Johnstone’s remarks, reaffirming its confidence in 
Anderson’s leadership.  Yet, the presence of an unapologetic conservativism in the face 
of Anderson’s moderation demonstrated the conflicting political alignments of 
Depression-era Saskatchewan.  Anderson’s policies were in stark contrast with the CCF’s 
radicalism.  However, Anderson’s alienation of hardline conservatives meant that he 
could no longer stand as the primary defender of Saskatchewan’s individualist traditions.  
The Liberals also opposed the CCF’s radicalism and were happy to welcome disaffected 
conservatives into their ranks. 
These divisions were on full display during the 1934 election.  The election was fought 
between Conservatives, Liberals, and the FLG, but a clear divide emerged between 
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Farmer-Labour’s radicalism and the older parties’ moderation.956  The new party offered 
the most extreme solution to the farmers’ debt problem through its use-lease plan, but its 
challenge to traditional individualism did not end there.  Throughout the campaign, the 
FLG attacked the capitalist system as the cause of the Depression.  “The present 
economic crisis,” they argued, “is due to the inherent unsoundness of the Capitalist 
system, which is based on private ownership of resources and capitalistic control of 
production and distribution.”957  The solution, as the CCF manifesto noted, lay in 
replacing  
the present capitalist system, with its inherent injustice and inhumanity, by 
a social order from which the domination and exploitation of one class by 
another will be eliminated, in which economic planning will supersede 
unregulated private enterprise and competition, and in which genuine 
democratic self government, based on economic equality, will be 
possible.958  
 
FLG speakers were clear that the party stood for a socialist future.  In addition to its 
policy of use-lease, the FLG called for the “social ownership of all resources and 
machinery of wealth production” and “a planned system of social economy for the 
production, distribution and exchange of good [sic] and services.”  When questioned 
whether a “planned system of national economy” meant “socialism,” the party responded 
with a firm “yes.”959 
Faced with Farmer-Labor’s unabashed socialism, the Anderson government further 
moderated its platform.  If returned to office, Conservatives promised to “fully study” the 
                                                 
956
 In 1929 the Conservatives negotiated saw-offs to avoid three-way contests against the governing 
Liberals.  In 1934, in contrast, the three parties contested fifty-two of the province’s fifty-five seats. 
957
 SAB, F65, Gardiner, X.VI.3, Publications of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, “The 
Saskatchewan Farmer-Labor Group: Economic Policy (1933).” 
958
 SAB, F65, Gardiner, X.VI.2., “Manifesto and Program of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation 
(1933).” 
959
 UofS, GS01, Diefenbaker, Series II, Vol. 8, Reel M-6818, Co-operative Commonwealth Federation-




idea of hospitalization insurance, pressure the federal government to increase social 
welfare, implement a progressive taxation system “so that the burden will fall on those 
best able to pay,” and improve “working conditions and minimum wage for those 
engaged in commercial and industrial employment.”  The platform also abandoned the 
Conservatives’ earlier nativism, pledging to follow the BNA Act’s lead in all questions of 
language and religion.960  The Conservative Party embraced a progressive platform and 
severed its earlier affiliation with British nativists in an attempt to steal support from the 
FLG.   
These moves, however, were not a wholesale abandonment of conservative 
individualism.  Delegates reaffirmed their belief “in a social order which preserves liberty 
of action to the individual citizen and permits him to enjoy the fruits of his labour, and 
the private ownership of property, and in a form of Government designed to safeguard all 
the rights of the individual in this respect.”  In terms of land policy, the party 
differentiated itself from the FLG by qualifying who was entitled to aid.  All farmers 
were suffering, but protection would only be granted to “those who have established a 
right to this protection by their own efforts.”  Delegates also pledged a policy of fiscal 
conservatism and limited intervention, noting that “the credit of the individual citizen can 
best be restored only by lessening the requirements of the government…upon the 
resources of the public.”961  The Conservative Party’s updated platform reflected the 
divisions Anderson faced during the Depression.  The Premier believed that he needed to 
undermine the province’s increasing radicalism and retain the support of hardliners 
within his own party. 
                                                 
960
 UofS, GS01, Diefenbaker, Series II, Vol. 3, Reel M-6816, Conservative Party: Saskatchewan-
Conventions, 1933, “Minutes of the Saskatchewan Liberal Conservative Association, 11-12 October, 
1933.” 
961
 UofS, GS01, Diefenbaker, Series II, Vol. 3, Reel, M-6816, Conservative Party: Saskatchewan-




The Liberals also stressed the party’s progressivism during the contest.  As Ward and 
Smith note, Gardiner’s politics rested on the belief that “the Liberal party was the most 
effective instrument for good.”962  Liberalism’s central goal, Gardiner noted, “is the 
greatest good for the greatest number.”963  He was therefore deeply concerned by the 
rising popularity of the FLG’s radical reform program.  “It is well to remember,” he 
wrote to a supporter, “that the Liberal Party is the only socialistic party in Canada.”964  
The Liberals provided Saskatchewan with a progressive administration, including support 
for co-operative elevators, hail insurance, telephone service, maternity grants, and old-
age pensions.  “When a party is socialistic,” Gardiner argued, “it tries to bring all 
organizations in industry, finance, transportation, trade and commerce, labor and primary 
production as well as the public service to work in harmony for the common good.”  
Socialism, in contrast, sought state power “as a panacea to all our economic ills.”965   
Gardiner combated the FLG by stressing the Liberals’ reformist and progressive 
credentials.  In 1932, Gardiner called a Liberal convention to reaffirm his leadership and 
update the party’s platform.  In addition to the customary calls for lower tariffs and 
increased co-operation, the platform offered decreased taxes, increased crop insurance, a 
survey of the province’s debt problem, a non-partisan educational system, a national bank 
responsible for issuing currency, as well as increases to the minimum wage and 
unemployment insurance.966  The platform, Ward and Smith note, “reflected the 
Liberals’ paper response to the rising C.C.F.”967  It was also remarkably close in 
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substance to the Conservative Party.  Both parties attempted to steal the FLG’s support 
by offering a progressive solution to the Depression. 
This does not mean, however, that the Liberal and Conservative Parties ignored the 
province’s conservative voters.  Anderson’s actions in office weakened his party’s close 
association with individualist conservatives, leaving it an open question as to which party 
they would support going forward.  Both parties actively courted conservative voters by 
reaffirming their faith in society’s individualist values.  The “Socialistic state,” the 
Conservatives argued, undermined the individual effort.  Under the use-lease plan, a 
farmer “could never rise higher than he was, a tenant all his life, just where he started, 
with no initiative.  If the Government controlled production they would tell the farmer 
how much land he could own, how much he could put in crop, what stock he could have.  
Instead of being master he would be a servant obeying orders, whether arbitrary or not, 
all his life.”968    
The Conservatives, in contrast, stood for “a social order that preserved individual liberty 
of action to the individual citizen, permits him to enjoy the fruits of his labor, private 
ownership of property and safeguards the rights of the individual.”969  The Liberals were 
equally clear on their stand for individual values.  Farmer-Labor, they argued, stood for 
“serfdom…under the directorate of an omnipotent dictatorship.”  Far from protecting 
farmers’ liberty, the use-lease plan signaled a reversion to feudalism: 
It means that you have not developed one iota…from the state of the 
savage; it means that the people of Canada--and that includes you--have 
not the brains or the backbone to take such other steps as may be 
necessary to protect the masses from being exploited; it means that you 
and me and nearly ten millions more are ready to throw in the sponge and 
quit the fight to keep what we’ve got; it means that millions of free men 
are ready to acknowledge that they are buffalooed and busted, ready to 
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throw up their hands and quit; ready to relinquish hold on the ground 
gained after centuries of struggle.970 
Both Conservatives and Liberals shifted their platforms to the left to undermine the 
FLG’s growing support but their rhetoric throughout the campaign signified a 
competition for conservative voters.   
These competing focuses polarized the campaign between individualism and 
collectivism.  Anderson, in office since the beginning of the province’s troubles, had no 
choice but to run on his government’s record.  Adopting the motto “we have stood by 
you,” Conservative publications and speakers stressed the government’s positive record 
in handling the Depression.  As M.A. MacPherson explained: “We do not claim to be 
perfect; we do not claim we have made no mistakes; but we do claim we have done our 
honest best to deal with extraordinary problems in a most difficult period.”971  Increased 
taxes and decreased benefits were regrettable, Bryant added, but were necessary as “the 
suit had to be cut according to the cloth.”972  Conservatives believed that they had given 
the best possible service in the face of the Depression.973 
Central to this discussion was the assertion that the government had successfully 
protected the province’s individualist ethic.  In terms of debt adjustment, for example, the 
government maintained that their 1933 legislation alleviated a hopeless situation without 
undermining people’s self-reliance.  “The debtor has been relieved of crippling financial 
bondage,” the party argued, “and the creditor given assurance of the payment of his 
voluntarily reduced claim—and from a position, hopeless for both parties, has evolved a 
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mutually fair deal, well within their capacity to carry to success.”974  In contrast, the 
FLG’s use-lease sought a “repudiation” of farmers’ debts.  It constituted “class legislation 
of the worst kind, and most inequitable, unless it has provided also a converse power on 
behalf of the creditor.”975  The Conservatives realized that many voters did not 
sympathize with the “financial interests” but they maintained that the FLG oversimplified 
who constituted the interests.  “Mortgages…represent the savings of retired farmers and 
of parties who are dead, invested for the widows, orphans and the aged,” they noted.  
“The Farmer-Labor party says that they stand for humanity first.  If they do, they are 
thinking only of the debtor and not at all of the owner of the savings.”976  The FLG’s 
collectivism was based upon “visions and dreams,” not practical realities.977  “If such a 
group should come into power,” Anderson concluded, “all I can say is God help 
Saskatchewan and God help Canada.”978  The Conservatives’ opposition to collectivism 
differentiated the party from the FLG. 
At the same time, the party did little to separate itself from the Liberals in the competition 
for conservative voters.  Despite Anderson’s portrayal of the debt legislation as a 
protection for individual rights, hardliners increasingly turned to the Liberal Party as the 
defender of their values.  Johnstone, the leader of the “true blue” faction, spent the 
election campaigning for the Liberal Party.  “Beating the Grits is a noble pastime when 
done in an honorable way,” he argued.  “I can subscribe to that myself.  But sacrificing 
everything that is honourable and decent in public life to do it--that is different.”979  
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Anderson was also handicapped in this struggle for conservative voters by previous 
appeals to racial and religious tensions in the 1920s.  The province’s Catholics were 
largely opposed to the FLG’s socialism but would not forgive the Conservatives’ close 
association with the Orange Lodge and the KKK.  In 1928, Catholics warned Bennett that 
the party’s courting of British nativists had made it “practically impossible for a Catholic 
to support the Conservative party in this province.”980  Changes in the Conservative 
platform were not enough to negate the past.  Senator Arthur Marcotte, a French-
Canadian Conservative from Ponteix appointed by Bennett in 1931 to help rebuild 
Catholic support in Saskatchewan, did not step foot in the province during the 
campaign.981  The Liberals, in contrast, stood in opposition to the FLG’s collectivism and 
had spent decades developing inroads with the Catholic community.  Catholics 
reciprocated by remaining loyal to the Liberal Party.  Athol Murray, for example, wrote 
Gardiner shortly after the 1929 election noting his “humiliation” that the people of the 
province were “so susceptible to the crude cunning of sectarian agitation.”  Murray also 
expressed “deep, genuine pride” that Gardiner stood against “Klanism” even though 
“doing so was, without a shadow of doubt, the cause of” the Liberals’ defeat.982  The 
Liberals, in short, were winning the competition for conservative voters. 
Anderson realized this fact and focused on attacking the Gardiner machine, the same 
tactics that had proven successful in 1929.  Conservative speakers informed voters of the 
“hundreds of thousands of dollars” it cost the province “to maintain organizers for the 
Liberal party while that party was in power.”983   The government portrayed Liberals as 
more interested in partisan politics than seeing the province through the crisis.  Bryant 
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maintained that the Liberals sabotaged the Anderson government before leaving office.  
“James G. Gardiner and his ex-ministers are the poorest political sports in the history of 
Canada,” he proclaimed.  “Defeated at the polls after twenty-five years of Liberal rule in 
Saskatchewan, they do nothing but whine and have no hesitancy in violating the best 
precedents of honorable political practice.”984  The message was clear.  “The people of 
the province cannot afford to experiment with theoretical proposals in these days,” the 
Regina Daily Star argued, “nor allow themselves to get into the hands of a party which 
has been weighed in the balance and found wanting.”  Only returning the Anderson 
government to office would allow the province to focus on fighting the Depression and 
protect individual values.  Despite the government’s best efforts to tarnish the Liberals, 
conservative voters were unreceptive.  Under normal conditions, renewed evidence of 
Liberal corruption—especially the findings of the Bryant Commission—may have 
convinced voters to shun Gardiner.  Such charges had appealed directly to conservatives’ 
individualism in 1929.  The political atmosphere in 1934, however, had decidedly 
changed.  Voters wanted a solution to the present crisis; they did not care about past 
corruption.     
Gardiner’s tactics reinforced this understanding.  Instead of responding directly to 
Anderson’s charges, the Liberals attacked the government’s inadequate provision of 
relief.  “The money for such purposes is not Premier Anderson’s money,” they 
reminded the voters, “neither is it the money of members of his cabinet, nor of his 
supporters in the legislature.  It is not charity money provided by members of the 
Anderson Government.  It is Public Money provided by ALL the people of the 
Province.”985  The people had a right to question how their money was being spent.  This 
was especially the case given Anderson’s “Merciless Record of Mismanagement.”  
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Campaign material, for example, singled out the rising provincial debt as evidence of the 
Government’s incompetence with titles such as “Anderson Plays Politics With Relief,” 
and “Wild Extravagance of the Anderson Government.”  Liberal attacks on Anderson’s 
record came down to a simple question: “What has the Anderson Government done for 
Saskatchewan except to make it more difficult for the people to make a living?”986  As 
far as the Liberals were concerned, Anderson’s record of doubling the debt, raising taxes, 
and decreasing services spoke for itself.   
Gardiner’s criticism of Anderson’s record and support for individualist values positioned 
the Liberals as the only party capable of handling the present crisis.  “Conservative 
policies would place the country in the hand of the barons of Wealth,” one pamphlet 
argued.  “Socialist policies would place the country in the hands of the barons of Power.  
Both are alike in this, that they would leave the masses to be directed and controlled by 
the few.”987 Liberals portrayed themselves as the middle ground between Conservative 
ineptitude and the FLG’s radicalism: “The C.C.F. Will Take Your Earnings.  The 
Conservatives Will Spend Your Earnings.  The Liberals Will Increase Your Earnings.”988  
The Liberals relied on this tactic to explain their position on every issue during the 
campaign.  They positioned themselves between the opposition’s undesirable debt 
policies.  The opposition would have the people “give up their purse” to Conservative 
taxes and mismanagement or they “give up their title” to their land through the FLG’s 
radical use-lease program.  The Liberals, in contrast, promised “Brighter Days” through 
common sense reforms.989  They vowed to provide interest relief in times of crop failure, 
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reverse Anderson’s decision to treat relief as loans, and pressure the federal government 
to assume the debts farmers entered into “on behalf of Canada” during the Great War.990  
As a leading Liberal explained, it was “a clear-cut, out-and-out policy of land and home 
ownership by the people, not by loan and mortgage companies on the one hand or by the 
state on the other.”991   
Figure 8- “Are You Going to Stand for This?”992 
 
This moderation was in marked contrast to the FLG’s radical rhetoric.  Unlike the 
Liberals and Conservatives who promised compromise between debtors and creditors, 
Coldwell vowed to “take nothing from those who serve, but to remove the toll exacted by 
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the parasitical interests that oppress us.”993  Coldwell returned to this theme throughout 
the campaign.  “Behind the Liberal and Conservative parties,” he argued, “are marshalled 
all the vested and financial interests of Canada.  They realize that the Farmer-Labor 
group is determined to place the needs of our people before the greed of the moneyed 
interests.”994  The only solution, therefore, was to transform society.  Only by voting 
Farmer-Labor could electors “protect” their “homes from confiscation by the financial 
interests” and free themselves “from tribute such as Caesar never dared to levy on the 
barbarians whom he conquered.”995  The use-lease program itself may have been a 
radical solution to farmers’ debt, but this radicalism was the only way to protect the 
people from the financial interests backing the Liberals and the Conservatives. 
The FLG, understanding that many voters were receptive to attacks on the party’s 
socialism, downplayed its platform’s extremism.  Under the campaign slogan of 
“Humanity First,” party speakers focused on the idea that the present system “of 
production for profit” held out little hope for the farmers to retain control of their land.996  
“Owing to economic conditions, over which he has no control,” the party argued, “he is 
hampered in his efforts at development, and in constant danger of losing his equity.”  Far 
from being a radical quest to destroy the people’s personal freedoms, the FLG portrayed 
itself as the only party that would maintain them.  Only the FLG’s planned economy 
contained “the basic principle for the preservation of freedom, individual rights and the 
dignity of the race in which we pride ourselves.”997  The party would “protect the people 
from despotic government by capitalist dictators whom Liberal and Conservative parties 
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alike serve.”  They promised to free the province “from economic slavery.”998  By 
simplifying their policies into a question of protection, as Figure 9 demonstrates, the FLG 
hoped to bypass the controversial aspects of their land program.  Use-lease, they argued, 
would make people’s homes “safe” by protecting land titles from the financial interests’ 
“greed.” 
The FLG was equally clear that it stood for a rejection of conservatives’ adherence to 
their own individualism.  Coldwell argued that farmers’ “rugged individualism” was the 
primary cause of the current crisis.  “Like a carrot before a stupid donkey,” he 
maintained, the opposition “hold out the possibilities of rich rewards as a result of 
liberalistic philosophy.”999  Instead, the FLG posited the creation of a “co-operative 
commonwealth” where “the principle means of production, distribution and exchange 
shall be socially or co-operatively owned by the people, so as they satisfy the needs of 
humanity.”1000  Only though co-operation, they explained, could the people receive 
“economic security which is a fundamental of self-development and the exercise of 
individual achievement.”1001  Whereas the Liberals and Conservatives portrayed 
themselves as protectors of society’s individualistic ethic, FLG speakers adopted the 
language of collectivism, calling on the province’s voters to “Join the Army of the 
Common Good in a War on Poverty.”1002  Voters were presented with a stark choice.  
Either they accepted the collective ethos of the FLG, or they voted for the perpetuation of 
the capitalist-individualistic ideals offered by the Conservatives and the Liberals.   
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Figure 9 – “Is Your Home Safe?” 1003 
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The electorate rejected the FLG’s socialism.  The new party only received twenty-five 
percent of the popular vote and five seats.  The Conservatives and Liberals convinced 
three-quarters of the electorate that the FLG’s socialism was a direct threat to society, but 
only the Liberals transformed this into electoral gains.  Gardiner received just under half 
of the popular vote, but an overwhelming majority of the seats in Saskatchewan’s first-
past-the-post electoral system.  The Conservatives failed to elect a single candidate 
despite outpacing the FLG’s support.  The Leader-Post took this as vindication for the 
Liberals’ 1929 defeat: “It may be a source of public satisfaction that men who raised a 
bogus racial and religious issue in 1929 because of a feeling that it would get them votes 
have been shown that such a course is to play with fire and that the final consequences 
are inevitable.”1004  The Conservatives viewed the results as a travesty.  “The wicked 
flourish like green bay trees,” MacPherson lamented.  “Sadly…Tory votes get no 
representation.”1005  F.W. Turnbull, a Klansman and former Conservative MP, blamed 
the defeat on the “silent vote” of the Liberal machine and Catholics.1006  The election was 
a victory for conservatives’ individualism, but it was a resounding defeat for the 
Conservative Party. 
Table 3 - Election Results, 19341007 
Party # of Candidates Votes Cast % of Vote # of Seats % of Seats 
Liberal 56 206,212 48 50 90 
Conservative 52 114,923 27 - - 
Farmer-Labor 53 102,944 24 5 10 
Other 8 5,555 1 - - 
      
Total  429,634 100 55 100 
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Farmer-Labor also viewed the results with dismay.  The new party was now the official 
opposition but the outcome did not meet the FLG’s pre-election expectations.   Coldwell 
and other party leaders spent the days before the election proclaiming that the disgruntled 
electorate would sweep the new party to a resounding majority.1008  This was not just 
pre-election posturing.  The FLG was founded on the belief that the Depression had 
fatally undermined the capitalist system.  The electorate’s rejection was a bitter blow to 
this belief.  Coldwell confided that he was “bitterly disappointed,” and felt “both tired 
and sick.”1009  Publicly, however, he was resolute that the election was the stepping-stone 
to ultimate victory.  “A new movement,” he noted on election night, “must take hard 
knocks at the beginning.”1010  It was not that their policies were wrong, but that 
“doctrines required more time and more explanation than they had received by 1934.”1011  
The FLG officially changed its name to the CCF in the aftermath of the election, 
reaffirming the party’s belief that the voters would ultimately abandon their “rugged 
individualism” in favour of a “co-operative commonwealth.” 
This process had begun in 1934.  The dominant narrative of the CCF’s rise is predicated 
on the notion that the 1934 election initiated the process of undermining the people’s 
individualist ethic.   Lipset, for example, argues that support for the FLG’s radical 
collectivism came from the most “prosperous farm areas.”  Radical political action was 
the realm of “those who possess economic and social status” and “are most resentful of a 
threat to their security.”1012  Liberal and Conservative support, in contrast, was confined 
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to the “decimated sectors” where the only political question was one of relief.1013  
Subsequent observers followed Lipset’s lead.  Peter Sinclair infers that “the poorest areas 
did not support the CCF” because they may have “saw their situation as hopeless.”1014  
Although David Smith complicates the discussion by focusing on previous political 
allegiance, the foundations of his analysis also rest on an assumption that wealthier voters 
supported the FLG.1015  The province’s wealthiest and largest farmers stood for the 
capitalist system and individual freedoms during the 1920s debates over orderly 
marketing.  Their alleged support for the FLG in the 1930s, as Lipset and others maintain, 
would provide evidence for a fundamental weakening of the people’s conservatism.   
Voting patterns, however, were not so straightforward.  Lipset relies on land assessments 
and tenancy rates to argue that FLG was successful amongst those with the “highest 
social and economic status.”1016  These show the economic situation as it stood in 1934 
but his analysis fails to account for changes in wealth during the Depression.  Prior to the 
Depression, the province’s southern portions were the centre of the province’s large-scale 
wheat production.  It was this region that disproportionately backed nativist movements, 
opposed orderly marketing, and strengthened conservative rejections of the Social 
Gospel.  This was also the area that experienced prolonged drought throughout the 1930s.  
The most affluent farmers at the height of the Depression, in contrast, were centered in 
the northern parkland that only experienced intermittent crop failure.   
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Figure 10 - Conservative and Farmer-Labor Results, 1934 Election1017 
 
Areas traditionally associated with conservative individualism stood firmly against the 
FLG’s collectivism despite their destitution.  The Liberals secured the largest body of 
support but the election was not just a question of government versus the opposition as it 
had been in 1929.  Three-way contests occurred in all but three of the province’s fifty-
five constituencies.  The support of second place parties illuminates the geographical 
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divide over the FLG’s collectivism.  Ridings that elected Liberals and where the 
Conservatives placed second clearly rejected the FLG’s collectivism.  The Conservatives 
outpaced the FLG vote in the southern and central areas of the province where 
conservative individualism was strongest.  Support for the FLG’s collectivist message 
was centered in constituencies that the new party won outright or placed second ahead of 
the Conservatives.   
Far from being most successful in areas with “high status,” as Lipset alleges, the largest 
body of FLG support emanated from the traditionally marginal areas of the province.  
The FLG fared best in the south-west, where widespread land abandonment was the norm 
even prior to the Depression, and the areas surrounding Yorkton which had also given 
rise to the radical FU.  As Andrew Milnor notes, Lipset’s economic focus ignores 
elements of religion and race that played as important a role in voters’ behaviour. 1018  
The FLG’s single largest body of support in 1934 came from eastern-Europeans who had 
a history of hostility to “traditional party lines.”1019  Conversely, Roman Catholics and 
English farmers in the south rejected the CCF’s collectivism by largely voting for either 
the Liberals or the Conservatives.  
The Liberal appeals to individualist values were responsible for their decisive majority, 
but Gardiner continued to focus on undermining support for the FLG.  In late 1934, 
Gardiner created the Bureau of Labour and Public Welfare with the express purpose of 
studying issues regarding “the relations between capital and labour.”1020   The Liberals 
also announced plans for a system of state-funded medicine.  The 1935 throne speech 
declared that all expenditures must be “kept within revenues.”  Given the costs involved, 
Liberals were adamant that they had “no immediate” plans “to inaugurate such a service.”  
However, J.M. Uhrich, then Minister of Public Health, assured the Legislature that “in 
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days to come, I am satisfied, we will solve the problem.”1021  The policy surprised many 
Liberal supporters.  The Leader-Post blanched at the costs involved.   The newspaper 
maintained that the policy stood “to do a good deal for the health of the public,” but 
cautioned that “all such services, whatever their form—on an individual or collective 
basis—come back on the individual pocketbook.”1022  Gardiner was convinced such 
policies would weaken socialism’s pull.  According to David Smith, the health-care 
announcement indicated the Liberals’ “appreciation of where votes lay.”1023   
This progressive focus did not survive Gardiner’s move to Ottawa.  In late 1935, Prime 
Minister Mackenzie King invited Gardiner to enter his cabinet as Minister of Agriculture.  
Gardiner accepted, leaving the party to find his successor.1024  Saskatchewan Liberals 
divided over two potential replacements: T.C. Davis, the attorney-general and Gardiner’s 
“political confidant,”1025 and William Patterson, Minister of Natural Resources and 
Telephones.  Both men had been in cabinet since 1926 and were capable administrators, 
but their personalities were decidedly different.  Whereas Davis was described as a 
fighter, fiercely partisan and abrasive like his mentor, Patterson was characterized as 
quiet, reserved, and generally well-liked by caucus.1026  The job ultimately fell to 
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Patterson.  Davis had grown tired of the “small arena” of provincial politics and voted 
against himself, leaving Patterson with a single-vote majority.1027   
Patterson moved the party in a decidedly conservative direction.  With a background in 
finance, the new Premier stressed “prudence and judgement in formulating policies.”1028  
Like Dunning before him, Patterson understood debts as “binding instruments,” and his 
measurement of the government’s ability to deal with the continued Depression was 
intrinsically connected to his ability to balance the budget and maintain the province’s 
credit rating.1029  Patterson was also deeply concerned over the people’s increasing 
reliance on government to solve their issues.  He considered the rise of the FLG a direct 
threat to democratic values.1030  Patterson was not alone in these beliefs.  Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King, faced with the real prospect of a bankrupt federal treasury, insisted on 
reducing spending after his return to power in 1935.  As Robert Wardhaugh argues, King 
“increasingly” became “a conservative among radicals.”1031 
Patterson’s conservatism was reflected in his government’s hesitant approach to the 
Depression.  The debt question continued to dominate the government’s attention.  By the 
summer of 1936, Saskatchewan’s farmers, especially those in the province’s south, had 
experienced over five years of crop failure.  In 1934, the Bennett Conservatives passed 
the Farmers’ Creditors Arrangements Act (FCA), making responsibility for debt 
adjustments a federal concern.  Although the legislation held that a negotiated settlement 
was preferred, Bennett insisted that it empower commissioners to force a settlement if 
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neither side could agree to an equitable adjustment.1032  Patterson did not oppose this 
move.  The FCA, while popular, did not solve the debt problem.  It kept farmers facing 
insolvency “on the farm,” but left it to the provinces to address the underlying causes of 
the debt crisis. 1033  Patterson understood that he had to act if he hoped to retain office.  
As Premier and Minister of Finance, Patterson’s future was intrinsically linked with the 
province’s financial situation.  The easiest solution to the ongoing debt problem was for 
the province to declare a debt moratorium—a policy advocated by the FLG and used 
extensively in Aberhart’s conflict with the federal government over Social Credit 
policy.1034  Patterson, however, was determined that the province’s farmers honour their 
debts.  Moratorium he argued, was akin to the “repudiation of debt and the avoidance of 
payment of any debts.” 1035  Instead, he called for an “amicable solution” between 
debtors and creditors that would alleviate the burden without resorting to “force.”1036   
In September 1936, Patterson announced a blanket scheme of voluntary debt adjustment.  
The agreement divided the province into three sections: the “red” areas in the south-west 
where drought had been continual since 1930; and the “white” areas where drought was 
intermittent at worst; and the “blue” marginal areas between them.1037  All farmers 
benefitted by having their mortgage rates lowered to five percent interest, but only those 
in the red areas would see their accrued tax arrears, relief payments, and mortgage 
interest, accrued prior to 1936, wiped out.  Farmers in the blue areas could continue to 
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rely on the Government’s debt adjustment board for arbitration, while white areas were 
forced to negotiate with their creditors on an individual basis or seek the help of the FCA 
if they too became insolvent.1038  The plan reflected Patterson’s understanding of 
personal responsibility.   While it alleviated the debt problem for those who had no hope 
of paying, it forced those who were not destitute to honour the contracts they entered of 
their own free will.  As T.C. Davis explained, the plan protected the individualist basis of 
society by making “insolvent debtors solvent” while not permitting “solvent debtors to 
avoid their obligations” as the opposition would have it under a general moratorium.1039  
It did not hurt that the plan was immensely successful.  The government happily reported 
that, in its first six months of operation, the plan had voluntarily reduced $100,000,000 
from farmers’ debts.1040   
Patterson’s conservative outlook was also clear in his strategy for the provincial debt.  By 
1936, Saskatchewan owed $192,635,509.  It was an untenable situation as interest 
payments alone accounted for thirty percent of government expenditures.  Although the 
federal government’s emergency loans staved off the very real prospect of Saskatchewan 
defaulting on its obligations, Mackenzie King was reluctant to continue to support the 
province indefinitely.1041  The only long-term solution to the problem was to refund 
bonds at a lower rate of interest.  Patterson’s problem lay in how to go about lowering 
interest rates without jeopardizing the province’s financial future.  The easier option 
rested in the province acting unilaterally.  Aberhart, for example, used Alberta’s 1936 
default to arbitrarily halve the interest owing on its long-term bonds, but destroyed the 
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province’s ability to borrow further funds.1042  Patterson, who measured his success in 
handling the Depression on the province’s credit rating, refused to contemplate such a 
solution.1043  Provincial bonds constituted “a contract,” he argued, and the creditor “has 
as much right to expect that the province will fulfill its contractual obligations as has the 
holder of any other agreement or contract made with the government.”  The Premier 
insisted that the question of interest rates was a federal issue, to be solved through a 
renegotiation of the terms of Confederation.  The government would not “repudiate” its 
debt or unilaterally lower interest payable.  Patterson believed that the drought 
constituted a “national emergency,” and urged the recently formed Royal Commission on 
Dominion-Provincial Relations to address the province’s debt and financial position on 
these terms.1044 
Patterson’s conservative stance on debt was further reflected in his approach to taxation.  
The Premier believed that provincial debt had grown to alarming proportions because 
politicians had been unwilling to make difficult decisions when it came to raising money.  
The province could have all the social services it desired, he declared, so long as “they 
will find the money to pay for them.”1045  When it came to education, for example, 
Patterson faced the same financial problem as his predecessors.  With an increase in 
property tax arrears across the province, municipalities were unable to pay their teachers.  
Both Anderson and Gardiner used direct aid and loans to cover part of the shortfall.  The 
CCF proposed to take the necessary funds from “monopolistic corporations” that “extract 
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huge profits from the people of the province.”1046  Patterson, in contrast, believed that all 
“must pay their share of costs.”1047  Backed by the recommendations of a Bank of 
Canada study into the province’s potential revenue sources, the Premier announced a 
controversial two percent sales tax to cover increased educational funding.1048  Taxes are 
never popular but Patterson believed that fiscal conservatism was the only way to ensure 
Saskatchewan’s future prosperity.  The Leader-Post reflected Patterson’s outlook: “No 
one will like it but we think…it will be better in the long run to have Saskatchewan get 
back closer to a pay-as-you-go basis than to continue a policy of borrowing to meet 
current needs.”1049  Even at the height of the Depression, people continued to adhere to 
traditional beliefs in individual responsibility. 
Patterson’s conservativism placed the Liberals in direct conflict with the opposition.  In 
1935, the provincial CCF selected George Williams as leader to fill the vacancy left by 
Coldwell’s election to the House of Commons.  Williams’ background was intrinsically 
linked with the province’s radical farmers.  Williams was leader of the agrarian 
movement’s “left wing” and was central to the UFC(SS)’s push for a compulsory pool 
and its decision to enter politics in 1932.  Described as a “devoted Marxist,” Williams 
dedicated his life to developing a class consciousness among Saskatchewan’s 
farmers.1050  Only “by being outright Socialists,” he explained, could party members 
“qualify ourselves for power when the Fascist experiment has run its course.”1051  For 
Williams, the Liberals were “supporters of capitalism,” endeavouring to protect the 
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“profit-making” system and its resulting “hunger, thirst, nakedness, eviction, [and] 
broken homes.”1052   
Williams was also pragmatic.  He realized that the CCF’s socialist policies, especially the 
use-lease plan, made the party susceptible to attack.  The party already had the support of 
the province’s more radical elements, but it alienated the moderate voters needed to 
defeat the Liberals.  As he explained to a supporter, “there comes a time…when we 
acquire a certain amount of worldly wisdom and a time when we find if we want to get a 
certain place and are continually shot down in frontal attack, you are wise to attack on the 
flank.”1053  Under Williams’ leadership, the Saskatchewan CCF removed all references 
to socialism from its platform and officially dropped its land nationalization policies.1054  
Williams remained committed to a socialized society, but he was willing to downplay this 
socialism for short-term success. 
Even with this moderation, the CCF remained significantly more radical than the 
Liberals.  Williams characterized the Patterson government as the “greatest extremists” 
whose “conservatism” was based on the premise of “frightening the farmers.”1055  In 
contrast, the CCF still stood for a fundamental re-ordering of the capitalist system.  
Rejecting traditional notions of self-sufficiency and individualism, Williams maintained 
that it was the “economic system, not [the farmers] themselves, which is at fault” for the 
province’s economic conditions.1056  Williams characterized Patterson’s voluntary debt 
adjustment scheme as making “Saskatchewan safe for the mortgage companies.”  The 
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farmers had “been sold down the river.”1057  Instead, the CCF called for a “crop failure 
clause” that would not allow principal or interest to be charged in years when income 
averaged less than six dollars an acre.1058  Similarly, Williams opposed Patterson’s tax 
increases.  “When our people are suffering from the cumulative effects of years of 
depression,” he argued during the 1937 budget debate, “is most certainly not the proper 
time to add to the burden of taxation.” Instead, Williams called for the “socialization” of 
“monopolistic industries” and the immediate “refunding of the public debt” to pay for 
increased social services.1059  Williams had abandoned the most extreme elements of the 
early FLG platform, but a clear divide continued to exist between the CCF and the 
Liberals’ programs.  Whereas Patterson believed that the province owed a duty to 
bondholders, Williams argued they must “become Canadians rather than money 
grabbers” and voluntarily refund the debt or be forced to do so.1060 
The CCF’s moderation was also influenced by Social Credit’s “invasion” beginning in 
1935.  The brainchild of Major Douglas, a British engineer with no formal economic 
training, Social Credit promised to solve the Depression by artificially increasing 
purchasing power through twenty-five-dollar dividends and abolishing interest charges 
on debts.  Aberhart popularized the idea in Alberta as an alternative to the CCF that did 
not threaten society’s individualist traditions.  Social Credit, he argued, protected “the 
individual’s God-given right to freedom.”1061  It was on this message of protecting 
people’s individualism that the new party swept the United Farmers of Alberta from 
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power in 1935.1062  Buoyed by this success, Social Credit supporters began organizing 
Saskatchewan’s federal constituencies in anticipation of the federal election later that 
year.  Both Social Credit and the CCF offered radical solutions to the ravages of the 
Depression, but Aberhart was clear that only he would solve the Depression and protect 
society’s individual values.  Campaign literature maintained that Social Credit protected 
individual “freedom,” stood “for entire freedom of religious belief,” provided “help and 
protection to the individual producer,” and most importantly, allowed farmers to control 
their own “money” and “property.”1063   
Aberhart’s promise to protect individual freedoms resonated with Saskatchewan voters.   
Social Credit and the CCF each won two seats in Saskatchewan in the 1935 election, but 
Aberhart won the contest for the popular vote, outpolling the CCF candidates in most 
rural seats.  “For the CCF leaders,” Sinclair explains, “this was the second severe defeat 
in little more than a year.”1064  Williams was also deeply concerned that CCF candidates 
in eight ridings—including Tommy Douglas in Weyburn, Major Coldwell in Rosetown-
Biggar, and Jacob Benson in Yorkton—went against the party’s leadership and publicly 
declared their willingness to support Social Credit legislation if elected.  Candidates 
feared the new party’s rising popularity more than they feared censure from CCF 
officials.1065 
Social Credit’s popularity was a threat to the CCF.  Williams realized that 
Saskatchewan’s farmers found Social Credit’s protection of individual rights appealing.  
Although Williams remained a socialist, he hoped the party’s newfound moderation 
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would compete with Social Credit’s appeal by convincing voters to “accept the CCF 
program by putting a new spring frock on it.”1066  Social Credit’s popularity also 
prompted a rethinking of the CCF’s stance on co-operation.  As Kenneth Andrews notes, 
reform-minded rural voters were more concerned with tangible results on central 
questions of debt adjustment and recovery than they were with partisan labels, which they 
considered “superfluous ideological attributes and distinctions.”1067  These progressives 
viewed the Liberals as hopeless reactionaries, but they did not care which reform party 
ultimately formed government.  Downplaying the CCF’s socialist roots was not enough.  
Williams had to demonstrate a willingness to put aside partisan squabbles for the greater 
good.  Although Williams was personally opposed to co-operation, he was a pragmatist 
and realized that continued opposition to co-operation in the face of widespread 
grassroots support would only weaken the CCF.1068   In addition to removing references 
to the use-lease plan, delegates to the 1936 convention called for “a united front against 
the forces of reaction,” passing a resolution urging co-operation with “all groups opposed 
to the present social order.”1069  Williams remained firmly against “fusion candidates,” 
insisting that each opposition retain its own platform and identity, but it was clear that he 
was willing to avoid splitting the opposition vote in an effort to defeat the “reactionary” 
Liberals. 
Aberhart was not willing to follow the CCF’s lead.  Like Williams, Aberhart was 
fanatical in his beliefs, but he did not share the CCF leader’s pragmatism.  Aberhart’s 
entry into politics was inspired by his fundamentalist beliefs.  Like Hildebrand in 
Briercrest, Aberhart criticized the CCF’s promise of a “New Jerusalem” and social 
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regeneration for leading people towards damnation.  Only a personal relationship with 
God could provide salvation.  CCF leaders, Aberhart proclaimed, “were infidels and were 
deceiving the people” at the very moment that their very salvation was of paramount 
concern.1070  Whereas Williams could downplay his doctrinaire socialism to save his 
party, Aberhart was unable to compromise his religious beliefs.   
Internal struggles within Aberhart’s party also made co-operation an impossibility.  Once 
in office, Aberhart failed to bring forward the promised reforms.  A back-bencher revolt 
in 1937 forced Aberhart to pass a series of controversial bills that effectively barred the 
collection of personal debt, unilaterally refunded provincial bonds, and transformed 
banks into little more than provincial clearing houses.  These moves saved Aberhart’s 
leadership, but legislating on questions of banking, interest, and financial policy was in 
clear violation of the divisions of power set out in the British North America Act and put 
the province on a collision course with Ottawa.  Aberhart’s program was either found 
ultra vires, disallowed by Ottawa, or reserved by the Lieutenant Governor.1071  Even if 
Aberhart was inclined toward co-operation, the growing conflict with Ottawa required a 
sign of strength.  Aberhart’s “invasion” was intended as a show-of-force to Ottawa, not to 
defeat Patterson.   
The Conservatives, in contrast, were more than willing to take the CCF up on their offer.  
Co-operation was not new to the Conservative Party.  Anderson’s success in 1929 was 
only possible with support from Independents and Progressives.  Yet, where Anderson 
entered negotiations from a position of strength, the Conservatives embraced co-
operation after 1934 from a place of decided weakness.  For the first time in the party’s 
history, Conservatives had failed to earn a single seat in the provincial legislature.  It was 
clear that a new leader was needed to right the ship.  In the aftermath of the election 
defeat, rumors circulated across the province of Anderson’s alcoholism.  “Unless a man 
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can control himself,” a leading Conservative confided, “which the Doctor does not seem 
to be able to do, then he should realize that he is certainly not working in the best interest 
of those who place him in such a responsible position as the Leader of the Great 
Conservative Party.”1072  This lack of faith in the party’s leadership resulted in a 
breakdown of organization.  “If a caucus of party leaders was called tomorrow,” a 
Conservative organizer questioned, “how many former provincial ministers, federal 
ministers, members of Parliament or senators would be sufficiently interested to attend?  
Not a Corporal’s guard!”  The situation was “worse if possible than in 1926 when Dr. 
Anderson re-organized the province.”1073   
It fell to John Diefenbaker, then party president, to intervene.  Beginning in the spring of 
1936, Diefenbaker began creating a “completely new organization.”1074  The first task lay 
in overcoming, as much as possible, the internal divisions that had plagued the 
Conservatives since the 1929 election.  R.L. Hanbridge, a former Conservative MLA for 
Kerrobert, explained the situation to Diefenbaker: “The position of leadership in this 
province is a mighty difficult one, with the ‘true blues’ and the insurgent elements that 
we have in the party; and one of our big problems will be to try to choose a man as leader 
who can bring all these more or less combative groups into a harmonious organization, 
fighting together for one cause.”1075  Diefenbaker initially spurned any suggestion that he 
take over leadership, but he was convinced by mid-1936 that only he could bridge party 
divides and began actively campaigning for the job.1076  He did not have to fight very 
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hard for the dubious “honour.”  Party delegates to the 1936 leadership convention 
nominated twelve people to the role, including Anderson, M.A. MacPherson, Robert 
Weir, and F.W. Turnbull.  Each had more electoral success than Diefenbaker; all refused 
the job.  Only Diefenbaker was willing to lead the moribund party.  A “congratulatory” 
letter summed up the feeling of most of the party in the prospect of Diefenbaker’s 
leadership: “As a compromise candidate between the various factions, you are by far the 
greatest leader available.” 1077  Diefenbaker was the least objectionable to all groups.  
After accepting his party’s “unanimous” support, Diefenbaker’s second task lay in 
repositioning the party to increase electoral support.  As Patrick Kyba explains, the 
platform had to contain “a selection of policies which both provided an attractive 
alternative to those of the government and also showed the Conservatives to be as 
progressive as the CCF in light of the circumstances in which the province found 
itself.”1078 Diefenbaker understood that Patterson’s approach to the Depression had 
captured the conservative and moderate vote for the Liberals and began moving the party 
to the left to challenge the CCF and Social Credit for the reformist vote.  This process 
mirrored a similar situation that had occurred within the federal Conservative Party.  R.B. 
Bennett, hoping to stave off almost certain defeat in 1935, announced a Canadian “New 
Deal” intended to “paint the Liberals into a laissez-faire corner.”1079  Declaring that “the 
old order is gone,” Bennett called for a fundamental reordering of the capitalist system 
and placed the federal Conservatives in favour of unemployment insurance, progressive 
taxation, health and accident insurance, better working conditions, revised old-age 
pensions, and increased agricultural aid.1080  Bennett’s “New Deal” did not save his 
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administration but it did resonate with many Conservatives in Saskatchewan who relished 
the opportunity it provided to make the party relevant.   
Even before he became leader, Diefenbaker was inundated with policy proposals 
advocating for a similar shift in provincial policy.  The Moose Jaw Conservative 
Constituency, for example, passed a resolution calling for a change to the party’s name.  
Given that Bennett “intimated most forcibly…that the Conservative Party of today is not 
the stand-pat, reactionary party that its name might indicate,” the local resolved to “take 
the first step towards the absorption of the thousands of misled and disillusioned citizens” 
by altering the name to “The Social Reform—Conservative Party of Saskatchewan.”1081  
The resolution was never brought to a convention floor but it was clear that many 
Conservatives agreed with the sentiment behind it.  “We have to forget the old days,” a 
long-time Conservative argued, “and meet facts and conditions as they are and plan to 
take care of them.”1082  Others were more forceful in their stance, threatening to jump 
ship if their demands were not met:  “In my own case (and I know of many staunch 
conservatives who feel likewise), if the platform does not formulate some proposals to 
alleviate the suffering existing in this Province, then I am going to vote for that party 
which does offer such platform.”1083  The message was clear.  Either the Saskatchewan 
Conservatives follow Bennett’s lead and adopt a reformist platform or they would lose 
any chance of emerging from the 1934 disaster.  The Saskatoon Star-Phoenix 
summarized the general thinking.  The party had to move “considerably to the left of 
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traditional Conservatism,” but it remained an open question as to “how far to the left” the 
party would go.1084   
The new platform, drafted over the course of 1937, furthered the ongoing process of 
political realignment by moving the Conservatives decidedly to the left.  In terms of debt 
adjustment, for example, Diefenbaker differentiated himself from Patterson by 
abandoning ideas of individual responsibility and the sanctity of contracts.  The platform 
promised to legally prevent all foreclosures in situations where the debtor had maintained 
positive equity in the property.  Likewise, it vowed to immediately refund the province’s 
debt at lower rates of interest even though such a policy had already been declared ultra 
vires in Alberta.  Mirroring Bennett’s “New Deal,” Conservatives also committed the 
party to a dramatic increase in government regulation and intervention.  Containing 
provisions for crop insurance, increased teachers’ salaries, a reduction in the minimum 
age for old-age pensions, elimination of the education tax, increased mothers’ allowances 
and maternity grants, a system of state health insurance, unemployment insurance, 
increased minimum wage, and an improved highway system, the platform was 
Diefenbaker’s attempt to place the Conservatives as a clear alternative to the Liberals and 
a “progressive” contender to the CCF and Social Credit.1085   
The party was divided over such a move.  Supporters viewed it as the only way the party 
could compete.  As R.M. Balfour, President of the Regina Conservative Association, 
explained: “A few years ago you and I may have thought this platform a bit radical, but 
Conservatism is not opposed to advancement with the times.”1086  Nor was the party shy 
in openly expressing its desire to capture the radical vote.  “Every plank in the CCF 
platform,” J.T.M. Anderson wrote in the Regina Star, “is ours and there is no reason why 
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the members of the [CCF] cannot conscientiously support us.”1087  Conservatives hoped 
to remain relevant by arming themselves with a new leader and an updated and relatively 
radical platform,. 
Opponents, in contrast, viewed the new platform as a continuation of Anderson’s reversal 
of individual responsibility.  Johnstone publicly declared that the platform was the final 
straw in the party’s degeneration.  “Left wing Conservatives must be having a dizzy time 
of it, trying to think of new stunts to keep them in the limelight,” he wrote in an open 
letter to the Craik Weekly News.  As was the case in the lead up to the 1934 election, 
Johnstone urged “true” Conservatives to vote Liberal: “Ten years of leftist control of the 
Conservative party explains the entire political mob that exists outside the Liberal ranks 
today.  The complete suppression of Conservative views over the past ten years has 
brought about the disappearance of that party in so far as anything Conservative is 
concerned.”1088  Rather than healing internal divisions as Diefenbaker hoped, the new 
platform further alienated conservatives from the party.   
The Liberals welcomed these divisions.  “They have promised everything that any 
individual in Saskatchewan could possibly wish to have,” T.C. Davis announced, “and 
surely the intelligence of the people of this province has not yet sunk to the level where 
they will seriously believe that it is within the realms of human possibility for any 
government to do the things that the Conservative Party promises to do.”1089  The 
Liberals did not view the Conservatives as a threat.  Rather, it was Social Credit and the 
CCF that posed the main risk to continued Liberal rule.  They did, however, welcome the 
support of erstwhile Conservatives who were opposed to Diefenbaker’s policy shift.  The 
Leader-Post, for example, mirrored Johnstone’s sentiment in attacking the Conservatives 
newfound radicalism: “Outside of Social Credit dividends and of the state ownership of 
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everything urged by the Communists, the new Conservative platform appears to offer 
nearly everything that any other party may be able to offer.  The C.C.F. which specializes 
in state help for everybody, will have a hard time keeping up with it.  Mr. George 
Williams, the C.C.F. leader, may wonder what is there left to offer the people in the form 
of government assistance.”1090  By actively courting conservatives, the Liberals furthered 
the province’s political realignment begun by Diefenbaker. 
The new platform fatally weakened the Conservative Party.   Diefenbaker abandoned the 
party’s connection with individualist conservatives to compete with Social Credit and the 
CCF for the reformist vote.  The task was exceedingly difficult.  Diefenbaker competed 
with both the CCF and the Social Credit who did not have the Conservative Party’s 
history in office to contend with.  With no way to effectively differentiate itself from 
other opposition groups, the Conservatives had to accept Williams’ offer of co-operation.  
“As long as those anxious for reform are to remain split up into three or four groups 
opposed by financial interests and the Roman Catholic Church,” a Conservative reported 
to Diefenbaker, “there is little or no hope of success.”  The only option was to “advocate” 
for “a considerable measure of socialism.”1091  Diefenbaker was unwilling to go further 
to the left, but he was favourable towards co-operation.  “If we allow all of our friends to 
become CCF or Liberal followers,” he argued, “where will we ever be in the future?”1092  
The leader was also under pressure from federal Conservatives who hoped to avoid 
competition in their fight with the federal Liberals.  E.E. Perley, Conservative MP for 
Regina, met extensively with Douglas and Coldwell in early 1938 to negotiate an 
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arrangement whereby each party would avoid competition in key ridings but retain their 
separate identities.1093   
The agreement benefitted both sides, but it was the Conservatives who entered it from a 
position of weakness.  Co-operation, Kyba notes, “destroyed the party’s claim to be a 
credible alternative to the Liberals.”1094  Williams intended co-operation to help diffuse 
the Social Credit threat.  When it came to negotiations with the Conservatives, however, 
he insisted that the CCF were “the dominant party in the province” and that the 
Conservatives recognize they “are distinctly inferior” before any deal could be 
reached.1095  Diefenbaker had hoped that his shift would differentiate his party from the 
Liberals, but it only succeeded in weakening the party.  The best Diefenbaker could hope 
for was to be a junior partner in a CCF-led coalition.1096   
The 1938 election completed the process of political realignment begun at the 
Depression’s onset.  Two central issues emerged throughout the campaign: debt 
adjustment and the restoration of agriculture given the improved crop conditions in 1938.  
The Liberals were adamant that, if returned to office, they would not deviate from 
Patterson’s conservative stance.  Debt adjustment, the party argued, had “been 
accomplished with a minimum of disturbance to the economic life of the people.”  The 
Liberals had reduced hundreds of millions of dollars from farmers’ obligations through 
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“voluntary amicable settlement.”1097  The opposition, in contrast, advocated for 
moratorium, repudiation, and general “soak-the-rich” policies.  All constituted an 
abandonment of individual freedoms in favour of “compulsion.”1098  The Liberals argued 
that only their financial policies allowed Saskatchewan to pass “through the most difficult 
years in the history of the province with credit unimpaired,” and the people’s “reputation 
for fair dealing unsullied.”  Financial retrenchment and increased taxes were never 
popular, but the Liberals chose “duty” over “popularity.”1099 
The Liberals maintained that only their policies alleviated suffering and protected 
individual freedoms.  The worst year for the Depression in Saskatchewan was 1937.  
Farmers seeded over 15,000,000 acres and harvested only 35,000,000 bushels, a return of 
barely two-for-one on seed grain.  With crop failure the norm, over half of the population 
was on relief.1100  It appeared in early 1938, however, that the province had finally turned 
the corner as the rains returned and forecasts called for a large harvest.  The question on 
many farmers’ minds during the election was the extent that their creditors would 
confiscate their crops to pay for past debts.  The Liberals were adamant that, although 
they respected the “contractual ‘Promise to Pay’,” their policies placed the farmers’ 
interests above all others.1101  The first plank in the Liberal election manifesto promised 
that proceeds of the expected 1938 crop would go towards farmers securing “himself and 
family...until another crop is harvested.”1102  Patterson adopted a fiscally conservative 
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policy that upheld the sanctity of debts, but the Liberals maintained this was the only plan 
that would allow individual farmers to rehabilitate themselves when conditions improved. 
The CCF and Conservatives, in contrast, used the election to paint the Liberals as a 
“reactionary” government out of touch with the suffering of everyday people.  Although 
the CCF moderated its socialist focus in 1936, Williams continued to view capitalism as 
the cause of society’s misery.  “The abuses of capitalism,” the party argued, “have 
brought about a state of planned economy that regiments all of us as well as our 
governments.  It is a planned economy by the vested interests.  We bow to its 
regimentation but share very meagrely[sic] in its rewards.”1103  The opposition 
maintained that Patterson’s efforts to preserve credit and contractual obligations 
supported a status quo detrimental to the people’s interests.  Liberal promises meant 
“standing still, submission to ‘Laissez-Faire’ ideology, indifference to wrongs and 
maintaining the attitude that our present conditions are the best we have reason to hope 
for.” The CCF upheld “the stability based on positive and planned action not the stability 
of utter passiveness.”1104  Whereas Patterson’s supporters believed in the sanctity of 
individual action, the CCF catered its message to more radical elements that believed the 
government had the power and the responsibility to create a “new social order” based on 
co-operation, not competition.1105  A fundamental divide existed between the two sides 
over the understanding of debt, the Depression, and the role of government.   
The Conservatives joined the CCF in condemning the Liberals as reactionary 
nonetheless.  “‘Do Nothing’,” they argued, “has been its guiding plan.  It has represented 
the essence of inaction, the quintessence of stagnation.  Dawdling without leadership has 
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characterized every effort.  It has always been waiting for something to ‘turn up’.”1106  
As Diefenbaker explained, “this government has nailed to its masthead the flag of 
inaction.”  The Liberals had sacrificed the wellbeing of the people by placing them 
through the “wringer” of increased taxation while protecting “financial interests” from 
repudiation.1107   
In direct response to this “do nothing” attitude, Diefenbaker pledged to rescind 
Patterson’s controversial sales taxes and dramatically increase spending through a 
program of direct government intervention.  Diefenbaker promised the voters the best of 
both worlds.  Advocating a policy of “sound businesslike government,” Diefenbaker 
believed that forcibly refunding the provincial debt and a policy of “rigid economy and 
efficiency” would be enough to pay for increased government spending without having to 
rely on increased taxation.1108  “Out of savings we will effect in government 
administration,” Diefenbaker declared, “the Conservative party will bring in state 
hospitalization, child guidance clinics, reductions of age for old age pensions from 70 to 
65.”1109  Diefenbaker failed to explain how exactly these economies would be found.   
Instead, the Conservatives relied on veiled references to Liberal corruption.  
Saskatchewan’s debt increased by one hundred million dollars during the Liberals four 
years in office, the party noted, but the province had nothing to show for it other than 
“useless and unnecessary inspectors, supervisors and political friends.”1110  These attacks 
on the Liberal “machine” had succeeded in 1929 but no longer resonated with voters.  
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Conservatives hoped to justify their leftward shift by portraying Liberal inaction and 
corruption as being responsible for transforming a manageable situation into four years of 
continued suffering and hardship.  Individualist voters, however, had long ceased to see 
the Conservative Party as their champion. 
Aberhart, in contrast, was less interested in fighting the provincial Liberals than he was in 
using the campaign to challenge Ottawa.  The Alberta Premier spurned grassroots 
organization in favour of authoritarian control from Edmonton.  Aberhart and Manning, 
his chief lieutenant, set the party’s platform, hired organizers, and personally selected the 
candidates to contest the Saskatchewan election.1111  This unprecedented level of control 
of a provincial political party from outside the province allowed Aberhart and Manning 
to design their electoral appeal as a regional defence of Social Credit in Alberta.  Unlike 
the CCF and Conservatives, who framed the struggle as one based between the people 
and the provincial Liberals, Aberhart viewed the central conflict as originating with the 
financial “interests” in central Canada.  As such, Social Credit’s campaign barely 
mentioned Patterson at all.  Instead, Aberhart vowed to “fight with all of our hearts” 
against the “financial tyranny” that was threatening all the people, not just those in 
Saskatchewan.1112  In his extensive tours across the province, Aberhart hardly discussed 
the Liberal’s education tax, debt program, or supposed corruption.  Rather, Aberhart 
focused his remarks on depicting the entire apparatus of Canadian federalism as one 
designed solely to benefit the “50 bigshots” in the East.  The federal power of 
disallowance, the Supreme Court, and the British North America Act had all 
demonstrated that the people were not free to chart their own destiny.  “We are in a real 
struggle,” he declared.  “The fight for economic freedom is on.”1113  Given this federal 
focus, Social Credit did not even bother to print campaign literature specifically dealing 
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with the 1938 election, preferring instead to recycle previous publications that outlined 
Aberhart’s outlook.1114 
It was a missed opportunity.  Social Credit’s reform program and protection for 
individual rights placed it in a unique position to challenge the Liberals for power.  Both 
Aberhart and Patterson championed the province’s individualist traditions, but Social 
Credit was willing to fight the “interests” where Patterson stood for the economic status 
quo.  Aberhart’s unequivocal individualism also differentiated the party from the CCF.  
Both offered a radical solution to the Depression, but the CCF’s socialist history alienated 
more voters than it gained.  Social Credit also posed a direct threat to Diefenbaker’s plans 
to transform the Conservative Party.  The Conservatives hoped their leftward shift would 
allow the party to mimic Social Credit’s appeal, but Diefenbaker’s active courting of 
CCF support and internal party divisions undermined their efforts.  Social Credit 
possessed all the Conservatives’ strengths and none of their weaknesses.  Aberhart, 
however, cared more about fighting Ottawa than he wanted to win in Saskatchewan. 
Although Aberhart failed to capitalize on his party’s potential, his “invasion” did have a 
direct influence on Patterson’s tactics.  The Liberal leader was confident that the CCF’s 
socialist platform made the party anathema to voters.  Their central tactic in dealing with 
the CCF, therefore, rested on undermining Williams’ moderation.  As far as the Liberals 
were concerned, the CCF continued to pose a threat to individual freedoms.  “This 
country,” they argued, “rewards Initiative, Thrift and a Willingness to Work.”1115  The 
CCF in contrast, remained “a Socialist Party” that hoped “to socialize the Province of 
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Saskatchewan.”1116  The Liberals were confident that the people would “have nothing to 
do with a party the policy of which…would mean dictatorship, an end to freedom of the 
individual, and a breaking down of the democratic institutions of government.”1117  
Diefenbaker’s formalized alliance with the CCF opened the Conservatives to attacks on 
the same grounds.  “Mr. Diefenbaker,” the Leader-Post argued, “cannot act without first 
consulting the C.C.F., the Socialist party.”1118  By portraying Diefenbaker as a CCF 
stooge, the Liberals depicted the entire Conservative Party as posing the same threat to 
personal freedoms as the CCF.   
When dealing with Social Credit, however, the same tactics would not hold.  Aberhart 
may have stressed a radical solution to the Depression but its basis was in preserving 
ideas of individual responsibility, action, and initiative.  As far as the Liberals were 
concerned, it was Social Credit, not the CCF, that was the party to beat in 1938.1119  The 
Liberals spent most of the campaign focusing on discrediting Social Credit among the 
province’s individualist conservatives. 1120  Liberal propaganda, for example, challenged 
Aberhart’s arguments that Social Credit theories protected individual interests.  Whereas 
Patterson’s debt program protected individual rights through negotiation, Liberal 
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propaganda noted, Aberhart sought “compulsion.”1121  Not only did Aberhart introduce a 
controversial seven percent tax on all farm produce in Alberta, but his “Crack-Pot 
Theories” meant that Saskatchewan’s farmers “would be bled in the effort to make his 
weird and incomprehensible theories work in Alberta.”1122  Aberhart, in short, had three 
years to make Social Credit theory operable and failed.  The Liberals, on the other hand, 
offered a “sane” and proven administration that protected people’s individual rights while 
ameliorating the worst effects of the crisis.1123 
The Liberals deftly used Aberhart’s struggle with the structures of federalism to 
characterize the entire Social Credit movement as undemocratic, totalitarian, and contrary 
to individualist values.  The election was not a fight between political parties, the Liberals 
maintained, but a referendum on the very future of the Canadian dominion: “The Liberal 
party remains the last bastion buttress of Canadian unity against the sinister forces from 
outside the province which seek to undermine and wreck national solidarity.  For 
Canadian unity is the issue.”  In this vein, the Supreme Court was not a tool of the 
“interests,” as Aberhart would have it, but existed as the “last bulwark of the liberty of 
our people” in defiance of a would-be dictator.1124  Similarly, Liberal speakers depicted 
Social Credit’s “invasion” as just that—an assault by a hostile force intent on destroying 
the fabric of Saskatchewan society.  “Clearly,” they argued, “Mr. Aberhart assumes that, 
given a subservient government in Regina, he can treat this province as a ‘puppet-state’ 
on the Japanese model.  Saskatchewan, if Alberta wins, appears destined to become an 
Albertan ‘Manchoukuo[sic]’.”1125  This same message was central in the series of 
political cartoons published in the Leader-Post throughout the campaign.  One depicted 
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Aberhart closing Saskatchewan’s legislature for “removal to Edmonton” as a shocked 
“citizen” looks on.  Aberhart proclaimed that he was standing up for individual rights, but 
the reality of a Social Credit administration meant dictatorship and the loss of all political 
rights for the people.   
Figure 11 - “Dark Days at Regina.”1126 
 
Patterson’s strategy to focus on Aberhart ensured the party’s victory.  Only the Liberals, 
with fifty-two candidates, and the Social Credit’s forty nominees had a realistic 
possibility of securing a majority.  The CCF, in contrast, contested thirty-one seats, while 
the Conservatives, relegated as the junior partner in their alliance with the CCF, only ran 
twenty-four candidates.  Patterson’s focus on Aberhart, therefore, neutralized the 
Liberals’ main opponent.  The only other realistic threat to Patterson rested in an 
opposition coalition.  The Liberals spent the last days of the campaign attacking such a 
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prospect.  A coalition of Conservatives, the CCF, and Social Credit, they argued, would 
be an unworkable mess.  Liberal propaganda depicted such a situation as a form of 
“Mulligan stew,” where a combination of “Social ‘No Credit’ Juice, CCF socialism, and 
Tory syrup” meant chaos for the province.1127  “A government composed of groups,” 
they informed the electorate, “has been a failure whenever and wherever tried.”1128  The 
Liberals had secured the support of individualist conservatives.  Patterson was able to 
ensure a Liberal victory by appealing to moderate voters who feared the prospect of 
another coalition government. 
Table 4 - Election Results, 19381129 
Party # of Candidates Votes Cast % of Vote # of Seats % of Seats 
Liberal 53 200,334 45 38 73 
CCF 31 82,529 19 10 20 
Social Credit 40 70,084 16 2 4 
Conservative 24 52,315 12 - - 
Unity 3 9,848 2 2 4 
Other 9 25,632 6 0 0 
 
The Liberal victory was not as large as that of 1934, but it constituted a dramatic win for 
Patterson’s conservative approach to the Depression.  The Liberals secured forty-five 
percent of the vote and thirty-eight seats.  The CCF placed second, with nineteen percent 
of the vote and ten seats.  Patterson’s efforts to disarm Social Credit were vindicated, as 
Aberhart only secured two seats with sixteen percent of the vote.  It was a disaster for the 
Conservatives who received twelve percent of the vote and failed to elect a single 
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candidate.  The majority of the electorate may have voted for an opposition candidate, but 
the Liberals secured a healthy mandate with seventy-three percent of the seats.   
Not all observers view the results as a Liberal victory.   Had it not been for Social Credit 
stealing reform-minded voters from the CCF, John Conway argues, Patterson’s 
government was doomed in 1938.  Conway bases his assertion on the success of the two 
Unity candidates—those who were nominated by joint resolutions of the Conservatives, 
CCF, and Social Credit—in Bengough and Yorkton.1130  This approach, however, 
assumes that votes for opposition candidates were easily transferable; it ignores 
individualism’s continued power to motivate voters.  Co-operation between opposition 
parties may have been the favoured tactic of reform-minded voters, but the very act of co-
operation divided the electorate.  The Conservative vote in 1938, for example, was half of 
that of 1934.  Some of these votes went to the CCF and Social Credit but many 
Conservatives followed Johnstone’s lead in abandoning the party.   Diefenbaker noted 
that Conservatives flocked in the “thousands” to the “Liberal candidates in order to make 
sure of the outcome.”1131  Likewise, the CCF downplayed the radicalism of its socialist 
program, but a clear majority of voters were not prepared to trust a “socialist” 
government with power.  The Liberals fought the election on the protection of 
Saskatchewan’s freedoms.  Far from mere “hysteria” and a “fear campaign,” as J.F. 
Conway maintains, it was a calculated plan to appeal directly to the broad segment of 
Saskatchewan’s population that remained steadfast in their individualist ideology.1132 
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Figure 12 - Election Map, 1938 
 
This message was most effective in areas of the province that had proven receptive to 
individualist appeals in the past.  The Liberals dominated the south and central regions.  
Not only were these areas traditionally home to the larger and more independent-minded 
farmers, they were also, since the onset of the Depression, fertile grounds for 
Saskatchewan’s conservative religious groups.  The CCF, in contrast, did not win a single 
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seat south of the Qu’Appelle River.1133  Academics attribute these results to the fact that 
CCF and Social Credit support was higher in the portions of the province that had the 
best harvests in 1937.1134  As was the case in 1934, the argument is that higher income 
afforded farmers the opportunity to take a risk on untried economic policies.  The 
Liberals’ electoral appeal, they allege, relied on poorer farmers who were more interested 
in “perpetuating relief” than solving the Depression.1135  This economic determinism, 
however, fails to consider the power of an individualist message.  Far from merely 
campaigning on continued relief, the Liberals offered hope to thousands of electors who 
believed that the Depression was solvable through individual effort and responsibility.  
The southern portions of the province were the hardest hit during the Depression, but 
they were also the regions where ethnic background, religious beliefs, and political 
traditions proved most receptive to the individualist message. 
The Depression altered Saskatchewan’s political trajectory.  The Anderson government 
entered office on the eve of the catastrophe with a platform designed to appeal to 
Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers and British nativists.  The first year of Anderson’s 
single term reflected his government’s focus on solidifying this base.  As crop failures, 
unemployment, and relief became widespread, however, the priorities of the electorate 
shifted from questions of separate schools and government patronage, towards tackling 
the problem of rising indebtedness and foreclosures.  Anderson attempted to mitigate the 
worst effects of the Depression but to little avail.  While any government that had the 
misfortune of governing during the Depression faced a hard fight to retain office, the 
Anderson coalition, attacked from all sides, was especially susceptible.  Not only did 
Anderson have to deal with the “True Blues,” who considered his government the 
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antithesis of conservative values, but the Liberals ran an effective campaign criticizing 
his “mismanagement’ of the catastrophe.  At the same time, Anderson was a victim of the 
“new” politics in Saskatchewan.  The emergence of the CCF and its calls for an 
abandonment of “unbridled individualism” left little room for two parties that, although 
differing on tactics, agreed when it came to the principal role of the individual within 
society. 
The 1934 election began the realignment of Saskatchewan’s political parties along this 
new divide between individualism and collectivism.  On the one hand, the CCF 
championed a radical reinterpretation of the role of capitalism, the state, and individual 
citizens.  Faced with the growing popularity of the new party, both the Liberals and the 
Conservatives shifted their platforms and rhetoric during the 1934 election to emphasize 
their reformist credentials and undermine CCF support.  At the same time, both parties 
also sought to galvanize conservative individualists by stressing the threat posed to 
individual freedoms by the CCF’s “lend-lease” program and socialist philosophy.  As 
much as the election was a referendum on Anderson’s handling of the Depression, it also 
served as a dividing line between individualism and collectivism.  The rhetoric employed 
by all political parties created, in the minds of the electors at least, a dichotomy between 
these two solitudes.   
Returned to office, the Liberals governed on traditional ideas of individual responsibility 
and limited government intervention into the economy.  Patterson championed a society 
based on the sanctity of contracts and individual responsibility.  The CCF began the 
process of moderating its socialist policies, but it continued to stand for collectivism and 
direct government action.  The Conservatives, for their part, responded to their dramatic 
defeat in 1934 by moving their platform in a radical direction in the hopes of 
undermining opposition support for the CCF.  If it had not been for Social Credit’s 
“invasion,” the 1938 election could very well have been fought between the Liberals’ 
individualist ideals and a united opposition advocating for dramatically increased 
government intervention and a reinterpretation of individual responsibilities.  As much as 
Aberhart called for government action in regulating the economy, his motivations were 
closer to those of Patterson than Williams.  Aberhart sought economic security as a 
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precursor to encourage the individual’s ability to make their own personal relationship 
with God. 
The 1938 election completed the realignment begun in 1934.  The Liberals secured a 
comfortable majority in the Legislature while Social Credit, vying for the individualist-
reformist vote, won only two seats.  It was the Liberals, not Social Credit, that emerged 
as the direct champions of the individualist voter.  “An invasion from an adjoining 
province has been repelled,” Patterson jubilantly declared, “and a sane, business-like, 
constructive program has been chosen in preference to theoretical and theatrical 
proposals, advocated by various opposition groups.”1136  Likewise, the Conservative 
strategy of moving to the left to stay relevant proved disastrous as they failed to win a 
single seat for the second election in a row.  Kyba argues that it was the alliance with the 
CCF that doomed the party to obscurity.1137  The fact that the Conservatives were 
relegated into the role of junior partner certainly damaged their reputation, but it was not 
just the alliance that caused the Conservative defeat.  The Conservatives were the victims 
of the realignment of Saskatchewan politics.  Diefenbaker sought, and failed, to steal the 
CCF’s reformist vote.  It would take almost forty years until the Conservatives were a 
viable electoral option in Saskatchewan.  It was the CCF who most benefited from this 
realignment.  Having doubled their representation in the Legislature, the CCF emerged as 
the undisputed opposition to the Liberals’ individualist approach. 
The Depression polarized Saskatchewan politics.  The CCF’s rise provides dramatic 
evidence of a growing radicalism among the electorate but it does not tell the whole 
story.  For every person who abandoned individualist ideals in favour of the Social 
Gospel’s promise of a New Jerusalem, there were others who, despite unprecedented 
hardship, remained closely aligned with an individualist society.  With the Conservatives 
and Social Credit discredited, the stage was set for a direct contest between these two 
ideologies. 
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7 1944: The Defeat 
Saskatchewan’s political polarization was on full display in the 1944 election.  In 1938, 
Patterson’s appeals to a conservative individualism successfully undermined the CCF’s 
newfound moderation and repelled Social Credit’s “invasion.”  The Liberals were 
confident that a similar approach would work in 1944 as well.  Patterson was adamant 
that his conservative approach to the Great Depression had ensured the province 
remained solvent throughout the crisis.  Debt and low commodity prices remained an 
issue, but Saskatchewan had emerged from the dark days of the Depression.  These 
appeals, however, failed to resonate with the electorate.  Since 1936, Williams had 
moderated the CCF’s socialist policies and rhetoric.  Tommy Douglas accelerated this 
process after he replaced Williams in 1942.  Unlike Williams, who remained a committed 
socialist, Douglas’ politics stemmed from his religious background and internalization of 
the social gospel’s calls for the creation of a more just society.1138  Williams’ previous 
support for an unrestrained socialism allowed Patterson to characterize the entire CCF as 
a direct threat to the people’s individualism.  Douglas, in contrast, framed his message 
around the possibility of creating a more equitable post-war society where government 
planning and co-operation would ameliorate the injustices caused by unrestrained 
capitalism.   
The election was a disaster for Patterson.  The Liberals’ share of the popular vote fell 
from forty-five percent in 1938 to thirty-five percent in 1944 and Saskatchewan’s 
“natural governing party” only managed to elect five candidates to the CCF’s forty-
seven.  Even these victories were close-fought affairs.  Patterson retained his seat, but 
only six votes separated him from the CCF challenger.  As the Leader-Post lamented, the 
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magnitude of the defeat constituted “one of the sharpest upsets in the history of Canadian 
politics.”1139  The Liberals would not return to office for twenty years.   
The causes of the downfall have been of considerable interest to historians.  There is a 
general understanding that the 1944 election results were the product of a widespread 
desire for “meaningful change” among the voting public.1140  The country emerged from 
the Great Depression only to face the Second World War.  Patterson’s conservative 
approach to the Depression had resisted calls for intervention into the capitalist market.  
Wartime experiences, however, demonstrated that the government could successfully 
take an active role in managing the capitalist system.  “Government had moved boldly to 
prosecute the war,” Thomas and Ian McLeod argue, and “voters reasoned that 
government could also manage economic and social affairs to produce a better and more 
secure life for all.”1141  The CCF capitalized on this reformist sentiment.   
The CCF’s 1944 victory was also the product of Patterson’s misreading of the political 
situation.  “The colorful campaign of 1944,” Lewis Thomas argues, “seems to prove the 
adage that governments are never defeated by the opposition, but instead commit 
suicide.”1142  All governments were forced to contend with the CCF’s growing popularity 
and its calls for post-war planning.  The federal CCF reached its apogee in September 
1943 when it placed first among federal parties in a Gallup Poll.  The King Liberals and 
the federal Conservatives responded by implementing plans for increased social welfare 
and labour regulations.  As J.L. Granatstein argues, “Social Welfare legislation, 
fundamentally conservative in intent, could help dampen down this unrest; it could 
cushion the shocks of peace; it could help re-elect the Liberal Party and thus maintain the 
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free-enterprise economy against the assaults of the left.”1143    Patterson, however, 
retained his fiscal conservatism and opposed any dramatic changes to the government’s 
role in the economy or increases to social welfare.  Whereas the King Liberals co-opted 
much of the CCF’s platform, Patterson retained his earlier tactics and spent the 1944 
election portraying the CCF as a socialist threat to personal freedoms.  According to 
Robert Wardhaugh, “the federal party moved to steal the CCF thunder,” but “the 
Saskatchewan Liberals stood in opposition, and there they would remain for many 
years.”1144  Even Prime Minister Mackenzie King considered Patterson’s leadership 
“heavy” and “lethargic.”1145  These explanations, however, do not explain why Patterson 
was so seemingly out of touch in 1944 when he had successfully managed the political 
situation in 1938.   
This chapter examines Liberal and Conservative tactics during Saskatchewan’s 1944 
provincial election.  The Depression polarized Saskatchewan politics between 
collectivism and individualism.  Patterson responded to the CCF and Aberhart’s 1938 
“invasion” by positioning the Liberals as the defender of personal freedoms and 
Saskatchewan’s individualist tradition.  He continued this approach in 1944.  Patterson 
was ideologically ill-disposed to follow the federal Liberals’ lead in co-opting the CCF’s 
reform program.  The Premier did not oppose moderate reforms but his primary concern 
lay in protecting the people’s self-reliance.  Rather than move to the left to undermine the 
CCF, Patterson retrenched his defence of “individualism” that had succeeded in 1938.  
The Conservatives, in contrast, were more pragmatic.  Diefenbaker’s co-operation with 
the CCF in 1938 was a disaster.  The party failed to elect a single candidate and, after 
Diefenbaker entered the House of Commons in 1940, the party announced that it would 
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not engage in “partisan politics” for the duration of the war.1146  It was not until the eve 
of the 1944 election that the Conservatives began to show signs of life.  The party 
formally adopted a new name, the Progressive Conservative Party of Saskatchewan (PC), 
elected a new leader, and formulated a progressive platform that called for increases to 
the welfare state.1147  The PCs had learned from Diefenbaker’s ill-fated co-operation with 
the CCF and stressed their adherence to individualist values throughout the campaign.   
Both the Liberals and the Conservatives spent the campaign attacking the CCF as a 
communist threat to Saskatchewan’s individualist traditions.  Historians disregard these 
attacks as simple “redbaiting.”1148  Bill Waiser, for example, contends that such tactics 
were the “defensive posturing” of “poorly organized” parties “bereft of any inspirational 
policies.”1149   Such dismissals, however, downplay the support that these attacks 
continued to receive from the electorate.  It is clear in hindsight that the Liberals and PCs 
underestimated the CCF’s strength, but the fact that they retained support of a sizeable 
portion of the electorate demonstrates the continued appeal of conservativism even with 
the CCFs dramatic landslide. 
Patterson maintained his conservative approach throughout his second term in office.  
The Premier responded to the Depression by adopting policies that maintained the 
sanctity of contracts and the people’s self-reliance.  Patterson characterized this as an 
“Orthodox” approach, “based on the sound business practices” of “smaller 
businesses.”1150   Nor did he change tactics when economic prosperity returned during 
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the war.  In 1940 and 1942, Saskatchewan farmers produced record wheat crops.  
Increased wartime demands for foodstuffs also prompted the province’s producers to 
diversify their operations away from their previous reliance on “king wheat.”1151  This 
prosperity, however, hid the Depression’s lingering effects on the province’s farmers.  
According to John Archer, a decade of depression and drought left Saskatchewan with 
“an economy that was nearly bankrupt, an agricultural plant that was almost derelict, 
[and] a countryside that was scorched and scarred.”1152  Saskatchewan’s brief to the 
Rowell-Sirois Commission, for example, noted that the province’s farmers lacked 200 
million dollars’ worth of equipment, supplies, and replacements.1153   
The central political question of Patterson’s second term centered on how to approach 
this prosperity to best rehabilitate Saskatchewan’s farms.  The UFC(SS), the Wheat Pool, 
and the CCF, urged Patterson to forgive the debt owed to the province by farmers.  
“Revision of the entire farm debt structure,” the CCF argued, “must take place without 
further delay if the West is to survive within an agricultural economy.”1154  Patterson 
characterized these calls as a “whispering campaign” prompting farmers “not to pay their 
debts.”1155  The Premier argued that forgiving this debt would undermine self-reliance.  
Saskatchewan, he argued, “has always taken the attitude that the responsibility rests with 
the person who took seed grain advances.”  The only “100 percent solution “would be for 
every individual to pay what he owes.”1156   Not all Liberals agreed.  Several 
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backbenchers argued that the Premier’s approach made “the government appear a 
heartless creditor” and “lent assurance to the CCF’s depiction of the Liberals as tight-
fisted, rigid, and unimaginative.”1157  Patterson’s stance had his cabinet’s full backing, 
but the approaching 1944 election forced a compromise.  The government reduced relief 
debts by forty percent, but Patterson refused any discussion of forgiving it entirely.1158   
Patterson’s conservativism was also evident in his government’s approach to post-war 
reconstruction.  The Premier was deeply concerned that wartime regimentation and 
government intervention would undermine the people’s self-reliance.  As the war 
progressed, Patterson increasingly spoke of the need to ensure that “the value and 
importance of individual effort and ability is not lost.”1159  Saskatchewan’s brief to the 
House of Commons’ Special Committee on Economic and Social Problems reflected this 
apprehension.  Patterson advocated for increased healthcare and expanded social services 
but cautioned that government aid should be limited to “those unable by their own efforts 
to provide security for themselves or their families.”1160  Patterson understood that the 
CCF was gaining support and was willing to combat this with provisions for increased 
social welfare, but he was unwilling to adopt positions that undermined people’s self-
reliance.  
Patterson’s policy of moderate reform and defence of individualist values was central to 
the Liberal’s election manifesto.  The Liberals promised voters an “efficient and 
economical administration.”  The party advocated for increased social services, including 
health insurance, old age pensions, mothers’ allowances, increased education spending, 
rural electrification, and highway construction, but these programs would come through 
“orderly progress.”  A policy of “prudence and economy” would guide all spending 
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decisions.   Patterson was also clear that his government would continue to promote self-
reliance.  Liberals limited debt relief to only those farmers who were “unable to meet 
their obligations by reason of…causes beyond their control.”  Patterson had little 
sympathy for those who refused to honour their debts.  Only by adopting “care and 
prudence,” he argued, could the government protect the people’s wellbeing.  The 
government would not forgive farmers’ debts, but it would provide “markets at profitable 
prices,” “protections against the hazards of nature,” and, most importantly, “independent 
ownership and operations of farms.”1161  The Liberals intended their plan to resonate 
with Saskatchewan’s conservatives who retained their affinity for individualist values.   
Patterson’s policy of “care and prudence” placed the Liberals in direct contrast with the 
CCF.   The CCF had abandoned its radical agricultural policies—namely its “use-lease” 
plan—but its continued adherence to a “co-operative commonwealth” called for a 
dramatic increase in the role of the state and “planned development.”1162  The CCF 
promised a wide-ranging system of “farm security” that did not make distinctions based 
on an individual farmer’s ability to pay.  The CCF vowed to end all “foreclosures on and 
evictions from the farm home” and to impose a “debt moratorium to force the loan and 
mortgage companies to reduce debts.”  The platform also called for “urban security” by 
supporting “union organization,” “compulsory” collective bargaining, and raises to the 
minimum wage.  Unlike the Liberals, the CCF promised to immediately increase social 
services regardless of the cost.  Funds for this program would come from the benefits of a 
planned economy and by keeping the people’s wealth “within the province.”  Natural 
resources, they argued, would serve the “public benefit,” not that of “promoters, 
investors, and absentee capitalists.”  The CCF’s manifesto was equally adamant that the 
party stood for a reinterpretation of the capitalist system.  A “planned economy,” they 
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argued, would replace “capitalism and the profit system by community ownership for the 
common good.”  The manifesto concluded by pledging a CCF government to use the 
“powers” of office to “carry the Province as far as possible forward to the realization of 
the aim set out in the Regina Manifesto.”1163  The CCF had clearly moved away from the 
socialist bent of its use-lease plan, but its collectivist and co-operative program was in 
direct contrast with Patterson’s defence of self-reliance and individualism.   
The Saskatchewan Liberals did not see these differences as a weakness.  Far from lacking 
“any inspirational policies” as some historians allege, the Liberals designed their 
pragmatic and cautious approach specifically to resonate with conservatives.  These 
policies, they argued, had successfully guided the people through the Depression by 
maintaining “the largest measure of democratic freedom.”1164  The CCF, in contrast, was 
promising an untested program that threatened the people’s individualism.  “There are 
some people who do not think very seriously,” Patterson argued in early 1944, “who are 
attracted by promises for the future, forgetting that much of what the promises made for 
the future amount to depends upon the measure of services given in the past.”1165  The 
Leader-Post reported throughout the campaign that over half of the province’s farmers 
were debt free because of Patterson’s debt plan.1166  Patterson went to the polls confident 
that his proven record and defence of individual freedoms would be enough to win the 
election.    
The 1944 election, however, was not fought on the parties’ platforms alone.  Patterson 
was the victim of farmers’ anger towards federal Liberal agricultural policies.  Since 
1935, the Canadian Wheat Board had operated as a voluntary selling agency with a fixed 
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price in tandem with the private grain trade, which operated on market prices.  Farmers 
delivered to the board when market prices dropped below the board’s fixed price.  When 
market prices increased, farmers delivered to the private grain trade.  The federal 
government was setting a minimum price for wheat.  The board’s floor price, not tariff or 
marketing reforms, became the primary political concern for farmers’ organizations.  
According to J.E. Rea, Ottawa’s assumption of responsibility for minimum prices 
transformed farmers into “clients of the government.”1167  In 1940, the board set its initial 
price at 70 cents per bushel, well below the one-dollar farmers held as their break-even 
cost.  Farmers’ organizations responded with “a March on Ottawa” in early 1942, 
presenting a petition signed by 185,000 farmers demanding “parity prices for all 
agricultural products.”1168  The King government raised the price to ninety cents, but 
farmers’ frustration was apparent.   
Saskatchewan farmers became increasingly hostile to the King Liberals throughout the 
war.  The Prairies was producing record wheat crops by 1941 but the Nazi takeover of 
Europe closed Canada’s traditional markets.  As surpluses mounted, Ottawa restricted the 
size and time of deliveries to the board and began issuing “acreage payments” to farmers 
who switched crops or left their lands fallow.  Prairie farmers, Wardhaugh notes, widely 
considered these moves as keeping them “from entering real prosperity.”1169  Even W.R. 
Motherwell condemned the King government for “grinding us down to privation.”1170  
The polls reflected this sentiment.  The Liberals lost both federal by-elections held in 
Saskatchewan during the war.  Patterson was a passive victim of this anger.  King relied 
on Jimmy Gardiner, his “prairie lieutenant,” and Thomas Crerar from Manitoba to inform 
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his government’s agricultural policies.1171  Patterson was rarely, if ever, asked for his 
opinion but his close association with Gardiner allowed the opposition to portray the 
Minister of Agriculture as the real power behind the Saskatchewan government.  
Patterson, they argued, had “been chosen to hold the fort for Jimmy Gardiner and not to 
offer ideas of his own.”1172  The 1944 election proved to be an opportunity for the 
farmers to air their frustrations with the federal Liberals.  
Patterson’s defeat was also the product of his own political blunders.  In what he later 
characterized as “the one serious mistake” he made in office, Patterson decided to extend 
the life of the Legislature beyond its legally prescribed limit.1173  Saskatchewan’s 
election laws required the Premier to call an election sometime in the summer of 1943.  
The prospect of holding a wartime election, however, troubled many lawmakers who 
believed the election would pose a distraction and use valuable funds that could go 
towards funding the war effort.  In April 1943, A.C. Stewart, Unity MLA for Yorkton, 
proposed to delay the election for a year.  “The holding of an election this year would be 
a waste of the people’s time,” he explained.  “It would entail the expense of printing, 
burning up gasoline and rubber, distract from the war effort and stir up bitterness and 
strife throughout the province.”1174  Patterson did not sponsor the bill, but he believed 
that the measure would “accelerate the winning of the war” and supported it as a “private 
member.”1175  The Premier was not alone.  The entire Liberal caucus and the legislature’s 
two Unity and two Social Credit MLAs voted for an extension.  Only the CCF remained 
opposed.   
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In the bitter debate that followed, both sides portrayed the other as undemocratic.  The 
CCF refused to accept that a wartime election was inherently distracting.  “If ever there 
was a time when we should take democracy seriously,” they noted, “it is now.  There are 
many parents who will not appreciate that their sons offer to make sacrifices and [they] 
are being refused the right to elect a government of their choosing.”1176  Instead of a 
necessary war measure, the CCF used the extension to portray the Liberals as afraid of 
facing the electorate.  “The Liberal arguments,” a CCF MLA intoned, “are like a 
drowning man grasping at a straw.”1177  Supporters of the measure, in contrast, 
maintained that the CCF was “more concerned about party and votes than they are about 
winning the war.”  Their opposition demonstrated that the CCF constituted “a disease of 
the mind” that “spreads quickly among those who are down-in-the-mouth.”1178  The 
public, for its part, seemed apathetic on the question.  The CCF were forced to cancel a 
planned protest after they only received one letter supporting such a move.1179  
Patterson’s mistake was not in misreading the public mood for an election in 1943 (which 
was clearly low), but for believing that the CCF’s opposition to the motion weakened 
them. 1180   Since the beginning of the war, both the Liberals and the PCs had neglected 
party organization.1181  The CCF, however, continued to organize.  Delaying the election 
only provided them more time to build their organization.  As John Archer explains, “the 
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CCF had a further year to organize—a further year to taunt the Liberals with avoiding the 
contest.”1182   
The extension also gave the CCF breathing room from earlier controversies.  Canada’s 
declaration of war divided the party.  J.S. Woodsworth, national leader since the party’s 
inception, considered capitalist greed the cause of all war and refused to support the 
present conflict.1183  Williams, in contrast, abhorred war, but believed that force was 
necessary to counter the fascist threat.1184  Canada’s decision to follow Great Britain into 
war in 1939 threatened to fragment the CCF.  Woodsworth, supported by British 
Columbia, Manitoba, and factions within the Ontario party, opposed the war, while 
Williams, backed by Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Nova Scotia, argued for full 
participation up to and including an expeditionary force.  Fearing the effects this division 
could have on the party, both sides agreed to a compromise wherein the CCF would only 
approve of Canada providing economic aid to the Allies.  Williams, however, continued 
to push for a policy of total war, ultimately deciding to enlist and serve overseas. 1185   
According to Conway, William’s  “principled stand on fighting the war against fascism” 
meant that he “had to set an example and do his part.”1186  His actions had the added 
benefit of undermining Patterson’s attempts to portray the CCF as unpatriotic.  If 
Patterson hoped to use the extension debate to embarrass the CCF, he had to contend with 
Williams’ willingness to serve overseas and the Saskatchewan CCF’s support for total 
war. 
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This extension allowed the CCF time to overcome the internal divisions surrounding 
Williams’ departure.  Serving overseas, Williams was unable to defend his leadership 
from mounting attacks.  Disgruntled members, including Tommy Douglas and Major 
Coldwell, characterized Williams as “dictatorial and controlling” and refused to forgive 
him for his split with Woodsworth.  Williams’ popularity among Saskatchewan’s rank-
and-file membership disarmed these attacks, but his departure allowed his opponents to 
attack him with impunity.  Douglas replaced Williams as leader in 1942.1187 
Patterson was aware of the divisions within the CCF but he did not take advantage.  An 
election in early 1942 would have pitted the Liberals against a CCF in disarray, beset by 
internal divisions and a leader posted overseas.  Even a 1943 election favoured the 
Liberals as Douglas had yet to consolidate his leadership.1188  By 1944, however, 
Douglas was the established leader and the CCF had spent the past two years organizing 
for the coming contest and establishing local organizations that rivalled the Liberal 
machine.  The CCF under Douglas’ command increased the circulation of its newspaper, 
The Saskatchewan Commonwealth, expanded party membership, and formed a proto-
cabinet and policy committees in anticipation of winning office.1189   The extension also 
provided Douglas with time to formulate an election strategy that articulated a detailed 
vision for post-war society.  Delaying the election did not benefit the Liberals, but it did 
serve CCF interests.  
The delayed election also gave the PCs time to reorganize.  The Conservative Party was 
the victim of Saskatchewan’s political realignment during the Great Depression.  
Diefenbaker responded to Anderson’s 1934 defeat by rejecting the party’s earlier 
association with the province’s conservative individualist ideology.  Diefenbaker 
formalized a co-operative agreement with the CCF to avoid splitting the “progressive” 
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vote.  Even with this agreement they did not manage to elect a single candidate in 1938.  
Diefenbaker stepped down as leader in 1940 following his election to the House of 
Commons.  Without effective leadership or representation in the legislature, the 
Conservatives were moribund for much of the war.  Their federal counterparts did not 
fare much better.  Robert Manion, Bennett’s replacement as leader in 1938, contested the 
1940 federal election as a “national unity” government akin to Borden’s Union 
Government during the First World War.  The plan failed to resonate with voters as 
Manion elected forty candidates to the Liberal’s 179.  The Conservative Party replaced 
Manion with Arthur Meighan in 1941, but the former Prime Minister failed in his 
attempts to win a seat.  The party “was in desperate need of remaking itself.”1190  In 
1942, the Conservatives adopted a new platform that contained provisions for increased 
unemployment insurance, low-cost housing, and collective bargaining.  They also 
selected John Bracken, Premier of Manitoba’s coalition government, to lead the party.  
Bracken’s progressive focus lent itself to the party’s updated platform and delegates 
voted to change the party’s name to the Progressive Conservative Party as a sign of the 
party’s new focus. 1191 
Bracken’s progressive focus inspired the Saskatchewan party.  Reconstructed on the eve 
of the 1944 election, the Saskatchewan PC Party adopted a centrist position between the 
CCF’s collectivism and Patterson’s conservativism.  The party tasked Rupert Ramsay, a 
professor in the Agricultural Extension Department at the University of Saskatchewan, as 
leader.  Described as a “sincere” and “decent” man with “few enemies,” the PCs hoped 
that Ramsay’s background in agriculture would win for the party the province’s farmers 
who rejected the CCF but were upset with King’s wartime policies.1192  The PCs’ 
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platform also reflected the national Conservative’s progressive emphasis under Bracken.  
The party’s election manifesto contained provisions for vocational training and co-
operation with the federal government to implement low-cost rehabilitation loans, “free 
education” for all children, and state-funded healthcare for all citizens regardless of 
income.1193  Ramsay was confident that the program placed the party as a moderate 
option between the CCF and the Liberals.  It avoided the CCF’s collectivism by retaining 
the voter’s “freedom” and “rights as an individual.” 1194  Ramsay was clear that his party 
would protect people’s individualism and maintained that the party’s platform gave “the 
people of Saskatchewan a chance to work out their own salvation in their own way.”1195   
At the same time, Ramsay also sought to differentiate the PCs from the Patterson Liberals 
who he characterized as reactionary.  Ramsay promised that a PC government would 
adopt a reform package “based on sound principles.”1196   
The Liberals’ decision to delay the election allowed the PCs to rebuild their party as an 
alternative option for Saskatchewan’s conservative voters.  Ramsay shared Patterson’s 
concern that the war was undermining individual freedoms.  It was one thing to have “a 
certain amount of regimentation” during the war, he reasoned, but once the war was over 
he was confident that the people did not “want to be pushed around by an army of 
government officials more than is necessary.”1197  Ramsay’s attacks on the CCF also 
mirrored the Premier’s defence of individual freedoms.  Ramsay was clear that the PCs 
opposed the “regimentation and restriction of socialism.”1198  The people, he argued, had 
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not abandoned their individualism.  The CCF, therefore, would require “the use of force” 
to implement its program.  A CCF victory would mean “running Canada army style.”1199   
Despite Ramsay’s best efforts the PCs did not have a realistic chance in forming 
government.  The party had neglected its organizational work for the course of the war, 
continued to struggle for funds, and was still reeling from internal divisions left over 
from the Depression.  As Spencer concedes, “all eyes were on the sizzling Liberal-CCF 
two-party contest.”1200  However, the reorganized PCs did have the potential to steal 
support from the Liberals.  The party learnt a valuable lesson from their disastrous co-
operation with the CCF in 1938 and Ramsay contested as many constituencies as 
possible.  It is a testament to Ramsay’s popularity that, although the party had only 
reorganized in February 1944, it had thirty-nine candidates in place by June.  Patterson 
did not lose the election because of vote splitting with Ramsay, but the PCs did manage 
to steal enough votes to increase the magnitude of the Liberal’s defeat.1201 
Patterson shared Ramsay’s anti-CCF stance.  Throughout the campaign, Liberals 
portrayed the CCF’s vision of a “co-operative commonwealth” as a dangerous 
experiment in state control.  The CCF’s “ideal form of State,” a pamphlet declared, could 
“be had only at the expense of personal rights and freedoms.” 1202  By relying on the state 
to solve society’s problems, the CCF also undermined personal initiative and drive.  “The 
incompetent who infests the whole district with weeds,” the Leader-Post editorialized, 
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“would be kept there as a pest; the dishonest and chiseler would be maintained to prey 
upon his neighbors; the waster and the dissolute would be enabled to squander the 
country’s resources.”1203  Patterson was clear that only “the preservation of democratic 
and individual freedom” would ensure Saskatchewan’s success going forward.1204 
A central element in the Liberal campaign strategy lay in convincing the electorate that 
the CCF in 1944 constituted the same socialist threat as the FLG had a decade earlier.  
The Liberals republished the FLG’s 1933 handbook “in order that everyone may 
understand the C.C.F. Socialist plans.”1205  The fact that the CCF disavowed the 
handbook in 1936 made little difference.  Liberal propaganda also frequently referenced 
M.J. Coldwell’s 1943 Maclean’s interview where the national CCF leader stated that the 
Regina Manifesto “was and remains a statement of the basic principles of the CCF.”1206  
Use-lease was gone, but the CCF’s vision of a co-operative commonwealth posed a 
similar danger.  The people, Patterson concluded, “don’t want to be socialized…and 
while the C.C.F. has to some extent dropped complete socialization of the land, the men 
who 10 years ago believed the state should run the farms are still running the party.”1207 
The election, according to the Liberals, was a struggle between freedom and compulsion.  
It was up to the people to “decide if they wished to be self-reliant and self established 
under free enterprise with proper rights and safeguards or depend upon the state under 
state control and regimentation.”1208    If the people voted to “keep socialism and the 
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socialists[sic] communal sharing plan out of this province,” the Liberals would maintain 
the people as their “own boss.”1209  It was within this same vein that Liberals attempted 
to equate the CCF with the totalitarian regimes terrorizing Europe.  Socialism, Gardiner 
argued during a campaign stop in support of Patterson, would “lead on to dictatorship.  
Under dictatorship you are either for them or against them, and if you are against them 
you will be taken out and lined up against a brick wall.”1210  The message was clear.  The 
Liberals stood for the forces of freedom, but the CCF represented strife, dictatorship, and 
a fundamental threat to Saskatchewan’s security. 
In portraying the CCF as a socialist threat, the Liberals were goading the CCF into 
defending its early program.  Douglas, however, would not take the bait.  The CCF leader 
realized that the CCF remained susceptible to attacks on its early socialism and refused to 
engage with the Liberals.  Instead, Douglas framed the election as a referendum on the 
type of society Saskatchewan would have after the war.  The CCF’s campaign material 
painted the election as a stark choice.  “You are either voting to go back to the old ‘dog 
eat dog’ system,” Douglas argued, “or to go forward to build a new society based on 
human needs.”1211  The CCF had learned from its previous mistakes.  Rather than open 
the party to attack by debating the nature of the party’s “socialism,” the CCF offered a 
positive message that promised voters a better life than the one they had during ten years 
of depression and five years of war. 
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Figure 13 – “When They Come Back”1212 
 
For the Liberal’s strategy to succeed, they had to convince the voters that Douglas was 
disingenuous in this moderation.  Liberal propaganda portrayed Douglas as a man torn 
between the promises necessary to win over Saskatchewan voters and the party’s 
dogmatic socialism.  The Liberals tacitly accepted that Douglas was a moderate, but they 
hoped to convince the electorate that CCF extremists—including Harold Winch, the 
“Fire-Eating” leader of the British Columbia CCF, and Clarence Gillis, an avowed trade 
unionist and MP for Cape Breton—were the real power behind the CCF in Saskatchewan 
and would push the province towards “revolution.”1213  In an oft-cited speech from early 
1944, Winch declared that the CCF, if elected, would force its socialist program on 
society:  “If Capitalism says ‘No’ then we know the answer—so did Russia.”  The fact 
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that Winch and other “Robespierres of 1944” stumped for the CCF was more than 
enough evidence for Liberals to conclude that the CCF stood for “dictatorship and 
suppression of opponents.”1214  The electorate may have trusted Douglas, but the Liberals 
urged them to consider if they trusted its radical leaders as well. 
Figure 14 – “The Crying Towel” 1215 
 
 
                                                 
1214
 “Robespierre of 1944,” Leader-Post, 30 May, 1944; “Extremists Take Charge,” Leader-Post, 31 May, 
1944. 
1215
 Leader-Post, 9 June, 1944. 
324 
 
The Liberals also recycled tactics from previous elections in their attempt to discredit the 
CCF.  The Liberals withstood Social Credit’s challenge by portraying it as a foreign 
“invasion” intent on destroying the foundations of Canadian society.  These 
characterizations resonated with Saskatchewan’s conservative voters who otherwise did 
not view Aberhart as a threat to individual freedoms.  Patterson concluded that a similar 
approach would have the same outcome when dealing with Douglas.  Liberal propaganda 
portrayed the CCF as an alien movement intent on parlaying a Saskatchewan victory into 
the very destruction of Canadian society.  “The question to be decided,” the Leader-Post 
urged, “is whether or not Saskatchewan is to become a socialist state and whether or not 
the ideological theory of socialism is to be given a start on the road to power in 
Canada.”1216  This invasion theme was central to a series of articles written by Bruce 
Hutchison, the noted Canadian author and journalist, that lampooned Coldwell as 
“Generalissimo” and “Commander-in-Chief” of the “Saskatchewan invasion 
headquarters,” leading socialist forces in an ineffective “Prairie Blitzkrieg.”1217   
Liberal cartoons from both elections also carried a similar “invasion” imagery.  In 1938, 
the Liberals portrayed Aberhart as a swarm of locusts intent on destroying 
Saskatchewan’s farmers.  The same theme was present in 1944 but with the CCF 
replacing Aberhart as the threat.  These “extremists” had no connection to Saskatchewan, 
and their background in organized labour left them with little understanding of 
Saskatchewan.  Their policies, if implemented, would “bring disaster to agriculture,” the 
Liberals argued, “but, of course, that does not matter to the industrial labor overlords of 
the C.C.F. socialist party.”1218  Patterson hoped that this invasion theme would have a 
similar effect on the province’s conservative voters as it had in 1938.  Just as they 
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repulsed Aberhart’s attempts to use Saskatchewan as a pawn in his fights with Ottawa, 
Patterson believed they would turn back the socialist invasion. 
Figure 15 – “Stay in Your Own Backyard”1219 
 
Figure 16 – “D-Day for the Socialist Storm-Troopers”1220 
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It was a fatal mistake.  Patterson was successful in 1938 because Aberhart’s authoritarian 
control of Saskatchewan’s Social Credit Party convinced voters that he posed a direct 
danger to their freedoms.  To be successful in 1944, the Liberals had to convince the 
voters that Douglas posed a similar threat.  This strategy was doomed from the start.  By 
conceding that Douglas himself was a moderate, the Liberals undermined their own 
attempts to characterize the party as a group of radicals.  Douglas also refused to engage.  
Even as Liberal speakers were portraying the CCF as a group of proto-Nazis, Douglas 
stuck to his positive message.  Patterson failed to convince enough voters that Douglas 
himself was a danger to their freedoms.   












CCF 52 211,364 53.13 47 90 
Liberal 52 140,901 35.42 5 10 
Progressive Conservative 39 42,511 10.69 0 - 
      
The election was a complete rout for the Liberals.  The CCF, backed by Douglas’ 
leadership and a vision for a better future, won forty-seven of the province’s fifty-two 
seats with fifty-three percent of the vote.1222  This victory was the product of the CCF’s 
sweep of Saskatchewan’s cities, which had previously been solidly Liberal, and 
continued breakthroughs in rural regions, where fifty-eight percent voted for the CCF.1223  
As the Leader-Post noted in the election’s post-mortem, “the result was decisive,” 
leaving “no doubt that the electors want a change, no matter how drastic that change may 
be.”1224   
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Figure 17 - CCF Share of the Popular Vote, 19441225 
 
CCF supporters certainly viewed it as a profound endorsement of their aims.  “This,” 
Coldwell remarked when returns began pouring in, “is sweet revenge.”1226  Patterson, for 
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his part, was mystified by the election results as “there did not appear to be any criticism 
of the public administration of the province.”  The Liberals had “carefully administered” 
the province’s “business” and “many of our former difficulties have been overcome or 
greatly reduced.”1227  Even in defeat, Patterson failed to appreciate Douglas’ appeal.  
Douglas transformed the election into a referendum on the type of society voters hoped 
for after the war.  It was clear that, when faced with this decision, most of the voters 
trusted Douglas with shaping the province’s future. 
The size of the Douglas’ victory, however, overshadowed deep divisions amongst 
Saskatchewan voters.  The CCF captured fifty-three percent of the vote, but their support 
was not evenly divided.  Douglas’ largest support came from the central-east 
constituencies where the CCF received over sixty percent of the vote.  Although the party 
made inroads into the central farming districts in the south, especially around Douglas’ 
home in Weyburn, these contests were decidedly closer.  The flatlands of Southern 
Saskatchewan had long served as the main support for conservative ideologies.  Not only 
had the region provided the bulk support for the Organization Opposing Compulsory 
Pool, the Orange Lodge, and the KKK, but the farming region also fostered Notre Dame 
and BBI at the height of the Depression.  Conservatives did not constitute the numbers 
necessary to defeat the CCF, but Patterson and Ramsay’s appeals continued to resonate 
with a significant minority of the voters.1228   
Conservatives remained defiant in their defeat.  Despite their best efforts, Henry 
Hildebrand and Athol Murray could not stop the CCF’s rise to power.  Neither man, 
however, believed this outcome reflected a failure of their ministries.  For Hildebrand, 
corrupt societies naturally elected “socialist” parties.  The CCF victory signaled a 
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triumph for its modernist “false gospel.”  The proper response to this outcome did not lay 
in abandoning his non-partisan stance, but revolved around fortifying the morality of his 
followers, lest they be lost “for eternity.”1229  Non-partisanship and a muted militancy 
were necessary to build BBI’s ministry, but Hildebrand never intended his followers to 
separate themselves entirely from the corrupted secular society.  He urged his followers 
to be on constant guard against the evils of modern society and the new “socialist” 
government overstepping its bounds.    “Christians are loyal subjects of the 
government,” Hildebrand reminded his listeners, “but when a government or institution 
denies true Christian freedom then there’s the compulsion that governs each child of 
God.  ‘He must obey God rather than man.’”1230   If the actions of the government went 
against the gospel, Christians were expected to make a stand for God.    
Similarly, Murray considered the CCF victory as a sign that his work in creating a 
leadership class was not complete.  Although he was forbidden to act directly against the 
CCF, Murray never ceased his agitation against socialism.  In the lead up to the 1944 
election, Murray wrote his friends about his fears that the CCF was becoming 
“dangerously strong” and urged them to take a stand where he could not.1231  After the 
election, Murray used Notre Dame’s classrooms and the pages of the school’s newspaper, 
The Lacoon, to warn students about the dangers and threat that socialism and communism 
posed to the province.  Although the CCF gained the upper hand in 1944, Murray looked 
forward to the day when a new generation of leaders would “liberate” Saskatchewan 
from socialism.1232   
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Patterson also continued his assault against the CCF’s collectivism until his retirement in 
1949.   From the opposition benches, Patterson harangued Douglas and the government 
for what he viewed as the CCF’s “complete, intensive, [and] unscrupulous” quest for 
power.1233  Patterson was adamant that the Douglas government was intent on destroying 
people’s individual freedoms.  For example, Patterson characterized the government’s 
decision to broadcast the 1945 throne speech without the legislature’s approval as a 
“further step in the direction of centralization and control of all power and authority in 
the Government, a road to serfdom.”1234  Similarly, Patterson was critical of the CCF’s 
Bill of Rights.1235  Not only did the leader of the opposition believe that British 
constitutional traditions provided minority protections, but he thought that it was a farce 
coming from a government which avowed “interference with the liberties and freedoms 
of the people” and had displayed “absolute indifference to individual rights.”1236   
Saskatchewan’s conservatives were disheartened with the election results but they did not 
interpret Patterson’s failure as a defeat for their ideology.  In the election’s post-mortem, 
the Leader-Post articulated the thoughts of many of the province’s conservative voters: 
“the fact that the party suppressed its socialism in the campaign, does not alter its basic 
philosophy.  That remains socialism.”1237  The 1944 election was certainly a victory for 
the CCF’s collectivist ethos.  Yet, to equate the election as a confirmation of 
Saskatchewan’s “social democratic” political culture requires one to turn a blind eye to 
those who remained steadfast in their adherence self-reliance, and traditional values. 
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It is commonly accepted that Saskatchewan and Alberta constitute twins separated at 
birth.  Although the provinces possessed similar demographics, economies, and 
experiences in territorial politics, we are told that whereas “Alberta tilts right, 
Saskatchewan tilts left.”1238  Election results certainly lend credence to this assumption.  
Alberta has continually elected a long series of right-of-centre governments, beginning 
with Social Credit in 1935, followed by the PCs in 1971, and most recently the United 
Conservative Party in 2019.  In contrast, Saskatchewan’s 1944 election ushered in a long-
period of CCF/NDP dominance wherein social democratic governments have ruled for 
forty-seven of the last seventy-five years.  As this study demonstrates, however, 
Saskatchewan has always been more conservative than historians have suggested.  To 
argue that Saskatchewan conservatism was a non-factor due to its inability to the CCF’s 
rise in 1944 assumes that elections serve as the sole barometer of ideological 
commitment.    
Social democracy was not Saskatchewan’s default setting.  The province has always been 
home to a dynamic and influential conservatism that was predicated on a defence of 
individual rights and freedoms.  This does not mean that conservatism was static.  As the 
central political issues shifted over time, so too did the way that conservatives expressed 
their understanding of the economy, society, and role of the state.  Challenges to the 
capitalist wheat economy and the place of religious and ethnic minorities dominated the 
political discourse prior to the Great Depression.  These issues, one economic, the other 
social, resonated with conservatives as they responded by entrenching in their belief in 
the societies fundamentally individualistic values.  Conservative farmers, on the one 
hand, opposed orderly marketing because it was based on an understanding of the 
capitalist system as being inherently exploitative.  Envisioning themselves as “masters of 
their own fate,” conservative farmers believed that they were able to effectively compete 
within the capitalist system.  In fact, they attributed their own success in large part to the 
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very competition which supporters of orderly marketing sought to eliminate.  British 
nativists, on the other hand, viewed racial and religious minorities as lacking the 
necessary cultural and social prerequisites to act individually.  Both the Orange Lodge 
and the KKK promoted a vision for society wherein Britishness and Protestantism were 
the central elements of belonging.  As a result, they viewed minority groups with 
suspicion and treated them as deficient individuals who were unable to fully take part in 
the body politic. 
The economic and environmental strife associated with the Great Depression 
dramatically altered Saskatchewan’s political discourse.  Issues surrounding debt 
amelioration and relief replaced the earlier experiments with orderly marketing and 
concerns over the rate of minority assimilation.  The decade also gave rise to a new 
political movement that was predicated on a rejection of individualism in favour of 
collectivism.  The CCF’s rise and ultimate victory is certainly a central element of 
Saskatchewan’s political history of the Great Depression.  It would be a mistake, 
however, to assume that the increasing support for a socially democratic solution meant a 
wholesale abandonment of conservative values.  Throughout the Depression 
conservatives retrenched their belief in the society’s individualistic nature.  This was 
evident in the emergence and support given to conservative religious schools.  It was also 
reflected in the continued support the Liberals received as William Patterson offered a 
decidedly conservative response to both the CCF and Social Credit. 
Saskatchewan, in short, was much more conservative than historians have previously 
accepted.  Yet, the question remains of why academics have insisted that Saskatchewan 
developed a distinctly socially democratic political culture?  Part of the problem stems 
from an overreliance on electoral results as the barometer of ideological affiliation.  It 
was certainly the case that the Saskatchewan Conservative Party struggled for much of 
the province’s early history.  It is equally true, however, that electoral failures do not tell 
the entire story.   The Conservative Party did not falter because conservative ideology 
failed to flourish in the province.  Rather, the party failed because of superior Liberal 
organization that divided conservatives.  From Saskatchewan’s creation in 1905, the 
Liberals worked tirelessly to build its support amongst the province’s conservative 
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farmers.  At the same time, the Liberals rejected the anti-Catholicism and conception of a 
racially-based citizenship emanating from the nativist movement.  The Conservative 
Party’s criticism of separate schools and support for assimilation earned it the approval of 
the Orange Lodge and KKK, but the party failed to gain electoral traction with the 
province’s independent farmers who supported the Liberals.   The 1929 election (the 
Conservative’s sole success prior to 1982) was not solely the product of rising racial and 
religious tensions but the party’s ability to briefly unite disparate conservatives into a 
single movement.  To write off Saskatchewan conservatism as ineffective is to 
misconstrue the nature of electoral politics themselves.  The Liberal Party’s impressive 
record of election victories prior to 1944 was based, in no small part, on its appeals to 
conservative’s individualism. 
The second element leading observers to downplay the strength of Saskatchewan’s 
conservatism revolves around defining the ideology itself.  Modern conservatism is 
viewed as an amalgam of a tory-inspired vision of hierarchy and tradition and a 
neoconservative focus on individual rights and freedoms.  As Nelson Wiseman explains 
“tories see individuals as members of communities…neoconservatives, like classical 
liberals, see communities as associations of individuals.”1239  Although it is widely 
accepted that this neoconservative position has dominated Saskatchewan’s recent politics, 
it is viewed as a modern phenomenon confined to the period after the rise of Margaret 
Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and Brian Mulroney in the 1980s.  As a result, attempts to 
locate Canadian conservatism prior to the Second World War focus almost exclusively on 
its tory strain.  The fact that Saskatchewan has never been home to a strong tory element 
leads to the assumption that conservatism did not flourish prior to CCF’s victory in 1944. 
Saskatchewan was home to a vibrant conservative ideology, just not one that was tory-
touched.  Like modern neoconservatives, this ideology sought to protect individual 
freedoms against what they viewed as a rising collectivist sentiment.  Saskatchewan 
conservatives internalized the individuality central to classical liberalism.  Conservatives 
                                                 
1239
 Wiseman, “Provincial Conservatism,” 209. 
334 
 
viewed society as a collection of individuals, each responsible for their own choices and 
ensuring their own success.  Privileging individualism placed them within Canada’s 
liberal order, but it was their staunch opposition to any attempt to undermine this 
individualism that made them conservative.  Conservative farmers internalized the “myth 
of the self-made man” and attributed their successes to their ability to compete effectively 
in the capitalist market as individuals.   Conservative farmers’ desire to protect this 
freedom of individual action lay at the heart of their opposition to orderly marketing.  
This conception of an individually-based society was also at the heart of Saskatchewan’s 
British nativist nationalism.  Both the Orange Lodge and the KKK considered 
Saskatchewan’s British and Protestant makeup as a prerequisite for a person’s ability to 
act as an individual and exercise effective citizenship.  Their conspiratorial anti-
Catholicism and attacks on separate schools reflected this belief.  This adherence to 
society’s individualist nature also survived through the Great Depression and Canada’s 
crisis in capitalism.  Historians often view the depravations of the 1930s as fueling 
support for the CCF’s vision of a “co-operative commonwealth,” but the same conditions 
also motivated many people to retrench their defence of individual freedoms.  Both BBI 
and Notre Dame emerged at the height of the Depression as champions of a conservative 
Christianity that downplayed collectivism in favour of individual action.  This 
individualist conservatism may not have been powerful enough to prevent the CCF’s 
1944 victory, but it remained influential nonetheless. 
This study focused on the development of a Saskatchewan conservatism, but its 
significance is not limited to a single province alone.  If nothing else, it demonstrates the 
need to rethink previous assumptions about the nature of Canadian politics.  A reliance 
on the “tory touched” thesis has distorted our understanding of the nature of Canadian 
politics generally, and conservatism more specifically.  Further research is required to 
understand the nature of conservatism both in other provinces as well as how they 
interacted between provinces and with their federal counterparts.  Likewise, it 
demonstrates the need to rethink our previous assumptions about dominant Canadian 
political cultures.  Just as Saskatchewan has always been more conservative than 
academics have suggested, other provinces’ political histories are more complicated than 
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assumed.  Ideas of a “conservative” Alberta, for instance, overshadow the province’s 
deep history of contributions to Canada’s social democracy.1240 
A defence of individualism and opposition to collectivism provides a bridge between 
Saskatchewan’s modern conservatism and its political history.  The CCF’s successes 
undoubtedly changed Saskatchewan’s political debate after 1944.  Further research is 
necessary on the development of Saskatchewan conservatism after the Second World 
War.  What is clear from this study, however, is that the understanding that Saskatchewan 
somehow contained a uniquely social democratic political culture has outlived its 
usefulness.  Saskatchewan elected the country’s first “socialist” government in 1944, but 
the success of the CCF has overshadowed an influential conservative movement.  The 
dichotomy between a “social democratic” Saskatchewan and a “conservative” Alberta is 
at best, an over simplification.  Both provinces have always been much more similar than 
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